THE

Parliamentary Register;

OR

HISTORY

OF THE

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES

OF THE

HOUSE OF COMMONS;

CONTAINING AN ACCOUNT OF

The moſt intereſting SPEECHES and MOTIONS; accurate Copies of the moſt remarkable LETTERS and PAPERS; of the moſt material EVIDENCE, PETITIONS, &c. laid before and offered to the HOUSE,

DURING THE

SECOND SESSION of the SEVENTEENTH PARLIAMENT

OF

GREAT BRITAIN.

VOL. XXXI.

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DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS

IN THE

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

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
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THE

HISTORY



OF THE

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES

OF THE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

In the SECOND SESSION of the

Seventeenth Parliament of GREAT BRITAIN,

Appointed to be holden at WESTMINSTER,

On THURSDAY the 25th of NOVEMBER, 1790.

Tuesday, 31st January, 1792.

A MESSAGE from His Majesty was delivered by Sir Francis Molyneux, Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod:

Mr. Speaker,

The King commands this honourable House to attend His Majesty immediately in the House of Peers.

Accordingly, Mr. Speaker, with the House, went up to attend His Majesty. And being returned,

Mr. Speaker acquainted the House, that, in pursuance of the directions of an act, passed in the twenty-fourth year of the reign of his present Majesty, entitled, " An act to repeal " so much of two acts made in the 10th and 15th years of the " reign of his present Majesty, as authorises the Speaker of

"the House of Commons to issue his warrants to the Clerk of "the Crown for making out writs for the election of Members to serve in Parliament," &c. &c. he had issued his warrants to the Clerk of the Crown, to make out new writs for the election of Members to serve in Parliament for the following places, viz. *Grantham*, *Warwick*, and *Merionethshire*.

A bill for the more effectual preventing clandestine outlawries, was read the first time, and ordered to be read a second time.

Mr. SPEAKER reported, that the House had attended His Majesty in the House of Peers, where His Majesty was pleased to make a most gracious speech from the throne to both Houses of Parliament; of which, Mr. Speaker said, he had, to prevent mistakes, obtained a copy, which he read to the House; and is as followeth, viz.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

THE many proofs which you have given of your affectionate attachment to my person and family, leave me no doubt of your participating in the satisfaction which I derive from the happy event of the marriage which has been celebrated between my son, the Duke of York, and the eldest daughter of my good brother and ally the King of Prussia: and I am persuaded that I may expect your chearful concurrence in enabling me to make a suitable provision for their establishment.

Since I last met you in Parliament, a definitive treaty has been concluded under my mediation and that of my allies, the King of Prussia and the States General of the United Provinces, between the Emperor and the Ottoman Porte, on principles which appear the best calculated to prevent future disputes between those Powers.

Our intervention has also been employed, with a view to promote a pacification between the Empress of Russia and the Porte; and conditions have been agreed upon between us and the former of those Powers, which we undertook to recommend to the Porte, as the re-establishment of peace on such terms appeared to be, under all the existing circumstances, a desirable event for the general interests of Europe. I am in expectation of speedily receiving the account of the conclusion of the definitive treaty of peace, preliminaries having been some time since agreed upon between those Powers.

I have directed copies of the definitive treaty between the Empe-

ror and the Porte to be laid before you, as well as ſuch papers as are neceſſary to ſhew the terms of peace, which have been under diſcuſſion during the negociation with the Court of Peterſburgh.

I regret that I am not yet enabled to inform you of the termination of the war in India; but the ſucceſs which has already attended the diſtinguiſhed bravery and exertions of the officers and troops under the able conduct of Lord Cornwallis, affords reaſonable ground to hope that the war may ſpeedily be brought to an honourable concluſion.

The friendly aſſurances which I receive from foreign Powers, and the general ſtate of affairs in Europe, appear to promiſe to my ſubjects the continuance of their preſent tranquillity. Under theſe circumſtances I am induced to think that ſome immediate reduction may ſafely be made in our naval and military eſtabliſhments; and my regard for the intereſts of my ſubjects render me at all times deſirous of availing myſelf of any favourable opportunity to diminiſh the public expences.

Gentlemen of the Houſe of Commons,

It will, I am perſuaded, give you great ſatisfaction to learn that the extraordinary expences incurred in the courſe of the laſt year, have, in a great meaſure, been already defrayed by the grants of the ſeſſion. The ſtate of our reſources will, I truſt, be found more than ſufficient to provide for the remaining part of theſe expences, as well as for the current ſervice of the year, the eſtimates for which I have directed to be laid before you.

I entertain the pleaſing hope, that the reductions which may be found practicable in the eſtabliſhments, and the continued increaſe of the revenue, will enable you, after making due proviſion for the ſeveral branches of the public ſervice, to enter upon a ſyſtem of gradually relieving my ſubjects from ſome part of the exiſting taxes, at the ſame time giving additional efficacy to the plan for the reduction of the national debt, on the ſucceſs of which our future eaſe and ſecurity eſſentially depend.

With a view to this important object, let me alſo recommend it to you to turn your attention to the conſideration of ſuch meaſures as the ſtate of the funds and of public credit may render practicable and expedient towards a reduction in the rate of intereſt of any of the annuities which are now redeemable.

My Lords, and Gentlemen,

The continued and progressive improvement in the internal situation of the country will, I am confident, animate you in the pursuit of every measure which may be conducive to the public interest. It must, at the same time, operate as the strongest encouragement to a spirit of useful industry among all classes of my subjects, aad above all, must confirm and increase their steady and zealous attachment to that constitution which we have found by long experience to unite the inestimable blessings of liberty and order, and to which, under the favour of Providence, all our other advantages are principally to be ascribed.

The Hon. CHARLES YORKE said, that His Majesty's speech, which the House had just heard, and to which he now rose to move an answer, contained so many gracious expressions of regard and affection, as he doubted not would secure, in return, the spontaneous and unanimous thanks of the House. But it contained something more than mere expressions; it contained substantial facts; it afforded information, with respect to the general prosperity, and particularly the flourishing state of the finances, of a nature which must be highly gratifying to every sincere lover of his country. The first paragraph was matter of much congratulation. The great body of the people were attached to the House of Brunswick on the most solid ground—on the testimony which a century had now borne to their distinguished virtues, and the experience which during that period had been afforded of their excellent administration. Attached to them on this ground, they could not but rejoice in every occurrence that tended to advance their welfare, and secure, upon a more stable footing, the continuance of their government. To all who wished well to the succession, the late marriage of the Duke of York and the eldest daughter of the King of Prussia was a most desirable event. This alliance was equally matter of exultation, whether it was politically considered, as affording additional security to the Royal House of Brunswick, or as calculated to promote their private satisfaction and happiness, as a new support to His Majesty's throne, or a source of comfort to him as a father and a man. And he was assured that the Members would most readily and cordially concur in providing such an establishment for the Duke

of York; and his illustrious and accomplished consort, as might be suitable to their exalted rank, and adequate to support that splendour in their manner of living, which the respect due to their station required. The second paragraph informed them, that a definitive treaty had been concluded under the mediation of His Majesty and of his allies, between the Emperor and the Ottoman Porte; and likewise, that His Majesty's intervention had been employed to promote a pacification between the Empress of Russia and the Porte; and that he was in expectation of speedily receiving the account of the conclusion of the definitive treaty of peace, preliminaries having been some time since agreed upon between those Powers. It was not now his intention to dilate on the important topics to which this part of the speech referred, and which had already occasioned so much difference of opinion and debate during the last session of Parliament. The proper time of such discussion was not come. His Majesty mentioned, that he has directed to be laid before the House such papers as are necessary to shew the terms of peace, which have been under discussion during the negociation with the Court of Petersburgh. Till these papers had been produced and examined, all consideration of the question ought, for the present, to be suspended. It was from those only that the Members could be made acquainted with the true state of facts, and the real springs of action, and enabled in consequence to form a proper decision. But, in the mean time, it would certainly become the House, nor could it possibly interfere with any future discussion which might take place, to return thanks to His Majesty for the progress which, under his mediation, had been already made in re-establishing peace and tranquillity, and for the communication of those papers which he had directed to be laid before the House. He was no friend to a demand of papers, while a negociation was pending, and when a certain degree of secresy was proper and necessary to be observed; but when that negociation was concluded, he considered that all papers ought to be produced, as far as was consistent with prudence, which were useful to elucidate the conduct of Ministers during its progress, and assist Members in forming a proper judgement of the general merits of the transaction. Whatever difference of opinion might, in the present case, exist with regard to particular circumstances of the con-

duct pursued by Administration, it would be allowed that the principle upon which His Majesty had acted, and what he had actually done towards restoring tranquillity, demanded the thanks of the House. The true system of British policy was to preserve the powers of Europe in the same situation with respect to one another, and hold the balance equal. It was our interest, as a commercial nation, not only to cultivate peace at home, but to direct our endeavours to the maintenance of general tranquillity. The principle and the mode of interference which His Majesty had adopted, had already, indeed, received the sanction of the House, and the necessary supplies for the purpose had been voted last session. The treaty effected between Russia and the Porte was best adapted to secure their future tranquillity. It tended to extinguish the sparks of animosity, and to prevent the feelings of ignominy, which might remain from the remembrance of any humiliating concession. It defined boundaries, which before were less clearly ascertained, and assigned to their proper master territories which were liable, from their situation, to be productive of jarring and hostile claims.

He would now advert to what His Majesty had said of the affairs of India. It was not necessary to prove that the war at present carrying on in that country was just and necessary; this war, after full discussion of these particulars, had already received the sanction of the House. They must, however, join with His Majesty, in regretting that it had not yet been terminated, and receive with satisfaction his assurance that there was reasonable ground to hope that it might speedily be brought to an honourable conclusion. The exertions which had been made by the commanders and army, in spite of the weather, and of the difficulties which they had to encounter, entitled them to the highest praise. Seldom had greater advantages been obtained in one campaign, and there was reason to think that the successful issue had only been retarded by those natural obstacles inseparable from the situation, and from the circumstances in which the war was carried on, obstacles which neither their prudence could enable them to obviate, nor their courage to subdue. Nor could he, on this occasion, fail to remark the excellent behaviour of all the departments, in cooperating with the commanders and troops, to promote the in-

tereſt of the war—a behaviour ſo different from what had taken place in the laſt war, where Sir Eyre Coote had been ſo little ſeconded, and had experienced ſo many difficulties, from want of ſupport. Theſe difficulties, however, were not found to ſtand in the way of his ſucceſs, and had only ſerved to enhance his glory; nor could he forbear to avail himſelf of the opportunity which thus preſented itſelf, to pay a tribute to the merit of this illuſtrious Commander.

With regard to the ſituation of this country, it muſt afford every friend of the national proſperity the ſincereſt ſatisfaction, to be aſſured by His Majeſty of the pacific intentions of the other Powers. The highly proſperous ſtate of the revenue was not of difficult proof, nor required to be long inſiſted upon. They were certainly obliged to His Majeſty for his intention of reducing the eſtabliſhment, with a view to lighten the burden of the public taxes. He was himſelf no friend to a diminution of eſtabliſhments: he conſidered thoſe which were exiſting as neceſſary to the ſafety of the country, and the protection of its commerce. But if the ſituation of the country was ſuch as to admit of reducing the eſtabliſhments, he would moſt chearfully concur in the meaſure. He was ſenſible that economy was no leſs neceſſary to be obſerved with them, than with regard to the other branches of the public expence. The next article of His Majeſty's ſpeech was particularly addreſſed to them; it directed their attention to the object of reducing the taxes. This ſolicitude, to eaſe as much as poſſible to his ſubjects the neceſſary load of public impoſitions, bore the ſtrongeſt and moſt honourable teſtimony to His Majeſty's paternal feelings. It became them, by their exertions, to ſecond his zeal, and immediately adopt ſome methods for this deſirable purpoſe. The concluſion of the ſpeech was particularly deſerving of attention, and ought not only to be ſtrongly impreſſed upon their minds, but treaſured up in their memory, and handed down as a leſſon of inſtruction to poſterity. The laſt ſpeech of an illuſtrious perſonage, who was regarded as the hero of the Proteſtant cauſe, and whoſe name would remain till the lateſt ſyllable of recorded time, was carefully preſerved both in this country and in Holland; and even framed and hung up, that it might be more effectually protected from injury, and more forcibly calculated to arreſt notice. The preſent ſpeech of

His Majeſty was entitled to an equal degree of reſpect and regard. For what avail our proſperity, the proſpects of permanent tranquillity, the boundleſs extent of our commerce, the overflowing riches of our treaſury, if we ourſelves are wanting to ourſelves? What avail the bleſſings of liberty, if we loſe the ſenſe of order, or wantonly violate its bounds? Should we abuſe the advantages which we now enjoy, we ſhall forfeit them for ever. We ſhall ſeem to have aſcended a height, only in order to render our fall more conſpicuous. Let us add, then, to our felicity, the inſtructions which we may derive from the misfortunes of others; it will form its beſt ſafeguard. What advantages have we in proſpect, which could at all compenſate us for the riſk we ſhould run, by attempting a change of our ſituation? We ſhould reſemble the valetudinarian, who was well, wiſhed to be better, and found himſelf in his grave. Let us then preſerve a ſenſe of thoſe high privileges which we enjoy under our preſent Government, accompanied with gratitude to His Majeſty, who, in his ſpeech, has afforded us ſo many expreſſions of his paternal affection and attention to our happineſs. He then concluded with moving the addreſs, which was drawn up in the uſual ſtile, and exactly correſponded with the ſentiments and wiſhes expreſſed in His Majeſty's ſpeech.

Sir JAMES MURRAY, Bart. ſaid, that in riſing to ſecond the motion, after what had been ſo fully and ſo ably ſtated by the honourable mover, little remained for him to ſay. On the ſubject of the marriage of the Duke of York, he deſired to join his voice of congratulation. He was aſſured, that there was no Member who would not feel the higheſt ſatisfaction in this event, and readily concur to provide the proper eſtabliſhment on the occaſion. If the alliance was highly deſirable in a political point of view, it was not leſs ſo with reſpect to its object, a Princeſs greatly loved and reſpected in the country, from which ſhe came, of the moſt amiable diſpoſitions and engaging manners, who poſſeſſed every requiſite, which could ſecure the private felicity of the Duke of York, a point to which, he perſuaded himſelf, the Members were not indifferent, and with which they did not fail heartily to ſympathize.

With regard to the terms of the Treaty between Ruſſia and the Porte, the Houſe would do juſtice to the benevolence of thoſe intentions which had engaged his Majeſty to take an ac-

tive part in attempting to restore the tranquillity of those two Powers. His exertions were prompted by the most laudable motives, and had in view the most useful end. Certain, however, it was, that untoward circumstances had occurred to frustrate the part acted by our Government upon that occasion, and the object proposed was not answered. The particular failure did not, however, affect the general principle. Continental connexions were desirable, and necessary to this country. We had reason, on a former occasion, to experience the bad consequences of having detached ourselves from such connections, when, in carrying on a heavy and long war, we stood alone and unsupported, while to aggravate our misfortune our rival, France, had pursued an opposite policy. Such consequences are perhaps not to be dreaded at the present moment, nor was it his intention to insinuate that they were. But the use which we ought to make of the situation in which France is placed, is to strengthen ourselves by foreign alliance, to secure in the present favourable moment connexions upon whom in the hour of danger we may rely with confidence for assistance and support. How desirable was it lately thought to form an alliance with Holland; but Holland is so engaged in Continental politics, that an alliance with it cannot be supported without likewise forming other connexions. The alliance with Prussia is particularly desirable to this country. The naval superiority of this country and the military force of Prussia render an union of strength highly eligible. He did not assert that there were any immediate prospects of war against which we were particularly interested to provide; but to be prepared for an attack might save us the necessity of being put on our defence, and by being able to do much, we might have occasion to do nothing. The vulgar idea ought not to be hastily run away with, that Prussia is a military monarchy, solely intent on schemes of conquest. It is indeed at present in possession of a well-disciplined army and an overflowing treasury. But it knows too well the value of these advantages, and is too desirous to retain them on their present footing of stability, to risk the hazard incurred by engaging in idle projects and useless wars. It has required a degree of respectability among the Powers of Europe which it is only solicitous to preserve; and though it has been thrice lately called out to re-

pel encroachment, has uniformly contented itſelf with accomplifhing its object, it has confined itſelf within the ſtricteſt line of moderation; and in no inſtance, even where the faireſt opportunities were preſented, attempted to retaliate and aſpire at conqueſt. What advantages, then, were not to be expected from the efforts of two nations, ſuch as England and Pruſſia, united in the ſupport of tranquillity and order! When thoſe papers which related to the negociation with Ruſſia ſhould be laid before the Houſe, they would be better qualified to judge of the ſyſtem of continental policy which had, upon that occaſion, influenced the proceedings of Government. To thoſe proceedings a ſtrong oppoſition had been raiſed by perſons of great abilities in that Houſe, who ſaw the intereſts of the country in a different point of view from that in which they were conſidered by Adminiſtration. That oppoſition had no doubt a conſiderable effect on the minds of men, and in ſome meaſure tended to influence the event, which followed. The Empreſs of Ruſſia, a wiſe Princeſs, perceiving the oppoſition of ſentiment which exiſted in this country to any war againſt her dominions, failed not to take advantage of the circumſtance in promoting her own purpoſes, and was induced to perſiſt in a demand, in ſupport of which ſhe would not otherwiſe have been inclinable to run the riſk of hoſtility. With regard to the affairs of India, our hopes of ſucceſs were founded on the abilities and courage of the commander and troops in that country; of theſe we had been aſcertained by paſt experience, which afforded the beſt ground of aſſurance to our future proſpects. On the laſt part of His Majeſty's ſpeech he would only remark, that however oppoſite parties might be in ſentiment, they would all unite to rejoice in the proſperity of their country. The conduct of the French, which had ſo often been introduced into that Houſe as the ſubject of ſtricture, warranted, in his opinion, one concluſion: if the French were juſtified in overturning their conſtitution, if they really had a conſtitution, it was becauſe that conſtitution was eſſentially bad: our conſtitution is excellent; it united the advantages of laws, ſupported by authority, and freedom, regulated by order; and ſo far from deſiring any change of the preſent ſyſtem of Government, we ought carefully to watch its preſervation, and be pre-

pared to go any lengths to support it. He concluded with seconding the addrefs.

Mr. GREY faid, that after having liftened to His Majefty's fpeech, which began with a fubject of congratulation, in which all muft join, and concluded with a reflection on the profperity of the country; and after having heard the two honourable fpeakers, it was matter of regret to him, that any thing fhould have been introduced into the body of the addrefs, which fhould prevent the unanimous vote which the firft fpeaker had hoped would take place, and in which he would have wifhed to have concurred upon this occafion. With regard to foreign politics, it was not his intention to enter into the wide field of difcuffion which had been adopted by the honourable Member who had fpoken laft. He was glad to fee that the principle for which he and other Members had laft feffion contended, was now acknowledged, that no vote of approbation ought to be required to any meafure, till complete information had been afforded of the circumftances which had preceded it. With refpect to the Ruffian armament, it was a moft important fubject of difcuffion, but as any attempt to bring forward that fubject had evidently been difcouraged on the other fide of the Houfe, he fhould not attempt to enter upon it at prefent. The proper time for fuch difcuffion, as had been remarked, was not come. A promife had been made that the neceffary papers fhould be laid before the Houfe, and he fhould now wait in expectation of that promife. It might be curious to know how far the interference of this country had been effectual, or whether the preliminaries of the treaty between Ruffia and the Porte had been influenced by our recommendation, or had been figned before fuch recommendation had taken place; but refpecting this point, it was not now his bufinefs to enquire.—The day muft at laft come when the difcuffion would be deliberately conducted, and the decifion maturely formed. From the degree of conviction which that day fhould be found to produce, it would be afcertained how far any Member preferred the fupport of a Minifter to his duty to his conftituents.

The honourable Baronet who feconded the addrefs, had intimated, that had it not been for the oppofition made in Parliament to the object which the Minifter had in view when he

armed against Russia, he might have carried his point, and compelled the Empress, by force of arms, to relinquish the possession of Oczakow. If that opposition which had been made, had, as was hinted, the effect to prevent a war so absurd, and contrary to the interests of this country, he should, till the latest day of his life, exult in the part he had then acted, and in having been an instrument, however humble, to promote so glorious an object. But after hearing the terms of moderation which had been, in this instance, thought necessary to be employed with respect to the interference in which this country had been engaged between Russia and the Porte, he was surprised, that in another article Ministers should have ventured upon a mode of expression so very different, and seemed to call for the discussion, and to provoke the censure, which, in the other instance, they were solicitous to shun: he meant with respect to the war in India. And here, before he should proceed farther, he should move to be read a paragraph of His Majesty's speech, at the commencement of last session of Parliament. The paragraph which related to the affairs of India being accordingly read by the clerk, was as follows:

" You will have observed, with concern, the interruption " which has taken place in the tranquillity of our Indian pos- " sessions, in consequence of the unprovoked attack of an ally " of the British nation. The respectable state, however, of " the forces, under the direction of the Government there, " and the confidence in the British name, which the system " prescribed by Parliament has established among the native " Powers in India, afford the most favourable prospect of a " speedy and successful conclusion."

This paragraph, resumed Mr. Grey, expresses, in terms nearly the same as those employed in the present speech, the hope of the war being brought to a speedy conclusion. It seems, then, a little extraordinary, that we should now be called to congratulate ourselves upon our success, while we remain in a situation not more favourable than at that former period, and still equally distant from our object. It is lamentable, indeed, that the prospect then afforded, should not have been made good. If any success had really taken place, it could only have been communicated by the last dispatches,

of the contents of which they were not yet in possession, and to which, while they remained ignorant of their tendency, they could not be called to give any approbation. Where, then, was the ground for the expressions of congratulation contained in the address? For his part, he was at a loss to find it, except he was to consider retreats as victories, and miscarriages as success. The object of the war was avowedly to reduce Seringapatam, and exterminate the power of Tippoo. If that was the case, would any one say that it had been accomplished? For to what does the success, of which we are informed in the former dispatches, amount? We shall find, that it consists in the retreat of two commanders, in circumstances of such distress and difficulty, as compelled them to leave behind their artillery; and one of whom was obliged to abandon his sick and wounded to the mercy of a Prince, whom we have been accustomed to represent as a cruel and inexorable tyrant. Yet, we are told of our success, and of the prospects of a speedy and honourable conclusion of the war; prospects which are no otherwise authorised, than by our again proceeding to an attack, in which we have already experienced a repulse: than by our being on the eve of a new campaign, from which we have only to look for the certainty of additional expence. On this part of the address, therefore, I would propose to move an amendment.

With respect to other parts of the speech, I acknowledge them to be exceedingly grateful to my feelings. I am only surprised that some reduction of the establishments which is now proposed, should not have been adopted before, and trust that at last it will be effectually carried into execution, and not merely employed as a bait for popularity. Of those flourishing prospects which are held out with respect to the revenue, we shall better be able to judge, when we enter upon an examination of real statements.

The other point on which he meant to touch, was the expression of a hope entertained by his Majesty, that some of the subsisting taxes might be repealed. He was very well convinced, that it would give the highest pleasure to the paternal heart of the King, to see a possibility of relieving his people from any part of their heavy burdens. He must, however, observe, that it was rather unusual, he believed, for a recom-

mendation of that nature to come from the Throne, becaufe it looked fomewhat like an encroachment upon the privilege of the Houfe of Commons, to whom it belonged exclufively to originate every meafure relating either to the laying on or taking off taxes. And therefore, though he muft perfectly approve of the object, there appeared to him fomething queftionable in the mode of introducing it. Perhaps he was over-cautious; but the right of determining in all queftions relative to money was the moft facred and the moft important privilege of the Houfe, and could not be watched with too much care. The duty of a Houfe of Commons was in many inftances invidious; they were bound to give falutary advice, where it was not moft pleafing; they were bound to impofe taxes, which, however neceffary, were always odious.

In difcharging thefe duties, they had nothing to fupport them but the confidence and affection of their conftituents, but the perfuafion which they fhould entertain that they acted under the influence of common interefts, and impofed no burden, which, as individuals, they were not themfelves ready to bear, and which they did not confider as neceffary to the general welfare. But fhould they, in the prefent inftance, upon examining the ftate of the country, find it neceffary to continue the exifting taxes, and inftead of granting any relief, rather apply the furplus to a more fpeedy extinction of the national debt, would they not incur a certain degree of odium, while the attention of the people would be turned to the Throne, as the quarter from which they were to expect the mitigation of their burdens. Or, in another point of view, might not fome Member, from regard to the Royal recommendation, be led to vote for fuch relief, contrary to his own better judgement? But, perhaps, he might feel the danger too ftrongly, or regard it with too fearful an eye. Yet he confidered it as proper to employ this warning in the firft inftance. He had only one thing farther to remark. Laft year a convention had been concluded with Spain, from which great advantages had been propofed; among other conditions, it had been ftipulated, that a compenfation fhould be made for the injuries fuftained by the Britifh Merchants, but they had not yet been informed, whether any means had been taken to obtain that compenfation, or what progrefs had been made for that purpofe.

The total ſilence of the ſpeech on this head, might afford room for unpleaſant conjecture, and could not certainly be very gratifying to the people of this country. Having made theſe remarks, he ſhould not detain the Houſe longer, but while he ſincerely congratulated the Nation on the flattering proſpects held out in the ſpeech, ſhould beg leave to move the amendment in the addreſs, that inſtead of the words " the ſuc-" ceſs which has already attended them," &c. ſhould be inſerted, " That ſenſible of the diſadvantages of a procraſtinated " war, and convinced that it muſt be attended with almoſt " certain ruin to the finances of the Company, we cannot " but expreſs our regret, that the proſpect which His Majeſty " held out to us in his moſt gracious ſpeech from the throne, " at the opening of the laſt ſeſſion of Parliament, has not " yet been realized. At the ſame time gratefully to ac-" knowledge His Majeſty's paternal care and attention to the " ſafety and happineſs of his people, expreſſed in his benevo-" lent wiſh for the concluſion of a ſpeedy and honourable " peace."

Major Maitland ſeconded the amendment.

The amendment having been read by the Speaker, and the queſtion propoſed upon it,

Mr. DUNDAS ſaid, that all the Members muſt join moſt cordially in expreſſing their thanks for the information contained in His Majeſty's ſpeech, with reſpect to the marriage of the Duke of York with the eldeſt daughter of the King of Pruſſia; they muſt all concur chearfully in meeting His Majeſty's propoſition of providing a ſuitable eſtabliſhment for their rank; and they muſt likewiſe all feel highly gratified in the growing proſperity of the conntry, and ſincerely uſe their endeavours to ſecure the continuance of thoſe ineſtimable bleſſings which they had long poſſeſſed and which they had undoubtedly derived from the excellent conſtitution under which they lived. Theſe were points with reſpect to which there could exiſt no difference of opinion, and from which only could reſult one general feeling of ſatisfaction. But the honourable Member, who had ſpoken laſt ſeemed to reſt his oppoſition to the Addreſs merely upon his objection to that part of it which congratulated His Majeſty on our ſucceſſes in India, upon which objection he had founded an amendment. To that amend-

ment he, for one, must oppose his negative, and give his vote for the Addrefs, as originally moved. As the honourable gentlemen did not object to the other parts of the Addrefs, he would direct himself precifely, and distinctly to that part of the honourable gentleman's fpeech, which referred to his objection. The honourable gentlemen, had ftated truly, that the war was not concluded, a fact which could not be denied; but he had endeavoured to infinuate that the war was a war of defeat and difgrace to the Britifh arms, that the conduct of Lord Cornwallis had not been that of an able Commander, and that we had in the courfe of the war gained no advantages. It was in thofe refpects, that the honourable gentleman's opinion and his completely differed. At the fame time, that the honourable Gentleman gave no credit to the brilliant fucceffes of our arms, he feemed to have forgotten the hiftory of the war in India. With regard to its commencement, he faid, that fubject had been fo fully, completely, and diftinctly difcuffed laft feffion, that little remained for him to fay, particularly as the Houfe had, after fuch difcuffion, been convinced of the neceffity, as well as the juftice and policy of the meafure. The honourable gentleman had advanced, that there was a total failure of the purpofes and objects of the laft campaign, becaufe Seringapatam was not taken. This, however, he denied to be the cafe; the object of the laft campaign was, to enable us to conclude a war unprovoked, and reluctantly undertaken on our part; and certainly, every ftep that tended to accellerate this defirable conclufion, was entitled to the epithet of fuccefsful: and he affirmed, that the fucceffes of Lord Cornwallis, during the laft campaign, were unparalleled, when compared to former wars in that country. He ftated, that fince the commencement of the war, we had detached from Tippoo the intereft and aid of every power on the Malabar coaft; and it was well known, that nothing did us more mifchief in our wars with Hyder Ally, than the fupport he met with in the Malabar country. On the contrary, we had now not only detached them from Tippoo; but the Bibby of Cannanore, as well as every Rajah and Polygar on the Malabar coaft, were become our friends, and had fhewn their readinefs to affift us. By our interpofition a confederacy had been renewed between us, the Mahrattas, and the Nizam; and a

confederacy that certainly had been attended with the most brilliant successes. The Mahrattas, by the taking of Darwar, had secured a key to a great and rich country; and the successes of the Nizam, had given us a command of the Mysore country; by these the resources were tripled; and would gentlemen say, that these were not brilliant successes? add to this the capture of Bangalore, a piece of good fortune that had inspired our allies with confidence, and by which Tippoo was completely hemmed in, and shut up in a narrow and confined district round his capital, unfit to supply him with provisions, and in every respect placed in a most hazardous and irksome situation; this he took to be the present situation of the war in India, at least, as far as he had any opportunity of knowing; though, he owned, his opinions were formed not from the last dispatches, for it was not, he declared, half an hour previous to his having come into the House since he had occasion to look at them, in consequence of circumstances that had retarded their arrival. He mentioned, that Lord Cornwallis, when he formed the plan for taking Seringapatam, was perfectly aware of the many and great difficulties he had to encounter, and notwithstanding, had he not met with the most unforeseen casualties and accidents, there can be little doubt, but he would have accomplished the great object of his enterprize. Having thus mentioned what he conceived to be brilliant successes, he expressed as his opinion that the words of the address were fully warranted by our actual situation in India.

He then replied to the observation of Mr. Grey, respecting the propriety of stating in His Majesty's speech the hopes which he entertained that Parliament might be enabled, from the growing increase of the Revenue, to take off some portion of the existing burdens; and thought that, when the disagreeable task of being obliged to make demands that occasioned taxation, remained with His Majesty, it would be very hard to deprive him of the pleasing hopes and beneficent feelings occasioned by the possibility of alleviating the burdens of his people; and he affirmed, that he knew of no part or article of the British constitution that in consequence of holding the prerogative of the Crown barred His Majesty from indulging or expressing such hopes and feelings. He held the rights and pri-

vileges of that House in high estimation, but he considered a great deal of the argument that had been used, to create jealousy about our situation, as speculative and unnecessary. Indeed the honourable gentleman himself did not seem to have laid great stress on this objection. With regard to the novelty of the measure, the honourable gentleman might be pretty right, for he believed any thing like a hope or intimation from the throne, that there was a probability of dminishing the taxes, was rather a novelty in any Administration: but surely it was a novelty of that sort, which ought rather to be welcomed than repulsed. He concluded with repeating that he should oppose the amendment.

The Hon. Major MAITLAND, after having expressed the satisfaction which he felt from other parts of the address, said, he did not mean to detain the House but for a very short time, though he thought it absolutely indispensable to his duty to express his surprize at the clause being introduced which congratulated His Majesty on the successes gained in India, and his still greater surprize that there could be found in that House two Members who would come down to move and second an address with that clause in it.

What the right honourable Secretary had said, respecting the great consequence of our being assisted by the Powers on the Malabar coast, he thought must be much exaggerated: certainly, he could not state the Bibby of Cannanore as a powerful ally, for he was one of the pettiest Rajahs on that coast, and if, as had been stated, all the other Princes, Rajahs, and Polygars, were emancipated from the tyranny of Tippoo Sultan, that fact was entirely unknown to the House. No notice seemed to be taken of General Abercrombie's retreat, although he had been obliged to leave behind, in the precipitancy with which he conducted it, his battering train, his cattle, and what was still more deplorable, his sick in the hospital. He commented upon our allies in the Carnatic, and on the successes of the Mahrattas and the Nizam, which were so much enlarged upon by the right honourable gentleman, and ridiculed the idea of enhancing the value of the capture of Darwar, by calling it a key to the Mysore country.

He affirmed that Tippoo was not confined in the manner that was said, nor in any unpleasant situation. With regard

to Lord Cornwallis, he respected highly his character, but was much hurt, as a military man, that he was obliged to speak concerning his successes, which he considered in no other light than a continued chain of disappointments and disasters since he left Madras, attended with a great expence of money, and effusion of blood, without the least certainty or probability of any advantage. He adverted to the recalling of General Meadows, and the total alteration of the measures which he had pursued for twelve months previous to Lord Cornwallis having quitted Madras. The capture of Bangalore he certainly regarded as a victory, not however obtained in a military way, though much praise might be due both to officers and men on the occasion, so much as by way of securing a retreat from a principle of absolute necessity. He contended, that the boasted confederacy was formed on views of ambition, much more so, indeed, than those which we could with any justice impute to Tippoo Sultan. He quoted Lord Cornwallis's reflection upon his own situation; and his opinion, that a procrastinated war would be attended with ruin to the Company's finances. He made some observations on the attack of Seringapatam, which certainly had no pretensions to be called a victory; he knew well the spirit, activity, and courage of a British army in India; he knew that we neither wanted men, ammunition, nor bravery; but give us something to eat. The object of the last campaign had been defeated, not through want of gallantry in our soldiers or conduct in our officers, but through want of food. The same gallantry, the same conduct, would be shewn again; but the same enemy, by which they were defeated before, would, he feared, defeat them again; famine forced our army to retreat last campaign, and he feared it would have to contend with famine again; a new battering train might be provided, a fresh and ample supply of draught cattle; but a good Commissary of provisions would be to the full as necessary, though, he apprehended, infinitely more difficult to be found.

After all this, he thought it curious to compare the present circumstances with what fell from the right honourable Secretary in May last. He then said, that India was likely to send resources to England, before England would have occasion to

assist India. This was now fully contradicted by Lord Cornwallis, though the House and the Country must think, that both the noble Lord and the right honourable gentleman had formed their judgement from the same documents. Perhaps, however, the difference in their mode of expression might arise from their different situations, and what was a safe argument for a General Officer on a foreign command, might be fatal to a politician at home. He said much stress had been laid on the loss which Tippoo had sustained, but not a word was said of ours; and admitting those arguments to be carried to their maximum, he considered our situation to be far from successful. Tippoo Sultan had been described as a cruel and merciless tyrant, and an unjust invader of Travancore and Iacottah, and this was made the ostensible ground of the confederacy against him. But if the House would look at the letter of Lord Cornwallis to the Nizam, in May, 1789, it would be found, that this was only a pretext, and not the real cause of the war. In that letter, the noble Lord represented Tippoo, not as a tyrant, or cruel or bloody, but as "a Prince of great ability "and great ambition;" and such, therefore, as it was the Nizam's interest to weaken. His Lordship accordingly proposed a confederacy against him, but wished not to conclude a specific treaty for the purpose, lest Tippoo should get intelligence of it, and make that a ground for an immediate war; he desired, however, that the Nizam would consider that letter, as amounting in effect to a treaty. Here was the real cause of the war; and as we had provoked it, we must in fairness and justice be considered as the aggressors, who covered our real object, which was, by offensive war, to extirpate the power of a *Prince of great ability*, and made his views upon Travancore a pretext for that war, which, if Travancore had never existed, would nevertheless have been waged against Tippoo. As to his ambition and thirst for war, in what did it appear? Not surely in his repeated efforts to procure peace, or the humiliation to which he had frequently descended, for the purpose of prevailing upon our Government to grant it to him. The confederacy against him was as injudicious as it was unjust: the Nizam and the Mahrattas would, no doubt, remain firm and steady in the union, until the extirpation of Tippoo; but, that end once accomplished, there was as little

doubt but they would fall out with us about the spoil of that Prince, whose highest crime, in the eye of the British Government, was, that he was a man of great ability.

Mr. J. T. STANLEY observed, with regret, that on this proud day there should be any diversity of opinion upon any point contained in the very gracious speech from the Throne. The happy prospects which it held out, could not fail to animate every bosom, and he had hoped would have been productive only of unanimity and satisfaction.

General SMITH begged leave to assign the reasons which induced him to differ on this occasion from those respectable friends, with whom it was a pleasure to agree on most other measures. The war was, in his opinion, absolutely necessary, for Tippoo was the sworn enemy of the British name in India; and as that Prince would not leave any thing undone to root that name out of Hindostan, so ought the British Government to resolve never to make peace with him, or sheathe the sword until he was completely extirpated. The successes of the last campaign, he contended, were splendid and brilliant; the only thing that could give a colour to a contrary opinion, was the retreat of our army from before Seringapatam. Lord Cornwallis himself was apprehensive that he should arrive too late in the season before that capital; the possibility of a retreat was therefore foreseen by himself, and was occasioned, not by the enemy, but by the climate. For his own part, he wished the noble Lord had not gone to Seringapatam till after the monsoon; had he put an end to the campaign by the capture of Bangalore, every one would have said that his successes had been truly brilliant: what he had foreseen, and had been the effect of climate, and not the defeat, ought not to be considered as derogating from the splendor of our victories. Tippoo, he maintained, was actually hemmed in, on the North, the South, and the East, and was confined to a very narrow slip of land; and there was not a doubt in his mind, but Seringapatam was at this moment in the hands of Lord Cornwallis.

Mr. FOX expressed his regret, that after having agreed in the address to His Majesty on the opening of the session of Parliament for so many years, although during that time he had generally differed from those entrusted with the administration of his government, he should now find himself obliged to op-

pose any part of it, when it contained so many topics, on which he, and every man who respected His Majesty's personal feelings, and rejoiced in the prosperity of the country, must cordially concur.

On the first topic, no man could stand forward with more readiness and sincerity than he did to congratulate His Majesty. No man could participate more cordially in the satisfaction which His Majesty derived from the illustrious connection which the Duke of York had formed, at once honourable to himself, and auspicious to his country; and he trusted there would be no difficulty opposed to enabling His Majesty to form a suitable and speedy establishment for His Royal Highness and his consort.

To several other topics introduced into the address, he could give his warmest approbation. The honourable gentleman who moved it, seemed to approve, with a degree of reluctance, that part of the speech which related to some reduction of our naval and military force. He had always been of opinion that such reductions might have been made at a much earlier period; but so little was he disposed to find fault with the past, and so happy to approve when he had an opportunity of approving, that provided the reductions were at last made in a fair and effectual manner, so as to afford substantial relief to the country, the honourable gentleman would be but a cold supporter of the measure in comparison of him.

The parts that related to the increase of the revenue, and the general prosperity of the finances, must be satisfactory to all who had an interest in the country; but if when the accounts came to the laid before the House, that increase should be sufficient to defray the late extraordinary expences, that circumstance would be no justification of the conduct by which those expences were incurred. It was no excuse for unnecessary profusion, that the nation was possessed of unexpected resources: nor could any Minister be allowed to say, It is true I have been lavish of the public money, but the public industry and the public wealth have outstript my profusion. It had been said,

Stultitiam patiuntur opes,

but it would be a very dangerous assumption in politics, that

the wealth of any nation could be greater than national folly would overcome.

Having said this much in general terms, he proceeded to comment on other parts of the Address, to notice the omission of some things which ought to have been mentioned in His Majesty's speech, and to state his reasons for voting for the amendment moved by his honourable friend.

The gentlemen who moved and seconded the Address, had not confined their remarks to the terms of the Speech, but had extended them to the articles of the pacification effected by our mediation in conjunction with our allies. For his own part, he was too blunt to see, and too dull to comprehend, how either the new or the old line of demarkation between the House of Austria and the Ottoman Porte could be of the least importance to this country; but he could not help observing the curious manner in which the new line had been settled. It was said, in the first instance, that preliminary articles had been settled between the contending powers, on the foundation of the *status quo*, not such a *status quo* as the French had formerly devised, a *status quo* as things ought to be, but a *status quo* as they actually were before the war. This foundation, for the honour of the mediating powers, was to be strictly maintained in the definitive treaty; but before that definitive treaty was agreed upon, a new line of demarkation, by which a certain extent of territory was to be transferred from one to the other, was also agreed upon the same day. This was ridiculous; and it was of consequence to nations to prevent their proceedings from being the subject of ridicule. Instead of negociating, and even arming to maintain an absolute *status quo*, and agreeing in the same instant to a demarkation of limits, by which that *status quo* was to be completely surrendered, how much more honourable and dignified would it have been to have resorted to the convenient term, *existing circumstances*, as applicable, surely, to the negociation with Austria, as to that with Russia, and have taken the French *status quo* of things not as they had been, but as they ought to be in future. While he animadverted on the absurdity of thus insisting on a *status quo* in words, and conceding it in fact, he desired to be understood, that neither for the new nor the old line of demarkation, would

he have agreed to hazard the hundredth part of a British life, or the hundredth part of a British pound.

On the negociation with Russia, the House were promised the papers necessary for their information; and till those papers were before them he should reserve what he had to say on the subject. If the information was partially given, if they were informed only of what all the world knew, and every thing most material for them to know was withheld, he should be surprised indeed if any proof of the increasing wealth and resources of the country could induce the House to pay the expence of the armament. The honourable Baronet who seconded the address had mentioned new circumstances arising as the reason that induced the Minister to recede from his original propositions. He had not, however, been able to point out any of those circumstances, and at last fairly put it upon the discussions that had taken place in Parliament. The honourable Baronet would not be more sorry for what he had said, that he (Mr. Fox) and the gentlemen who thought as he did on those discussions, considered it as the highest compliment to their exertions, and as tending to secure to them the approbation and the confidence of their constituents and their country. In calling for the good sense of the country, in warning the people of their danger, and obliging the Minister to abandon the most absurd and impolitic attempt that ever was conceived, they had done their duty then, and had now the consciousness of having done signal service to the nation. But it was said, that these discussions provoked the contest; that but for them Russia would have yielded. That it would not have been for the interest of Russia to contend at the hazard of a war, he was ready to admit; but that the government of a country, like that of Russia, not immediately under the control of public opinion, might have been impelled by resentment, or obstinacy, to resist, even at the hazard of war, was at least a probable supposition. The Empress had declared that she would not yield, and the Minister also that he would not. On this supposition, what must have been the consequence, had not the minority in Parliament, and the sense of the Public, interposed? The Minister would have gone on with his menaces; the Empress would have persisted in her claims; and he must either have gone to war for an

object which was now admitted both by himself and his friends as not worth going to war for, or exposed the nation by receding, as the bully, instead of the mediator of Europe. I meant to intimidate the Empress, he must have said; I trusted to her fears, but she was not to be intimidated; I was therefore under the necessity of apologizing for the peremptoriness of my demands, by the humility of my retractation; for the insolence of my menaces by the meanness of my submission. Such must have been the consequences, but for the interposition of those who thought as he did, and had the courage to avow it: unsuccessful indeed in numbers, but strong in argument. Ministers on that occasion were not ashamed to persuade a majority to support that as of the highest importance to the interests of Great Britain and her allies, which they themselves had predetermined to give up as of no importance at all. How they who had been so persuaded, or their leaders, felt on the subject, he knew not. He knew how he himself should have felt in either situation. The honourable gentleman who seconded the address, had, in the course of the last session, stood almost single in maintaining the great consequence of Oczakow in the scale between Russia and the Porte. They therefore who proposed to him to second an address, in which all that he had then said was in fact now unsaid, after having so long relied on the confidence of others, were at last determined to display no less a degree of confidence in themselves. It required no moderate share of confidence to say to any gentleman, "That which you so ably contended for as of the highest importance, we have abandoned as of none; will you have the goodness to move an address, approving of what we have done?" The honourable gentleman seemed to feel the awkwardness of his situation, and was obliged to shelter himself behind the cover of existing circumstances. What those existing circumstances were, he had not condescended to state.

For the farther discussion of that negociation, he waited for the papers promised to the House. He hoped when they came they would be complete, and afford ample room for full and fair discussion. They were obliged to His Majesty for his gracious promise of granting the papers, for if the House

persisted in the opinion adopted last year with respect to the Convention with Spain, they had no other means of obtaining any information on any negociation pending or concluded. If they could not ask for papers, they could only obtain them by His Majesty's gift. In that opinion, however, he trusted they did not persist, consistency in evil being not a virtue, but a crime. The doctrine of last year was, that papers were never to be called for respecting any negociation, or any treaty, unless there appeared on the face of it such strong presumptions of criminality as seemed to call for the impeachment of Ministers, and induce them to fill their address with threats of gibbets and axes. The papers, he trusted, for the sake of Ministers, were not given on this, but on the good old parliamentary doctrine; not on His Majesty's reasoning with himself that he had armed to support a negociation, and when the armament was ready to act, given up the whole object for which he armed; that in this conduct of his Ministers there was something so absurd, as made it adviseable, without waiting for an address from the House, filled with the harsh and ungracious terms of impeachment, axes, and gibbets, to send down the papers, and submit the whole business to a fair investigation.

This he could not believe to be the motive of His Majesty's promise, any more than that the House, or even the Ministers had ever seriously adopted as a general principle, the doctrine of last session with respect to papers.

With respect to the repeal of taxes, as suggested in His Majesty's speech, and most properly observed on by his honourable friend, who moved the amendment as infringing on the privileges of the House of Commons, for the uncandid and delusive purpose of catching at surreptitious popularity, he could not but remark, that the observations of his honourable friend had been treated by the right honourable Secretary with a degree of levity unsuitable to the subject. To originate taxes, and to originate the repeal of taxes, was the peculiar right of the House; and any infringement, or any thing short of an infringement, that seemed to call in question that right, might be taken up as a breach of privilege. It was not, however, in that point of view that he meant to consider it. The situation of the country was that of owing a debt of great magni-

tude, for which a great intereſt was payable, in poſſeſſion of peace, and an increaſing revenue. For the reduction of the debt, the Houſe had appropriated one million annually; but in doing that, they never meant to decide that in caſe the revenue ſhould increaſe, they would apply no more than a million to the reduction of the debt and remit taxes to the amount of all the ſurplus above that ſum. How much they ought in any circumſtances to apply to the reduction of the debt, and how much to the immediate relief of the people by a remiſſion of taxes, was a queſtion of great importance and difficulty. The extreme—that the whole ſurplus was to be applied to pay off debt, or go to the remiſſion of taxes, was not to be maintained on either ſide. What the mean might be was not eaſy to determine, and being ſo, the diſcuſſion ſhould be free.—Above all it was extremely unfit that men's minds ſhould be prejudiced by the authority of an opinion expreſſed by His Majeſty. The ſpeech expreſſed a hope that the reduction of eſtabliſhments, and the increaſe of the revenue, would enable them to enter on a ſyſtem of relieving his ſubjects from part of the exiſting taxes. Now what would be the caſe when they came to debate? Suppoſe he, or any other Member, or even the majority of the Houſe, to be of the harſh opinion that none of the taxes ought to be remitted, an opinion which he was far from entertaining at preſent, or believing that he ſhould form, and which he put merely for the ſake of argument, in what a ſituation would they be placed! To the public it would appear that the King was willing to alleviate the burdens of the people, but that their own repreſentatives, feeling leſs for them than he did, perſiſted in making them bear what His Majeſty was willing to remit; and were men to be deterred from giving their honeſt opinion on a ſubject of ſuch moment, or expoſed to obloquy and odium if they did? The functions of that Houſe moſt directly felt by the people were moſt of them ungracious; that of impoſing taxes, and making rigorous laws for collecting them, particularly ſo; and it was neither juſt nor wiſe to teach them to look to the Crown for every inſtance of grace and favour; and to their repreſentatives for burdens and reſtraints. On what principle was it that the Lords could nei-

ther propose a new tax, nor the repeal of an old one? The repeal of a tax was not certainly levying money on the subject, and yet the Commons had always been as jealous of the one as the other. For what reason, but that the House might never be put into the unpleasant situation he had mentioned, of appearing to continue taxes, from which the Lords, or the King, thought the people might be relieved? He repeated that he spoke on this subject from no previous opinion, that it would not be adviseable to remit part of these taxes, and put the supposition hypothetically. To form any opinion on the subject, it was necessary to have before him, the accounts of the expences, and the income, of all which he was yet ignorant. He wished only to be free to form an opinion when the documents were before him, without any apprehension of popular odium to bias his judgement. It had been asked, if he would deny to the King the pleasing part of suggesting the repeal of taxes, when he had often the unpleasant duty of suggesting the imposing of them. The King's pleasant part was, the giving his assent to the repeal, as the unpleasant part of originating new taxes, and the pleasant part of originating the repeal of old, ought to fall equally to the House of Commons It was not, he believed, correct, that the King ever did recommend taxes. He recommended measures that required money to support them, but it was the exclusive privilege of the House to provide that money by imposing taxes, or otherwise. The right honourable Secretary had said, that not the King's recommendation, but the repeal of taxes, without the substitution of others, was the *novelty*. Did he mean to say, that taxes never before were repealed or reduced? Within one, two, or three years after the conclusion of every war, except the last, a remission to the amount of half a million had taken place by the reduction of the land tax, and that without any suggestion from the King. It was, therefore, not the *thing*, but the *mode* that was new. When the land tax was reduced from four to three shillings in the pound, in 1763, had he been then in Parliament, he should have voted against that reduction. Had he done so after a recommendation from the throne, he should have been in the precise situation in which he had shewn, neither the House nor any individual Member could be entirely free from prejudice.

He had dwelt more particularly on this circumſtance, which he believed originated in no deſign, but merely a miſtake on the part of Miniſters, becauſe a ſtrict adherence to the principles on which the three branches of the Legiſlature had long acted with reſpect to taxes, tended to preſerve that conſtitution on which he had heard ſo many and ſo deſerved encomiums. To all ſuch encomiums he moſt cheerfully ſubſcribed, when they were not introduced indirectly and unfairly, with alluſion to the affairs of other countries, and for the purpoſe of conveying cenſure on other perſons, as entertaining ſentiments hoſtile to the conſtitution. In this way they were often introduced againſt him, and thoſe who, like him, did not conſider themſelves as debarred by their reverence for the Britiſh conſtitution, from reading and thinking, and approving of what ſeemed worthy of approbation in forms of Government very different from it. For himſelf, and thoſe who, like him, had frankly avowed their approbation of what had paſſed in France, he thanked the honourable Baronet who ſeconded the motion, for having furniſhed him with a better expreſſion than he could have thought of for himſelf. *The conſtitution of France was eſſentially bad, and every thing was to be riſked to deſtroy it; the conſtitution of Great Britain is eſſentially good, and every thing is to be riſked to preſerve it.* It was in vain, therefore, to ſay that they who rejoiced in the deſtruction of the one, muſt wiſh for the deſtruction of the other. There was no ſimilarity between them. They were as radically different as good and evil, as freedom and ſlavery, and never to be mentioned in the ſame terms, or any inference made from the one to the other.

No man could think more highly, or with greater reverence of the fundamental principles of the Britiſh conſtitution than he did. But he could neither ſhut his eyes, nor ſuſpend the operations of his reaſon; and where he ſaw great miſchiefs happen under any conſtitution, he could not help concluding, that the conſtitution was in ſome part decayed, or imperfect.

It muſt have been owing to the unwillingneſs of Miniſters to damp the pleaſure ariſing from ſo many topics of ſatisfaction as the ſpeech from the Throne contained, that with the mention of the ineſtimable bleſſings of liberty, and order, they had introduced no expreſſions of regret and concern at the violent interruption of order, that had occurred in the courſe of the ſum-

mer. Nothing, surely, but extreme reluctance to cast the least shade over so many subjects of rejoicing, could account for such an omission. To read His Majesty's speech one would imagine that nothing had happened to disturb the long experience of liberty and order so earnestly recommended as the foundation of all our other blessings. But the cautious omission could not conceal the evil; it was impossible not to know, and not to lament, that, towards the close of the eighteenth century, men, instead of following the progress of knowledge and liberality, had revived the spirit and the practice of the darkest and most barbarous ages; and that outrages, the most unparalleled and disgraceful, had been committed—disgraceful, he meant, to the country, not to the Ministers. They, it was to be presumed, had done every thing in their power to prevent and to check such detestable proceedings. But whether or not they, and those who acted under them, had exerted themselves as they ought in repressing the devastations of a mob, at all times mischievous, but doubly so when it assumed the pretext of supporting Government or Religion, was it not melancholy to see that mob reigning triumphant for near a week in a rich and populous part of the country, and those, whose duty it was to have denounced the rigour of the law, addressing them rather in terms of approbation than rebuke? Was not this calculated to cherish an idea which but too fatally appeared to have been entertained, that the principle on which they pretended to act was not disagreeable to government, however necessary it might be to punish a few for the irregularity of their proceedings? He accused Ministers neither of holding nor favouring such opinions. But when it could not be dissembled that such opinions had been held, if not inculcated, it would have been well if his Majesty had spoken of such riots, and their pretext, with horror, and of the exertions made to suppress them, and punish both the authors and the actors, with approbation.—*These were not riots for want of bread—such every feeling heart must pity while it condemned. Neither were they riots in the cause of liberty, which, though highly blameable, and highly to be reprobated by every good man, and every true friend to liberty, had yet some excuse in their principle. No, they were the riots of men neither aggrieved nor complaining, but, who, pretending to be the Executors of Government,*

did not select individual objects of party animosity, or private hatred, but by personal insult, violence, and fire, set on foot an indiscriminate persecution of an entire description of their fellow citizens, that had furnished persons, as eminent, as good subjects, and as zealous supporters of the family on the throne, as any other in the kingdom could boast. Instead of passing over such acts in silence, ought not His Majesty's sentiments to have gone forth as a manifesto, applying to them every epithet vituperative and expressive of abomination, which the language could furnish? When men were found so deluded as to suppose that their general object was not disagreeable to Government, a belief certainly unfounded, it might do much more mischief than Ministers were aware of. He had supposed that all practicable measures were taken to put a stop to these riots, and to punish those concerned in them as an example to others; but after they had threatened the person, and destroyed the house of a man, distinguished by a life attached to literature and useful science, of Dr. Priestley, whom he named but to honour, when they had destroyed all the accumulated labours of his youth, when they had demolished, what neither money nor industry could replace, that which ought to have been the solace and the ornament of his age, then came from those whose rank and stations ought to have given them influence, the slow desire to desist. How was this desire expressed, and how reprobated a conduct, subversive of every principle of civilized society? *Friends and Fellow Churchmen! We know you by the crosses and the banners you bear. You have now done enough in this pious cause. What farther you do, you and we, your friends, must pay for. Your farther exertions might be laudable, but they would be too expensive.* If holding such degrading language to a riotous mob could prevent mischief till assistance arrived; if it could save a house from the flames, much more a life, perhaps the sense of strict propriety might yield without blame, to the immediate impulse of compassion; but if neither of these was done, how contemptible? If they who held it were now ashamed of it, so much the more was it incumbent upon them and Government, to do away the impression it might have made, and to declare their abhorrence of acts, which they, in a moment of weakness, seemed not to disapprove. He hoped, therefore, that if an opportunity offered, this would still be done; and he

and insisted on it the more largely, as he thought an occasion might not offer of noticing it in Parliament again.

Having remarked on the general topics and omissions of the speech, he came now to give his reasons for voting for the amendment. His Majesty professed his hopes, that by the distinguished bravery and exertions of the officers and troops, under the able conduct of Lord Cornwallis, the war may speedily be brought to an honourable conclusion. These hopes were undoubtedly of less value, from His Majesty's having held out the same prospect last year, which they all know had not been fulfilled. Had he declared his opinion last year that the war would continue till now, he should have been told that he was arguing against probability, the conclusions of those who had the best means of information, and especially the assurance of His Majesty from the throne. Fresh hopes were again held out, in which he must now have less confidence from the failure of the last.

" *L'on desespere, quand on espere toujours.*"

They might renew their hopes from year to year, but they must not forget, that constant hoping leads at length to despair. The hopes last year were, that the war would be terminated in a single campaign, but unforeseen circumstances had retarded the accomplishment. Not one circumstance had occurred that had not been foreseen, or which those who undertook the war ought not to have considered. Was the monsoon an unforeseen circumstance? Did it set in sooner, or with more violence than usual? Perhaps it might be said, that the bad conduct of our officers was the unforeseen circumstance; but here the House was most improperly called upon before the service on which they were sent was accomplished, without any ground of judging but that they had been unsuccessful, to approve of their conduct. Without much knowledge of Lord Cornwallis, but with a prepossession in favour of his character and talents, he would not prostitute the praise of the House, by approving of the conduct of an officer, who had done nothing as yet on which a vote of approbation could be reasonably founded. In what event of the present war were they to look for proofs of the ability which they were called upon to praise? He had failed in putting an end to the war within the time expected;

were they to consider that as a proof of ability? He had marched, too, against Seringapatam and failed; he had directed General Abercrombie to approach it from another quarter, and when preparing to form a junction with him, he found that impossible, from the intervention of a river; and the only question then was, whether the army that he had ordered to meet him, through passes so difficult as were never traversed with cannon before, should get away safe—was this a presumption of ability? If the retreat of that army, instead of disgraceful and scandalous, had been most orderly and ably conducted, would merely going back amount to a proof of able exertion? The circumstances of that retreat might be owing to General Abercrombie, to his orders from Lord Cornwallis, or to causes which neither of them could prevent; he hoped it would yet appear that neither of them was to blame; but till this did appear, how could the House praise ability where they saw nothing but miscarriage and disgrace. When we talked of distinguished bravery and exertions, was the character of the British army fallen so low as to make the capture of an Indian fort, or a victory over an Indian army, a matter of distinguished triumph and exultation? Was this the utmost that was to be expected from an army the most numerous, the best disciplined, the best officered, and the best appointed, as it had been always represented, that India ever saw? Thank the stars of the British Empire, our superiority in arms had been always such, that much more important conquests had been often achieved by armies far inferior in every respect to this. Respecting the feelings of Lord Cornwallis, and having a respect for his character, he deprecated this mode of insulting him with approbation, when there was no rational ground on which to found it, and he called on the friends of the noble Lord to rescue him from such disgrace. His honourable friend (General Smith) had asked if Tippoo thought the war procrastinated: if the powers of India thought the war procrastinated? He had no occasion to resort to such evidence, having the testimony of Lord Cornwallis himself that the war must be considered as procrastinated, if it lasted beyond the period of the monsoons. In the speech of last year, the confidence inspired into the powers of India by the sanction of Parliament, to the

meaſures adopted by our government there, was held out as one of our grounds of hope. Had he known the extent to which this led, he ſhould have oppoſed the correſponding part of the addreſs. That however did not appear till the production of Lord Cornwallis's letter to the Nizam ſome time after, in which his Lordſhip writes, that the directions of the Britiſh Parliament will not allow him to conclude an offenſive treaty, but that the letter itſelf may be conſidered as equivalent to one. This meaſure was wrong in his opinion ; but at any rate it could not be ſaid, that the confidence of the native powers was engaged by the ſanction of Parliament, when the very agreement on which they were acting was, if not a violation, at leaſt an evaſion of an act of Parliament. He had always conſidered the ſyſtem of offenſive wars in India, as unjuſt, impolitic, and, whatever might be their apparent ſucceſs, eventually miſchievous. That we might be victorious in the preſent war he was ſtill inclined to believe ; but if, as the right honourable gentleman had ſaid, towards the end of the laſt Seſſion of Parliament, peace was the moſt deſirable news from India, victory was not worth the hazard of failure or defeat. It had been ſaid that he himſelf was ſanguine laſt year in his hopes of ſucceſs. On what he had heard of Lord Cornwallis and the army, he had been ſanguine in his hopes of brilliant victories, and, the natural conſequence, brilliant ruin to the Company's finances. If the right honourable gentleman could find leiſure from his other employments, (though, undoubtedly, they were numerous enough to occupy almoſt all his attention) to review the hiſtory of another war, on the juſtice and the policy of which he had likewiſe the misfortune to differ with him, he would ſee how many ſplendid victories we had obtained, and how many officers, both by ſea and land, had been thanked for their great and able exertions, yet all theſe victories and all theſe exertions, led, as by one uniform tenour, to eventual misfortune, and the loſs of the entire object for which we were contending. There was nothing in Lord Cornwallis's conduct in that war, that induced him to think ill of his abilities, and he had mentioned them incidentally, to illuſtrate his argument. For the victory at Camden, the thanks of the Houſe were voted him, and reached him juſt time enough not to paſs through the hands of an American General. Let not the

House anticipate success by their praise. Let his Lordship conquer, and the due praise follow; or let it appear that he had deserved to conquer, and it would become the House to endeavour to repair the error of fortune. But at present, while all they knew for certain was, that he had formed great expectations, and that those expectations had been disappointed, let them speak with candour, and suspend both their praise and their blame. Had he his nearest relation in a similar situation, this was the line of conduct he would recommend towards him, considering nothing as more degrading than praise undeserved. His honourable friend (General Smith) whose opinion on affairs in India he should follow as soon as any man's, had owned that his Lordship had marched against Seringapatam at a period when he thought he ought not to have done so. Was this to be considered as an instance of ability, or an act deserving of praise? The cause of General Abercrombie's precipitate retreat was not yet known. He hoped both he and Lord Cornwallis would be able to justify their conduct; but the blame, if there was any, lay between them, and the exculpation of the one must fix it on the other. It was therefore wrong to express an approbation of the one, which might look like deciding on the case, and render it more difficult for the other to clear up his character. Suppose General Abercrombie had been included in this expression of approbation, how would it have sounded? Yet it was customary on thanking the Commander in Chief, to thank all the officers under him, and no good reason for the omission of General Abercrombie, on the present occasion, could be given, except that it was impossible to withstand the ridicule of praising his ability after such a retreat. Yet no man was at present sufficiently informed to say that General Abercrombie was in fault, and Lord Cornwallis free from blame.

If, in the course of his argument he had said any thing disrespectful or unpleasing of Lord Cornwallis, he was sorry for it: that he had been mentioned at all was not imputable to him, but to the introduction of his name into the speech and the address, which obliged him, in the honest discharge of his duty, to say what he had said. There was no custom that warranted expressions of approbation where nothing had appeared but miscarriage and retreat.

On these grounds he supported the amendment. If on other topics of the speech and address he had touched but lightly, especially on the first, he desired it to be understood as owing to a sense of public duty and to a respect to that House, which did not allow him to mix his congratulations as a Member of Parliament on the marriage of His Majesty's son, with those of his own private sentiments as a man, or to indulge the feelings of personal respect and individual attachment on a subject of general concern and national importance.

Mr. Chancellor PITT said, it had been formerly a practice with some gentlemen, to think that the first day of the session was a proper occasion to enlarge upon the political state of Europe, which, however, he did not mean now to follow.—He did not conceive that there was any necessity for entering into a discussion concerning the origin of the war in India, as the right honourable gentleman had done; that matter had been amply and particularly discussed already, and had received the full and deliberate decision of the House last session respecting its expediency, policy, and justice; therefore, while the grounds upon which that decision was given remained uncontradicted, he saw no reason again to revive the same discussion. The right honourable gentleman, however, had not argued this point upon the same grounds which were employed last session, but seemed to have found out some new grounds which were unknown to the House. He insisted that Lord Cornwallis's letter to the Nizam was not the cause of the war, as had been alledged, and that Tippoo had never thought or stated this to be the case; but his arguments upon that question he would reserve till a period arrived for entering upon the subject with more propriety, and until the question concerning the origin of the war, which had been fully debated last session, was resumed; and when it was so resumed, he would meet it fairly: he, in support of the Government both in India and at home, as well as in justice to Lord Cornwallis, had an undoubted right to rest in the former decision, until upon resuming the discussion, there was found some new ground and substantial reason for the House to think differently from what they had done last session. He at the same time believed that the right honourable gentleman himself saw no necessity for discussing the subject now, and had rather introduced it as a col-

lateral argument, for the purpose of diminishing in the public eye the advantages gained in India, and censuring the measures of Lord Cornwallis. Without entering into any minute detail of the different occurrences of last campaign, he thought himself perfectly justified in asserting, that there were sufficient grounds to entitle him and that House to say, that they congratulated His Majesty and the country on the able conduct of Lord Cornwallis. It had been asked, what the successes were that attended our arms in India? and he thought they had been very fairly and fully stated by his right honourable friend.

He then observed, that it had been said by the right honourable gentleman, that pending a war, whatever success had occurred in the progress of that war, was not a proper subject either of approbation or blame, and that both ought to be reserved till the business should be concluded, and then distributed in the due proportion. In this he had no hesitation in saying, that he perfectly disagreed from the right honourable gentleman; and if such an argument could be supported, he would ask, if ever Marlborough would have received the thanks of his country after the battle of Blenheim, or Rodney after the glorious twelfth of April? The greatest success that could attend any enterprise, was the accomplishment of the end for which it was undertaken; yet because a war that had been reluctantly entered into was not terminated, formed surely no reason for with-holding the praise that was due to the exertions that had been employed in carrying it on.

He mentioned, that formerly the right honourable gentleman had been in the situation of having a near friend and connection in a command, and he did not recollect that he had then used the same arguments which he now brought forward: he alluded to the thanks which had been voted to Admiral Keppel for his conduct on the 27th of July; but the right honourable gentleman, in using his abstract principles, varied the application of them, according to the persons and circumstances of the time. It had been stated, that the taking of Seringapatam was the object of the last campaign; and that not being effected, no credit was due to the abilities of Lord Cornwallis; and it was likewise said, that though great and untoward difficulties had been mentioned to have intervened, none such were publicly known. This last observation was not just,

for difficulties certainly both unexpected and unusual had occurred: the monsoons, in particular, had set in much earlier than common, and the effect was evident. The river Cavary was found to be impassable, and that this was contrary to the expectation of Lord Cornwallis, could be accounted for, without the smallest reflection on his Lordship, or any necessity to suppose that he was ignorant of the local situation. His right honourable friend had very properly detailed many of the advantages we had gained during the last campaign, and yet were he to listen to the opinions of the right honourable gentleman, these were to be considered as nothing. He would ask, if depriving Tippoo of every support from the Powers on the Malabar Coast, was nothing? when these had proved of such consequence to our enemies in former wars; and he would ask, if the capture of Bangalore, a fortress of more strength, though not so rich as Seringapatam, was nothing? yet these were but some part of our successes; and he agreed with his right honourable friend, and the honourable General, that Tippoo's situation at present was so confined in every sense, that we ought to consider it as warranting our future expectations of success. In short, until new proofs, differing entirely from any thing he had yet seen, were produced, he should remain in the same opinion that he was when that House decided upon the justice, expediency, and policy of the war; and be no less persuaded that it has been well and ably conducted. As to the other topics in the speech, which the House seemed to be unanimous about, he would only say, that they afforded him as much satisfaction as they could to any one; and he did not think it necessary to enlarge upon them after what had been said. From the particular manner in which the conclusion of His Majesty's speech had been treated by the right honourable gentleman, he was compelled to say something. The right honourable gentleman seemed to think it improper that His Majesty should have selected this year as the proper juncture for mentioning in his speech the inestimable connections between liberty and order, which are the principal blessings of our excellent constitution, without referring to a temporary interruption of that order which took place in the course of the year. For his part, he regretted the circumstance as much as any man could do, but at the same time was sorry that it had

been introduced in the manner it was to-night, and really could have wished that the right honourable gentleman had rather used his discretion than his zeal, because he was sure that moderation and perseverance were the best means of getting rid of the effects of such disorders. In all popular excesses of every kind, whether proceeding from fanaticism, republicanism, or any other cause, it had been the constant wish and study of His Majesty's Ministers, to use every effort that could tend to check their progress in the most effectual manner; and though he did not believe that the right honourable gentleman had any intention of saying otherwise, he would challenge him, or any other person, not meaning that he gave the challenge now for the purpose of debate, but upon any future investigation of the facts connected with that unhappy event, to say that every means had not been taken to stop its progress, and that Government not only shewed its promptitude to check these horrid proceedings, but had likewise made every farther preparation that could be devised, in case there had still been a necessity to use them. This, therefore, was only an exception to the general happiness which the nature of our constitution was calculated to afford; and an exception certainly ought not to be made a rule for judgement; and he considered that nothing could be a stronger confirmation of the excellency and power inherent in the constitution, than that such enormities would be extinguished by the first efforts that were used to suppress them, without having recourse to more violent remedies, which might still have been used, and would not have been found wanting, had the necessity for exercising them appeared.

He came next to notice what had been said on foreign affairs. With respect to the adjustment of differences between Austria and the Porte, it had been stated that it ought to have been effected upon the principle of the *status quo*, and it was argued that this principle had been entirely deviated from, upon a supposition that when it was determined to effect the *status quo*, there was no knowledge of any modification or farther negociation that might happen afterwards, as to the line of demarkation which the right honourable gentleman treated so lightly, and would not value at the hundredth part of an English pound; he was somewhat surprised that it appeared of so

very little importance in his eyes, and he insisted that the modification he had mentioned was known, expected, and admitted at the treaty of Reichenbach, when the *status quo* was determined on as the terms of adjustment.

The arguments of the right honourable gentleman, both on this subject, and concerning the negociation with Russia, though there might be a future time for discussing them, he considered now as introduced more in a speculative than useful manner. He then replied to what Mr. Fox had said relative to the production of papers, which he seemed inclined to move for, but more inclined that they should be refused. It had been asserted that on a former occasion it was said, that unless something criminal appeared on the face of the negociation to which the papers referred, something that almost called for gibbets and axes, there was no occasion for the production of them; and that Ministers now had changed their minds so far, that they spontaneously produced the very papers which would be found *prima facie* criminal, as if they had merited and now courted the gibbets and axes, which could alone give rise to the necessity for bringing them forward. This, he said, was in the first place charging them with a very improbable timidity, and then ascribing to them a very chimerical degree of courage.

All that had been spoken in this way, he thought, was an endeavour to convert sound into argument, by what he termed a paradoxical ingenuity of debate, and observed, that in any political discussion it was very easy, and not uncommon, for warm imaginations to introduce gibbets, axes, and similar expressions. In whatever light might appear the issue of the negociation just mentioned, he would not hesitate to give his reasons for granting the papers alluded to in the speech, because he was sure it would appear to every impartial man, that the views and conduct of His Majesty's Ministers throughout the whole negociation, were directed to objects which to them appeared for the interest and honour of the country; he was free to own, that their exertions had not succeeded to the full extent of their wishes: and after defending the conduct of administration, in endeavouring to preserve the balance of power in Europe, by preventing too great an acquisition to Russia at the expence of the Porte, he confessed it to be his opinion, that the negociation would have terminated more successfully, had it

not been for opinions delivered both in and out of that House, particularly on the point respecting Oczakow. Whatever his feelings, influenced by the circumstances, might be, he would admit in the broadest manner, when the subject came more properly to a future discussion. That he had yielded, he would not say to the opinion of the whole country, but to the decided opinion of the country and of that House, conscious of the hazard and danger that must attend entering upon a war, while such a division of sentiments concerning its tendency existed; and he would consider himself very unworthy of the trust reposed in him, if he had endeavoured to resist the general opinion, however different from his own, at the same time esteeming the satisfaction of the country which seemed to be expressed on the relinquishment of his object, however well meant, a sufficient compensation for his own disappointment. And this was a subject which he hoped, on a subsequent and not distant day, would be discussed with much attention and seriousness, more, he hoped, than he now observed on the other side of the House.

He came then to mention the state of the country, and to express the heartfelt satisfaction it gave him to be able to describe it in so flourishing a condition; and contended, that a constant attention to the lessening of the public burdens, and paying off the national debt, was the best security for the continuance of its prosperity. He granted that the privilege of originating all taxes, and repealing them, was vested in the House of Commons, and had as high a respect for their privileges as any body, but as the demand which occasioned taxes came from the Crown, he saw no reason why His Majesty might not express his hopes, and the pleasure it would give him, when the revenue of the country was in such a situation as to enable the House of Commons to take off any part of them. Had His Majesty stated any particular amount of taxes to be reduced, or specified any thing relative to the mode of reduction, there might have been some reasonable ground of jealousy, but he had merely suggested his hope, that the House would find it opportune and not difficult to take off a certain part of the taxes, and to lessen the National Debt. The withdrawing any grant certainly originated there; but claiming a grant ori-

ginated with the Crown, as the head of the executive Government. On the arguments that had been used, both as to the House of Lords, and the King, by the right honourable gentleman, he said, the analogy did not hold good. He stated that some appropriation of part of the sinking fund had been proposed in the time of Sir Robert Walpole, and in his opinion too hastily given up. But all opinions on that point now he would reserve, as the right honourable gentleman had done; but from what he had heard, he did not think their opinions would coincide. He thought it necessary, however, to prevent improper speculation, that he should now give notice that he would on an early day call the attention of the House to this subject; the necessary accounts would all be ready, and on to-morrow fortnight, if nothing happened to prevent it, he would bring them forward. He would now pledge himself that the general statement he was about to give of the revenue and expenditure of the country would be found, when it came to be investigated, to contain a true and faithful account of what they really were.

STATE OF THE REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE.

The whole amount of the revenue last year, up to the 5th of January, amounted to the sum of -	£.16,690,000
Average of the last two years - - -	16,600,000
Average of three years - -	16,400,000
Average of four years was less than the last year by 500,000l. and only amounted to -	16,200,000

This was in itself a circumstance of great satisfaction. In the last year there were some causes peculiar to the year, although the bulk of the increase of last year arose from permanent causes.

In going through this statement, he made frequent references to the Finance Committee * of last year, and said, that though he considered the increase as permanent, it was not his intention to appropriate or divide the whole of this surplus, because it was surely necessary to provide against possible events

* Vide Report of the Select Committee, May 1791, printed for J. Debrett.

that might occasion additional expences; for this purpose, he meant to reserve - - - £.500,000 and all this was without interfering with the annual million for paying off the national debt.

The next question was with regard to the expenditure. He understood, from what he had heard, that he should differ with some others with regard to the reduction of the taxes. He contended that taxes should be taken off to the yearly amount of - - - £200,000

It would have been greater, had they not lately been put to some extraordinary expence, from the state of their foreign colonies. He took the annual expenditure to be £.15,800,000

By comparing this with the revenue, the excess of the last year, after the annual million was paid off, amounted to £.900,000

Excess for two years amounted to - -	800,000
For three years to - - -	600,000
For four years to - - -	400,000

This was a circumstance which one viewed with the highest satisfaction. He wished to make an allowance of 500,000l. every year for fluctuation, and meant only to take the excess of the revenue, at an average of four years, which amounted to 400,000l. and was less than the excess of the revenue of last year by half a million. He wished to divide this 400,000l. between annihilating the national debt, and taking off taxes, to wit, 200,000l. for each purpose. In order to leave the navy debt in the same situation that they were stated in the last report, would require 130,000l. He hoped, besides all this, from the surplus that would take place in the revenue, from April 5, 1792, to April 5, 1793, to get 100,000l. which would enable him to take off the last duty on malt.

This subject he wished to submit to the consideration of the House. There were four articles from which he proposed to take off the 200,000l., and he wished to mention them then, that gentlemen might have an opportunity of turning them in their minds before they came under consideration. The three first were under the head of Assessed Taxes. The first was that

which related to the general agriculture of the country, and was a tax on carts and waggons, that he meant to be taken off. The second was, a tax on female servants. The third was, 3s. a year on all houses below seven windows. These three put together would amount to more than one hundred thousand pounds. The next was a very general article of consumption, and taking the tax off it would afford general satisfaction, and there was a great chance if the tax was taken off, that the commodity would really become so much cheaper. He meant to take one halfpenny off every pound of candles, which would amount to near another 100,000l.

All this he mentioned by way of notice, and hoped it would not be thought entirely to proceed from his impatience to publish good news by way of catching at popularity, but he thought he could not be too early in pledging himself to the particulars stated in His Majesty's speech. He concluded with expressing his participation in the general happiness occasioned by the marriage of the Duke of York to the Princess Royal of Prussia.

Mr. FOX rose to explain, and contended that the question as to what portion of the surplus should be applied to the reduction of the existing taxes, and what portion to the diminution of the national debt, being mingled with the idea of removing certain taxes which were highly obnoxious, and which every body must wish to see removed, could not come forward fairly for discussion. It should have been first submitted to the House abstractedly.

Mr. Chancellor PITT then spoke of the reduced annuities. The only funds redeemable were, he said, the four per cents. He spoke of a rumour having obtained ground, that he meant to borrow money at 3½ per cent. to redeem the 5 per cents, to make up 25 millions of the debt reduced, but he declared he never had entertained any such idea, and he should consider it as acting contrary to the spirit of an act of Parliament. The 4 per cents. he said, were redeemable, and the *fives*, when 25 millions of debt were discharged clearly and unquestionably. At 9 the question was called, and the House divided on the amendment,

Ayes, 85; Noes, 209.

The main question on the addrefs, as first moved, was then put and carried.

A Committee was then appointed to draw up an addrefs, who withdrew to the Speaker's chamber for that purpofe; and His Majefty's fpeech was upon motion referred to the faid Committee.

The Houfe adjourned.

Wednefday, 1ft February.

A meffage from the Lords, by Mr. Holford and Mr. Graves; that the Lords had commanded them to acquaint this Houfe, That their Lordfhips will proceed farther in the trial of Warren Haftings, Efquire, on Tuefday the 14th day of this inftant February, at ten of the clock in Weftminfter Hall.

Mr. Charles Yorke reported from the Committee, appointed yefterday to draw up an addrefs to be prefented to His Majefty, that the Committee had drawn up an addrefs accordingly, which they had directed him to report to the Houfe; and he read the fame in his place, and afterwards delivered it in at the table, where the fame was read, and agreed to by the Houfe.

The humble Addrefs of the Houfe of Commons to the King.

Moft gracious Sovereign,

WE, your Majefty's moft dutiful and loyal fubjects, the Commons of Great Britain, in Parliament affembled, humbly beg leave to return your Majefty the thanks of this Houfe, for your moft gracious Speech from the Throne.

We embrace the earlieft opportunity to offer to your Majefty our cordial and dutiful congratulations upon the nuptials of His Royal Highnefs the Duke of York; and to exprefs the great fatisfaction and joy of your faithful Commons on this happy occafion, which may furnifh an additional fecurity to the many bleffings which this country has enjoyed under the mild and aufpicious Government of your Majefty, and your illuftrious family.

Impreffed with thefe fentiments, we fhall chearfully proceed to make fuch provifion for the eftablifhment of their Royal Highneffes the Duke and Dutchefs of York, as fhall be fuited to their rank and dignity.

We learn, with satisfaction, the progress which has been made towards the restoration of general tranquillity.

We acknowledge your Majesty's condescension and goodness, in communicating to us the result of the negociations in which your Majesty has been engaged with foreign powers; and in having been graciously pleased to order copies of the definitive treaty between Austria and the Porte to be laid before us; together with such papers as are necessary to shew the terms of peace which have been under discussion, during the negociation with the Court of Petersburgh.

Although we cannot but regret that your Majesty is not yet enabled to inform us of the termination of the war in India, we reflect, with just satisfaction, on the success which has already attended the distinguished bravery and exertions of the officers and troops under the able conduct of Lord Cornwallis; and we rejoice that your Majesty sees reasonable ground to hope that the war may be speedily brought to an honourable conclusion.

We are happy to learn that the friendly assurances which your Majesty receives from foreign powers, and the general situation of affairs, induce your Majesty to think, that some immediate reduction may safely be made in our naval and military establishments; and we observe, with the warmest gratitude, your Majesty's parental regard for the interests of your subjects, manifested in your desire of availiag yourself of any favourable opportunity to diminish the public expences.

It cannot but afford us great satisfaction to find that the extraordinary expences, incurred in the course of the last year, have been already defrayed, in a great measure, by the grants of the session; and we shall apply ourselves, without delay, to the consideration of the best means of providing for the remaining part of those expences, as well as for the current service of the year.

We shall proceed to the examination of the state of the public income and expenditure; and it will afford us the highest gratification if, on the result of such examination, we shall find ourselves enabled to enter on a system so consonant to our most earnest and anxious wishes, as that of gradually relieving your Majesty's faithful subjects from some parts of the existing taxes; at the same time giving additional efficacy to the plan for the reduction of the national debt, on the success of which we are

fully sensible that our future ease and security must essentially depend.

With a view to this important object, we shall not fail to turn our attention to the consideration of such measures, as the state of the funds, and of public credit, may render practicable and expedient, towards a reduction in the rate of interest of any of the annuities which are now redeemable.

We beseech your Majesty to believe, that we shall consider the continued and progressive improvement of the internal situation of the country, as an additional incentive to the faithful discharge of our duty, in the pursuit of every measure that can be conducive to the public interest.

We cordially join with your Majesty in a just expectation and reliance, that this happy circumstance must operate as the strongest encouragement to a spirit of useful industry, among all classes of your Majesty's subjects. And, above all, we rejoice to think that it must confirm and increase their steady and zealous attachment to the principles of that constitution, which has been found, by long experience, to unite the inestimable blessings of liberty and order; and which we shall ever consider it our first duty to preserve and maintain, as being the cause to which, under the favour of providence, all our other advantages are principally to be ascribed.

Resolved,

That the said address be presented to His Majesty by the whole House.

Ordered,

That such Members of this House as are of His Majesty's most honourable Privy Council, do humbly know His Majesty's pleasure, when he will be attended by this House.

Mr. Chancellor Pitt moved, "That this House do congratulate Her Majesty on the nuptials of his Royal Highness the Duke of York."

Resolved, *nem. con.*

That this House do congratulate Her Majesty on the nuptials of his Royal Highness the Duke of York.

Ordered,

That Mr. Chancellor Pitt, Mr. Secretary Dundas, Lord Frederick Campbell, the Lord Apſley, and Mr. Harbord, do attend Her Majeſty with this congratulation.

The Earl of Euſton moved, "That a congratulatory meſ- "ſage be ſent to their Royal Highneſſes the Duke and Dutcheſs "of York."

Reſolved, *nem. con.*

That a congratulatory meſſage be ſent to their Royal Highneſſes the Duke and Dutcheſs of York, on the joyful occaſion of their nuptials.

Ordered,

That the Earl of Euſton, the Earl of Mornington, the Lord Bayham, the Lord Hinchinbrook, Mr. John Smyth, Mr. Ryder, and Mr. Secretary at War, do attend their Royal Highneſſes with the ſaid meſſage.

Ordered,

That His Majeſty's moſt gracious ſpeech to both Houſes of Parliament, be taken into conſideration to-morrow morning.

The Committee of Privileges, and other Committees, uſually appointed on the ſecond day of the ſeſſion, were moved and ordered,

The ſeveral orders for preventing ſtoppages in the ſtreets, &c. were revived.

TRIAL of WARREN HASTINGS, Eſq.

Mr. Fox recommended, in fixing the days for taking the ſeveral petitions into conſideration, to prevent them as much as poſſible from interfering with the trial of Mr. Haſtings, that the want of a ſufficient number of Members to ballot for a Committee might never interrupt the proceedings of the trial.

The SPEAKER ſaid, he had not ſuffered the conſideration to eſcape him; and that it had occurred to his mind, that two different modes of proceeding might be adopted to prevent the inconvenience; the one to paſs an act of Parliament to declare Mr. Haſtings's trial one of the exceptions to the coercion of

Mr. Grenville's act; the other to follow the precedent adopted in 1628, upon Lord Strafford's trial, it having been then resolved, that the Committee of the House who attended the trial might go into Court, without having been first obliged to come to the House.

Mr. Chancellor PITT said, that it was due to the importance of the trial, and the necessary solemnity of it, that something should be resolved on to accommodate every difficulty that might occur respecting it, but that he thought the last Precedent mentioned from the Chair infinitely the most preferable, since it was clear that the House meant to impose some trouble upon themselves in order to obtain the ballots for election Committees, when they passed the clause of the act enacting that no business should be proceeded on whenever a Committee was to be balloted for, before the ballot was over and the Committee sworn in, to make therefore any new exception to the operation of the act, would be, in his mind, improperly to weaken its efficacy.

The House adjourned.

Thursday, 2d February.

Lord Courtown reported to the House, that His Majesty having been waited upon, pursuant to the order of Wednesday last, had been pleased to appoint that day, at three o'clock, to be attended with the address of the House.

The order of the day being read to take into consideration His Majesty's most gracious speech to both Houses of Parliament,

The same was read by the Speaker.

It was then moved, "That a supply be granted to His Majesty."

The said motion was, by order, referred to a Committee of the whole House for to-morrow, when the same will be taken into consideration.

A new writ was moved for Great Bedwin, in the room of Lord Down, deceased.

The Speaker and Members left the House at a quarter before three o'clock, and proceeded to St. James's.

Friday, 3d February.

Several petitions were received for private bills, and the last day for receiving such petitions was fixed for Friday the 2d of March.

Mr. Speaker reported to the House, that the House attended His Majesty yesterday, with their address; to which His Majesty was pleased to give this most gracious answer:

Gentlemen,

I thank you for this loyal and dutiful address.

Your cordial and affectionate congratulations on the marriage of my son the Duke of York with the Princess Royal of Prussia, and the assurances of your readiness to enable me to make a suitable provision for their establishment, cannot but afford me the warmest satisfaction.

I observe, with peculiar pleasure, the expressions of your regard to the interests of my subjects, which cannot be more fully manifested than by your constant and earnest desire to preserve, unimpaired, the innumerable blessings which they derive from our excellent constitution.

Mr. Chancellor Pitt acquainted the House, that the gentlemen appointed to attend Her Majesty with the congratulation of this House, had attended Her Majesty accordingly; and that Her Majesty was pleased to say,

I am fully persuaded of the attachment of the House of Commons to the King, and the Royal Family, on all occasions, and desire my thanks may be expressed for their congratulations on the present happy occasion.

The Earl of Euston acquainted the House, that the gentlemen appointed to attend their Royal Highnesses the Duke and Dutchess of York, with the congratulatory message sent from this House, had attended their Royal Highnesses accordingly; and that their Royal Highnesses were pleased to give this answer:

We both return our thanks to the House of Commons for their congratulatory compliments.

The House resolved into a Committee of Supply on His Majesty's speech, and came to a resolution, that a supply be granted to His Majesty.

Ordered,

That the House resolve again into a Committee of Supply on Monday.

Mr. GREY rose to give notice that he meant, on Monday next, to move for a continuance of the Committee, nominated last year, for examining the laws respecting imprisonment for debt. He said, when he gave this notice, he wished to be completely understood, that it was not his intention to bring in a bill of insolvency, but merely to have some regulations made, by which the industrious and unfortunate debtor might be relieved, and at the same time no sanction or encouragement given to fraudulent transactions. This he thought it necessary to say now, to prevent false hopes on one side, and false alarms on the other.

The Hon. Major MAITLAND said, he wished to call the attention of the House to the notice of a motion which he meant to bring forward on an early day. It was for certain papers, explanatory of our present situation in India, which he conceived to be very different from what it was when that subject was discussed last year. The cause of the war in India was now entirely changed: then it was to avenge an insult offered to one of our allies—now it became a claim to defray the expence we had been put to on that account; and according to the system now pursued, he thought, however much Lord Cornwallis wished for peace, it would not be in his power to make peace, nor would the Mahrattas and the Nizam agree to it, until Tippoo was extirpated from the Mysore country. The papers he meant to move for, he expected would have been readily granted; but as he understood from the right honourable gentleman opposite, that the production of them was to be opposed, he would bring forward his motion on Thursday next.

Mr. HIPPISLEY understanding that his honourable friend was to move for papers, said he would avail himself of the opportunity to request information from the right honourable gen-

Bonnerman (Mr. Dundas), on a ſubject which he conſidered of ſome importance. When he had originally moved for papers, a letter of the late Sir Archibald Campbell had been produced, denying his aſſent to the purchaſe of Cranganore. He underſtood that a notarial copy of a letter of Sir Archibald Campbell, or Major Bonnerman, had been ſent home, in contradiction of the original information. He begged to ſay, that no man in that Houſe could entertain a higher veneration for his deceaſed friend, Sir Archibald Campbell, than himſelf; that he was a man of the moſt rigid, principled honour; but it was neceſſary to recollect, that, for many months anterior to his death, Sir Archibald had laboured under an infirmity which might reaſonably be ſuppoſed to have weakened his memory. As the fact of the letter of contradiction was of general report, Mr. Hippiſley thought it in juſtice due to the Houſe, that, if it exiſted, it ſhould be produced, as much of the arguments had been built upon it. He then read a paragraph of a letter by the Swallow, mentioning the ſubject, and concluded by moving for the production of the letter.

Mr. Secretary DUNDAS ſaid, that for his own part he certainly could have no objection to the production of the particular paper mentioned by the honourable gentleman, but as he conſidered that no good had ariſen from diſcuſſions on ſuch demands laſt ſeſſion, and likewiſe knew that no advantage could enſue, and that much hazard and danger might be incurred from ſimilar motions in the preſent ſtate of the war in India, he certainly ſhould oppoſe the motion, and all ſuch whenever they were made; with regard to himſelf he could entertain no wiſh to conceal the contents of papers, but unleſs it appeared to the wiſdom of the Houſe that there was ſome neceſſity, uſe, or propriety in calling for them, he thought it his duty to reſiſt ſuch motions.

Mr. HIPPISLEY ſaid, what he had moved was in ſtrict juſtice and propriety due. The Houſe had received information which now ſtood contradicted. They had a right to examine the ground of this contradiction. With reſpect to what had fallen from the right honourable Secretary, of his intention of oppoſing motions of his honourable friend for a continuation of intelligence, &c. from India, it was with ſurpriſe, and even aſtoniſhment, he heard ſuch objection; the right ho-

nourable gentleman was one of the most forward to move every possible investigation on the subject of the last war, and the news of its breaking out had scarcely reached England, when a Committee was appointed to inquire into the causes of the war, at which Committee the right honourable Gentleman presided; that the public were infinitely indebted to the meritorious labours of that Committee in the production of a body of information on the subject of India, from which not only his condemnation of the former war was to be drawn, but which proved inconteſtibly alſo, the impolicy and inexpediency of this preſent war, and ſtated the juſt principles on which to form the trueſt eſtimation of our preſent allies. Indeed, Lord Cornwallis began at length to entertain himſelf a juſt eſtimation of thoſe allies (the Mahrattas and the Nizam), as the two laſt Gazettes would prove. His Lordſhip's letter on the Bangalore Gazette expreſsly told us, that little dependance was to be placed on the influence of the Mahratta Chiefs, even if they ſhould be diſpoſed to exert it; and from this hypothetical ſtatement his Lordſhip's opinion of the Mahrattas might eaſily be collected: but the laſt Gazette put the queſtion out of all doubt. as Lord Cornwallis expreſsly pronounces the ſtrongeſt condemnation of the Nizam's General, and the Mahratta Chiefs. He ſays, that the apprehenſion of loſing the ſpoils of one place, was the only motive that could draw them from another; that he had, however, concealed his diſſatisfaction, &c.; in a word, he ſtood committed to theſe people, whom he had ſo much reaſon to diſtruſt and condemn. Mr. Hippiſley ſaid, he would venture to ſtate to the face of the right honourable Secretary, what Lord Cornwallis's real ſituation was with reſpect to his allies. His Lordſhip wiſhed to conclude a peace on honourable terms; the Mahrattas would not permit any peace, but inſiſted on purſuing the object, even to extirpation. This was their view and determination at the period of the laſt diſpatches. They might, perhaps, be brought over, if Tippoo could bid high enough to ſatisfy their avarice. He hoped in future the queſtion of the war would be diſcuſſed by the evidence of facts, not by the eſtimation of private character.— That we had heard enough of the merits of Lord Cornwallis, and the demerits of his antagoniſt. No man could queſtion the high principled honour of Lord Cornwallis, or the mercileſs

blood-thirsty character of Tippoo Sultan; yet personal characters had no relation to the origin or conduct of the war, and the right honourable Secretary must recollect, a good Scotch motto, "Let the deed show." His honourable Friend had touched on the letter of Lord Cornwallis of the 7th of July, 1789, to the Nizam, which in fact amounted to a declaration of war against Tippoo Sultan, anterior to the Travancore attack; that it took away the negative which the English Government before held to granting a British force to the Nizam, and it gave the Nizam the power of calling for it when he pleased, provided he did not employ it against the Peshwa, &c. enumerating all the powers, except Tippoo Sultan, in other words, telling the Nizam, that he might employ it against Tippoo Sultan when he pleased, and if we were so fortunate to get Tippoo's country by his Highness's means, we could pay him the seven lacks of Subah, and Chout to the Mahrattas. Lord Cornwallis admits, in the same letter, that Tippoo has not been the aggressor of any treaty, yet he holds out this temptation to the Nizam. Mr. Hippisley said, he could not hesitate to pronounce this letter to be pregnant with all the mischief that has since befallen us, and that if Mr. Hastings had written such a letter, it assuredly would have been voted one of the articles of impeachment against him.

Mr. DUNDAS said a few words across the table, and it was agreed that Major Maitland's and Mr. Hippisley's motions should be made on Thursday next.

Ordered,

That Mr. Burke, Mr. Fox, Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Thomas Pelham, Mr. Windham, Sir Gilbert Elliot, Mr. Grey, Mr. Adam, Mr. Anstruther, Mr. Michael Angelo Taylor, Mr. Dudley North, General Burgoyne, the Lord North, Mr. St. John, Mr. Fitzpatrick, Mr. Wilbraham, Mr. Courtenay, and Sir James St. Clair Erskine, be the Managers to make good the articles of impeachment against Warren Hastings, Esquire.

The House adjourned.

Monday, 6th February.

Mr. Grey moved for the ſame Committee which was appointed laſt year, to take into conſideration the preſent practice and effects of impriſonment for debt. He likewiſe moved, "That a liſt of perſons confined for debt in the different jails "in England and Wales, be laid before the Houſe."

Mr. PELHAM preſented a petition relative to the Seaford election. He ſtated, that by an inadvertency, the petition already preſented on the ſubject of the Seaford election, was not an exact copy of the petition of the laſt ſeſſion, whereas according to the words of the act of Parliament, all renewed petitions offered in a ſubſequent ſeſſion, muſt be *fac ſimilies* of the firſt petition. He accounted for the difference by the following explanation, viz. that in the courſe of the laſt ſummer, Sir Godfrey Webſter (one of the petitioners) ſuddenly called on Mr. Froggatt, his agent, ſaid he was preparing to go abroad, and as he might not probably return to England ſo ſoon as the commencement of the next ſeſſion of Parliament, he wiſhed to ſign his petition then. Mr. Froggatt opened a box in which were two different drafts of petitions, the one the draft of the original petition, which, upon re-conſideration, was thrown aſide, and the other, the draſt of a petition, which had been actually engroſſed and preſented to the Houſe laſt ſeſſion. Unfortunately, in his hurry, Mr. Froggatt took out the draft of the rejected petition, and had it copied and preſented this ſeſſion, before he diſcovered his miſtake. The petition, therefore, that Mr. Pelham had to preſent, was a petition from Mr. Froggatt, alledging the facts before mentioned; adding, that Sir Godfrey Webſter was abroad, and Mr. John Tarleton (the other petitioner) in the North of England, and praying that the Houſe would allow him farther time for preſenting a petition, under ſuch circumſtances, than the ſtrict order of the Houſe admitted.

Mr. Pelham ſaid, he would not move any thing upon the ſubject immediately, farther than that the ſaid petition be taken into conſideration at a future day, which was ſettled for Tueſday next.

MR. ANSTRUTHER produced a petition on the subject of the Sutherland election, the grounds of which he explained to the House. There was, Mr. Anstruther observed, a difference in words, but not in substance, between the petition that had been presented this year, and that presented last session. In the former petition a paragraph was inserted, charging certain persons with "having offered bribes, pensions, "places, and other rewards, to the electors," whereas, in the petition lately presented, the paragraph was thus worded:— "Bribes, pensions, places, *offices*, and other rewards," which certainly was a variance in words, although not in sense or spirit, since the description, "bribes, pensions, places, and "other rewards," would clearly have let the petitioners into a right of proving a promise of *offices*, but in strict conformity to the act of Parliament, the petition in his hand, Mr. Anstruther said, was intended to be delivered in at the table, it being a literal and *verbatim* copy of the petition delivered in last session.

The said petition was ordered to be taken into consideration on the 8th of March next, half an hour after the former petition shall have been disposed of.

Mr. BURKE complimented the Speaker on the clearness and perspicuity with which he had stated the difficulty that would attend the adoption of the precedent in Lord Strafford's case, and the wisdom of his suggestion in respect to a special bill, proving on the one hand, that what had been done in 1640, had not been authorized by any thing to be traced before it, and on the other hand, that it had not been sanctioned by any subsequent example. Mr. Burke said, that although Lord Strafford's impeachment was much to be lamented, it had happened in what he should ever contend to have been constitutional though troubled times, yet as men's minds were then warm and inflamed, and as the resolution of the House in Lord Strafford's case stood single and by itself, he should rest upon the advice and authority of the Chair, which ought to have due weight in all important and momentous proceedings, and therefore he should take the liberty of moving for leave to bring in a special bill, but such a one as should amount to a permanent regulation in all cases of impeachment, and not merely be adapted to the particular trial in question. Mr.

Burke moved "that Mr. Grenville's act relative to trials of "election petitions be read;" the same having been read accordingly, Mr. Burke added a few more words on the occasion which made such a procedure necessary, and then moved for leave to bring in a bill "to amend several acts of Parliament for regulating the trials of controverted elections or "returns of Members to serve in Parliament." The same was afterwards presented, read a first time, and ordered to be read a second time; after which it was committed for next day.

Mr. FOX said, he should have occasion but very shortly to trouble the House, as the bills he meant to move for leave to bring in, had last session been honoured with the sanction of that House. The bills, he said, had last session been lost in the House of Lords, but he understood, if he might at all allude to what passed elsewhere, that the Lords did not object to the principles of the bills, but merely to the very advanced period of the Session in which they had been sent to them, and which did not admit of fit opportunity of full discussion of subjects so interesting and important. In order therefore to obviate any such objection, he had thus early moved for leave to bring in the bills again. Mr. Fox concluded with moving, that leave be given to bring in a bill "to remove doubts respecting the functions of juries in cases of libels," and the same was agreed to.

Mr. FOX afterwards moved for leave to bring in a bill to explain and amend several acts relative to writs of *Quo Warranto*, &c. Leave was given.

Sir BENJAMIN HAMMETT gave notice, that he should on a future day, move for leave to bring in a bill to make the private estates of Bankers responsible, for their simple and contract debts. Sir Benjamin stated, that they ought to be so responsible, and mentioned, that he understood, a bill of a similar kind had formerly been introduced, and passed that House, but that it had been lost in the House of Lords. That bill however, he said, had gone much farther than the bill he meant to propose. Sir Benjamin reminded the House of the success that had attended his bill, to change the sentence of female capital convicts, from burning to hanging, and trusted that he should experience the same degree of success, with regard to the bill, of which he then gave notice.

Mr. Chancellor Pitt presented to the House the following Papers:

I.

Extract of the Empress's Rescript to Count Woronzow, of the 1/8 December, 1789.

TRANSLATION.

THE answer which we ordered our Ministry to make to the note delivered by the Prussian Envoy, Count de Goltze, relative to our peace with the Ottoman Porte and the King of Sweden, is known to you in its full extent.

We manifested to the King of Prussia our regret that his endeavours to incline our enemies to pacific intentions had not succeeded, and that they obstinately refused to adopt a measure, which ought, in strict justice, to have been the first step, on their part in the road to peace, being deaf to the pacific representations which were made respecting the detention of the person of our Minister Bulgakoff, contrary to all the laws of nations. We informed him of our desire that the continuation of his good offices might prevail over the obstinacy of the Porte and the King of Sweden; and we proposed, as soon as there should be a hope of our enemies altering their way of thinking, to give him a fresh proof of our rectitude, and of the sincerity of our intentions, in communicating to him our ulterior conditions.

Although the British Ministry have not entered into any explanation with you, relative to our peace, you know, by our rescripts of the 8th of December, 1788, and of the 6th of October of the present year, (1789) that we intended to make a like friendly overture to the Court of London, at the first favourable opportunity. It is true that, even to this time, we have no certain proof, that the Ottoman Porte is sincerely desirous of terminating the war which she unjustly began, and for which our dignity highly insulted, and the considerable expences, indispensably require an adequate satisfaction: but, in order to shew that even the victories and conquests, with which providence has blessed our arms, have not shaken our moderation, we have resolved to make a communication, as

well at London as at Berlin, of our firm and sincere desire to see peace and tranquillity re-established between us and our enemies. The Ottoman Porte, in setting our Minister Bulgakoff at liberty, has given an outward sign of repentance, which removes, in some measure, the bar which was opposed to pacific communications and overtures, so that the friendly and disinterested powers, who have no other object than the restoration of tranquillity, may be the more able to contribute to it, as, in order to faciliate their efforts, equally laudable and salutary, we make no difficulty to communicate to them, in full confidence, our ultimate conditions, founded in extreme moderation.

Before we enter into the detail of those conditions, we will sincerely avow, that we have no intention of destroying the balance of Europe, and of annihilating the Ottoman Monarchy; but that the whole of our pretensions are confined, 1st, to the satisfaction due to our dignity so highly insulted; 2dly, to the reimbursement of our expences, which have been occasioned by an unjust war; and 3dly, to obtain for the future a firm peace, and security to our empire. As to what relates to the first article, after the superiority which our arms have acquired over the enemy, we establish the satisfaction due to our dignity in his repentance, and in the simple renewal, without ambiguity, of the validity of all preceding engagements, beginning with the peace of Kainardgi, up to the day of the rupture; in the fixing of our frontiers to the river Dniester, comprehending the town of Akerman, or Belgorod, at the mouth of that river, situated on the right hand shore; and in the facility of the Porte to acquiesce in other conditions, which are to be proposed, in compensation for our expences, as well as for preventing every kind of misunderstanding.

The expences of this war, so unjustly commenced against us, have already amounted to sixteen millions of roubles, without including the precious loss of men. We leave it to the decision of the friendly and impartial powers, whether it is not just to demand and expect that an equivalent should be given to us for such considerable losses. But we are ready to fix upon a reasonable valuation of these expences, in asking, as an equiva-

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lent, that the country situated between the Dniester and the coasts of the Black Sea, the Danube, the river Olte, and the frontiers of Austria, known by the names of Bessarabia, Moldavia and Wallachia, should form an independent state, governed by a Sovereign of the Christian religion which prevails in those provinces, and that such state should never be appropriated to any other power, but serve as a barrier to its neighbours, thereb avoiding subjects of dispute, which easily arise from an immediate neighbourhood.

From regulating thus these two first points relative to the peace, the third and most important condition naturally results, which is to secure mutual tranquillity for the future. Our frontiers in Europe on terra firma being distant, and separated by an independent State, an end would be thereby put to the various causes of misunderstanding and dispute occasioned by their contiguity.

With respect to our ally the Emperor, we are able to declare that his views concur, jointly with ours, in the re-establishment of peace with the Porte, and that his intentions, equally with ours, are very distant from destroying the balance of Europe, and annihilating the Ottoman Empire. We doubt not but his pretensions are founded in moderation, on justice, and on the most scrupulous proportion to the expences he has incurred, by taking an active part in the war with the Turks, according to the engagements subsisting between us, after all the pains he had taken to prevent it, or, at least immediately after its commencement, to terminate it, had proved fruitless. It naturally follows, that our ally, making war in common with us, and without interruption, against our common enemy, ought consequently, by the tenor of our mutual engagements, to be included in the pacification with the Porte.

In communicating all this, with the most unlimited confidence, to the Court of London, we shall receive it as the most convincing proof of the friendship of the King of Great Britain for us, if he should judge proper to send orders to his Ambassador at Constantinople, and to his Minister at Stockholm, to employ their most assiduous endeavours to dissuade our enemies from the continuation of the present war, and to incline them to pacific intentions, analagous to our offers. We shall receive such good offices with great gratitude, sincerely desiring

to employ our reciprocity in favour of His Majesty, having always considered the augmentation of his glory, his power, and his dominion, as our own happiness, and to which we are ready to contribute with our whole power.

As a greater mark of our confidence in the King of Great Britain, and as a proof of our moderation, we here add, that, in case our enemies manifest an insurmountable obstinacy, and drive us to the necessity of continuing the war, we will preserve, even though successful, the same pacific and moderate principles, and the same repugnance to their destruction, without ceasing to open ourselves, in a friendly and confidential manner, with the Court of London, and to profit of its good offices for our pacification.

II.

Extract of a letter from his Grace the Duke of Leeds to Count Woronzow, dated Whitehall, February 9, 1790.

TRANSLATION.

Having laid before the King the papers which you communicated to me, by order of your Court, I have His Majesty's commands to assure you, that any proposition made by the Empress will meet with the greatest attention on the part of the King, especially when it relates to so desirable an object as the re-establishment of the public tranquillity.

The King, however, has seen, with sincere regret, the nature of the conditions of peace proposed by her Imperial Majesty, which are founded on such considerable exchanges of territory, as cannot fail essentially to affect the interests of various European powers, and which appear to the King as calculated rather to prolong, and even to extend the war, than to put an end to its calamities.

It is of course impossible that His Majesty can, in any manner, interfere in support of the conditions now brought forward. The King, however, will never have any object more at heart, (next to the immediate prosperity of his people) than

that of seeing an end put to the troubles which at present distract a considerable portion of Europe, by a general peace, founded on moderate and equitable principles; and His Majesty will not cease to testify the same desire, which he has already so often manifested, of embracing, in concert with his allies, every favourable opportunity which may offer of accomplishing so desirable an object.

III.

Copy of a letter from the Duke of Leeds to Mr. Whitworth.

Whitehall, April 2, 1790.

SIR,

YOUR several dispatches, to No. XV. inclusive, have been duly received and laid before the King.

I have it now in command from His Majesty, to instruct you to take the earliest opportunity of expressing to the Court of St. Petersburgh, His Majesty's concern, that the period for the opening of the campaign has drawn so near without any progress having been made, in the interval of hostilities, towards a negociation for putting an end to the war, or for preventing its farther extension. His Majesty has already repeatedly expressed his earnest desire to employ his good offices and mediation, if they can be effectual, for restoring the peace of Europe; but he has hitherto had the mortification of observing, that the terms proposed by Russia are not such as can be likely to produce the desired end, which, His Majesty conceives, can alone be obtained by all the Belligerent powers concurring in a wish to terminate the war, without any material alteration in the relative situation in which they were previous to its commencement. You will, therefore, state His Majesty's earnest hope, that the Empress may be inclined to desist from demands inconsistent with this principle; and that His Majesty, at all events, conceives the only chance now left of obtaining the great end in view, and of avoiding the mischiefs of another campaign, and the possibility of the extension of the war, will be, that an immediate armistice should be agreed upon by all the Belligerent powers, which

would afford an opportunity of ſetting on foot a negociation on juſt and reaſonable grounds.

On theſe motives, and from a conſideration of the urgency of the moment, His Majeſty has determined immediately to propoſe this armiſtice to all the Belligerent powers, as well as to the Court of St. Peterſburgh. Should it be accepted, His Majeſty will be ready immediately to employ his mediation for ſetting on foot a negociation on the principle already mentioned.

IV.

Extract of a diſpatch from Count d'Oſterman to Count de Woronzow, dated St. Peterſburgh, May 1, 1790, communicated May 30.

THE Engliſh Miniſter at our Court having delivered to me the incloſed extract of a diſpatch addreſſed to him by the Duke of Leeds, dated April 2, N. S. I have loſt no time in ſubmitting it to the conſideration of the Empreſs.

Her imperial Majeſty has learnt, with equal pleaſure and gratitude, the ſentiments again manifeſted by His Britannic Majeſty on this occaſion, ſo friendly towards her, and ſo favourable to humanity.

You have already been authorized, Sir, on different occaſions, to make known the ſentiments of the Empreſs at the Court where you reſide; and Her Majeſty has a right to expect, that His Britannic Majeſty has not miſunderſtood the perfect conformity of views which ſubſiſts between them, relative to the double object by which they are animated, of putting a ſpeedy end to the exiſting war, and of preventing the poſſible extenſion of it. You will now, Sir, add, that the confidence which dictated theſe firſt overtures, on our part, cannot but have been increaſed by the ſtep lately taken by His Britannic Majeſty; and that the Empreſs, duly eſtimating and honouring the juſtice and equity of his principles, will feel herſelf the leſs embarraſſed in demonſtrating her own, as ſhe thinks ſhe may rely on His Britannic Majeſty's doing her reciprocal juſtice.

The manner in which her imperial Majeſty has received the overtures which have been made to her from different quar-

[illegible] for the purpoſe of terminating the two wars which have been ſo unjuſtly undertaken againſt her, ought not to leave any doubt of her inclinations upon this ſubject: her conduct, ever in conformity with her expreſſions, has proved, that ſhe has not allowed any opportunity, either direct or indirect, to eſcape her, which appeared to her as proper to inſpire her enemies with diſpoſitions analogous to her own. If the grounds of pacification, which ſhe confided laſt winter to the Court of London, jointly with that of Berlin, have appeared little calculated to anſwer the end propoſed by them, we have not heſitated to explain ourſelves, with the moſt cordial frankneſs, on the motives which obliged us to preſent them in a certain degree of extenſion. Theſe motives were ſupported by ſuch evident reaſons, that when, in conſequence of the orders you received, you ſtated them to the Britiſh Miniſtry, they could not but produce an effect upon them, and leave them no reaſonable apprehenſion, that, when the enemies of Ruſſia ſhall be ſeriouſly diſpoſed to treat for a peace, ſhe will not afford every facility which may depend upon her. In referring to theſe reaſons, and in again impreſſing them, if it ſhall be neceſſary, your Excellency will add, that her Imperial Majeſty, perſiſting ſincerely in her diſpoſition of ſpeedily reconciling herſelf with her enemies, on juſt and reaſonable conditions, and perceiving that thoſe which ſhe has propoſed for this purpoſe have been deemed not to be of a nature to be accepted by them, conceives that ſhe cannot more properly fulfil the views of his Britannic Majeſty, than by waiting till they diſcloſe, in their turn, what conditions they are ready to grant, for the attainment of this object; and ſhould they prove in any degree compatible with the honour and dignity of the Empreſs, and with the intereſts of her empire, her Imperial Majeſty will not heſitate to accede to them, adhering, as cloſely as poſſible, to the very principles ſtated in the above-mentioned extract of the Duke of Leeds's diſpatch.

With regard to the armiſtice, which His Britannic Majeſty propoſes as a ſtep towards the peace, her Imperial Majeſty would not have heſitated to accept it immediately, with regard to the Ottoman Porte, if her inclinations in this reſpect were not combated by the obligation ſhe is under of acting in this affair in concert with the Court of Vienna; and by a

consideration which she has, in common with that Court, arising from the certain knowledge we have of the secret project of the Porte, to amuse the two allied Courts, by feigned negociations for an armistice and for a peace, till they shall be able to assemble all their forces. Since therefore the armistice in question must terminate in giving success to the artifice of the Ottoman Porte, his Britannic Majesty must feel what injury and prejudice may result from it to the interests of the two allied Courts, and to the work of peace itself. On weighing maturely this consideration, the Empress hopes that his Britannic Majesty has too much equity, and too much friendship for her, to insist on so pernicious a measure, unless his wisdom shall be able to devise the means of obviating this danger and inconvenience. But, notwithstanding the continuation of the operations which have been settled for this campaign, her Imperial Majesty does not hesitate to give his Britannic Majesty the most positive assurances, that, whatever may be the success which Providence may be pleased to grant to her arms, her principles of moderation, of equity, and of regard for the system of balance, which forms the object of his Britannic Majesty's solicitude, shall in no wise be altered.

V.

Copy of a Letter from the Duke of Leeds to Mr. Whitworth, dated Whitehall, June 15, 1790.

Sir,

I send you inclosed a copy of a paper which was lately communicated to me by Count Woronzow. After a mature consideration of its contents, I think it proper to direct you, Sir, immediately to represent to the Russian Ministers, that, although His Majesty observes, with concern, that circumstances prevented the Empress from closing with the proposal of an armistice, he sees, on the other hand, with great satisfaction, the expression of the Empress's disposition to listen to overtures of peace, coming as near as possible to the principles which I stated to you in my dispatch of the 2d of April. These principles continue to appear to His Majesty, as most likely to lay

the foundation of a general pacification. It, however, appears to His Majesty, to be very difficult to propose any precise terms for that purpose, previous to the commencement of a negociation: until that can be brought forward, the most just and reasonable proposition for a general basis, appears to be, either that of the *status quo*, as it stood previous to the war, subject, however, to some reasonable modifications, or one founded upon such exchange between the different belligerent Powers, and those immediately in their neighbourhood, as may tend to conciliate their different interests and pretensions, and, at the same time, prevent any material alteration, on the whole, in the balance of power in the North and East of Europe.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LEEDS.

VI.

Extract of a Dispatch from Count Osterman to Count Woronzow, dated St. Petersburgh, May 26, 1790, N. S. Communicated June 9.

TRANSLATION.

By the dispatch of the 1st of this month, which your Excellency has been instructed to communicate to the British Ministry, they have been informed, that the principal motive which has prevented us from answering so precisely as we could have wished the overtures made here by Mr. Whitworth, relative to the object of the pacification, arose from the obligation we were under, of a previous understanding, on that subject, with the Court of Vienna. At present, this difficulty is overcome; and the explanations we have received (by the arrival of a courier from that Court in the interim) having made us acquainted with all its intentions, her Imperial Majesty feels herself enabled to explain herself as to her own.

In consequence of this, Sir, you will announce to His Britannic Majesty's Ministers, that her Imperial Majesty, influenced by the confidence she reposes in the friendship of that Monarch towards her, in his equity, and in the justice and

disinterestedness of his views and proceedings, does not hesitate to impart to him the utmost extent of the conditions, on which she is ready to reconcile herself with her enemies, and which undoubtedly are calculated to prove at once the height of her moderation, and the sincerity of the desire, with which she is animated, to see a speedy termination put to the evils, which at present distress humanity, and to prevent those which seem farther to menace it.

The conditions respecting the Turks consist in

The pure and simple re-establishment of the treaties, which have subsisted between Russia and the Ottoman Porte, down to the moment of the last rupture; and

In the cession of the territory which extends as far as the Dniester, so as that this river may hereafter serve as a frontier between Russia and Turkey.

This arid and uncultivated territory, containing nothing of any importance, except the single town of Oczakow, is solely fit to serve as a boundary between the two empires, and by no means as an augmentation or as a diminution of power on one side or the other.

VII.

Extract of a Letter from his Grace the Duke of Leeds to Count Woronzow, dated Whitehall, July 17, 1790.

TRANSLATION.

The King having been informed of the contents of Count Osterman's dispatch of the 26th of last May, which you, Sir, communicated to me, conformably to the instructions of your Court, I have the King's commands again to assure you, Sir, of the satisfaction with which His Majesty will receive, on all occasions, the assurances of her Imperial Majesty's disposition to facilitate, as much as may depend upon that Sovereign, the salutary work of the re-establishment of the general tranquillity.

The propositions, which the King, in concert with his allies, has recommended more than once to the Belligerent Pow-

ing, for the accomplishment of so desirable an object, are too well known for it to be necessary at present to recall them to the recollection of her Imperial Majesty; and the principles, on which these propositions are founded, cannot but serve as proofs of the sentiments of justice, as well as of friendship towards the interested parties, with which the King has been animated in all the proposals which His Majesty has made to the Belligerent Courts, for the re-establishment of peace.

The King, convinced of the Empress's sincere desire to cooperate towards the success of so salutary a work, has not failed to weigh, with the greatest attention, the last propositions of the Court of St. Petersburgh, contained in the dispatch of the Vice-Chancellor; and His Majesty cannot avoid observing, that these propositions appear little calculated to conciliate the minds either of the King of Sweden or of the Porte.

As to what respects the Ottoman Porte, the cession of the town of Oczakow, with its territory, to Russia, might meet with the greatest opposition on the part of the Turks, and consequently, serve rather to prolong than to terminate the calamities of war.

VIII.

Extract of a Letter from the Duke of Leeds to Mr. Whitworth, dated Whitehall, August 17, 1790.

THE several circumstances which have taken place in consequence of the conferences at Reichenbach, will doubtless be known at Petersburgh before this dispatch can possibly be received by you; it is impossible, however, for me not to state to you, for information of her Imperial Majesty, the result of those conferences, as an additional motive for His Majesty's again renewing his instances for the purpose of contributing, as far as possible, to prevail upon the Court of Petersburgh to promote the great object of pacification, upon the only grounds which either power, would, for its own dignity, either recommend or accept, those of fairness and moderation.

One of the Belligerent parties having adopted the idea of setting on foot a negociation for peace, and proposing an armistice in consequence, it is impossible not to flatter one's self with the

Hope of finding the ally of that power diſpoſed to promote, by the ſame means, the great object of pacification.

The anxious wiſh of His Majeſty and his allies for the ſucceſs of ſo important an event is already too well known to leave a doubt of their continuing their exertions for its final completion. You will not fail to renew your repreſentations to this effect, in conjunction with the Miniſters of His Majeſty's allies; and under the preſent circumſtances, I cannot help hoping, that a difficulty will no longer exiſt, on the part of Ruſſia, to impede the farther progreſs of ſo glorious a work, or to occaſion any conſequences in future, which might give the ſmalleſt umbrage to her Imperial Majeſty.

IX.

Extract of a Letter from Count d'Oſterman to Count de Woronzow, dated Peterſburgh, Auguſt 27, 1790. Communicated Sept. 30.

TRANSLATION.

WE had ſcarcely received the news of the concluſion of the negociation at Reichenbach, when the Pruſſian Miniſter, accredited to our Court, was inſtructed to make a communication here, of which he has acquitted himſelf by tranſmitting to us the incloſed extract of a diſpatch addreſſed to him by the King his maſter. Mr. Whitworth, the Engliſh Miniſter, preſented himſelf immediately afterwards, to declare, that he had received formal orders from his Court to ſupport the ſtep now taken by his colleague, and to which he gave the name of a declaration.

After having obviated every thing that could render the troubles more complicated, and liable to be extended, her Imperial Majeſty, conſenting to ſtand alone againſt an enemy, who had unjuſtly provoked her, and over whom ſhe had obtained the moſt ſignal advantages, which ſeemed to promiſe her the moſt compleat indemnification for all the loſſes he had occaſioned to her, is ready herſelf to ſet bounds to her conqueſts, and to be contented, as the price of the peace ſhe is willing to grant him, with an uncultivated territory, which can only ſerve, on the one ſide, to facilitate the communication between the frontier

of Russia, and to form, on the other side, a barrier adapted to the consolidating and securing the duration and permanency of such peace.'

Regarding the affair in this point of view, which is incontestably the natural one, the Empress has reason to believe, that, by insisting upon it, she fulfils the real views of the British King, such at least as he had declared, as often as he had expressed his desire for the re-establishment of general tranquillity, and such as her Imperial Majesty must suppose in him, especially from the natural connections, and constant conformity of interest of their respective dominions.

Her Imperial Majesty's entire conviction on the object in general, dictated her answer to the overtures of the Court of Berlin, conformably to what you will find in the inclosure, which you will communicate to the British Ministry.

After all the proofs which the Empress has given of her moderation, and her regard for the general balance, she thinks herself entitled to expect, from the disinterestedness and equity of his Britannic Majesty, that that Prince will be pleased to use his endeavours to persuade the King of Prussia to enter into concert with him, in order, by their united councils, to prevail with the Ottoman Porte to listen to and accept the moderate and reasonable propositions which the Field Marshal General Prince Potemkin Javrickzeskoy is instructed directly to offer her, and upon which he is authorised to conclude with her a definitive treaty of peace.

The grounds on which these propositions are founded have been already discussed with the cabinet of St. James's, which has found them perfectly just and admissible. Indeed, according to your last reports, its language and sentiments have varied in this respect: but her Imperial Majesty, still confiding in the disinterested and equitable principles of his Britannic Majesty, attributed this alteration solely to his great earnestness to lessen the difficulties of a general accommodation. But since they are now obviated by the existing circumstances, it seems, that nothing remains to prevent his Britannic Majesty from reverting to his former determination, equally conformable to his natural justice, as to the sentiments of friendship, with which her Imperial Majesty flatters herself, on his part, as a return for all those which she, on her side, bears towards

him. Such a proceeding, by augmenting the obligations, of which they have often ſtrove to give mutual proofs to each other, will, with the re-eſtabliſhment of general tranquillity, complete the facility of that order of things, to which the conſtant and immutable intereſt of their reſpective monarchies ſeems to invite them.

X.

Copy of a Letter from the Vice-Chancellor, Count d'Oſterman, to the Count de Neſſelrode, at Berlin, dated Auguſt 27, 1790. Communicated September 30.

TRANSLATION.

THE Pruſſian Envoy, having tranſmitted to me the incloſed extract of a diſpatch, which the King his maſter had addreſſed to him, I haſtened to ſubmit it to the conſideration of her imperial Majeſty; and it is by her command that I have the honour to authorize you to return, through the channel of His Pruſſian Majeſty's Miniſtry, the following anſwer to the overtures and inſinuations contained in that extract.

That doubtleſs her imperial Majeſty has not forgotten that His Pruſſian Majeſty had employed and offered his good offices for effecting the re-eſtabliſhment of peace in Europe; and ſhe hopes that His Pruſſian Majeſty will be pleaſed to recollect, on his ſide, the attention with which her imperial Majeſty has always received and liſtened to thoſe offers.

That her imperial Majeſty was perfectly informed by the King of Hungary and Bohemia, of every thing that had paſſed in the conferences at Reichenbach, as well as of the iſſue of them; but that however ſhe was not the leſs ſenſible to the communication which his Pruſſian Majeſty has been pleaſed to make to her thereof, on his part.

That her imperial Majeſty has ſeen with pleaſure, that, by means of the amicable arrangement, which reſulted therefrom, an effuſion of blood has been prevented, of which her imperial Majeſty has profeſſed her abhorrence.

That, from this principle, and from ſo many others which have characteriſed her reign, her imperial Majeſty has mani-

fested, upon all occasions, the sincere desire with which she was animated, to see a speedy cessation of the calamities of the wars which have been commenced against her; and that providence has granted, at least a part of her wishes, by the peace which she has now concluded with the King of Sweden, upon conditions which contain undoubted proofs of her imperial Majesty's moderation and generosity, as his Prussian Majesty will himself be convinced, by the communication of the treaty of peace, which you will forward to him, for which purpose a printed copy thereof is herewith inclosed to you.

That it will not be her imperial Majesty's fault, if the war with the Ottoman Porte be not likewise terminated, and as speedily as her imperial Majesty desires; and it may be asserted that she facilitates it by the moderation of the demands which she makes.

That these must be perfectly known to his Prussian Majesty, in consequence of her imperial Majesty's having confided them to the King of Hungary and Bohemia, as well as to the King of Great Britain, neither of whom have failed to communicate them to his Prussian Majesty.

That if the King will be pleased to weigh these demands with that impartiality which the Empress thinks she may expect from his equity, as well as from his friendship for her, he cannot but find them so much the more moderate and reasonable, as their object, including nothing which can, in the least degree, threaten that balance of power, the support of which his Prussian Majesty has at heart, fulfils, on the contrary, another of his views, which is that of securing the solidity and duration of the peace, the re-establishment of which is now in question, by stipulating, between Russia and the Porte, a frontier, more distinct, natural, and proper for maintaining between them a peaceable neighbourhood, and undisturbed harmony for the future.

That her imperial Majesty, by restoring so many other conquests made by her arms from the Porte, and thus sacrificing, to the re-establishment of peace, the lawful right, which she had acquired, to much more considerable indemnifications for all the losses occasioned to Russia by the unjust aggression of the Porte, has nothing to desire for the proofs she might give of her pacific dispositions; and that, in order to promote their

effect, she some time ago authorised her Field Marshal General, Prince Potemkin Janverikskoy, to propose the same conditions directly to the Turks, and to conclude a peace with them, on the basis contained therein, and from which the superior considerations of dignity, honour, and indispensable security to the frontiers, cannot permit the Empress to deviate.

That, from this exposition, it is evident, on the one hand, that it will depend hereafter only on the Ottoman Porte, to fix and accelerate the desired period of the pacification, by imitating at length the spirit of conciliation which the Empress has incessantly displayed; and, on the other, that, as is above mentioned, the direct negotiation with the Turks being already opened, the just apprehension of retarding its continuation and progress, is the reason which prevents the Empress from profiting of the friendly offers which his Prussian Majesty has been pleased to make to her of his formal mediation.

But that her Imperial Majesty, highly valuing the weight which the intervention of a Prince, so respectable as the King of Prussia, would necessarily have, and confiding in the assurances which he has now renewed to her, of the disinterestedness of his motives, as well as of his sentiments of friendship for her, cannot receive more essential or more convincing marks either of the one or the other, or which, at the same time, can be more proper to excite the just gratitude of her Imperial Majesty, than if his Prussian Majesty, conjointly with the King of Great Britain, his ally, will be pleased to employ, and render efficacious, his good offices and salutary councils with the Ottoman Porte, in order to induce her to accept the reasonable terms proposed to her, and by which the Empress has exhausted all that could be expected, in the utmost rigour, from her moderation, condescension, and regard for the general tranquillity.

I have the honour, &c.

XI.

Copy of a Letter from the Duke of Leeds to Count de Woronzow, dated October 9, 1790.

Whitehall, October 9, 1790.

SIR,

I HAVE not failed to lay before the King the papers which you communicated to me some days ago.

His Majesty cannot see, without regret, the difficulties which must probably result from the reiterated resolution of insisting on the cession of Oczakow and its territory. There was reason to hope, that the basis of negotiation, to which the King of Hungary had consented, would have been equally approved of by the Empress; while, at the same time, considering the moderation with which that Princess had declared herself disposed to contribute, on her part, to the re-establishment of general tranquillity, we had flattered ourselves that every obstacle to the happy accomplishment of this important object would speedily have been removed.

The King's Minister at the Court of St. Petersburgh, in giving his support to the representations of his Prussian Majesty on this object, has done no more than obey the precise orders of his Majesty; and it is particularly to be regretted, that her Imperial Majesty, at the same time she thinks proper to decline the mediation of the allies, should continue to express her Wishes that they should employ their good offices for obtaining a point, which appears so difficult to reconcile with the immediate interests of the Porte, or even with the general basis, on which it is so desirable that the negotiation for a peace may be founded.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) LEEDS.

XII.

Extract of a Letter from the Duke of Leeds to Mr. Whitworth, dated Whitehall, October 19, 1790.

I SEND you inclosed a copy of the answer which I returned, by his Majesty's command, to the late communication made by Count Woronzow by order of his Court.

You will not fail to communicate the answer above mentioned to the Russian Ministers; (although they will no doubt receive it from Count Woronzow) for the purpose of repeating the King's sentiments respecting the desirable event of peace between the Empress and the Porte, on the grounds of the *Status quo*: at the same time expressing the sincere wishes of his Majesty to cultivate the most cordial friendship with Russia, at all times, however circumstances may have been interpreted to the Empress, with a view to promote jealousy on the part of Russia towards Great Britain.

That this country, however flattering the acceptance of its mediation, in conjunction with that of its allies, by the Empress, would have been, cannot but suppose that Princess had the strongest motives for not acceding to so friendly a proposal; and we have too sincere a desire of seeing Russia restored to perfect tranquillity, not to be satisfied with the means, which may appear most agreeable to her Imperial Majesty, being adopted for that purpose.

XIII.

Copy of a Dispatch from Count Osterman to Count Woronzow, dated St. Petersburgh, October 31, 1790. Communicated December 2.

TRANSLATION.

St. Petersburgh, Oct. 31, 1790.

SIR,

WE have safely received the dispatches which your Excellency intrusted to the Courier Nasarskofky, and which

accompanied the written anſwer which the Duke of Leeds gave you, in conſequence of the overtures which you had orders to make to the Britiſh Miniſtry, by the opportunity of M. Pogenpool's returning to his poſt.

Her Imperial Majeſty, ſupporting the whole burden of the war, and ſincerely deſiring to ſee it terminate as ſpeedily as poſſible, has a double motive for partaking with his Britannic Majeſty in the regrets he expreſſes to her, on the ſubject of the difficulties which may reſult from her Imperial Majeſty's reſolution of inſiſting on the ceſſion of Oczakow and its territory; but ſhe thinks ſhe does not depart from the moderation with which ſhe has ſhewn herſelf ready to treat with her enemies, in not giving up a point, of no intrinſic value, but indiſpenſable for the ſtability of the peace itſelf, which, without that, muſt neceſſarily be precarious and temporary, and the conſequences of which, conſidering the ill will and bad faith of the Turks in the obſervance of their treaties, would be ſoon to draw Ruſſia into a new war, and to cauſe to the other powers the ſame alarms and the ſame inquietudes, to which the preſent war has unhappily given too much occaſion.

Your Excellency, in the different converſations you have had with the Duke of Leeds, has ſo well ſtated the reaſons which do not permit us to avail ourſelves of the offer which the allies have made us of their mediation, that nothing remains but to refer ourſelves entirely to them. But if his Britannic Majeſty thinks that the good offices, which the Empreſs continues earneſtly to aſk of him, for facilitating the pacification, will not be effectual, ſo long as the demand of Oczakow ſhall not be waved, the only conſequence is, that the Ottoman Porte will not be reaſonable, and that Ruſſia is not obliged, after having been ſo unjuſtly attacked, to ſacrifice to her, by the reſtitution of all her conqueſts, not only her claim to a juſt indemnification, but even her moſt eſſential ſecurity for the future.

The Empreſs does not think ſhe preſumes too much on her pretenſions with his Britannic Majeſty, in demanding that the intereſts of Ruſſia ſhould, on this occaſion,

weighed at least in the same balance as those of Turkey; and she hopes, from the equity, as well as the friendship of that Monarch, that he will not urge her to admit grounds of negotiation, so prejudicial to the honour and safety of her empire, as those which the obstinacy and injustice of the Ottoman Porte would make her adopt.

In detailing to the British Ministry the intentions of her Imperial Majesty, which we now announce to you, you will add, that her Imperial Majesty, faithful to the assurances she has given, will not go beyond them in consequence of any success with which it may please providence to bless the means, which she is resolved (contrary to her inclinations) to employ for reducing the Turks; and that the conditions of her peace with them will always consist of the same terms of moderation and equity, which she has lately communicated to the Court of London.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

C. J. D'OSTERMAN.

XIV.

Memorial from Mr. Whitworth and Count Goltze, dated Petersburgh, May 26, 1791. Received June 20.

SINCE the beginning of the existing war, the Courts of London and Berlin have manifested, on all occasions, their ardent desire of contributing, by all the means in their power, to its speedy termination, upon such principles as might best accord with the general interest of Europe: they have had the satisfaction of seeing these salutary views in part accomplished, by the acceptation of the *Status quo*, such as it existed before the war, as the basis of the pacification between Austria and the Porte. The same principle

having equally ſerved as the baſis of the peace between Ruſſia and Sweden, they had flattered themſelves, that, in conformity with theſe principles, the Court of Peterſburgh would alſo have conſented to negotiate, on the ſame baſis, her pacification with the Porte. But their wiſhes having hitherto been fruitleſs, and the time for opening the campaign being again at hand, the conſequences which the continuation of the war muſt unavoidably entail upon their common intereſts, have laid them under an indiſpenſable neceſſity of making ſuch preparations as circumſtances may require. At the ſame time, the two Courts, deſiring to do every thing which depends on them to contribute to the re-eſtabliſhment of general tranquillity, provided that the ſafety of the Porte, and conſequently the Intereſts of Europe, ſhould not be committed, have ſeriouſly weighed the idea ſuggeſted by other reſpectable powers, to try to conciliate the views of the intereſted parties, by ſome modification, conformable to the principle already laid down.

The demand made by Ruſſia of Oczakow and its diſtrict, compriſing the country ſituated between the Bog and the Dnieſter, is brought forward by that Court, as founded ſolely on the principle of ſecuring a defenſive frontier. It is, however, evident that the preſent ſituation of Turkey makes it more neceſſary for her than for Ruſſia, that the ſame principle ſhould be applied to her dominions and limits; that it is a point of the higheſt importance for the ſecurity and independence of that power; and that it is eſſential for the maintenance of the permanent tranquillity of Europe to provide for it in an effectual manner.

From theſe conſiderations, the allies are induced to teſtify to the Court of Peterſburgh their deſire to ſee this principle adopted, as the baſis of any modification of the *Status quo*; and their earneſt deſire to facilitate the ſpeedy re-eſtabliſhment of the general tranquillity, has induced them to authoriſe the underſigned to declare, that their reſpective Courts are ready to contribute, by their aſſiſtance to fulfil ſo deſirable an object, and to ſet on foot a

negotiation for this purpose, provided that it be conformable to the principles of equity and justice above detailed, by which their conduct has always been influenced.

(Signed)

CHARLES WHITWORTH. Comte de GOLTZ.

Petersburgh, Thursday
¹⁄₂₆ May, 1791.

XV.

Copy of a Letter from Count d'Osterman to Mr. Whitworth and Count Goltze, dated June 6, 1791. Received July 5.

ON every occasion that the Courts of London and Berlin, as well as other powers, have made overtures to the Empress, on the subject of their wishes to see a speedy termination put to the war, which unhappily has taken place between Russia and the Ottoman Porte, her Imperial Majesty has constantly manifested a disposition, which proved the most perfect conformity between her own views and those of the above powers. The most undeniable documents and evidences of this are to be found in all their Cabinets.

The memorial lately presented by the Ministers of the two above-mentioned Courts, dated the ¹⁄₂₆ of May, making mention, in general terms, only of a provision to be made for the security of the Ottoman Porte in the future pacification, and of a negotiation to be set on foot here on that subject, her Imperial Majesty is the less enabled to appreciate its object and aim, as she has a right to flatter herself, that she has exhausted, in her propositions, every thing which her love of peace, her generosity, and even her attention to general accommodations, have been able to suggest to her, as compatible with her dignity, the justice of her cause, and her attention to the security and repose of her empire. For, after having been unjustly attacked and

provoked, as all the world knows, and as the Courts of London and Berlin have at the time acknowledged and avowed;" after four years of a burdensome war, accompanied, however, with uninterrupted success on the part of Russia, by which she has become mistress of various provinces and strong places of the Ottoman dominions; the Empress, "conformably to all the laws received and acknowledged by all nations, would have been completely entitled to retain the whole of these conquests, or, at least, a considerable part of them, as a just, though with certainly an inadequate indemnification for so many evils and so many incalculable losses, the burden of which her dominions have so long had to sustain. Her Imperial Majesty, however, in consequence of her moderation and disinterestedness, has not hesitated to make a sacrifice of all the advantages to which the progress of her arms appeared naturally to hold out to her, merely reserving to herself that of insuring the duration and the stability of the peace, which she is desirous of concluding, by a new frontier, which, far from endangering or exposing the defensive security of the Ottoman Porte, confirms it, at the same time that it removes every subject of dispute and of quarrel between the two states, to which an immediate neighbourhood too often gives occasion, and which becomes the origin and cause of ruptures and of long and bloody wars. As a river, like the Dniester, offers a boundary equally natural and proper to prevent and remove hereafter all the above-mentioned inconveniencies, without at all affecting, as it is extremely easy to prove, the relative proportion of power between the two interested parties, her Imperial Majesty conceives herself intitled to insist upon this demarcation with the greater propriety, as conciliating at once the object of security for the Ottoman Porte, for which the Courts of London and Berlin are desirous of providing, and that of the lasting preservation of the general tranquillity of Europe, which has always been, in an equal degree, the object of the Empress's most constant and lively solicitude.

Influenced by these [illegible] equity and justice, her Imperial Majesty has ordered her Minister to declare to the Courts of London and Berlin, that she still perseveres in the sentiments and in the peaceable and moderate dispositions, which she has invariably manifested; and that she will, with pleasure and gratitude, avail herself of all the friendly and impartial steps that those Courts may think proper to take, to accelerate the salutary work of peace, provided that the interests of her dignity, and of the welfare of her subjects, shall be thereby attended to, to the extent which both justice, the goodness of her cause, and reason, prescribe and demand.

(Signed)

C. J. D'OSTERMAN.

Petersburgh, 6 June, 1791.

XVI.

Copy of a Memorial from Messrs. Whitworth and Fawkener and Count Goltz, Petersburgh, June 18/29, 1791.

THE undersigned, Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary of England and Prussia, thinking themselves authorized to conclude, from the answer made, by order of her Imperial Majesty, to the representation of the Courts of London and Berlin, dated the 14/25 of last month, that she feels herself disposed to permit her Ministers to enter into a discussion of the principle brought forward in the aforesaid representation, respecting a defensive frontier, as well for the Russian empire as the Ottoman Porte, have determined to collect into one point of view, and to submit to the consideration of her Imperial Majesty, without disguise or reserve, all they are permitted by their instructions to propose, with regard to this object, to the Court of Petersburgh.

They have no doubt but that her Imperial Majesty will consider the earnestness they thus shew, and their candour, which is so different from the ordinary course of negociations, as an indubitable proof of the sincere and disinterested desire of the

[illegible] to make their good offices and friendly interposition, [illegible] the speedy re-establishment of a peace, both safe and [illegible] to the Belligerent Powers.

The aforesaid Ministers are induced to think, in consequence of the overtures made by His Catholic Majesty and by the Court of Denmark, which do not appear to have been rejected, or even disapproved by the Court of Russia, and from the detail of the inconveniencies resulting from an immediate neighbourhood, which is to be found in the answer already mentioned, that her Imperial Majesty may be induced to consent to conclude a peace, on condition that the district of Oczakow, from the Bog to the Dniester, should be declared neutral and independent of both powers. This stipulation, were it faithfully and exactly performed by the contracting parties, might perhaps fulfil the object more perfectly than any other, and might insure the advantage of a frontier reciprocally defensive. Two great rivers, and an uncultivated and desert country, extending more than two hundred wersts, which must be passed before the troops of either of the Powers could arrive in the country of the other, would undoubtedly secure the two Empires from surprise; and the fortifying of the eastern banks of the Bog by Russia, and of the western banks of the Dniester by the Turks, would leave nothing to be wished for on this important point. Such is the first means of conciliation which the aforesaid Ministers are willing, with the consent of Her Imperial Majesty, to propose to the Turks, as the basis of a peace.

The second proposition, which might come in question, is the cession of Oczakow, and its immediate district, to Russia, in full property and sovereignty, with all the rights thence resulting, without any exception; reserving, however, to Turkey, a space on the eastern bank of the Dniester, more or less considerable, in proportion to the facility there may be to find some natural and defineable frontier; such, for instance, as the Lake Teligol, or such other as may be agreed upon; it being nevertheless understood, that this should be at a distance sufficient to secure to the Turks the free navigation of the Dniester. It might even be practicable to engage to induce the Turks to consent to the neutrality of this part of the ceded

district, situated between the new frontier of Russia and that river.

The allied Courts do not think they shall be able to engage the Porte to conclude a peace, on the condition of leaving Oczakow fortified in the hands of Russia, unless this sacrifice, so dangerous for her, should be compensated by the security of the two banks of the Dniester; and the aforesaid Ministers flatter themselves that her Imperial Majesty will not refuse this condition.

Should her Imperial Majesty, however, feel any repugnance to accede to these terms, the aforesaid Ministers declare their readiness, as the last resource, to propose to the Ottoman Ministry to cede to Russia, as the price of peace, the district of Oczakow, from the Bog to the Dniester, in full property and sovereignty; provided, however, that her Imperial Majesty will authorize them to give the Porte such assurances as may be proper to calm the minds of its subjects, to prevent its alarms, and to tranquilize it, as to the consequences of such a dismemberment of its empire, by enabling the Courts of London and Berlin to engage, that her Majesty shall demolish the fortress of Oczakow, and shall not rebuild it; that she shall not raise other fortifications within this district; and that she shall leave the navigation of the Dniester perfectly free.

The Courts of London and Berlin conceive they cannot propose any thing beyond these conditions to the Ottoman Porte; but, by the choice which they desire her Imperial Majesty to make between these different propositions of conciliation, all of them just, moderate, and reasonable, they are persuaded she will perceive, beyond a possibility of doubt, their particular regard towards herself personally, and their extreme attention to consult the dignity of her crown, the honour and the glory of her empire, and the interests of her subjects: they confidently refer to the judgement, which all Europe must form, of their sincere intention to restore peace, and to contribute to the general tranquillity, as well as of their impartiality and their perfect disinterestedness, which are evidently proved by the step they have now taken.

With regard to the form of the arrangement to be adopted, the aforesaid Ministers will make no difficulty in agreeing to

any thing her Imperial Majesty may desire on that head, provided that the engagements, for which they must become responsible to the Ottoman Porte, may thereby be securely established.

If it be true, that the regular conferences were not begun till this day, it is equally so, that the Ministers of her Imperial Majesty have long been made acquainted, by confidential conversations, and by other means, with the propositions for peace, which were about to be brought forward. It is therefore to be presumed, that her Imperial Majesty's resolution on this important business is in some degree formed, if not absolutely settled; and her determination is expected with the greatest impatience at London and Berlin. Her Imperial Majesty's friendship and regard for the Kings of Great Britain and Prussia, her lively solicitude for the repose of Europe, her love towards her people, her desire to restore peace to them, and to prevent the farther effusion of human blood, afford the surest confidence to the under-signed Ministers, that this important decision will speedily be signified to them, and that it will be favourable; more especially as, complying with every thing her Imperial Majesty has appeared to desire, they ask from her goodness and generosity only some slight modifications.

Signed,

CHARLES WHITWORTH. LE COMTE DE GOLTZ.
WILLIAM FAWKENER.

Petersburgh,
18/29 June, 1791

XVII.

Copy of a Note from Count Osterman to Messrs. Whitworth and Fawkener, and Count Goltze, dated July 9, 1791, (O. S.) Received August 8.

THE second memorial, delivered here on the 18/29 of last June, by the Envoys extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary of England and Prussia, having been submitted to the consideration of the Empress, her Ministers having receive

Imperial Majesty's orders, now find themselves enabled to continue the amicable discussion which forms the object of that memorial.

In the first place, the underwritten Minister has the pleasure to announce the satisfaction with which her Imperial Majesty has seen in the fairness and candour with which the Ministers of their Majesties the Kings of Great Britain and Prussia have given to their negociation, the sincere wish of their Majesties to accelerate the desirable work of a peace between Russia and the Ottoman Porte. Such an intention corresponds too much with the wishes of her Imperial Majesty, for her not to afford, on her side, every reasonable facility in her power. But if, having supported for so long a time the burden of a war, provoked by the unjust aggression of the Porte, she is interested more than any other power to accellerate its conclusion, she conceives herself equally intitled to weigh and to fix, in her wisdom and moderation, the means of securing to her subjects, if not a compensation proportioned to their exertions, at least a certain and secure repose, of which they stand in need, and which ought to be the smallest reward of those exertions. The demands which her Imperial Majesty has, in consequence, made, and which she has caused to be manifested to the Courts of London and Berlin, as well as to all Europe, assuredly present nothing more than this innocent and equitable desire. They must be considered in this light by all impartial powers; and if any of them have suggested any ideas of modifying these demands (though without any concert or consent of Russia), this must have arisen from considerations, derived not from their incompatibility with strict justice and the general interest, but solely from an apprehension of the extension of the calamities of war. Such must undoubtedly have been the motive of the overtures made to the Courts of London and Berlin by that of Copenhagen; of which, however, the Court of Russia never had any direct knowledge, nor ever authorized her to propose the sacrifices of which that Court has made mention. At present, when this apprehension seems to be dissipated, by means of the friendly explanations to which the two first Courts have opened the way, the Empress is as assured of obtaining the unanimous suffrage of all the powers to her propositions, as she finds herself obliged, for the most serious reason of main-

[illegible] of her own Dominions as well as of [illegible], not to depart from the moderate and disin- [illegible] which she has hitherto brought forward.

The [illegible] grounds of pacification, presented in the above-mentioned memorial of the [illegible] June, not being equivalent, and the [illegible] the only one which, in any degree, corresponds with the [illegible] intention of her Imperial Majesty, it is upon this alone that we can fix our attention and observations.

The two allied Courts propose to offer to the Ottoman Ministry the cession of the district of Oczakow, from the Bog to the Dneister, to Russia, *in full property and sovereignty; provided that her Imperial Majesty will authorise them to give the Porte such assurances as may be proper to calm the minds of its subjects, to prevent its alarms, and to tranquillise it as to the consequences of such a dismemberment of its Empire, by enabling those Courts to engage, that her Majesty shall demolish the fortress of Oczakow, and shall not rebuild it; and that she shall not raise other fortifications within this district.*

Besides, independently, that a clause or restriction of this nature would imply a contradiction of the principle of property and absolute sovereignty, on the footing of which the two above-mentioned Courts consent to negociate the cession of the country in question with the Ottoman Porte, it does not even correspond with that of perfect equality or reciprocity, which ought to be the indispensable basis of this negociation; for her Imperial Majesty leaves to the Turks an entire liberty of preserving, on their bank, all their ancient fortifications, of repairing them, and erecting new ones at their pleasure. Besides, a clause of this nature would overturn and render null the principal object proposed by this acquisition, which is that of obtaining for Russia a certain and distinct frontier, which she feels to be the more necessary, as the existing war, as well as the preceding, were both of them commenced on the part of the Ottoman Porte. In addition to this, the construction of fortresses in general does not indicate any intention of attacking; it is connected with measures of precaution and [illegible]ce, and cannot, consequently, give occasion to any subject or reasonable alarm or inquietude: on the contrary, the more that frontiers, separated by a river like the Dniester, are fortified on both sides, the greater will be the respective security for the

preservation of good harmony and of good [illegible] between the adjoining states. Other reasons might be alledged, drawn from the local situation of the country, and the character of the neighbouring nations, all of which concur to prevent the admission of engagements, equally contrary to the object of the Empress and of the mediating powers. But to shew them, in the most unequivocal manner, an equal deference and respect for their intervention, her Imperial Majesty does not hesitate to give them the most positive assurances, that not only she will not disturb the liberty of the navigation of the Dniester, but that she will, on the contrary, afford it all favour and protection. She will do this the more willingly, as, during her whole reign, she has acted upon an invariable principle of encouraging, by all possible means, the commerce and navigation of neutral and friendly nations. Her Majesty, however, hopes, that those powers will undertake to induce the Ottoman Porte to adopt, in this respect, the same rule, and the same principle; and, in general, although her Imperial Majesty is not informed that the allied Courts have been specially authorised, by the Ottoman Porte, to treat, and to make propositions in its name, she, however, presumes that, from the zealous pains and trouble they take for the re-establishment of peace, their good offices and representations will have all the weight they deserve; and she flatters herself, in consequence, that they will be inclined to employ all their credit and influence with the Porte, to make her as well convinced, as they must be themselves, of the justice and purity of the Empress's intentions, which assuredly do not tend either to the destruction of the Ottoman Porte, or to the overturning of the general balance, but which, on the contrary, prove the most sincere desire to effect a general pacification, and, above all things, to put a stop to a farther effusion of human blood. If however, contrary to all expectation, and in spite of the moderation and equity of the Empress's demands, and of the endeavours of their Majesties the Kings of Great Britain and Prussia to give them weight at the aforesaid Porte, that Court should persist in its unreasonable obstinacy, her Imperial Majesty hopes, in that case, from the justice and friendship of those Sovereigns, that they will abandon the care of terminating this war to the sole course of events which it may occasion. She conceives she may, with the more

justice, expect this deference on their part, as, far from being desirous of dissembling, that the modifications she has given to the conditions of peace are in a great part owing to that which she has a pleasure in shewing them on her side, she is glad, on every occasion, to manifest the value she attaches to the preservation of their friendship, and the desire which animates her to cultivate with them, without alteration, the most real harmony and most perfect good understanding.

(Signed)

Count JOHN D'OSTERMAN.

Petersburgh,
July 9, 1791.

XVIII.

Copy of a Memorial from Messrs. Whitworth and Fawkener and Count Goltz, Petersburgh, 22d July, 2791.

THE undersigned, Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary of England and Prussia, have received the communication, which his Excellency the Vice Chancellor Count d'Osterman was pleased to make them on the $\frac{9}{20}$ of this month, by order of her Imperial Majesty, in answer to their memorial of the $\frac{18}{29}$ of June, with all the sensibility, which an intimate knowledge of the sentiments of regard and esteem of the Kings their masters for the august person of her Majesty the Empress, and of the infinite value which they attach to her friendship and confidence, must inspire them with. The justice which the Empress renders to the purity of the intentions of the Kings of Great Britain and Prussia, and to the sincerity of their desire to contribute to the speedy re-establishment of peace between Russia and the Ottoman Porte, and to maintain and preserve the public tranquillity, how much soever it might be due to them, could not but be agreeable and valuable to them in the highest degeee; and the above-mentioned Ministers think they cannot better concur, in the name and on the part of their Sovereigns, with the spirit of conciliation which dictated those expressions, than in passing over all difficulties, and re-

moving all obstacles, which might still retard the accomplishment of that desirable work.

If the said Ministers proposed to her Imperial Majesty, that she would be pleased to engage not to erect any fortifications in the district which is to be ceded to her by the Porte, that proposal was not made with the view of depriving Russia of the just means of security and defence, but in order more effectually to secure the free navigation of the Dniester; the principal object, which has always appeared to the allied Courts of the highest importance. Since, however, her Imperial Majesty has been pleased to give them the most positive assurances that not only she will not disturb the freedom of the navigation of that river, but that, on the contrary, she will grant it her full favour and protection, that precaution is become superfluous and useless, the undersigned regarding her Imperial Majesty's word as the most certain pledge of the engagements she contracts.

In consequence, therefore, of such engagement on the part of her Majesty the Empress, the above-mentioned Ministers promise, without hesitation, in the names of their masters, and by virtue of their full powers, that the Kings of Great Britain and Prussia shall propose to the Ottoman Porte, to conclude peace with Russia, by ceding to the latter, in full right and sovereignty, the district of Oczakow, from the Bog to the Dniester; her Imperial Majesty engaging, as above, not to disturb the freedom of the navigation of the latter river, but, on the contrary, to grant it her full favour and protection; a condition by which the Ottoman Porte will be equally bound, and which will make, on each side, an article of the peace to be concluded. It follows that Russia will restore to the Ottoman Porte, at the conclusion of the peace, all the other provinces and possessions whatsoever, belonging to the Porte, and which have been, or may be, conquered by the arms of Russia.

If, contrary to all expectation, the Porte should be unwilling to yield to the advice and representations of the allied Courts, and should decline entering into negociation on the proposed basis, the said Courts promise her Imperial Majesty to abandon the termination of this war solely to the course of events

which it may produce. The above-mentioned Minifters are neverthelefs perfuaded, that her Majefty the Emprefs will not think the term of four months too long for the acceptance, by the Turks, of the conditions above mentioned, and for the fettlement of the peace.

The Kings of Great Britain and Pruffia hope, moreover, from the generofity of her Majefty the Emprefs, and from her defire to ftop any farther effufion of human blood, that fhe will be pleafed, as foon as the Porte fhall have confented to the bafis of pacification above declared, to confent to an immediate armiftice, in order to give every fecurity and facility to the Plenipotentiaries, to be appointed on each fide to negociate the peace, and to conclude it, without lofs of time.— Their Majefties are the more readily inclined to believe that her Imperial Majefty will agree to this propofal, as her intentions thereupon have already been fignified by his Excellency, the Vice Chancellor, to the Count de Woronzow, her Imperial Majefty's Minifter at London, and communicated by him to that Court.

It only remains to the aforefaid Minifters, to affure her Imperial Majefty's Miniftry of their real fatisfaction, in having ferved as the inftruments for the completion of an arrangement, which cannot but produce the moft happy confequences, and the moft advantageous effects on the harmony and good underftanding already fubfifting between her Imperial Majefty and the allied Courts. Thefe fentiments cannot but be maintained and ftrengthened by the proofs of regard, deference, and friendfhip, which thefe Sovereigns have now mutually given to each other, in the face of all Europe.

The gracious teftimony which her Imperial Majefty has deigned to give to the zeal and franknefs of the above-mentioned Minifters, is to them of ineftimable value, and they regard it as a very glorious reward of their pains and labours.

(Signed)

CHARLES WHITWORTH. LE COMTE DE GOLTZ.
WILLIAM FAWKENER.

Peterfburgh,
$\frac{11}{22}$ July, 1791.

XIX.

Copy of a Note from Count d'Osterman to Messrs. Whitworth and Fawkener, and Count Goltz, July 16/27, 1791. Received August 14.

TRANSLATION.

THE Empress has seen, with entire satisfaction, by the memorial delivered to her Ministry, on the 11/22 of this month, from the Ministers of their Majesties the Kings of Great Britain and Prussia, that those Princes do full justice to the moderation and equity of the conditions proposed by her Imperial Majesty, as the commencement and means of her accommodation with the Ottoman Porte; and that consequently they are willing to charge themselves with recommending those conditions to the latter, and to endeavour to make them accepted by that Court, in their utmost purity and extent.

Seeing in those intentions of their said Majesties a perfect conformity with those which her Imperial Majesty has herself declared, she will not certainly neglect any of the facilities which may depend upon her, and which can contribute to the accomplishment of the end proposed, relying with confidence on the friendship and zeal, which their Britannic and Prussian Majesties have shewn for her, that, in their measures for influencing the determination of the Porte, they will unite all the activity and energy, which the importance of the object, and the value they have appeared to attach to it, require.

Whatever can tend or contribute to the immediate stopping of any farther effusion of human blood, affecting her Imperial Majesty, as a party interested, more particularly and directly than any other power, no doubt can be entertained of the eagerness with which she will seize the moment, when she may, without danger or inconvenience, agree to a suspension of hostilities, as soon as she is assured of the pure and simple acquiescence of the Turks to the bases which will be proposed to them.

The interval of four months proposed in the memorial of the English and Prussian Ministers, is a term more than sufficient for the acceptance and concurrence of the Turks. Therefore the completion of the work of peace will depend solely on the Ottoman Porte; and all delays and obstacles, with their consequences, can only be attributed to herself alone.

However, her Imperial Majesty, relying on the efficacious intervention which their Majesties the Kings of Great Britain and Prussia have undertaken to employ, for giving a happy issue to their interposition, draws therefrom a favourable omen, and anticipates to herself the pleasure of evincing to them how agreeable it will be to her, to find, in the accomplishment of her wishes for peace, an opportunity of giving them a fresh proof of her constant desire to cultivate their friendship and confidence.

(Signed)

C. J. D'OSTERMAN.

St. Petersburgh,
July 16, 1791.

Definitive Treaty of Peace between the Emperor of Germany and the Ottoman Porte. Signed at Siſtovo, August 4th, 1791.

Au Nom de la Très Sainte et Indiviſible Trinité.

LA Cour Imperiale et Royale, et la Sublime Porte Ottomanne, animées d'un deſir égal de retablir les Liaiſons heureuſes de paix, d'Amitié, et de bon voiſinage, qui avaient ſubſiſté pendant un demi ſiecle entre les deux empires, et ſecondées dans ce deſſein ſalutaire de la mediation efficace de leurs Majeſtés les Rois de la Grande Bretagne et de Pruſſe, et de leurs Hautes Puiſſances les Etats Généraux des Provinces Unies, ont nommé et deſigné pour leurs Miniſtres Plenipotentiaires au Congrés de paix, aſſemblé à Siſtow, à ſavoir; ſa Majeſté Imperiale et Apoſtolique, le Baron Pierre Phillippe d'Herbert Rathkeal, ſon Conſeilleur Aulique actuel, et le Comte François Eſterhazy de Galantha, ſon Chambellan actuel, Seigneur de la Seigneurie de Tottis, et Seigneur héréditaire du Comté de Forchtenſtein; et la Sublime Porte Ottomanne le Reis Effendi, ou Miniſtre des affaires etrangeres, Biri Abdullah Effendi, l'Ordon Cadiſſi, ou Grand Juge des Armées Ottomannes, Yſmet Ibrahim Bey, et le Rouſnamedgi, ou Controleur Général des Finances, Durri Mehemet Effendi; leſquels, à l'Intervention, par le Canal, et moyennant les bons Offices des Miniſtres Plenipotentiaires des Trois Hautes Puiſſances Mediatrices, denommées, à ſavoir; du Chevalier Robert Murray Keith, Membre du Conſeil Privé de ſa Majeſté Britannique, Chevalier du très honorable ordre Militaire du Bain, Lieutenant-Général de ſes Armées, ſon Envoyé Extraordinaire et Miniſtre Plenipotentiaire à la Cour de ſa Majeſté l'Empereur, actuellement ſon Miniſtre Plenipotentiaire au Congrès de paix; du Marquis Jerome de Lucchefini, Chambellan actuel de ſa Majeſté le Roi de Pruſſe, ſon Envoyé Extraordinaire et Miniſtre Plenipotentiaire près de ſa Majeſté le Roi et la Republique de Pologne, Chevalier de l'Ordre de l'Aigle blanc, actuellement ſon Miniſtre Plenipotentiaire au Congrès de paix; et du Baron Reiner de Haeſten, Seigneur d'Optiemeſt et de Zennewynen, Membre de

l'ordre equestre de la province de Gueldre, deputé de cette province à l'Assemblée de leurs hautes puissances les etats généraux des Provinces Unies, leur Envoyé Extraordinaire à la cour Imperiale et Royale, actuellement leur Ministre Plenipotentiare au Congrès de paix: après s'être communiqué leurs plein pouvoirs respectifs, et avoir tenu ensemble plusieurs conferences amicales, sont convenus des points et articles suivans, qui composent le present traité definitif de paix.

Article I.

Il y aura desormais une paix perpetuelle et universelle par terre, sur mer, et sur les rivieres entre les deux empires, leurs sujets et vassaux, une amitié vraie et sincere, une union parfaite et étroite, une abolition et amnistie pleine et générale de toutes les hostilités, violences et injuries commises dans le cours de cette guerre, par les deux puissances, ou par les sujets et vassaux de l'une qui ont suivi le parti de l'autre, et specialement les habitans de toute condition du Monténégre, de la Bosnie, la Servie, la Valachie et la Moldavie, qui, en vertu de cette amnistie, pourront tous rentrer dans leurs anciennes demeures, possessions et droits quelconques, et en jouir paisiblement, sans être jamais inquiétés, molestés, ni punis, pour s'être declarés contre leurs propre Souverain, ou pour avoir prété hommage à la Cour Imperiale et Royale.

Article II.

Les deux hautes parties contractantes reconnaissent et admettent pour base commune de la presente pacification, le *status quo* strict, anterieur à la guerre declarée le 9 Fevrier, 1788: en consequence de quoi, elles renouvellent et confirment tels quels, dans le sens le plus strict, et dans toute leur etendue, sans jamais rien faire, ni souffrir qu'il soit rien fait du contraire: le traité de Belgrade du 18 Septembre, 1739; la Convention du 5 Novembre de la même année; celle du 2 Mars, 1741, explicatoire du traité de Belgrade; l'acte du 25 Mai, 1747, qui perpetue la paix de Belgrade; la Convention du 7 Mai, 1755, sur la cession de la Buccowina; celle enfin du

12 Mai, 1776, sur la démarcation de cette province; tous lesquels traités, actes et conventions sont et demeureront à perpetuité, dans leur pleine et entiere force et vigueur, comme s'ils etoient transcris et inserées ici de mot à mot.

Article III.

Et en particulier, la Sublime Porte Ottomanne renouvelle et confirme tels quels, dans le sens le plus strict, et dans toute leur etendue, sans jamais rien faire, ni souffrir qu'il soit rien fait au contraire: le sened, ou acte obligatoire du 8 Août, 1783, renfermant l'obligation, de la part de la Sublime Porte, de procurer aux batimens marchands allemands, qui ressortissent des ports de la cour imperiale, la sûreté contre les Corsaires des Cantons de Barbarie, et d'autres sujets Ottomans, et la reparation de tout dommage, qu'ils pourraient en eprouver; le sened, ou acte obligatoire, du 24 Fevrier, 1784, en faveur du libre commerce et navigation des sujets imperiaux et royaux, sur toutes les terres, mers et fleuves de la domination Ottomanne; le ferman du 4 Decembre, 1786, concernant les passages, repassages et sejour des patres et troupeaux de Transilvanie, dans les provinces de Valachie et de Moldavie; ainsi que tous autres fermans, actes et arrangemens ministeriels actuellement reconnus, et qui etoient en vigueur avant le 9 Fevrier, 1788, pour la tranquilité et le bon ordre des frontieres, pour l'avantage, la sûreté, et les interéts des sujets, commerce et navigation de la domination Autrichienne; tous lesquels seneds, fermans, actes et arrangemens reconnus, sont et demeureront à perpetuité dans leur pleine et entiere force et vigueur, comme s'ils étaient cités, transcrits, inserés et expliqués ici de mot à mot.

Article IV.

La Cour Imperiale et Royale, de son coté, pour ramener aussi les choses à la base commune du *status quo* strict de l'époque du 9 Fevrier, 1788, et pour correspondre pleinement aux procédés amicales et equitables de la Sublime Porte Ottomanne, s'engage d'evacuer, ceder et rendre à la dite porte Ottomanne, dans leur entier, et sans aucun partage, toutes les possessions, territoires, villes, forteresses et palanques, sous quelque denomi-

[illegible] que ce puisse être, conquises par les troupes de sa Majesté Imperiale, pendant le cours de cette guerre, y compris toute la principalité de la Valachie, et les districts de la Moldavie, occupés par les troupes Imperiales, et retablir telles quelles les anciennes limites qui separaient à la dite epoque du 9 Fevrier, 1788, les deux dominations : quant aux forteresses, chateaux, palanques, conquises sur la Porte Ottomanne, la cour Imperiale s'engage de les rendre dans l'état où elles etaient, et avec l'artillerie Ottomanne qui s'y trouvait au moment de leur occupation.

Article V.

Et quant à la forteresse de Hotin, et à son district vulgairement nommé la Raya, ils seront aussi évacués, cédés et rendus, sous les mêmes conditions, dont on est convenu pour les autres forteresses ; mais seulement après que la Sublime Porte Ottomanne aura conclu sa paix avec l'empire de toutes les Russies, et dans le terme qui sera stipulé pour l'évacuation des conquêtes de cette dernière puissance ; jusqu'à laquelle epoque, la cour Imperiale et Royale gardera en depot neutre la dite forteresse, avec son district, sans se meler plus de la guerre présente, ni prêter plus aucun secours d'aucune manière, directe ou indirecte, à la cour Imperiale des Russies, contre la Sublime Porte Ottomanne.

Article VI.

D'abord, après l'echange des ratifications l'on procedera de part et d'autre aux evacuations, et respectivement à la reprise de toutes les conquêtes quelconques, ainsi qu'au retablissement des anciennes limites des deux empires, dans les delais fixés ci-après. Des commissaires respectifs étant choisis et nommés, comme par l'article XIII. du traité de Belgrade, les uns conduiront les operations de la Valachie, et des cinq districts de la Moldavie, de façon à les terminer dans l'espace de trente jours, à compter de celui de l'echange des ratifications. Les autres se porteront à la haute Unna, pour retablir les limites de la Bosnie, de la Servie, et du vieux Bourg d'Orsova, avec ses envi-

rons ; le tout d'après le *ſtatus quo* ſtrict des poſſeſſions reſpectives, avant le 9 Fevrier, 1788. L'ón donne à ces derniers l'eſpace plus long de deux mois, qui courront de la même epoque, parceque ce tems eſt neceſſaire pour démolir les ouvrages nouveaux des forteresſes, et les remettre dans l'etat où elles etoient à la Conquête, ainſi que pour les tranſports de toute l'artillerie et des munitions de guerre et de Bouche.

Article VII.

Tous les priſonniers et captifs Ottomans, tant civils que militaires, faits pendant le cours de cette guerre, ayant été, ſans nulle exception, remis en liberté de la part de la Cour Imperiale et Royale, et conſignés aux Commiſſaires Ottomans à Roundzouk, Widen, et Boſnie, tandis qu'on n'a rendu en echange que ceux des ſujets et ſoldats Imperiaux et Royaux, qui ſe trouvaient dans les priſons publiques, ou ſous la puiſſance de quelques Seigneurs Boſniaques, et qu'il en reſte encore un grand nombre dans la captivité domeſtique en Turquie ; la Sublime Porte Ottomanne, pour ſe conformer à cet egard à la regle du *ſtatus quo* ſtrict, anterieur à la guerre, et pour detruire avec elle toutes les calamites qu'elle entraine, s'engage de rendre gratuitement, c'eſt-à-dire, ſans prix de rachat ni rançon quelconque, à la Cour Imperiale et Royale, dans l'eſpace de deux mois après l'echange des ratifications, tous les priſonniers de guerre et eſclaves de tout age, tout ſexe et toute condition, telle part qu'ils ſe trouvent, et à quelques perſonnes qu'ils appartiennent, deſorte que deſormais aucun ſujet des deux parties ne puiſſe plus être eſclave ſous l'autre domination ; excepté ſeulement ceux qui, d'après les regles obſervées en pareil cas, auront fait conſtater d'avoir volontairement embraſſé la religion Chrêtienne, d'un coté, ou la religion Mahometanne de l'autre.

Article VIII.

Les ſujets cependant de l'une partie, qui avant cette guerre, ou pendant ſon cours, ſe ſont retirés ſur les terres de l'autre, ſe ſont ſoumis à ſa domination, et y demeurent de plein gré, ne pourront jamais être reclamés par leur Souverain naturel, mais

ils feroit deformais confidérés et traités comme les autres fujets de la Puiffance à laquelle ils fe font données. En revanche les individus, qui poffedent en même tems des Biensfonds fous les deux dominations, pourront établir leur Domicile de l'un ou de l'autre coté, d'après leurs convenances, et fans qu'on puiffe y mettre oppofition; mais ils doivent fe choifir à leur grè une domination unique, en vendant les poffeffions qu'ils ont fous l'autre Gouvernement.

Article IX.

Les hautes parties, contractantes, defirant de faire renaitre, le plutôt poffible, le commerce, qui eft le fruit de la paix, et d'étendre à la claffe utile des marchands, le benefice du retour au *ftatus quo* ftrict, fixé par les articles II. et III. ci-deffus, ftatuent que l'intervalle de la guerre, comme telle, ne doit apporter aucun prejudice aux fujets refpectifs; c'eft-à-dire, ni aux fujets Imperiaux, et Royaux dans l'empire Ottoman, ni aux fujets Ottomans dans la monarchie Autrichienne; mais qu'il eft libre aux uns et aux autres de reprendre leurs affaires là, où ils les avoient laiffés à l'epoque de la declaration de guerre, de faire valoir tous les droits et pretentions quelconques antérieures à la guerre, de répeter leurs creances et effets, d'interpeller leurs debiteurs, de demander des indemnités à titre de payemens refufés, ou de dommages foufferts lors de la declaration de guerre, contre la teneur de l'article XVII. de Belgrade, et XVIII. du traité de commerce de Paffarowitz; de reclamer enfin, dans tous les Cas, l'affiftance des tribunaux, et des gouverneurs refpectifs; lefquels, de leur coté, feront rendre à cet egard prompte et impartiale juftice, fans admettre jamais, comme une exception legitime, le laps de tems du chef de la durée de la guerre.

Article X.

Il fera d'abord donné aux Commandans et Governeurs limitrophes des deux empires, en les rendant même perfonnellement refponfables de l'execution, les ordres les plus precis et les plus ftricts, fur le prompt rétabliffement de la police générale, la tranquilité publique, et du bon voifinage, dans toute

l'etendue des confins, l'inviolabilité des bornes replacées par les commissaires respectifs ; le soin d'empecher les empietemens, les incursions et les devastations, celui de procurer les reparations des injures et des dommages ; de leurs delits et crimes, en procedant, à cet effet, d'après les celui enfin de punir les contrevenans et les coupables, selon la gravité regles et principes fixés par les traités et les arrangemens précédens, entre les deux hautes Cours, pour faire rentrer incessamment toutes choses dans leur etat ancien, regulier et paisible.

Article XI.

Il leur sera en même tems enjoint serieusement, et recommandé, de proteger les sujets de l'autre partie, que leur commerce ou affaires obligeront à passer les confins, à voyager dans l'interieur des provinces, à descendre et à remonter librement les rivieres, observant et faisant observer à leur egard non seulement les offices de l'hospitalité, mais aussi tous les articles et dispositions des traités, conventions, et actes confirmés aux articles II. et III. ci-dessus ; sans en exiger, ni permettre qu'il en soit exigé, à tels titres que ce puisse être, d'autres retributions ou droits, que ceux qui y sont fixés pour les personnes et pour les marchandises de l'autre partie.

Article XII.

Et quant à l'exercise de la religion Catholique Chrêtienne dans l'empire Ottoman, ses prêtres, ses sectateurs, ses eglises à entretenir ou à reparer, la liberté du culte et des personnes, la frequentation et la protection des lieux saints de Jerusalem et autres endroits, la Sublime Porte Ottomanne renouvelle et confirme, d'après la regle du *status quo* strict, non seulement les privileges assurés, par l'article IX. du traité de Belgrade, à cette religion, mais aussi ceux qui ont été posterieurement concedés par ses fermans, et autres actes emanés de son autorité.

Article XIII.

On envetra, de part et d'autre des Miniſtres du ſecond rang, tant à l'occaſion de cette heureuſe paix, que pour annoncer l'evenement des Auguſtes Souverains reſpectifs au trone de leurs ancêtres. Ces Miniſtres ſeront reçus avec le ceremonial, honneurs et traitement uſités entre les deux Cours, et jouiront, en vertu du *ſtatus quo* ſtrict, de toutes les prerogatives du droit des gens, et autres immunitées attachées à leur caractère, d'après les articles des traités et l'obſervance etablie. Il en ſera de même à l'égard des ſucceſſeurs de l'Internonce, et Miniſtre Plenipotentiaire Imperiale et Royale, reſidens auprès de la Sublime Porte Ottomanne, eu cependant égard à la difference du rang dont ils pourront être revetus, ainſi que de leurs ſubalternes, ſuites, gens et domeſtiques meniaux, et comme plusieurs de leurs couriers, venans de la Cour Imperiale, ou allant vers elle, ont été dépouillés avant la guerre, la Sublime Porte Ottomanne, non ſeulement ne negligera aucun moyen qui puiſſe procurer le dédommagement des effets depredés, mais elle prendra auſſi les meſures le plus ſolides, àfin que ces couriers puiſſent deſormais aller et venir avec toute ſureté et protection.

Article XIV.

Deux inſtrumens originaux parfaitement conformes au preſent traité, l'un en langue Françaiſe, dont on s'eſt ſervi pour le commodité, et l'autre en langue Turque, ſeront ſignés, le premier des deux Miniſtres Plenipotentiares Imperiaux et Royaux, et le ſecond des trois Miniſtres Plenipotentiares Ottomans, échangés l'un contre l'autre, par l'entremiſe des Miniſtres Plenipotentiares mediateurs, et Envoyés reſpectivement aux deux hautes Cours contractantes; après quoi, et dans l'eſpace de quarante jours, à compter de celui de ſa ſignature, ou plutôt ſi faire ſe peut, les diplomes ſolemnels des ratifications, ſignés par les deux Auguſtes Souverains, ſeront pareillement echangés par le Miniſtere de la même mediation, entre les dits contractans, avec de copies legali ées de tous les traités, conventions, et actes renouvellés, confirmés et perpetuellement obligatoires pour les deux parties.

En consequence de quoi, et en vertu des pleinpouvoirs sa Majesté Imperiale et Apostolique, nous Pierre Philippe, Baron d'Herbert Rathkeal, et nons François, Comte Esterhazy de Galantha, ses Ministres Plenipotentiaires au Congrès de Paix, avons signé le present traité et instrument authentique de paix, et y avons fait apposer le cachet de nos armes. Fait à Sistow, à la Salle des Conferences, le 4 jour du mois d'Aout, d'an de grace, 1791.

(Signé)

(L. S.) *Le Baron d' Herbert Rathkeal.*

(L. S.) *Le Comte Francois Esterhazy de Galantha.*

NOUS Plenipotentiaires de Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne, et de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, et de leurs Hautes Puissances les Etats Généraux des Provinces Unies, ayant servi de mediateurs à l'ouvrage de la pacification, declarons, que le traité de paix ci-dessus, entre la Cour Imperiale et Royale et la Sublime Porte Ottomanne, avec toutes les clauses, conditions, et stipulations qui y sont contenues, a été conclu par la mediation de leurs Majestés les Rois de la Grand Bretagne et de Prusse, et de leurs Hautes Puissances les Etats Généraux de Provinces Unies.' En Foi de quoi nous avons signé les presentes de notre main, et y avons fait apposer le cachet de nos armes. Fait à Sistow, ce quatre Aout, mille sept cens quatre vingt et onze.

Signé,

(L. S.) *Robert Murray Keith.*

(L. S.) *Jerome Marquis de Lucchesini.*

(L. S.) *R. de Haeften.*

Definitive Treaty of Peace between the Emperor of Germany and the Ottoman Porte. Signed at Siſtovo, Auguſt 4th, 1791.

In the Name of the moſt holy and undivided Trinity.

THE Imperial and Royal Court, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte, animated with an equal deſire to re-eſtabliſh the happy bonds of peace, friendſhip, and good neighbourhood, which ſubſiſted for half a century between the two empires, and ſeconded in that ſalutary intention by the efficacious mediation of their Majeſties the Kings of Great Britain and Pruſſia, and of their High Mightineſſes the States General of the United Provinces, have appointed and choſen for their Miniſters Plenipotentiary, at the Congreſs for peace aſſembled at Siſtovo, viz.; his Imperial and Apoſtolic Majeſty, Baron Peter Phillip d'Herbert Rath-Keal, his actual Aulic Counſellor, and Count Francis Eſterhazy de Galantha, his actual Chamberlain, Lord of the Lordſhip of Tottis, and hereditary Lord of the county of Forchtenſtein; and the Sublime Ottoman Porte, the Reis Effendi, or Miniſter for foreign affairs, Bari Abdullah Effendi, l'Orden Cadiſſi, or Chief Juſtice of the Ottoman forces, Yſmet Abrahim Bey, and the Rouſnamedgi, or Comptroller General of the finances, Durri Mehmed Effendi; who, by the intervention, through the channel, and in conſequence of the good offices of the Miniſters Plenipotentiary appointed by the three high mediating powers; viz. Sir Robert Murray Keith, a Member of his Britannic Majeſty's Privy Council, Knight of the moſt Honourable Military order of the Bath, Lieutenant General of his forces, his Envoy Extraordinary and Miniſter Plenipotentiary at the Court of his Majeſty the Emperor, now his Miniſter Plenipotentiary at the Congreſs for peace; the Marquis Jerome de Luccheſini, actual Chamberlain to his Majeſty the King of Pruſſia, his Envoy Extraordinary and Miniſter Plenipotentiary to his Majeſty the King and the Republic of Poland, Knight of the order of the White Eagle, now his Miniſter Plenipotentiary at the Congreſs for peace; and the Baron Reiner de Haeften,

Lord of Optiemest and Zennewynen, Member of the Equestrian order of the province of Guelderland, Deputy from the said province to the Assembly of their High Mightinesses the States General of the United Provinces, their Envoy Extraordinary to the Imperial and Royal Court, now their Minister Plenipotentiary at the Congress for peace; after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, and having held several friendly conferences together, have agreed on the following points and articles, which form the present definitive treaty of peace.

Article I.

There shall be for the future a perpetual and universal peace, by land, and on the sea and the rivers, between the two empires, their subjects and vassals, a true and sincere friendship, a perfect and strict union, a cessation of, and a full and general amnesty for all hostilities, violences, and injuries, committed in the course of this war, by the two powers, or by the subjects and vassals of the one, who have taken the side of the other, and especially all the inhabitants of Montenegria, Bosnia, Servia, Wallachia, and Moldavia, who, in virtue of this amnesty, may all return to their former habitations, possessions, and rights, whatsoever, and enjoy the same peaceably, without being ever disturbed, molested, or punished, for having declared themselves against their own Sovereign, or for having done homage to the Imperial and Royal Court.

Article II.

The two high contracting parties recognize and admit, as the common basis of the present pacification, the strict *status quo*, as it existed anterior to the war declared on the 9th of February, 1788: in consequence whereof, they renew and confirm (be they what they may) in the strictest sense, and in their full extent, without ever doing, or suffering to be done, any thing to the contrary, the treaty of Belgrade of the 18th of September, 1739; the convention of the 5th of November in the same year, and that of the 2nd of March, 1741,

in explanation of the treaty of Belgrade; the act of the 25th of May, 1747, perpetuating the peace of Belgrade; the convention of the 7th of May, 1775, on the cession of the Buccowina; and lastly, that of the 12th of May, 1776, for the demarcation of the said province: all which treaties, acts, and conventions, are and shall for ever remain in full and entire force and vigour, as if they were herein transcribed and inserted word for word.

Article III.

And in particular the Sublime Ottoman Porte renews and confirms (be they what they may) in the strictest sense, and in their full extent, without ever doing, or suffering to be done, any thing to the contrary, the sened, or contract of the 8th of August, 1783, containing the obligation, on the part of the Sublime Ottoman Porte, to procure for the German merchant ships, sailing from the ports of the Imperial Court, security against the corsairs of Barbary, and other Ottoman subjects, and a reparation for all the losses they may sustain therefrom; the sened, or contract of the 24th of February, 1784, in favour of the free trade and navigation of the Imperial and royal subjects, in all the seas and rivers of the Ottoman dominions; the firman of the 4th of December, 1786, concerning the passing, repassing, and residence of the shepherds and flocks of Transylvania, in the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia; as also all other firmans, acts, and ministerial agreements, mutually recognised, and which were in force prior to the 9th of February, 1788, for the tranquillity and good order of the frontiers, and for the advantage, security, and interests of the subjects, trade, and navigation of the Austrian dominions: all which seneds, firmans, acts, and agreements, so recognised, are and shall for ever remain in full and entire force and vigour, as if they were herein recited, transcribed, inserted, and explained, word for word.

Article IV.

The Imperial and Royal Court, on its part, in order in like manner to restore things to the common basis of the strict *status quo*, of the epoch of the 9th of February, 1788, and to correspond entirely with the friendly and equitable proceedings of the Sublime Ottoman Porte, engages to evacuate, cede, and restore to the said Ottoman Porte, completely and without any partition, all the possessions, territories, towns, fortresses, and palancas, of every denomination, conquered by his Imperial Majesty's troops, during the course of this war, including the whole principality of Wallachia, and the districts of Moldavia occupied by the Imperial troops, and to re-establish, as they were, the same ancient limits which divided the two empires at the said epoch of the 9th of February, 1788. As to the fortresses, castles, and palancas, conquered by the Ottoman Porte, the Imperial Court engages to restore them in the state in which they were, and with the Ottoman artillery found therein, at the time of their reduction.

Article V.

And as to the fortress of Hotim, and its district, commonly called La Raya, they shall also be evacuated, ceded, and restored, on the same conditions as are agreed upon for the other fortresses; but not till after the Sublime Ottoman Porte shall have concluded a peace with the empire of all the Russias, and within the precise term which shall be stipulated for the evacuation of the conquests of the latter power; till which time, the Imperial and Royal Court shall retain, as a neutral deposit, the said fortress, with its district, without intermeddling any farther in the present war, or furnishing any farther succours in any manner, directly or indirectly, to the Imperial Court of Russia, against the Sublime Ottoman Porte.

Article VI.

Immediately after the exchange of the ratifications, each party ſhall proceed to the evacuations, and to the repoſſeſſion reſpectively of all conqueſts whatſoever, as well as to the re-eſtabliſhment of the former limits of the two empires, within the terms hereinafter fixed; the reſpective Commiſſaries being choſen and appointed, according to the thirteenth article of the treaty of Belgrade, ſome of them ſhall conduct the operations in Wallachia, and the five diſtricts of Moldavia, ſo as to complete them in the ſpace of thirty days, to be computed from the day of the exchange of the ratifications. The others ſhall repair to the Upper Unna, to re-eſtabliſh the limits of Boſnia, Servia, and the ancient burgh of Orſova, with its ſuburbs; the whole, according to the ſtrict *ſtatus quo* of the reſpective poſſeſſions, prior to the 9th of February, 1788: a longer ſpace of two months, computing from the ſame epoch, is granted to the latter, as that time is neceſſary for the demolition of the new works of the fortreſſes, and for reſtoring them to the ſtate in which they were at the conqueſt, as well as for the removal of all the artillery, ammunition, and ſtores.

Article VII.

All the Ottoman priſoners and captives, as well civil as military, taken during the courſe of this war, having, without any exception, been releaſed by the Imperial and Royal Court, and conſigned to the Ottoman Commiſſaries at Roundzouk, Widin, and in Boſnia, whilſt only ſuch of the Imperial and Royal ſubjects and ſoldiers as were in the public priſons, or in the power of ſome of the Boſniack Lords, have been reſtored in exchange; and as a conſiderable number of them ſtill remain in domeſtic ſlavery in Turkey, the Sublime Ottoman Porte, in order to conform, in this reſpect, to the rule of the ſtrict *ſtatus quo* anterior to the war, and to terminate with it all the calamities attend-

ing it, engages to restore gratuitously, that is to say, without any price for their re-purchase or ransom whatsoever, to the Imperial and Royal Court, in the space of two months after the exchange of the ratifications, all the prisoners of war and slaves, of whatever age, sex, or condition, wherever they may be found, or to what persons soever they may belong; so that in future no subject of either of the two parties shall be a slave under the dominion of the other, excepting those only who, according to the rules observed in like cases, shall be legally found to have voluntarily embraced the Christian religion on the one side, or the Mahometan religion on the other.

Article VIII.

Neverthelefs the subjects of either party, who, before the war, or during the course of it, may have retired upon the lands of the other, submitted to that government, and remain there of their own accord, shall never be claimed by their natural sovereign, but shall in future be considered and treated as the other subjects of the power to which they have given themselves: in return, such individuals, as possess at the same time lands under both empires, may fix their habitations on either side, at their convenience, without any opposition being given to them; but they must determine, at their own choice, under which of the two governments they will live, and they must sell the possessions they may have under the other.

Article IX.

The high contracting parties, being desirous to renew as early as possible the intercourse of trade, which is the fruit of peace, and to extend to the useful class of merchants the benefit of the return to the strict *status quo* fixed by the 2d and 3d articles above, declare that the interval of the war, as such, ought not to cause any prejudice to the respective subjects, that is to say, neither to the Imperial and Royal

[illegible] in the Ottoman empire, not to the Ottoman subjects in the Austrian monarchy; but that it is lawful to all of them to resume their affairs, in the same state in which they were left at the time of the declaration of war, to prosecute all their rights and claims whatever anterior to the war, to reclaim their credits and effects, to summon their debtors, to demand indemnifications for payments refused, or losses sustained, at the time of the declaration of war, against the tenor of the 17th article of the treaty of Belgrade, and the 18th article of the treaty of commerce of Passarowitz; and finally to claim, in all cases, the assistance of the respective tribunals and governments, which, on their part, shall render speedy and impartial justice in this respect, without ever admitting, as a lawful exception, the lapse of time occasioned by the duration of the war.

Article X.

The most precise and strict orders shall be immediately given to the Commandants and Governors on the borders of the two empires, rendering them even personally answerable for their execution, as to the speedy re-establishment of the general police, public tranquillity, and good neighbourhood, in the whole extent of the confines, the inviolability of the boundaries restored by the respective Commissaries, the preventing encroachments, incursions, and devastations, the procuring reparations for injuries and damages, and finally, the punishing offenders and criminals, in proportion to their transgressions and crimes, proceeding, for that end, according to the rules and principles fixed by the preceding treaties and agreements between the two high Courts, in order that all things may be immediately restored to their former regular and peaceable state.

Article XI.

It shall be at the same time seriously enjoined and recommended to them to protect the subjects of the other party,

[illegible]

whoſe commercial affairs ſhall [illegible] fines, to travel in the interior of that [illegible] to paſs freely up and down the rivers, [illegible] to be obſerved towards them not only the [illegible] hoſpitality, but alſo all the articles and regulations of the [illegible] conventions, and acts, confirmed in the [illegible] above, without requiring, or permitting [illegible] from them, on any account whatſoever, any other recompence or duties, than ſuch as are therein eſtabliſhed for the perſons and merchandiſe of the other party.

Article XII.

And as to the exerciſe of the Catholic Chriſtian religion in the Ottoman empire, the prieſts, ſectaries, churches there to be maintained or repaired, the freedom of worſhip and of perſons, the frequentation and protection of the holy places in Jeruſalem, and other parts, the Sublime Ottoman Porte renews and confirms, according to the rule of the ſtrict *ſtatus quo*, not only the privileges ſtipulated by the 9th article of the treaty of Belgrade for that religion, but alſo thoſe which have been ſince granted by firmans and other acts iſſuing under its authority.

Article XIII.

Miniſters of the ſecond rank ſhall be ſent on each ſide, as well upon the occaſion of this happy peace, as to announce the acceſſion of the reſpective auguſt ſovereigns to the thrones of their anceſtors. Theſe miniſters ſhall be received with the ceremony, honours, and treatment, accuſtomed between the two Courts, and ſhall enjoy, in virtue of the ſtrict *ſtatus quo*, all the privileges of the law of nations, and other immunities, attached to their characters, according to the articles of the treaties, and the eſtabliſhed cuſtom. The ſame rule ſhall be obſerved with regard to the ſucceſſors of the Internuncio, and the Imperial and Royal Miniſter Plenipotentiary reſiding at the Sub-

Sublime Ottoman Porte, (attention being paid, however, to the difference of rank with which they may be inveſted) and alſo with regard to their ſubalterns, ſuite, attendants, and ſervants: and whereas ſeveral of their couriers coming from or going to the Imperial Court were plundered before the war; the Sublime Ottoman Porte will not only not neglect any means which may procure a compenſation for the effects of which they were robbed, but will alſo take the moſt effectual and ſolid meaſures, in order that ſuch couriers may hereafter paſs and repaſs with perfect ſecurity and protection.

Article XIV.

Two original inſtruments, perfectly conformable to each other, of the preſent treaty, one in the French language, which has been made uſe of for convenience, and the other in the Turkiſh language, ſhall be ſigned, the firſt by the two Imperial and Royal Miniſters Plenipotentiary, and the ſecond by the three Ottoman Miniſters Plenipotentiary, exchanged one againſt the other by the intervention of the mediating Miniſters Plenipotentiary, and ſent reſpectively to the two high contracting Courts. After which, and within the ſpace of forty days, to be computed from the day of the ſignature, or ſooner, if it can be done, the ſolemn acts of ratification, ſigned by the two auguſt Sovereigns, ſhall be likewiſe exchanged, through the means of the ſame mediation, between the ſaid contracting parties, with legaliſed copies of all the treaties, conventions and acts renewed, confirmed, and perpetually obligatory upon the two parties.

In conſequence whereof, and in virtue of the full powers of his Imperial and Apoſtolic Majeſty, we Peter Philip, Baron d'Herbert Rath-Keal, and we Francis, Count Eſterhazy de Galantha, his Miniſters Plenipotentiary at the Congreſs for Peace, have ſigned the preſent treaty and authentic inſtruments of peace, and have cauſed the ſeals of

our arms to be put thereto, Done at Sistove, in the Chamber of Conferences, the 4th day of the month of August, in the year of Grace 1791.

(Signed)

(L. S.) The Baron *D'Herbert Rath-Keal.*

(L. S.) The Count *Francis Esterhazy de Galantha.*

WE Plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the King of Great Britain, of his Majesty the King of Prussia, and of their High Mightinesses the States General of the United Provinces, having acted as mediators in the work of the pacification, declare that the above treaty of peace between the Imperial and Royal Court, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte, with all the clauses, conditions, and stipulations, which are therein contained, was concluded by the mediation of their Majesties the Kings of Great Britain and Prussia, and of their High Mightinesses the States General of the United Provinces. In witness whereof we have signed these presents with our hands, and have caused the seals of our arms to be put thereto. Done at Sistovo, this 4th of August, 1791.

(Signed)

(L. S.) *Robert Murray Keith.*

(L. S.) *Jerome Marquis de Lucchesini.*

(L. S.) *R. de Haeften.*

[illegible] between the Emperor of Germany and the Ottoman Porte. Signed at Siſtovo, Auguſt 4th, 1791.

Au Nom de la Tres Sainte et Indiviſible Trinité.

LA Cour Imperiale et Royale, et la Sublime Porte Ottomane, voulant a l'heureuſe epoque de la pacification concluë, ſe donner des preuves reëlles de leur amitie, prevenir tout ce qui pourroit dans la ſuite deranger l'harmonie parfaite des [illegible] confins de leurs dominations, et ſanctionner pour l'utilité reciproque les ſeules Changemens qu'elles ſe permettront jamais aux articles de tout le traité definitif de paix, ſigné à Siſtow ce Jourd'hui, 4 d'Août, 1791, ſont convenus par le canal de leurs Miniſtres Plenipotentiaires; ſavoir, de la part de la Cour Imperiale et Royale, le Baron Pierre Philippe d'Herbert Rath-Keal, ſon Conſeiller Aulique actuel, et le Comte François Eſterhazy de Galantha, ſon Chambellan actuel, Seigneur de la Seigneurie de Tottis, et Seigneur hereditaire du Comté de Forchenſtein; et de celle de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, le Reis Effendi, ou Miniſtre des affaires etrangeres, Birri Abdullah Effendi, l'Ordon Kadiſi, ou Grand Juge des armées Ottomanes, Iſmet Ibrahim Bey, et le Rouſnamedgi, ou Controleur-General des finances, Durri Mehmet Effendi, des articles ſuivans.

Article I.

Comme il y avait avant la guerre une negociation ouverte ſur les demandes de la Cour Imperiale, des terreins du Bannat de Temeſvar, poſſedés par l'empire Ottoman, et des diſtricts ſitués à la Gauche de l'Unna, les deux parties conſiderant d'un coté les defectuoſités de l'ancienne frontiere dans ces parties, et voulant de l'autre y remedier d'une maniere invariable, à la ſatisfaction commune, ont arrêté l'arrangement final, ſpecifié dans les Articles II. et III. de la preſent convention, par lequel arrangement elles con-

sentent de terminer foncierement et definitivement tous les sujets de reclamation, qui faisoient l'objet de la negociation citée.

Article II.

En consequence de quoi, la Sublime Porte Ottomane consent que le Bourg et Terrein du vieux Orsova, jusqu'à la Czerna, restent et demeurent dans la possession et Souveraineté de la Cour Imperiale et Royale, de façon que la Czerna fasse, de ce coté, desormais et à perpetuité, la frontiere de la Monarchie Autrichienne; mais avec la condition expresse, que la dite Cour Imperiale et Royale ne puisse jamais fortifier, ni le vieux Bourg d'Orsova, en aucune partie du Terrein cedé par la Sublime Porte, en vertu du present article. Pour la petite plaine vis-à-vis le fort de l'isle d'Orsova, bornée par les confins specifiés dans l'article V. du traité de paix de Belgrade, elle restera pour toujours, dans le sens le plus strict, neutre entre les deux dominations; c'est-à-dire, que la Souveraineté n'en appartiendra ni à l'une ni à l'autre; et les parties contractantes s'engagent à laisser la dite plaine absolument deserte, sans jamais permettre à personne d'y batir, d'y demeurer, ni d'y exercer la culture.

Article III.

Quant aux districts à la Gauche de l'Unna, les deux hautes parties contractantes sont convenues que les limites des deux empires seront desormais et à perpetuité reglées de la manière que voici. La nouvelle ligne de separation, d'après le dessein tracé en couleur rouge sur la carte annexée au present article, commencera dans ces endroits à la Rive droite de la Glina, par le point marqué sur la dite carte; sera continuée le long d'un petit Ruisseau, en laissant Czettin, avec son district, sous la domination Imperiale et Royale, se dirigera le long de la Banlieu du Fort Ottoman Sturlich, ou Sterlitz, marqué sur la carte en jaune, de façon que ce fort, ainsi que son Banlieu, determinée par la portie d'un coup de canon, restent dans la possession de l'empire Ottoman; d'où cette ligne se portera en droit Chemin sur la Corana, pour suivre en remontant le cours de cette Riviere jusques, et compris

Dresnick, qui restera avec son district sous la domination Imperiale et Royale. Ensuite de quoi la dite ligne se prolongera par la Montagne de Smolianatz, et l'endroit de Tichiero, elle longera la haute Montagne, au pied de laquelle se trouve l'endroit de Lapaz, marqué sur la carte en jaune, et sera continuée jusqu'à l'Unna à une heure de chemin au dessus de Vacup, marqué en jaune, d'où cette ligne prendra en remontant la rive gauche de l'Unna, jusqu'à ses sources occidentales, suivant la ligne marquée en rouge, pour se terminer par le plus droit chemin que donne la direction des hautes montagnes au triple confin actuel, en laissant ainsi Sterniza Turc sous la domination Ottomane. La Cour Imperiale et Royale s'engagera à ne jamais reparer ni construire aucunes fortifications quelconques, sous quelque titre, et pour quelque motive que puisse être, dans toute l'etendue, sans exception du district que la Sublime Porte lui cede en vertu du present article.

Article IV.

La Cour Imperiale et Royale àfin de repondre de son coté aux dispositions amicales, que la Sublime Porte a montrées dans l'arrangement final des confins, tant du coté du bourg et terrein du vieux Orsova, que sur la haute Unna, tel qu'il se trouve arreté par les articles II. et III. de la presente convention separée, et pour affermir et consolider d'autant plus l'heureuse paix qui vient d'etre conclue entre les deux empires, declare, de la maniere la plus solemnelle, qu'elle reconnait le present arrangement de confins comme definitif, et s'engage à ne former à l'avenir aucune pretention au delà des limites fixées ci-dessus.

Article V.

La Cour Imperiale et Royale, pour marquer sa satisfaction de l'arrangement des limites fixées ci-dessus, s'engage de rendre à la Sublime Porte toutes les forteresses, chateaux et palanques, conquises sur l'empire Ottoman, dans l'etat où elles se trouvent à present, et sans detruire au-

cunes des reparations, ni les ouvrages nouveaux, qu'on y a faits, renoncant, en consequence, à la clause de demolition stipulée à la fin de l'article VI. du traité definitif.

Article VI.

Pareillement la Cour Imperiale et Royale, secondant le desir manifesté par la Sublime Porte Ottomane, de rentrer promptement dans la possession de toutes les conquêtes, concourt voluntiers à rapprocher les delais fixés aux evacuations dans l'article VI. du dit traité, et etablit avec la Sublime Porte Ottomane, qu'on comptera ces delais du jour de la signature du traité, et non plus de celui de l'echange des ratifications; savoir 30 jours, à compter de ce jourd'hui 4 d'Aout, pour l'evacuation, cession et restitution de toute la Valachie, et des cinq districts de la Moldavie ; et de soixante jours, à compter de la même epoque, pour toutes les autres conquêtes. Les deux parties s'engagent en outre à effectuer l'echange des ratifications du traité de paix en 15 jours au plûtard, au lieu de 40, fixés par l'article XIV. du traité definitif.

Article VII.

Les ratifications de cette convention separée seront dressées séparement, mais echangées le méme jour que les ratifications du traite de paix.

En consequence de quoi, et en vertu des pleinpouvoirs de sa Majesté Imperiale et Apostolique, nous Pierre Philippe, Baron d'Herbert Rath-Keal, et nous François, Comte Esterhazy de Galantha, ses Ministres Plenipotentiaires Imperiaux et Royaux, au Congrès de Paix, avons signé la presente convention et instrument autentique, et y avons fait opposer le cachet de nos Armes. Fait à Sistow, à la Salle des Conferences, le 4 jour du mois d'Aout, l'an de grace, 1791.

(L. S.) Le Baron *d'Herbert Rath-Keal.*

(L. S.) Le Comte *Francois Esterhazy de Galantha.*

Separate Convention between the Emperor of Germany and the Ottoman Porte. Signed at Siftovo, Auguft 4th, 1791.

In the Name of the Moft Holy and Undivided Trinity.

THE Imperial and Royal Court, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte, being defirous, at the happy epoch of the conclufion of the pacification, to give to each other real proofs of their friendfhip, to prevent every thing which might in future difturb the perfect harmony of the extenfive confines of their dominions, and to fanction, for mutual benefit, the only alterations which they will ever permit in the articles of the whole definitive treaty of peace, figned at Siftovo this day, the 4th of Auguft, 1791, have, through their Minifters Plenipotentiary, viz. on the part of the Imperial and Royal Court, the Baron Peter Philip d'Herbert Rath-Keal, actual Aulick Councillor, and the Count Francis Efterhazy de Galantha, actual Chamberlain, Lord of the Lordfhip of Tottis, and Hereditary Lord of the county of Forchenftein, and on that of the Sublime Ottoman Porte, the Reis Effendi, or Minifter for Foreign Affairs, Birri Abdullah Effendi, the Ordon Cadiffi, or Chief Judge of the Ottoman forces, Ifmet Ibrahim Bey, and the Roufnamedgi, or Comptroller General of the Finances, Durri Mehmet Effendi, agreed to the following articles.

Article I.

Whereas, anterior to the war, a negotiation was opened upon the demands of the Imperial Court of the lands of the Bannat of Temefwar, poffeffed by the Ottoman Empire, and of the diftricts fituated on the left fide of the Unna; the high contracting parties confidering, on the one hand, the defects of the ancient frontier in thofe parts, and being defirous, on the other, to remedy the fame in a manner which may invariably conduce to the common

satisfaction, have agreed to the final arrangement specified in the 2d and 3d articles of the present convention; by which arrangement they consent to terminate completely and definitively all the subjects of claim which made the object of the above-recited negotiation.

Article II.

In consequence whereof the Sublime Ottoman Porte consents, that the burgh and lands of old Orsova, to the Czerna, shall remain and continue in the possession and sovereignty of the Imperial and Royal Court, so that the Czerna shall be, on that side, hereafter and for ever, the frontier of the Austrian monarchy; but under this express condition, that the said Imperial and Royal Court shall never fortify either the old burgh of Orsova, or any part of the lands ceded by the Sublime Porte, in virtue of the present article. As to the little plain opposite the fort, on the Island of Orsova, bounded by the confines described in the 5th article of the treaty of peace of Belgrade, it shall remain for ever neuter, in the strictest sense, between the two empires, that is to say, the sovereignty thereof shall not belong to either of them; and the contracting parties engage to leave the said place absolutely desert, without ever permitting any person to build or reside there, or to cultivate the soil.

Article III.

As to the districts on the left side of the Unna, the two high contracting parties have agreed, that the limits of the two empires shall be, hereafter and for ever, regulated in the manner following. The new line of separation, according to the drawing traced in red on the map annexed to the present article, shall begin in those parts, on the right shore of the Glina, at the point marked on the said map: it shall be continued along a small river, leaving Czettin, with its district, under the Imperial and Royal

dominion; ſhall take its courſe along the Banlieu of the Ottoman fort Sturlich, or Sturlitz, marked on the map with yellow; ſo that the ſaid fort, as well as its Banlieu, determined at the diſtance of cannon ſhot, ſhall remain in the poſſeſſion of the Ottoman empire; from whence the ſaid line ſhall be carried ſtraight forward on the Corana, aſcending that river up to and including Dreſnick, which ſhall remain, with its diſtrict, under the Imperial and Royal dominion. The ſaid line ſhall be continued from thence by the mountain Smolianatz, and the place of Tichiero, following the high mountain, at the foot of which is ſituated the place of Lapaz, marked on the map with yellow, and it ſhall be continued to the Unna, to the diſtance of an hour's journey above Vacup, marked with yellow, from whence the ſaid line ſhall proceed upwards along the left ſhore of the Unna, to its weſtern ſources, according to the line marked red, to end by the ſhorteſt way which the directions of the high mountains permit, at the preſent triple confines, thus leaving Turkiſh Sterniza under the Ottoman dominion. The Imperial and Royal Court engage never to repair or conſtruct any fortifications whatſoever, under any name, or for any motive whatſoever, in the whole extent, without exception, of the diſtrict which the Sublime Porte cedes to the former, by virtue of the preſent article.

Article IV.

The Imperial and Royal Court, in order to correſpond, on its ſide, to the friendly diſpoſitions which the Sublime Porte has manifeſted in the final arrangement of the confines, as well on the ſide of the burgh and lands of old Orſova, as on the Upper Unna, in the manner agreed upon by the 2d and 3d articles of the preſent ſeparate convention, and to ſtrengthen and conſolidate ſo much the more the happy peace juſt concluded between the two empires, declares, in the moſt ſolemn manner, that ſhe acknowledges the preſent arrangement of confines as defi-

finitive, and engages not to form hereafter any pretenſions beyond the limits above ſettled.

Article V.

The Imperial and Royal Court, in order to evince her ſatisfaction with the arrangement of the limits above ſettled, engages to reſtore to the Sublime Porte all the fortreſſes, caſtles, and palancas, taken from the Ottoman empire, in the ſtate in which they are at preſent, and without deſtroying any of the repairs or new works made therein, renouncing conſequently the clauſe for demolition, ſtipulated at the end of the 6th article of the definitive treaty.

Article VI.

In like Manner the Imperial and Royal Court, ſeconding the deſire manifeſted by the Sublime Ottoman Porte to re-enter ſpeedily into poſſeſſion of all the conqueſts, readily concurs in ſhortening the periods fixed for the evacuations by the 6th article of the ſaid treaty, and agrees with the Sublime Ottoman Porte, that the ſaid periods ſhall be computed from the day of the ſignature of the treaty, inſtead of the day of the exchange of the ratifications; viz. thirty days, reckoning from this day, the 4th of Auguſt, for the evacuation, ceſſion, and reſtitution, of the whole of Wallachia, and the five diſtricts of Moldavia, and ſixty days, reckoning from the ſame date, for all other conqueſts. The two parties farther engage to effectuate the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty of peace, in fifteen days at fartheſt, inſtead of the forty days fixed by the fourteenth article of the definitive treaty.

Article VII.

The ratifications of this ſeparate convention ſhall be prepared ſeparately, but exchanged the ſame day as the ratifications of the treaty of peace.

In consequence whereof, and by virtue of the full powers of his Imperial and Apostolic Majesty, we Peter Philip d'Herbert, Baron Rath-Keal, and we Francis Count Esterhazy de Galantha, his Imperial and Royal Ministers Plenipotentiary at the Congress for peace, have signed the present convention and authentic instrument, and have caused the seals of our arms to be put thereto. Done at Sistovo, in the chamber of conferences, the 4th day of the month of August, in the year of grace, 1791.

(L. S.) Le Baron *d'Herbert Rath-Keal.*

(L. S.) Le Comte *Francois Esterhazy de Galantha.*

AN ACCOMPT of the Total Produce of the Duties of CUSTOMS, EXCISE, STAMPS, and INCIDENTS, respectively, for One Year, ended the 5th Day of January, 1792; distinguishing (as far as possible) in each Branch, the Produce on every separate Article, the Duties on which have amounted to One Thousand Pounds, or more, in the Four Quarters of the said Year, viz.

	£.	s.	d.
The total produce of the duties of customs for one year, ended the 5th day of January, 1792, as per account *(A.)*	3,719,128	13	2½
Ditto of the excise for one year, ended ditto (exclusive of £.643,892 —s. —¼d. the produce of the annual malt duties) as per accompt *(B.)* ——— ———	7,495,740	10	4¾
Ditto of the stamp duties for one year, ended ditto, as per accompt *(C.)*	1,404,422	0	0
Ditto of incidents at the receipt of the Exchequer for one year, ended ditto, as per accompt *(D.)* ———	2,152,378	19	7
	14,771,670	3	2¼

Memdum.

In the sum of 2,152,378l. 19s. 7d. stated as the amount of incidents at the Exchequer, is included 150,843l. 6s. 11½d. being the amount of imprest and other monies paid in there within the above period.

Presented pursuant to an act of the 27th year of his present Majesty's reign, this 7th day of February, 1792, by

GEORGE ROSE.

An ACCOUNT of the Total Net Produce, and Payments into the Exchequer, of the Revenue of the CUSTOMS of GREAT BRITAIN, between the 5th January, 1791, and the 5th January, 1792; diſtinguiſhing (as far as poſſible) the Produce on every ſeparate Article, the Duties on which ſhall have amounted to 1,000l. or more.

SPECIES OF GOODS.	Net Produce, ſubject to the Payment of Bounties and Charges of Management.		
Aſhes, pearl	1,086	1	3¾
—— pot	754	7	4½
Barilla	22,177	16	7
Beads, coral	132	5	8½
Books, bound	655	18	6
Bottles, glaſs	1,329	1	10
Brimſtone	7,213	14	8½
Briſtles, undreſt	3,767	4	11¾
Bugle, great	1,312	5	4
Callicoes, Eaſt-India	96	19	1
Canes, walking	1,134	18	3½
Capers	651	15	6
Carpets, Turkey	1,452	18	9
China ware	16,050	12	2¾
Copper, unwrought	167	16	4
Cork	6,039	14	10½
Corn, oats	6,283	5	1¼
—— wheat	9,776	8	2
Drugs: Almonds, bitter	721	0	10
Aloes, Succotrina	743	13	6½
——— Eaſt-India	275	14	7
Balſam Capaivi	36	6	9½
Benjamin			
Borax, refined	200	16	4
Buds of Caſſia	30	2	6½
Caſſia Lignea			
Cortex Peru	1,683	7	11½
Cream of Tartar	1,388	14	9
Gambogium			
Ginſeng			
Gum: Cop	773	18	5½
Gum: Guiaci	16	18	9
Gum: Senega	545	10	1
Gum: Tragacanth	66	9	11½
Jalap	886	19	6
Juniper berries	2,993	5	1¼
Lead, black	313	15	11½
Manna	649	1	9½
Oil, perfumed	434	14	11½

	SPECIES OF GOODS.	Net Produce, subject to the Payment of Bounties and Charges of Management.		
Drugs.	Oil, Turpentine	21	8	0
	Opium	606	13	1½
	Quickfilver	2,049	19	7
	——— East-India	352	9	7½
	Radix Ipecacuana			
	Rhubarb	225	8	8
	——— East-India			
	Saccarum Saturni	2,347	4	5½
	Sarfaparilla	2,248	4	8½
	Senna	581	9	5½
	Succus Liquoritiæ	6,587	7	0
	Tamarinds	616	4	2½
	Verdigreafe	1,810	7	0
	Dye ftuffs, Shellack			
	——— Smalts	9,835	11	11½
	Elephants Teeth	2,150	6	3
	——— East-India			
	Feathers for beds	8,342	14	11
	Fifh, anchovies	1,032	19	2
	—— oyfters	3,060	5	0
	Fruit, lemons and oranges	8,964	9	7
	—— nuts, fmall	3,175	1	10
	Glafs plates	7,880	17	3¾
	Glue	446	0	4
Grocery.	Amonds, Jordan	2,791	19	1½
	——— not Jordan	1,250	11	2¾
	Annifeeds	1,994	1	10
	Cinnamon	879	3	11
	Cloves	1,067	10	7½
	—— E. India	91	4	2½
	Cocoa	1,768	2	8
	Coffee	16,393	4	6½
	—— E. India	5,970	9	3½
	Currants	103,883	18	10¾
	Figs	2,629	5	0¼
	Ginger			
	Mace	1,497	4	4½
	—— E. India	—	6	7
	Nutmegs	2,359	6	2½
	——— E. India	12	10	3
	Pepper	22,089	0	11½
	Pimento	8,758	10	10¼
	Prunes	7,679	11	1¼
Raifins.	Denia	29,054	9	9¾
	Faro	199	13	1
	Lexia	12,215	12	6¾
	Lipari	5,410	2	10¾
	Smyrna	6,973	3	1½
	Solis	16,144	4	1¼

SPECIES OF GOODS.		Net Produce, subject to the Payment of Bounties and Charges of Management.		
Grocery.	Rice	7,250	13	7½
	—— E. India	75	7	11
	Sago	1,701	0	11
	Succades	626	14	7
	Sugar, brown	1,044,053	8	7¼
	—— ditto —— new duty	221,024	7	10¾
	Tea	120,105	9	6
	Turmerick	131	1	9½
	Hair, horse	793	5	5
	—— human	750	14	6
	Hats, chip	2,804	11	7
	—— straw	756	6	4
	Hemp, rough	64,623	15	0½
	Hides, Indian			
	—— Losh	557	9	11
	—— ox or cow	3,729	6	3
	Incle, wrought	4,113	8	1¾
	Iron, bar	148,638	16	3
	—— cast	1,824	6	0
	Kelp	2,031	11	0½
Linen.	Cambricks	12,548	8	3½
	Canvas, Hessens	17,887	7	11
	—— Spruce	4,039	8	10
	Damask tabling, Silesia	1,300	7	4
	Diaper napkening, Silesia	326	11	9
	Germany, narrow, not above 31½	28,852	17	11¼
	Lawns, French	2,733	17	8½
	—— Silesia, Holland, whited			
Linen. Russia.	Broad, above 22½ inches	13,667	10	2¾
	—— above 31½	1,502	8	4¼
	—— above 36			
	Drilling	2,247	11	6¾
	Narrow	4,352	0	1½
	Towelling and napkening	881	12	0
	Mats, Russia	1,442	10	2¾
	Molasses	1,092	14	2¼
	Muslins, E. India	128,268	12	7
	Oil, ordinary	19,643	13	0½
	—— sallad	3,599	2	9
	—— train	7,566	5	0¼
	Paper, foolscap, Genoa, second	980	0	5
	Pictures	2,143	10	0
	Pitch	550	7	4¼
	Salt	2,057	9	6
	Salt Petre	84	10	2
	—— E. India	14,805	3	2
	Seeds, clover	3,710	6	5½

SPECIES OF GOODS.		Net Produce, subject to the Payment of Bounties and Charges of Management.		
Silks.	Raw	46,120	9	10
	Bengal, raw	44,386	13	9
	China, raw	23,889	18	0
	Thrown	164,031	0	2
	Wrought	700	3	0
Shells, mother of pearl				
Skins.	Bear, black	1,663	13	6
	Beaver	1,091	10	9
	Calf, undress'd	2,392	2	1¼
	—— tann'd	4,254	12	2
	Deer in hair	3,334	0	11
	Fox, ordinary	696	6	9
	Goat, tann'd	5,286	10	0
	Kid, dressed	504	11	7¼
	—— undressed	3,464	10	10¼
	Martin	478	12	9
	Mink	45	18	11½
	Musquash	180	8	7½
	Otter	1,026	1	1
	Raccoon	237	8	11
	Seal	907	8	0
	Wolf	1,402	15	8
Snuff		760	7	6
Sope, hard		1,122	3	2½
Spirits, brandy		44,663	6	7
——— Geneva		21,709	15	11¾
——— rum		36,285	16	3½
Stones, blocks of marble		1,510	3	11¾
Tapes, open		322	15	1½
Tar		4,434	7	7½
Thread, Sisters		2,011	17	10
Tobacco, Brazil ——— manufactured		230,674	14	6
Tow		1,102	5	5½
Turpentine		13,386	18	2¼
Wax, bees		4,779	15	6
Wine.	French	24,641	5	5¼
	Madeira	26,147	18	2¾
	Port	406,179	8	7¼
	Rhenish	3,712	5	3¾
	Spanish	84,690	8	0¾
Wood.	Balks	1,701	10	4
	Battens	13,969	5	11½
	Deals	125,897	17	11¼
	Deal Ends	4,241	6	9¼

SPECIES OF GOODS.	Net Produce, subject to the Payment of Bounties and Charges of Management.		
Wood. Lathwood	3,060	2	2¾
Wood. Masts	2,450	15	10
Wood. Oak plank	3,103	18	1½
Wood. —— timber	725	0	1
Wood. Pasing boards	1,292	2	1¼
Wood. Scaleboards	696	17	8
Wood. Staves	9,031	15	11¼
Wood. Timber, fir	63,821	8	3¾
Wood. Users	1,463	6	5
Wood. Wainscot boards	1,392	18	10¾
Wood. ——— logs	2,410	12	11
Yarn, cotton	794	16	1
—— mohair	833	8	4
Coals carried coastwise	553,688	15	3½
Wine sent coastwise to London	952	3	0
King's share of condemn'd tobacco	2,228	14	0½
Subsidy on allum	3,241	3	1
——— on coals exported to foreign parts	105,949	15	10¾
——— on lead	26,651	14	9¾
——— on tin	5,820	2	0¼
——— on other goods exported	25,505	5	9¼
Received from the receivers general of window tax	228,441	16	3
Remittances from the plantations	12,600	18	9
Duty on wine, from the receiver general of excise	1,027	5	10½
Sundry small articles, the produce upon each of which did not amount to 1,000l.	146,732	13	7
Total charge	4,871,126	11	6¼

DISCHARGE.

	£.	s.	d.
By bounties paid —— ——	498,722	14	9¾
— Charges of management ——	395,493	13	11
— Payments to the Barons of the Exchequer in Scotland towards supporting the three Supreme Courts of Justice	21,000	0	0
— Payments to ditto, to be distributed among indigent persons, by act of union	22,000	0	0
Paid itinerant preachers —— —	1,000	0	0
—— for fitting the Register Office for keeping the records — —	191	15	9
—— for purchasing the exemption of the Pitfarren coals from duty —	7,332	4	7
—— into the Exchequer, consolidated customs ———	3,719,128	13	2½
— — into the Exchequer, the produce of the new duty imposed upon sugar by the act of last Session of Parliament —— ——	206,257	9	3
Total discharge	4,871,126	11	6¼

P. S. The articles in the above account, the net produce of which does not amount to 1,000l. yielded a 1,000l. and more gross.

THOMAS IRVING,
Inspector General of the Imports and Exports of Great Britain.

Custom House, London,
February 7, 1792.

EXCISE.—An ACCOUNT of the Net Produce paid into the Exchequer of the Duties of EXCISE; distinguishing, as far as possible, the Produce upon every separate Article, the Duty on which has amounted to 1,000l. or more, between the 5 January 1791 and the 5 January 1792.

Under what HEADS paid in.	First Quarter, from 5 Jan^y 1791 to 5 April 1791	Second Quarter from 5 Ap^l 1791 to 5 July 1791	Third Quarter, from 5 July 1791 to 10 October 1791	Fourth Quarter, from 10 Oct^r 1791 to 5 January 1792	Total Net Produce of the Four Quarters
Auctions — —	13,518 0 0	19,913 0 0	20,171 0 0	17,371 0 0	70,973 0 0
Beer — —	425,089 0 0	592,630 0 0	496,780 0 0	365,979 0 0	1,880,478 0 0
Bricks and tiles — —	11,456 0 0	1,355 0 0	47,950 0 0	54,621 0 0	115,382 0 0
Candles — —	110,631 0 0	89,372 0 0	40,540 0 0	58,907 0 0	299,450 0 0
Coaches built for sale —	435 0 0	419 0 0	811 0 0	649 0 0	2,314 0 0
Cocoa nuts and coffee —	8,232 0 0	10,042 0 0	10,129 0 0	12,791 0 0	41,194 0 0
Cyder, perry, and verjuice	2,471 0 0	3,991 0 0	8,520 0 0	4,392 0 0	19,374 0 0
Glass — —	41,707 0 0	29,765 0 0	38,452 0 0	32,133 0 0	142,057 0 0
Hides & skins, vell^m & parchment	65,613 0 0	53,051 0 0	59,895 0 0	53,394 0 0	231,953 0 0
Hops — —	— —	93,865 0 0	1,815 0 0	— —	95,680 0 0
Malt, perpetual duty —	— —	141,917 0 0	407,431 0 0	147,187 0 0	696,535 0 0
Metheglin or mead and vinegar	1,798 0 0	2,959 0 0	13,673 0 0	5,420 0 0	23,850 0 0
Paper — —	16,669 0 0	13,236 0 0	19,187 0 0	17,413 0 0	66,505 0 0
Printed goods — —	53,135 0 0	26,071 0 0	60,146 0 0	52,137 0 0	191,489 0 0
Sope — —	70,925 0 0	85,079 0 0	90,067 0 0	99,338 0 0	345,409 0 0
Spirits { British —	198,311 0 0	217,604 0 0	52,380 0 0	123,821 0 0	592,116 0 0
Spirits { Foreign —	181,224 0 0	83,813 0 0	121,168 0 0	187,013 0 0	573,218 0 0
Starch — —	23,821 0 0	23,330 0 0	29,181 0 0	27,941 0 0	104,273 0 0
Sweets — —	1,421 0 0	6,249 0 0	5,167 0 0	445 0 0	13,282 0 0
Tea — —	65,214 10 4¾	153,531 0 0	70,130 0 0	159,834 0 0	448,709 10 4¾

Tobacco and snuff comm^d 11th October, 1789 —	78,550 0 0	80,727 0 0		78,512 0 0	78,472 0 0		316,261 0 0
Verjuice (with cider and perry)							
Vinegar (with Metheglin or mead)							
Wine — —	58,687 0 0	66,758 0 0		104,879 0 0	106,225 0 0		336,549 0 0
Wire — —	801 0 0	442 0 0		593 0 0	401 0 0		2,237 0 0
Licences to: Auctioneers (with auctions,							
Coachmakers (with coaches)							
Dealers in coffee, chocolate, or tea —	2,513 0 0	2,443 0 0		5,620 0 0	3,345 0 0		13,921 0 0
Mak^s and sell^s of wax and Sper. candles (with cand^s)							
Makers of, and dealers in, excise commodities	5,270 0 0	3,001 0 0		5,614 0 0	30,355 0 0	Spirit^s and	44,240 0 0
Retailers of spirit^s liquors			Spirit^s Lic^s	1,127 0 0	148,952 0 0	Wine Lic^s	13,385 0 0
Ditto comm^d 6 July 1787	10,749 0 0	2,636 0 0	Wine Lic^s	287 0 0	26,580 0 0	Spir^s Lic^s	150,079 0 0
						Wine Lic^s	26,857 0 0
Sell^s of gold and silver plate	1,710 0 0	1,712 0 0		2,720 0 0	2,185 0 0		8,327 0 0
Manuf^s and dealers in tobacco and snuff (with tobacco and snuff)							
Duties comm^d 5 Jan^y 1791 Spirits British	13,845 0 0	34,777 0 0		11,024 0 0	19,057 0 0		78,703 0 0
Foreig^n	8,644 0 0	16,436 0 0		26,087 0 0	37,031 0 0		88,198 0 0
Malt	11,106 0 0	28,987 0 0		68,430 0 0	37,209 0 0		145,732 0 0
Total of duties, except malt annu^l	1,483,545 10 4¾	1,886,111 0 0		1,898,486 0 0	1,910,598 0 0		7,178,740 10 4¾
Ann^l malt, mum, cyder, & perry	4,685 0 0	158,380 0 0		331,333 0 0	136,494 0 0		630,892 0 0
Total of England —	1,488,230 10 4¾	2,044,491 0 0		2,229,819 0 0	2,047,092 0 0		7,809,632 10 4¾

An ACCOUNT of the Duties of EXCISE paid into the Exchequer by the Commissioners of Excise in England, in One Year, between 5 January 1791, and 5 January 1792, on the Part of Scotland.

Under what HEADS paid in.	First Quarter, from 5 Jany 1791 to 5 April 1791	Second Quarter, from 5 April 1791 to 5 July 1791	Third Quarter, from 5 July 1791 to 10 Octr 1791	Fourth Quarter, from 10 Octr 1791 to 5 January 1792	Total Net Produce of the Four Quarters
Auctions — — —	1,000 0 0	— —	1,000 0 0	1,000 0 0	3,000 0 0
Beer and ale — —	4,000 0 0	5,000 0 0	3,000 0 0	10,000 0 0	22,000 0 0
Bricks and tiles — —	1,000 0 0	— —	— —	1,000 0 0	2,000 0 0
Candles — — —	— —	4,000 0 0	— —	2,000 0 0	6,000 0 0
Coaches — — —					
Cocoa nuts and coffee — —					
General licences — —	1,000 0 0	2,000 0 0	— —	— —	3,000 0 0
Glass — — —	3,000 0 0	3,000 0 0	3,000 0 0	3,000 0 0	12,000 0 0
Hides and skins — —					
Tea — — —					
Malt, perpetual duty — —	7,000 0 0	4,000 0 0	7,000 0 0	10,000 0 0	28,000 0 0
Paper — — —	— —	2,000 0 0	1,000 0 0	2,000 0 0	5,000 0 0
Printed goods — —	13,000 0 0	13,000 0 0	9,000 0 0	16,000 0 0	51,000 0 0
Sope — — —	6,000 0 0	7,000 0 0	11,000 0 0	3,000 0 0	27,000 0 0
Spirits { British — —	9,000 0 0	9,000 0 0	— —	12,000 0 0	30,000 0 0
Spirits { Foreign — —	14,000 0 0	28,000 0 0	— —	3,000 0 0	45,000 0 0
Starch — —	2,000 0 0	2,000 0 0	2,000 0 0	2,000 0 0	8,000 0 0
Tobacco and snuff — —	10,000 0 0	10,000 0 0	8,000 0 0	10,000 0 0	38,000 0 0
Wine — — —	7,000 0 0	11,000 0 0	2,000 0 0	9,000 0 0	29,000 0 0

Licences — Tea	— —	— —	1,000 0 0	— —	1,000 0 0
Licences — Plate					
Licences — Spirit. liquors	2,000 0 0	3,000 0 0	1,000 0 0	— —	6,000 0 0
Malt, perpetual duty, comm^d 5^th Jan^y 1791	— —	— —	1,000 0 0	— —	1,000 0 0
Total of duties, except malt ann^l	80,000 0 0	103,000 0 0	50,000 0 0	84,000 0 0	317,000 0 0
Ann^l malt, mum, cider, and perry	4,500 0 0	— —	3,500 0 0¼	5,000 0 0	13,000 0 0¼
Total of Scotland	84,500 0 0	103,000 0 0	53,500 0 0¼	89,000 0 0	330,000 0 0¼

England	7,178,740 10 4¾	
Scotland	317,000 0 0	
	Perpetual duties	7,495,740 10 4¾
England	630,892 0 0	
Scotland	13,000 0 0¼	
	Annual malt, &c.	643,892 0 0¼
	TOTAL	8,139,632 10 5

Excise Office, London,
1st February 1792.

JA. WEBB, Accomp^t Gen^l.
JA. BROWNE, p. Compt^r.

An ACCOUNT of the Total Net Produce paid into the Exchequer of the Duties arising from the STAMP REVENUE, that have amounted to 1,000l. or more, in the Four Quarters next preceding the 5th January 1792

	5th January to 5th April 1791	5th of April to 5th of July 1791	5th of July to 10 October 1791	10th October to 5th January 1792	TOTAL.
Consolidated duties — — —	168,273 0 0	168,487 0 0	213,049 13 4	172,394 0 0	722,203 13 4
Insurance duty — — —	32,383 0 0	27,688 0 0	28,575 7 3	27,101 0 0	115,747 7 3
Burials — — —	— —	— —	1,571 4 9	— —	1,571 4 9
Bills of Exchange — —	22,487 0 0	20,232 0 0	69,543 1 4	36,476 0 0	148,738 1 4
Receipts — — —	10,524 0 0	8,843 0 0	17,681 5 11	9,307 0 0	46,355 5 11
Hats — — — —	3,513 0 0	3,407 0 0	5,785 15 1	2,689 0 0	15,394 15 1
Plate — — — —	11,647 0 0	6,200 0 0	6,920 13 11	6,756 0 0	31,523 13 11
Post-horse duty, &c. — —	51,764 0 0	42 859 0	55,896 11 7	48,115 0 0	198,634 11 7
Medicine — — —	2,705 0 0	2,641 0	4,219 3 10	2,505 0 0	12,070 3 10
Game — — —	13,794 0 0	6 111 0	7,298 16 5	26,368 0 0	53,571 16 5
Attornies — — —	5,185 0 0	5,966 0 0	4,256 10 7	9,299 0 0	24,706 10 7
Pawnbrokers — —	— —	— —	2,645 6 5	— —	2,645 6 5
Glove — — —	1,339 0 0	1,225 0 0	3,522 15 9	— —	6,086 15 9
Perfumery — — —	1,470 0 0	1,661 0 0	2,525 13 3	1,250 0 0	6,906 13 2
Add¹ Game — — —	— —	— —	— —	10,106 0 0	10,106 0 0
Apprentice Duty — —	1,733 0 0	2,506 0 0	2,597 0 8	1,324 0 0	8,160 0 8
	326,817 0 0	297,82 0	426,089 0 0	353,690 0 0	1,404,422 0 0

Stamp Office,
February 7th, 1792.

J. LLOYD, pro Compr.

J. BINDLEY,
W. BAILLIE,

R. TICKELL.
J. BYNG.
E. FAWKENER.

To the Honourable the Knights, Citizens, and Burgeſſes, in Parliament aſſembled.

An ACCOUNT of the Monies remaining in the Exchequer, on the 5th Day of January, 1792, of the Surplus of the CONSOLIDATED FUND, for the Diſpoſition of Parliament, after ſatisfying the ſeveral Charges and Incumbrances thereon.

THE MONIES remaining in the Exchequer, on the 5th day of January 1792, of the ſurplus of the Conſolidated Fund, for the diſpoſition of Parliament, after ſatisfying the ſeveral charges and incumbrances thereon, amount to the ſum of one hundred fifty-five thouſand four hundred ninety-five pounds, nineteen ſhillings, and one halfpenny.

WILLIAM ROSE HAWORTH.

Exchequer, the 9th
Day of February 1792.

An ACCOUNT of the Total Net Produce paid into the Exchequer, of the Duties under the Head of INCIDENTS, diſtinguiſhing (as far as poſſible) in each Branch, the Produce on every ſeparate Article, the Duties on which ſhall have amounted to 1000l. or more, in the Four Quarters from the 5th January 1791, to the 5th January 1792.

Conſolidated ſalt, 1787	382,800	8	10
Letter money per week	156,000	0	0
Letter money, 1760	173,000	0	0
Seizures, ditto Alum mines, ditto	34,558	9	8
Alienation duty, ditto	2,086	18	8
Hawkers, 1710	3,498	11	4
Hackney coaches, 1711	13,100	0	0
Ditto 1784	14,600	0	0
6d. per lib. on penſions	44,780	0	0
1s. deduct. on ſalaries	40,948	6	6½
Firſt fruits of the clergy	3,905	9	6¾
Tenths ditto	10,033	1	11½
Male ſervants, 1785	103,349	18	7½
Female ditto, ditto	34,461	1	4¼
Four-wheel carriages, 1785	173,846	16	3¼
Two-wheel ditto ditto	41,281	10	1½
Waggons ditto	21,105	18	6½
Carts ditto	11,953	16	8¾
Horſes ditto	126,659	15	4¾
Shops ditto	2,762	4	11½
10l. per cent. on aſſeſſed taxes, 1790	53,504	8	10¼
Houſes and windows, 1766	400,471	0	0
Inhabited houſes, 1779	151,231	4	8½
£.	1,999,939	2	1½
The produce of the duties under 1,000l. in the above period amount to the ſum of £.	1,596	10	6
£.	2,001,535	12	7½

Exchequer, the 7th
Day of February, 1791.

Money paid by Charles Peace, on account of the slave trade	4	7	6
Ditto by Senhouse Wilson, Esq. late deputy receiver general of the Isle of Man — —	1,660	10	8½
Ditto by Charles Long, Esq. for interest of 187,000l. by act 29 Geo. III. — — —	4,026	16	11
Imprest money repaid by Robert Pringle, Esq. late colonel of the Newfoundland regiment of foot —	1,200	0	0
Ditto by William Crosbie, Esq. colonel of a company in America — — — —	614	3	0¼
Money paid by William Mitford, Esq. on account of the public debt, transmitted from Canada — —	9,000	0	0
Imprest money repaid by Thomas Coutts and Andrew Clinton, executors of Elizabeth Campbell, executrix of John Campbell, late agent for Georgia — — —	20	11	4½
Ditto by Andrew Clinton, late barrack master —	152	11	3
Money paid by Edmund Armstrong, Esq. on account of 8th regiment — — — — —	6,000	0	0
Ditto by William Brummell, Esq. on account of out pensioners of Chelsea Hospital —	3,000	0	0
Ditto by Messrs Ross and Ogilvie, on account of independant companies — — —	1,872	19	9
Imprest money repaid by Alexander Trotter, Esq. on account of Sir Gilbert Elliot, Bart. late treasurer of the navy — — —	2,018	5	¼
Ditto by Ed. Beeston Long and David Barclay, Esqrs. on account of forces in North America —	7,341	19	11¼
Ditto by Major Boleyn Douglas, late paymaster of troops under General Meadows — —	500	0	0
Ditto by Thomas Harley and Henry Drummond, Esqrs.	37,406	7	10½
Interest on ditto by ditto — —	12,441	3	0
Imprest money repaid by Henry William Pomroy and Kender Mason, Esqrs., executors of Kender Mason, on account of an agreement for victualling 3,000 militia in East Florida — — —	2,000	0	0
Ditto by Lieutenant-colonel George Clerke, late barrack-master general in North America —	140	2	4¼
Ditto by Daniel Macknamara, Esq., executor of Richard Rigby, Esq., late paymaster of the forces	16,884	15	6
Ditto by Peregrine Francis Thomas, Esq. —	81	18	4
Money paid for conscience sake — — —	25	0	0
Ditto by Messrs. Meyricks, for sale of commissions	5,981	7	6
Ditto by Messrs. Bishopp and Brummel, for ditto	1,498	17	0
Ditto by Alexander Adair, Esq., for ditto —	2,201	6	6½
Ditto by Messrs. Ross and Ogilvie, for ditto	5,794	15	0
Ditto by Messrs. Fitter and Croasdaile, for ditto	648	6	0
Ditto by James Russell, Esq., for ditto —	549	8	6
Ditto by Nathaniel Collyer, Esq., for ditto —	549	8	6
Ditto by Messrs. Lambe and Cock, for ditto	1,101	18	6
Ditto by Messrs. Cox and Greenwood, for ditto	13,628	8	6
Ditto by Edmund Armstrong, Esq., for ditto	3,198	10	0
Ditto by Humphrey Donaldson, Esq., for ditto	1,799	8	0
Ditto by Fountain Elwin, Esq., on account of the 70th regiment — —	4,500	0	0
Ditto by Montagu Wilkinson, on account of the late corps of Queen's Rangers —	3,000	0	0
	150,843	6	11½
Total of Incidents —	2,001,535	12	7½
£.	2,152,378	19	7

Exr per NEWCASTLE.

An ACCOUNT of the Produce of the TAXES for One Year, to the 5th of January 1792.

	£.	s.	d.
CUSTOMS — — —	3,723,361	17	7¾
EXCISE — — —	7,182,107	10	4½
STAMPS — —	1,277,970	15	11
Total of Cuftoms, Excife, and Stamps	£. 12,183,440	3	11¼

INCIDENTS.

	£.	s.	d.
Confolidated Letter Money, 1787	156,000	—	—
Do — Salt — Do.	382,800	8	10
Seizures fince 25 October 1760 —	34,558	9	8
Proffers — Do. —	622	8	10
Fines of Leafes — Do. —			
Letter Money — Do. —	173,000	—	—
Alum Mines — — Do. —	960	—	—
Compofitions — — Do. —	5	3	4
Fines and Forfeitures Do. —			
Rent of a Light Houfe Do. —	6	13	4
Alienation Duty — Do. —	2,086	18	8
6d. Deduct. on Penfions, &c. 24th June 1710	44,780	—	—
1fh. Do on Salaries, &c. 5 April 1758 —	40,948	6	6½
Houfes and Windows, 1766 —	400,471	—	—
Inhabited Houfes, 1779 — —	151,231	4	8½
Hawkers and Pedlars, 1710 —	3,498	11	4
Do — 1784 —			
Hackney Coaches and Chairs, 1ft Auguft 1711	13,100	—	—
Do — 1784 —	14,600	—	—
Male Servants, 1785 —	103,349	18	7½
Female Do, Do. —	34,461	1	4¾
Horfes, Do. — —	126,659	15	4¼
Four Wheel Carriages, Do. —	173,846	16	3¼
Two Wheel Do, Do. —	41,281	10	1½
Waggons, Do. —	21,105	18	6½
Carts — Do. — —	11,953	16	8¾
Shops — Do. — —	2,762	4	11½
Firft Fruits of the Clergy —	3,905	9	6¾
Tenths Do — — —	10,033	1	11½
Men Servants, 1777 (Arrears) —	2	5	—
Total of Incidents	£. 1,948,031	3	9¼

NEW DUTIES.	£.	s.	d.
Sugars, Customs 1791 — —	206,257	9	3
British Spirits, Excise 1791 —	78,703	—	—
Foreign Do Do. —	88,198	—	—
Malt — Do. — —	146,732	—	—
Bills and Receipts Do. —	108,637	—	—
Game Duty Do. —	10,917	—	—
£. 10 per Cent. on Assessed Taxes Do.	53,504	8	10¾
Total of New Duties —	692,948	18	1½
Total of Customs, Excise and Stamps	12,183,440	3	11¼
Total of Incidents — —	1,948,031	3	9¼
GRAND TOTAL	£. 14,824,420	5	9¾

equer, the 6th Day of
February 1792. WILLIAM ROSE HAWORTH.

An Account of the Annual Net Produce of the Duties upon Female Servants, under the Act of the 25th of George III. for four Years, ending the 5th of April, 1791.

1787, ending 5th April,	1788,	£.32,983	2	0½
1788,	——	1789,	32,751	1	2½
1789,	——	1790,	32,912	9	0½
1790,	——	1791,	33,039	3	6

Office for Taxes,
10th February, 1792.

TIM. BRENT.

GEORGE BLOUNT,
F. FOWNES LUTTRELL,
B. BARNE.

An Account of the Annual Net Produce of the Duty upon Carts, chargeable under the Act of the 23d of Geo. III. for four Years, ending the 5th of April, 1791.

1787, ending 5th April,		1788,	£.11,562	7	10
1788,	——	1789,	11,320	18	10
1789,	——	1790,	11,130	5	4
1790,	——	1791,	10,661	3	5½

Office for Taxes,
10th February, 1792.

TIM. BRENT.

GEORGE BLOUNT,
F. FOWNES LUTTRELL,
B. BARNE.

An Account of the Annual Net Produce of the Duty upon Waggons, chargeable under the Act of the 23d of George III. for four Years, ending 5th April, 1791.

1787, ending 5th April,	1788,	£.18,810	14	5
1788, ——	1789,	18,858	14	4½
1789, ——	1790,	19,462	7	10
1790, ——	1791,	18,542	13	11

Office for Taxes,
10th February, 1792.
TIM. BRENT.

GEORGE BLOUNT,
F. FOWNES LUTTRELL,
B. BARNE.

An Account of the Net Produce of the Duty upon Houses under Seven Windows, chargeable only with the Duty of Three Shillings per House, under the Act of the 6th of Geo. III.; and also of the Net Produce of the Duty upon such Houses as are chargeable only with the Duty of One Shilling per House, in that Part of Great Britain called Scotland, under the said Act, for the Year 1788, ending the 5th of April, 1789.

England and Wales -	£.52,922	17	2
Scotland - -	3,210	3	0
	56,133	0	2

The duty of three shillings upon houses under seven windows, cannot be ascertained later than the year 1788, ending the 5th of April, 1789, as an abstract of the classes of the several houses is only made up once in three or four years.

Office for Taxes,
10th Feb. 1792.
TIM. BRENT.

GEORGE BLOUNT,
F. FOWNES LUTTRELL,
B. BARNE.

Tuesday, 7th February.

The SPEAKER acquainted the House, that pursuant to the order of the last session, lists had been transmitted to the Clerk of the prisoners for debt in the several jails. Referred to the Committee appointed to enquire into the situation of prisoners for debt.

The usual annual accounts were presented.

The bill for enabling the House to proceed on an impeachment, without a previous ballot for an election Committee, was gone through in a Committee, and ordered to be engrossed.

Mr. Chancellor PITT said, in conformity to the mention he had taken the liberty of making on the first day of the session, of the finances of the country, he meant on Wednesday se'nnight, to bring forward a statement of the public income and expenditure, but as it would be impossible for him, clearly to shew upon what grounds he meant to appropriate a certain part of the surplus revenue in hand, towards the reduction of the national debt, and the remainder to the extinction of those taxes, he had already pointed out; (as those which he had selected for the purpose of being first abolished,) without going into the detail of all the minute parts of the subject of finance, he should be under the necessity of doing so in the Committee of Supply, although it must be obvious to every gentleman, that the sum to be taken from the consolidated fund must be voted in another Committee, viz. the Committee of Ways and Means. He begged the House, therefore, to understand, that on Wednesday se'nnight he should enter at large into the detail of every branch of the public income and expenditure, in the same manner as had usually been done heretofore at a more advanced period of the session. The Chancellor of the Exchequer concluded with moving, "That this House will on Wednesday "se'nnight resolve itself into a Committee of the whole House, "to consider of so much of His Majesty's speech as relates to "the public income and Expenditure, and the national debt."

The same was ordered accordingly, and

Mr. ROSE immediately moved for all the customary public accounts of expence incurred under the various heads of expenditure for the past year.

Mr. Chancellor PITT gave notice, that on Friday next, in the Committee of Supply, he should propose to vote the navy debt, including such of the expences of the late armament as remained undischarged.

Mr. SMYTH gave notice of voting the seamen to-morrow.

Mr. HOBART reported from the Committee of Friday last the resolution relative to a Committee of Suply. The same was read and agreed to *nem. con.* and the Committee of Supply ordered to sit to-morrow.

A new writ was moved for St. Mawes, in the room of Colonel Simcoe, made Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada.

The SPEAKER called the attention of the House to what had past on Friday last, when, on an honourable Member (Mr. Fox) having mentioned the necessity of early providing, by some regulation, that the balloting days for Committees on election petitions, and the business of the trial in Westminster-Hall, should not clash with each other, he had suggested two modes that occurred to his mind, by each of which the inconvenience to be apprehended might be averted, viz. the bringing in a special bill for the purpose, or the following the precedent adopted in Lord Strafford's impeachment in the year 1640, when the House had appeared generally inclined to adopt the latter mode, and follow the precedent of 1640. Upon more closely inspecting that precedent, Mr. Speaker said he found it would be attended with difficulty and inconvenience if it were adopted, of which he would state two possible cases. Supposing that the House of Lords were to adjourn to their own Chamber of Parliament during a day's proceeding, to discuss any particular point that had occurred in the progress of the trial, and were on the same day to send a message to that House (the Commons) that they wished to proceed with the trial; having previously resolved themselves into a Committee, they could not receive any such message; and again, if their Managers were to meet with any difficulty in the course of the trial, and to wish to refer it to the House, and take their instructions how to act, they would not have an opportunity to make such reference. Finding, therefore, that the resolution in the case of Lord Strafford's impeachment had no precedent that could previously be traced, nor had ever been followed by an instance of a similar sort in subsequent times, but that it

ſtood ſingle and anomalous, Mr. Speaker, upon mature conſideration, thought a ſpecial bill of general regulation with reſpect to all impeachments the moſt adviſeable mode of proceeding.

The Houſe adjourned.

Wedneſday, 8th February.

The SPEAKER reported to the Houſe, that the recognizances entered into by the parties intereſted in the petition complaining of an undue election for Boſton, had been forfeited, in conſequence of non-compliance with the conditions of the act of Parliament, and that he had eſtreated the ſaid recognizances into the Exchequer.

Mr. Chancellor PITT ſaid, that not ſeeing the honourable gentleman in the Houſe, whoſe duty it peculiarly was to ſtate any thing relative to the Army, he felt it neceſſary to obſerve, that the army papers unfortunately could not be preſented as was intended, and that therefore the voting the amount of the eſtimate muſt neceſſarily be deferred from Monday to Wedneſday next. That neverthelefs he would not propoſe waving his notice of ſtating the ſituation of the finances, &c. on Wedneſday, becauſe, unleſs the conſideration of the army eſtimates occaſioned very great length of debate, he ſhould bring forward his ſtatement of the finances after the army eſtimates were diſpoſed of.

Mr. FOX ſaid, as the right honourable gentleman had given notice of his intention to vote the expences of the late armament on Friday, he hoped it was not to be underſtood, if the Houſe came to that vote, that gentlemen were to be precluded from freely diſcuſſing the ſubject of the negociation with Ruſſia at a future opportunity, or that it was to be inferred, that they, in any ſort, approved of the meaſures that had cauſed the expence.

Mr. Chancellor PITT ſaid, moſt certainly not. The voting the money to anſwer the expence incurred, would neither pledge gentlemen to an approbation or diſapprobation of the meaſures that occaſioned the expence. If it were thought neceſſary to diſcuſs the ſubject at large at a ſubſequent opportunity, it would be in the power of gentlemen to bring it forward

I

whenever they pleafed. That as it might feem naturally to follow, that the voting the expence, and reafoning upon it, fhould accompany each other, thofe gentlemen who chofe it, would fay what they thought proper on Friday, but that the mere vote of the expence could not prevent any gentleman from giving his opinion on the fubject, whenever an opportunity fhould fubfequently offer. Mr. Pitt faid, he had propofed Friday for no other reafon than to get forward with public bufinefs, but that if any gentleman preferred Monday, he was perfectly willing to take that day inftead of Friday.

Mr. FOX faid, he had rather fpoken from the circumftance of wifhing to avoid mifunderftanding on the fubject, than with any view to create a difficulty. That however he might feel reafon to object to the meafures, he, for one at leaft, fhould not be unwilling to vote that the expence of the armament, whatever it might be, fhould be difcharged. He was only defirous of laying in his claim to a fair and full difcuffion of the Ruffian negociation at a fit opportunity, which from what he knew and underftood, would, he hoped, be brought forward by fome gentlemen on the other fide of the Houfe, and be rather the bufinefs of a feparate day's confideration, than that of the day on which they voted the expence of the late armament.

The Houfe adjourned.

Thurfday, 9th February.

The bill to enable the Houfe to proceed on an impeachment, without balloting for an election Committee, was read a third time and paffed.

Mr. FOX brought in his two bills on Libels and Quo Warranto, which were feverally read a firft time.

The report from the Commiffioners of Supply was brought up and agreed to.

The honourable Major MAITLAND faid, that the intention which a right honourable gentleman had intimated to oppofe the production of papers, relative to the tranfactions in India, naturally led to enquire upon what grounds fuch oppofition could be founded. It was difficult to perceive how the production of fuch papers could at all be deemed dangerous and mifchievous in the prefent moment, more efpecially as every

paper which had been demanded last year had then been granted. Upon this subject, he should presume to solicit the indulgence of the House to what he had to say, previous to moving for certain papers; and he knew too well the value of the indulgence, to trespass upon it long. The system which had been adopted with regard to India, and which had originated from a quarter to which, in point of ability, the House had never been more indebted, was a system of forbearance and moderation; which inculcated the most pacific principles, and held out as the great object of our policy, the strict observance of tranquillity. From whatever cause, that system had failed of its effect. A war, at the present moment, was carried on in that country as pernicious in its tendency, and fatal in its effect, as had ever taken place during the most corrupt and venal administration. A war which was so much more to be dreaded, as it presented no prospect of its conclusion: we had no longer the recovery of tranquillity in our own hands: we were wholly in the power of our allies, and depended upon their concurrence for the re-establishment of peace. And who were these allies? Allies whose sole object was rapine and plunder; who were desirous of a continuance of the war, in order to promote their own mercenary views. They had no other object than to enrich themselves from every quarter, and to benefit equally by our wealth, and the pillage of the enemy. Then after having amassed whatever could be obtained, they would leave us to the consequences of our fate, and laugh at the easy faith which had been the dupe of their proverbial treachery. How little sensible soever some persons might be to the importance of the present transactions in India, they were pregnant to this country with the most serious consequences. It might afterwards be found that India debts were to be defrayed by British burdens, and that the mischiefs of Indian avarice and ambition were to be expiated by British citizens, by an addition to taxes, which were already but too aggravated. If it was alledged that discussion was dangerous, it could be dangerous only to the views of Ministers; it must be always beneficial to the interests of the people. Was it recollected by those who urged the danger of discussion, from what threatening consequences the discussion which had taken place on the Russian armament last session had saved this country? Had the advice which was

brought forward in this difcuffion then been allowed to have had its proper weight, the right honourable gentleman on the other fide would not have had occafion to have altered his opinion with refpect to the meafures in which he had engaged the country, the honour of a Britifh armament had been faved, and humble conceffions would not have been fubftituted to infolent demands. Was it alledged that it was dangerous now to produce papers, when the war was affirmed to be drawing to a conclufion, which had freely been granted at its commencement. Did not the refufal prove, that all the boafts of fuccefs, and hopes which had been afforded of a fpeedy end of the war, were unfounded; and that fallacious expectations had been put into a mouth, which ought only to be the facred vehicle of truth? If the Britifh army fhould fail in its defign upon Seringapatam, what hope could be entertained of a fuccefsful iffue of the war? Would not in this cafe the language of the Sovereign be invalidated, and muft not the war be attended with the moft ruinous confequences? With regard to the King's fpeech, a circumftance had occurred of a nature entirely unprecedented, to which he begged leave to call the attention of the Houfe. In oppofing the amendment of his honourable friend, a right honourable gentlemen had ftated, that he had derived no light on the fubject from the recent difpatches, fince he had no opportunity to infpect them till within half an hour previous to his having come to the Houfe. But upon examining the King's fpeech, as printed in the Gazette, it was found that the affertions of fuccefs, and the hopes of a fpeedy end of the war, were confirmed in confequence of the intelligence faid to have arrived by the recent difpatches.—Was not the language then thus fanctioned from the Throne, employed more with a view to ftage effect, and a temporary popularity, than from a regard to truth, or a defire to exhibit a juft ftatement of the real pofture of affairs? The right honourable gentleman had, on a former occafion, when this country was engaged in war, not only with all India, but with all Europe, come down to that Houfe, called their attention to all the circumftances connected with that Indian war, and laid before them all the papers which were neceffary to affift their inquiries. He had then ftated every danger to which we were expofed, and enumerated every quarter on which we

were liable to attack, information of which our enemies had not failed to profit.

All that he now wanted was a few papers, which were neceſſary to elucidate papers that had already been produced. But it might be alledged, that if the production of theſe papers was not dangerous, they were ſo frivolous, as did not require to be produced. He ſhould, therefore, briefly ſtate the nature of thoſe papers, which he meant to move for on the preſent occaſion. The firſt was a letter from Lord Cornwallis to the Nizam, dated July 7, 1789. This letter, from the uſe which had afterwards been made of it, he could not help regarding as a piece of diplomatic artifice. After having read an extract from this letter, he ſaid that it proved three points: 1ſt, that at the time the letter was written, there exiſted an amicable intercourſe between Tippoo and the Engliſh, a circumſtance which, on the part of that Prince, completely does away every idea of previous inſult and intentions of hoſtility: 2dly, if any treaty was formed to ratify the 10th and 11th articles of the former treaty of 1768, it was to be conſidered as a treaty of partition, and afforded Tippoo juſt cauſe of ſuſpicion and jealouſy: 3dly, that the conduct of the Britiſh Government in that country, with regard to Tippoo, could be placed in no other point of view than as a breach of treaty. It was not neceſſary that we ſhould enter into a war on account of the diſputes reſpecting the forts, as theſe had been purchaſed without our conſent; and were the demarkation of limits to be aſſigned as a ground for war in that country, ſuch a pretext would not be wanting every day. That Tippoo had not brought forward this letter among the cauſes which he had urged for hoſtility, was a proof of his moderation. He ſhould barely touch on the treatment which the Indian Princes had met, who eſpouſed our cauſe; after having exhauſted all their reſources in our ſupport, they were left beggars and vagabonds in their own dominions. But theſe particulars he did not bring forward with any intention of implied cenſure on Lord Cornwallis, who, he ſuppoſed, had acted in conſequence of orders from this country. When his Lordſhip, in the caſe of the Prince of Delhi, our ally, who had been plundered by banditti, declined to afford the ſupport even of a battalion, or interpoſe his interference by a letter, and as the reaſon of his refuſal, al-

ledged the plea of moderation and forbearance, he could not account for his conduct otherwise than by supposing that he acted from authority. He could not suppose that he was, in this instance, dead to the voice of justice, humanity, and pity; more especially, when he afterwards saw him deviating so widely from this system of forbearance, and engaging in schemes of hostility, and treaties of partition, to what could he impute this alteration so glaring in his policy, but to some influence to which he was bound to submit. The next papers for which he meant to move, were those relative to the loan to the Mahrattas. It was the business of that House to keep a watchful eye over every money transaction, especially where it appeared in so questionable a shape as in the present instance. In the Gazette, this loan was stated to be considerable, about 10 or 12 lacks; but was this ascertained to be the whole amount? After having received this loan, the Mahrattas went westward. Had this sum been necessary to purchase their co-operation? At last they had found out the communication of which they were so fond—the communication with the Company's pockets, and which, no doubt, they would take every occasion to renew. The other papers which he wanted, were all those relative to the proposals of peace that had been made by Tippoo, and the reasons that had operated for rejecting the same. It was necessary that these should be known, in order to ascertain the footing upon which the war at present stood. It might become dubious how far the war continued to be just, after certain terms of peace had been offered. To refuse reasonable terms of peace, was a conduct hardly less culpable than to provoke hostility. Was there not reason to suspect that aggrandizement was now the object of the war? The military language, which held out extension of territory as a sufficient ground for carrying on the war, would, he trusted, never find its way into that House. At present, the executive power of war, and the deliberative power of peace, was vested in one person, the Governor General, and no maxim could be more just, than that there was no man more unfit to conclude a peace than the General by whose victories its acquisition had been facilitated. He would not now enter into the detail of all the calamities of the war in India. He meant not to state

that our allies in that country, who were of no service in real action, were found useful only to remain beside the baggage, and starve our troops, by consuming their provisions. He meant not to state that all the merit of Lord Cornwallis appeared to consist in bearing with temper the repeated disasters and disappointments which he had experienced. We had now, to use the language of one of our dramatic poets, *placed our empire on the cast, and were resolved to stand the hazard of the die.* There appear no other means of supporting the war, but by specie from this country, and the war carried on in such circumstances might be easily anticipated. He concluded with moving,

"That there be laid before the House copies of all orders "or instructions from the Court of Directors, or the Secret "Committee, to the Governments of India, relative to the "conduct to be observed towards Tippoo Sultan, or the Ni-"zam, from the 1st of January, 1788, to the receipt of the "first accounts from India of the commencement of hostilities "with Tippoo."

"Copies of minutes of all consultations of the Bengal Go-"vernment relative to any negociation between Earl Corn-"wallis and the Nizam in 1789."

"Copies of all correspondence between the Court of Di-"rectors, or the Secret Committee, and the Government of "India, relative to any negociation carried on by Earl Corn-"wallis with the Nizam in 1789."

"Copies of all parts of letters from Earl Cornwallis, or the "Presidency of Fort St. George, relative to a considerable "sum of money, promised by Earl Cornwallis to the Mah-"rattas in June 1791."

"Copies of all accounts received by the Court of Directors, "in their public or secret capacity, from their servants in "India, relative to proposals for peace, either written or "verbal, made by Tippoo Sultan, since the commencement "of the present war in India, together with the reasons as-"signed for not accepting the same, according to the latest "advices."

Mr. FRANCIS began with saying, that he should have been contented with seconding the motions in the usual form, and left them to prevail, as he thought they must have done, by their own evident propriety and necessity, very ably enforced and illustrated by his honourable friend, but for an extraordinary declaration, which he understood had been made, for he had not heard it himself, by the Secretary of State for the affairs of India, viz. *that he was determined not to consent to the production of any of the papers proposed to be moved for; because it might lead to discussions, which would be dangerous in the present circumstances.* This declaration, I must own, has filled me with amazement. That it should proceed from that honourable person in particular, is indeed astonishing. I shall confine myself strictly to the motion for papers, and carefully abstain from entering at all into the merits of the war, which must be the subject of another debate. I have now sat in Parliament about eight years. In that time, the affairs and government of India have been almost perpetually before us, and one way or other the subject of incessant debate. On every other topic we have differed, on every other principle we have disputed; on this point alone there never yet was a difference of opinion—that transactions in India could not be made too public in this country; that the publication of them could never be injurious, or the concealment beneficial, to the public service. The truth of this proposition has been repeatedly asserted and insisted on by all parties, and from every quarter in this House, and never was denied. The case, that constitutes a fair and rational exception to a rule so acknowledged, must be powerful indeed, must be clearly and specifically made out, and not taken for granted upon bare abstract possibilities. In the present instance, I believe I may defy the most subtle imagination to conceive, or the acutest human wit to state, a specific danger, or even an inconvenience, that can arise from a production of the papers immediately in question, or from any others that tend to throw a light on the origin, the conduct, or the consequences of the present war in India. When papers are called for, which relate to discussions between this country and any of the other European Powers, the pretences usually set up for refusing them are, that negociations

are depending, that military operations are in contemplation; that the former may be embarraſſed, and the latter defeated by an unſeaſonable diſcloſure of tranſactions unfiniſhed and in ſuſpence. Be it ſo. The argument, if it were ever ſo good in Europe, proves nothing with reſpect to India. The caſes have no connection. No rational concluſion can be drawn from one to the other. We are ſpeaking of events, which happened ſeveral months ago on the other ſide of the globe. The report of our debates cannot reach the ſcene of action till many months hence; and when it does, I ſhould be glad to know how the parties are to underſtand, or in what ſenſe they are likely to be affected by what we ſay of them? If it were poſſible that the contrary might be true, if it were admitted that the policy of concealment ought to be applied to tranſactions in India, then let me call upon the Houſe and upon the Nation to conſider, in what ſituation the actual application of that policy ſuppoſes us to be. We are told by the higheſt authority at home, that there is "a reaſonable ground to hope "that the war may *ſpeedily* be brought to an honourable con-"cluſion." Our Governors in India tell us, that *we muſt be undone by procraſtination*. Yet now, on the 9th of February, 1792, the production of papers is to be refuſed, leſt it ſhould betray the operations of an exiſting war, or diſtreſs the conduct of a depending negociation. At this day, then, the war exiſts; the peace is not concluded. Even that ſuppoſition, alarming and dreadful as it is, is not ſufficient to juſtify the refuſal. The Miniſters muſt ſtate it to us in terms, that the war not only exiſts, but is likely to exiſt ſix months hence, when the advices of what we are now doing may arrive and make its impreſſion in India. Even upon their own ridiculous principles of concealment, no other ſtate of facts will bear them out. If the war be at an end, whether by victory or by treaty, all pretences for ſecrecy are annihilated. Sir, I am ſenſible that theſe conſiderations are of a negative nature. I ſhall now endeavour to ſupport the motion by other arguments, which appear to me poſitive and unanſwerable. To refuſe the explanations demanded, on a ſubject, into which this Houſe, and every Member of it, has not only a right, but is bound by duty, to inquire; I mean the cauſe, the continuance, and

the effects of a war, which, as we are aſſured by thoſe who conduct it, *cannot, even if attended with the utmoſt ſucceſs, prove advantageous to our affairs*, is a palpable injuſtice to many parties. In the firſt inſtance, it is unjuſt to *us*, and not the leſs unjuſt, becauſe it may be done without reluctance, who are endeavouring to perform an important, perhaps an invidious duty to our conſtituents. In this inquiry, if the object of it be proper, and if the mode of our procceeding be fair and regular, we ought to be ſupported and aſſiſted; we ought not to be diſcouraged or diſabled. We have a right to all the materials and information, that may be neceſſary to make the inquiry complete and effectual to its purpoſe. In the ſecond inſtance, it is an injuſtice to the Public, to refuſe to us their repreſentatives the means of executing a public ſervice. It is unjuſt to keep the nation in ſuſpenſe and anxiety, concerning the circumſtances and details of very important military operations, in which our armies are engaged, in which the wealth of India is waſted, but of which we know nothing but general reſults, and thoſe very lamely and imperfectly, I mean from authority. Of what uſe is it to know the bare event of an enterpriſe, without its circumſtances, or without its conſequences? It is unjuſt to the nation to drive and reduce them to depend on private information, on the retreat of our armies, the ſufferings of our officers and ſoldiers, perhaps the indelible diſgrace of our arms. Finally, Sir, it is unjuſt to a perſon, to whom, if I may judge by the exalted terms applied to him, no injuſtice is intended, to Lord Cornwallis, who is not allowed to ſpeak for himſelf, whoſe letters come before us not entire as they ſhould have done, but by piecemeal, garbled and extracted by the Preſidency of Madras. Even for his ſake, we ought to have been informed of the whole of his ſituation; even for his honour, the public mind ought not to be left open to a ſuſpicion that any material circumſtances were concealed, or to the unavoidable inference from that ſuſpicion, that if the entire truth were produced, it would fail a little in the ſupport of thoſe praiſes, profuſely, I do not mean to ſay undeſervedly, but perhaps prematurely laviſhed upon him, and excluſively confined to his conduct. Is it poſſible for any reaſonable man to affirm, that the events of this campaign, on the face of the accounts publiſhed by authority, ſuggeſt no cauſe of anxiety,

no ground for hesitation, no motive for inquiry? In effect, what is it we know from the Gazette, but that the greatest European force, to say nothing of our allies, that ever appeared in India, that a force sufficient to have conquered twenty Tippoos, has taken an Indian fort, has beaten an Indian Chief; and then been compelled to burst their cannon, *which, for the last several marches, had been drawn almost by the soldiers;* to destroy their military stores; to abandon their tents and camp equipage; and to retire to the place they set out from about three weeks before, to save the whole army from perishing by famine. These, we are told, are brilliant successes; these are the effects of a pitched battle with Tippoo, in which, it seems, *we gave him a total defeat.* The day before the engagement, Lord Cornwallis declares, that *all hopes were then at an end of being able to execute his original plan.*— Why so? Did he set out with a power or preparation unequal to the enterprize? or was no calculation made of the quantity of provisions necessary for such an army during their probable continuance in the field? Was it reasonable to expect that the *original plan* could have succeeded in less than a month? The army marches on the third of May from Bangalore, and arrive at the place of their destination in ten days without meeting with any hostile opposition; on the fourteenth they take their ground; on the fifteenth they give battle; on the sixteenth they find themselves obliged to retreat, and to abandon the whole plan and object of the campaign. I do not say that these events, calamitous certainly, if not disgraceful, may not be fairly and rationally accounted for, in a way that may answer all objections, and remove every possible idea of censure; though it is beyond my conception, that they ever can be converted, by any explanations, into a subject of triumph. A General, who does not, in the first instance, secure his magazines, who ventures into the heart of an enemy's country, without a *certain* supply of provisions, proportioned to the probable duration of the enterprise, seems to me to fail in one of the most essential articles of military prudence; at the same time, I do not take upon me to judge, to pronounce, or to condemn. We are left in the dark; let us inquire; and then, and not till then, we shall be able to do justice to the character and conduct of Lord Cornwallis. Let us now turn our eyes

to the other side of the Cavery. Another powerful army has been obliged to retire, with the loss of their baggage, cattle, and camp equipage. This is all the information that Government has thought fit to communicate of the retreat of General Abercrombie, accompanied, as I believe it was, with every circumstance of distress, of misery, and disgrace; without a misfortune to plead; no attack on their rear, no defeat in the field, but a perfect panic, a rout without a pursuit. This at least is the present universal impression of this transaction. If it be false, if it be groundless and unjust, why are we left without better information? Is it fair to the Public, is it common justice to General Abercrombie, to leave his reputation at the mercy of private letters; to give us no authorised account of the motives and circumstances of an event, which, on the face of it at least, is not honourable to the British arms, in which we know that our army suffered every thing that could be suffered, except defeat? Has General Abercrombie never written any letter upon a subject so important to himself, as well as to his country, except that of the 19th of June, of which a short extract was published in the Gazette? Is it *our* fault, that we are driven to depend upon private letters for intelligence? I do and must rely upon it, because I have no other, and the rather, because that, which ought to be given by authority, is withheld. Allow me to state to you a singular fact, which I believe to be true, and which I hope will help to attract the attention and excite the curiosity of the Public to the whole transaction. My object is not to press upon individuals, not to reflect upon a commanding officer, who possibly may have been compelled to act as he has done, by circumstances of indispensable necessity, perhaps by peremptory orders, which left him no choice; but to promote a fair inquiry, by which all parties may be justified. It is perfectly possible, and I shall be happy to find it true, that calamity, and even disgrace may have existed in the fact, without a shadow of blame upon the person. The circumstance I allude to is this: In the rear of this precipitate retreat, a Captain of one of the Company's battalions had contrived to bring away the guns belonging to his battalion. Being sent to,

to know why he did not march with greater expedition, he said, he should follow them as fast as he could, *but he had not been used to it;* that the Company's officers had not been in the habit of flying from an Indian enemy, much less of leaving their guns behind them. If their guns had been all that they abandoned on that occasion, the loss might be of no great consequence. Many private letters affirm that they brought nothing away with them, but what they could carry on their backs. Is it so, or is it not? We demand the truth, and we have a right to know it. Were they in such a hurry as to leave their stores and provisions untouched, their military chest, and all their baggage? Above all things, is it true that they left their sick in the hospital at Periapatam to the mercy of the enemy? What, to the mercy of a man, whom we call a barbarous, cruel, perfidious tyrant, whom the writers of the Madrass Gazettes are perpetually insulting and exasperating by the most opprobrious abuse! I do not believe he deserves it; I do not believe he will treat his prisoners with severity. But, let his character be what it may, is it prudent, is it becoming, is it not utterly ignoble in us, to revenge ourselves, by personal invectives, against a great Chief, for great he is in many qualifications, whom, hitherto at least, we have not been able to subdue? This, surely, is no time for insults, if insults could *ever* be applied with propriety to a gallant Prince, defending himself as he has done, defending his country and his crown against such a power and preparation as that, which has now, for two years together, assaulted him in vain. With an enormous superiority of strength, the attack, that does not succeed, in point of military reputation is defeated; the resistance, that is not overcome, in point of honour is victorious. You have been told by Mr. Hastings, whose knowledge and abilities I have not disputed, though I condemn the use he made of them, that *our existence in India hangs on the thread of opinion.* The expression may be overdone, but in substance it is true. Whatever the final termination of the war may be, the apparent state of facts cannot be favourable to us in the eyes of India. Two campaigns have been lost; two armies have retreated; either of which, in former times, when great things were done with little means, would have been more than a match for any of the native Powers in that country. Without pro-

nouncing on the conduct or character of any man, I hold it to be the ſpecial duty of this Houſe to inquire, whether the reputation of unqueſtionable ſuperiority, which we poſſeſſed before the war, and on which ſo much of our ſecurity depended, has not been unneceſſarily hazarded by the rupture with Tippoo, and conſiderably impaired by the events of the war.

Another object, into which the Houſe of Commons is ſpecially bound to inquire, is the expence of this war.—We know, with too much certainty, that it muſt be immoderate. But what the amount of it has been already; to what exceſs it may be extended, or where it will end, we neither know with preciſion, nor have we the means of forming a probable conjecture on the ſubject. On whoſe ſhoulders this enormous burden is ultimately to fall, is a queſtion, which this Houſe cannot refuſe to examine, without renouncing their office, without deſerting their ſtation, without treachery to their conſtituents. If I promote the inquiry, believe me, Sir, it is not becauſe I doubt. It is, that this Houſe and the nation may calculate in ſome degree, how much they are to pay; that they may foreſee what they muſt feel, and endeavour to fix ſome limitation to an expence, which, one way or other, muſt be ſupported by this country. Will the right honourable gentleman take upon him to affirm, that the charge of the war will be provided for by thoſe whom it concerns; that the Houſe of Commons will never be called upon to make good any part of it; that the unappropriated aſſets of the India Company, or the ſurplus of the territorial revenues, are ſufficient to defray it. I will not combat ſuch propoſitions as theſe, until I hear them diſtinctly ſtated. Whenever that may happen, I give the right honourable gentleman notice, that I ſhall carefully obſerve his words, and endeavour to preſerve them. What language the Court of Directors may hold, in their official communications with Government on this ſubject, I know not. In their private converſations elſewhere, I have ſome reaſon to believe that they diſclaim the idea of ſubjecting the India Company to any part of the expences entered into without their conſent or knowledge. In the cauſe they have no

concern: over the conduct they have no control: by the event they ought not to be affected. They say that, since the government of India has been taken out of their hands, and vested in effect in the Ministers of the Crown, if wars are created, the Company have nothing to do with it; if debts are incurred, they must be paid by the nation. It is high time, Sir, that this question should be cleared up. Let us know, once for all, whether a war in India be a national war or not; I mean, in point of expence. I do not mean to admit that, if it were as certainly true as I know it to be false, that the resources of the India Company are equal to the burden, and that this country is never to bear a part of it, it would be the less our proper right and duty to inquire, and take care that those resources should not be prodigally wasted, or wantonly misapplied. We are at all times the guardians of public property against abuse, even when we do not dispose of it for the public service. A state of the finances of India is brought before us every year. We already exercise the right of inspection and control over the territorial revenues; and, if this be proper in time of peace, will any man deny that it is infinitely more so, when you have the unlimited expences of a war, as well as your peace establishment, to provide for? I do not insist much on these topics, since I do not believe that the right and duty of the House, in this respect, are likely to be disputed. All expenditure of public money should be publicly accounted for. Independent of the cost of our own army, a large sum of money has been *lent* to the Mahrattas. Of the specific amount, or of the motives for parting with it, no account is given. It could not, however, have been less than twelve lacks of rupees, and it may have been much more. All we know of the matter is, that Lord Cornwallis had been obliged, *for reasons he could not then explain*, to promise a considerable loan to the Mahrattas; and that "he had *therefore* "desired the Presidency of Fort St. George, immediately to "take the amount of twelve lacks of rupees out of the China "ships, notwithstanding any orders they might have received "to the contrary, and coin it into rupees *with as much dispatch* "*as possible*." In the year 1780, Mr. Hastings too found himself obliged to give or to lend, I forget which, but it makes no difference, twenty-six lacks of rupees to another Mahratta

Chief, called *Moodajee Boosla*, who to this hour has never paid a farthing of it, nor ever will. But this, it seems, is *a loan*. He might as well have called it a gift at once, and taken credit for his generosity. Will the right honourable gentleman tell us what security has been taken for the debt, and how he proposes to recover it? I should like to see a note of hand from *Pursuram Bow*, or a bond and judgement executed by *Hurry Punt*. Sir, I should just as soon expect to be paid by a highwayman, who had robbed me on Hounslow Heath, and promised to refund, whenever he was in cash. In this transaction, the House have a right to suspect that we have suffered something worse than the loss of so much money, and that the concealed reasons may be of more consequence than the avowed fact. This pretended loan, for any thing that appears to the contrary, may in effect have been a tribute; and in fact, if not in form, a practical acknowledgement of their claim to the chout, or fourth part of the revenues of Bengal, which they have never relinquished. To pay money to the Mahrattas cannot, in any circumstances, be a safe or honourable measure. Their uniform practice is to take all they can get, and quarrel for the rest: the more you give them, the more they expect. If it should be contended that, in this case, the sacrifice of a great sum of money was *indispensably necessary*, I have no difficulty in believing that the plea may be well founded. Then, indeed, we have no occasion to ask what the situation was that created the necessity; but it is so much the more our duty to inquire by what means we came into it.

Another very important object is to know, what has been the conduct of our boasted allies, the Nizam and the Mahrattas, to whom the right honourable gentleman has thought fit *to pledge the honour of the British nation*, and with whom, it seems, we are to divide the dominions of Tippoo, as soon as we have conquered them? Does he know and will he tell us, what service they have done; what bravery they have exhibited in action, or with what disinterested generosity they have relieved our distresses? All we know at present is, that Lord Cornwallis is not so very proud of his allies, as some people here pretend to be, and that, in all appearance, he might have succeeded much better without them. The Nizam's troops, *far from rendering the services, that he had expected from so nu-*

merous and powerful a body of horse, did nothing but *exhaust the forage and provisions*, disobey orders, and distress the army in all its operations. Such are the banditti, to whom the honour of the nation is engaged. But the Mahrattas perhaps have conducted themselves with greater fidelity and more spirit. Private letters, I do assure you, are very moderate in their praise. But what do we collect from the public advices? That they suddenly appeared in the nick of time to share in the plunder of Seringapatam, if Lord Cornwallis had taken it; that they had promised him a supply of grain, which they could not or would not furnish, and that, *even if they kept their word*, of which he has some doubt, it would only serve to *hold him in a state of wretched dependence on the Mahratta Bazar, where he must be obliged to pay an immense price for a scanty subsistance, and be exposed, at all times, to the risk of a total failure!* In the end, they do him the favour to borrow a large sum of money of him, and then they *acquiesce in his Lordship's beginning to move to the eastward.*

Other reasons might be stated in support of the motions; but these, I conceive, are sufficient to convince any man, with whom reasons have any weight. You may cripple the inquiry if you please, or make it imperfect, by denying us the materials and information, which we have a right to demand for the public service. But let this House and the nation take notice, that the necessity of the inquiry will be virtually inforced and acknowledged by a refusal of the papers, if they should be refused; for what would it amount to in effect, but a palpable confession that the papers would not support the elevated character given of the war, but that on the contrary the whole conduct of it has been attended with such expences, and involved in such losses and calamities, as they who exalt the war in general terms, are afraid to exhibit in detail to the inspection of Parliament.

Mr. Secretary DUNDAS begged leave to call the attention of the House to some things which had been stated in the course of that evening's conversation, and particularly by the honourable gentleman who spoke last. He said, he did not mean to stand up the advocate of Lord Cornwallis, because he did not conceive that reflections, like those the House had heard, would have been made on the conduct of a General Officer, employed

in the ſervice of his country, who was not preſent to defend himſelf; much leſs that language would be applied to him, ſuch as it was not cuſtomary for one gentleman to hold to another; and he was the more eſpecially ſurpriſed to hear it from the honourable gentleman who had brought forward the motions, as he had frequently heard that gentleman ſpeak of his Lordſhip in terms of reſpect and approbation. He was ready, on the preſent buſineſs, to appeal to the public impreſſion, and to abide by its deciſion. But many things, he doubted not, had been ſaid on this occaſion from expectations, which wo:'d not be fulfilled. It certainly reſted in the diſcretion of the Houſe to give, or not to give, ſuch papers. It had been aſked, what miſchief would enſue from the production of papers? but had it been forgotten what, danger might have followed from a former demand of this ſort, if the poiſon had not immediately been attended with its antidote.

Alluſions had been made to what he had ſaid the other day; he ſaid then, and would ſtill ſay, that if the reſolutions of the laſt ſeſſion had not been moved, in conſequence of the diſcuſſion, and debates that had been forward by the other ſide of the Houſe, thoſe debates and diſcuſſions would have been productive of infinite miſchief in India, by perſuading our allies that this country would not keep its faith with them, or could not be depended upon for ſupport. The honourable gentleman ſaid, that the diſtance of India was ſo great, that no diſcuſſion which might take place in that Houſe, could poſſibly affect the war; probably the war was by this time at an end; but if not, the diſtance of India was rather a circumſtance that added to the danger of ſuch diſcuſſions, than diminiſhed it.—Let gentlemen recollect the ignorance of the natives of that country of the cuſtoms of that Houſe, and their practice in debates. Let them recollect that it was not there as here, where people being near the ſcene of diſcuſſion, could readily get every miſapprehenſion explained, and every doubt removed. The effect which diſcuſſions in this country might have on the Princes in India, unacquainted with the language and mode of proceeding of a Britiſh Parliament, was ſtill more to be dreaded than in the caſe of European Princes, by whom both theſe were better underſtood. In ſhort, upon every view of the matter, he contended, that all the arguments reſpecting the

diſtance of India, went rather to prove the impropriety of ſuch diſcuſſions upon Indian topics, than their utility. As to the alluſion that had been ſtated to have been made in His Majeſty's ſpeech, as printed in the Gazette, reſpecting the recent diſpatches, it muſt have been the conſequence of ſome ſtrange inaccuracy, of which he was ignorant, and which did not at all affect what he had aſſerted on a former occaſion. With regard to the motions that had been made, he did not think they would anſwer the honourable gentleman's purpoſe, but, excepting one of them, he ſhould have very little objection; and he would tell the Houſe what his objections to that one were. The honourable gentleman who had moved for the papers had ſtated, that poſſibly their production might be miſchievous to Miniſters, however honourable to Lord Cornwallis. He would, in return to this, inform him, that there was no line of diſtinction to be drawn. There was no one meaſure of Lord Cornwallis, ſince he had been in the ſituation of Governor General of Bengal, which he was not ready to take upon himſelf in the moſt complete and unequivocal reſponſibility, and abide by the conſequences either of applauſe or blame.— Let not then gentlemen ſeek for an abſent object of cenſure, ſince he had furniſhed them with one more near at hand: here is a quarter againſt which they are at liberty to direct all their arrows, and which is prepared to receive them all. With regard to the letter of Lord Cornwallis to the Nizam, of the 7th of June 1789, which had been adduced as a proof of breach of treaty, he ſhould ever regard it as a teſtimony of his Lordſhip's ſacred attention to treaties. Had the honourable gentleman forgotten the treaties of 1766 and 1768. That letter which was now demanded had been upon the table at the period of the former diſcuſſion: it had not then been made uſe of, nor though it had continued there for three months, did it afford ground for any ſubſequent motion: evidently becauſe it contained nothing which had appeared to deſerve the attention of theſe gentlemen, or which by any arts of eloquence or ingenuity of argument could then be converted into ground of cenſure.

With regard to the aſſertion that the public mind was left in the dark by Miniſters, he muſt ſay, that the Public was not poſſeſſed of that information that was in the poſſeſſion of Mi-

nifters was not true in point of fact. The letters that were inferted in the Gazette were the real and genuine letters of Lord Cornwallis, and not partial extracts from them; the Public, therefore, was in poffeffion of every intelligence that Government had received; perhaps the gentlemen on the other fide were in poffeffion of much more. With refpect to General Abercrombie's retreat, and the partial lofs of his baggage, he believed the fact was, that General Abercrombie gave an order not for a retreat, but for his men to be under arms, and that his troops thought it was with a view to an attack and not a retreat; in confequence of which fome of them placed their baggage fo as to endanger it and oblige it to be left behind, when they found that the object of General Abercrombie was to march. What he now fpoke was on the authority of a private letter, and he knew nothing from Lord Cornwallis refpecting General Abercrombie; but at the inftant he was fpeaking, he verily believed that General Abercrombie had no idea that blame was imputed to him in this country, and his retreat confidered as improper and difgraceful. General Abercrombie was well known to be a brave, a gallant, and an able officer, who had uniformly ferved his country with honour, and was fully entitled to have the moft favourable conftruction put upon his conduct, efpecially before that conduct and the motives that governed it, were clearly known: he explained the circumftances under which Lord Cornwallis ordered General Abercrombie to retire as foon as he could, while he, with the main army, ftaid at an inconvenience, where his object was to prevent the whole of Tippoo's army from falling upon General Abercrombie's troops. The infinuation that it was the intention of Government to conceal the real ftate of the war was unfair and falfe; and with regard to the affertion refpecting the finances of India, he declared he could not but think that it was peculiarly unfair that it fhould be made ufe of againft him, who, unfolicited, and without being obliged by the orders of any act of Parliament, was, he believed, the firft to introduce the cuftom of annually ftating the financial concerns of the Company at large to the Houfe. It might, however, eafily be perceived that it was impoffible for him to form at the pre-

ſent moment any eſtimate of the whole expence. As much of it as could be made up from the papers already in his poſſeſſion, he might lay before the Houſe at a future period of the ſeſſion. As to the idea that the Court of Directors, or any of them, imagined that the expences of the war would not fall upon them, or that their intereſts were at all ſeparated from thoſe of the country, he knew of no Directors who entertained ſuch an idea, and ſtill farther was he from either conceiving or aſſerting, that the Houſe had not a right to inquire into and examine every part of the expence of the war, whenever that expence could be aſcertained; but ignorant as he acknowledged himſelf to be of the preciſe extent of the expences of the preſent war in India, he was ready to renew a former aſſertion, and to declare, *that the time was nearer at hand, when the reſources of India would be ſuch as to adminiſter aid to the revenue of this country, than India would have occaſion to apply for aſſiſtance from the finances of this country.* With regard to the laſt motion, reſpecting the offers of peace that might have been made to Lord Cornwallis, if it were to paſs, he verily believed the return to it would be, that there were no accounts of any ſuch offers; but the reaſon he objected to it was, on the principle of the motion itſelf, namely, the calling for accounts of negociations of war and peace, while thoſe negociations were pending. He had already ſo often been called upon to aſſign his reaſons why he ſhould deem it unwiſe and improper to produce any papers, in theſe circumſtances, and was ſo fully perſuaded of the point in his own mind, that he was reſolved to give no ſanction to entering any order upon the book, which ſhould afford a precedent for ſuch a practice.

The honourable Major MAITLAND roſe to explain. He remarked that the right honourable gentleman, after having intimated his intention to oppoſe any demand of papers, had now changed his opinion. He exculpated himſelf from any intention to throw out reflections on the military character of Lord Cornwallis; what he had brought forward was meant only to apply to him in his civil capacity, which he conceived to be fair ſubject of remark to every Member of that Houſe; nay, on which, by their indiſpenſable duty to their conſtituents, they were bound freely to deliver their ſentiments. He truſted, therefore, that nothing which he had ſaid in this view, would

be conceived to be derogatory to his Lordſhip's military talents, or deviating from theſe ſentiments of reſpect which he had ſo often expreſſed, and which he ſtill entertained for his character.

Mr. HIPPISLEY obſerved, that as the right honourable gentleman had expreſſed his ſurpriſe that the letter of Lord Cornwallis to the Nizam had not been made the ſubject of diſcuſſion laſt year, when the treaties were on the table, it was neceſſary to call the recollection of the Houſe to the very extraordinary manner in which that celebrated letter had been brought forward. When the treaties with the Mahrattas and Nizam had been produced, in conſequence of a motion to that effect, his honourable friend below him had noticed that a letter of Lord Cornwallis, of the 7th July in the preceding year, had been recognized as equivalent to a treaty, and ſtood confirmed, together with all the antecedent treaties made with the Nizam. This letter was therefore immediately moved for, and the firſt moment of its production was at the ſame inſtant that the right honourable gentleman oppoſite to him had, without any preface, moved the unqualified approbation of the treaties with the Mahrattas and Nizam, and he believed not two perſons in the Houſe had even read the letter, much leſs were aware of its miſchievous and impolitic tendency. Mr. Hippiſley obſerved, that he had a few days ſince, in his place, given his opinion very fully on that letter; and that he ſhould ever think it a ſufficient aggreſſion on our part to have juſtified Tipppo in an immediate deſcent on our territories. One object of it was to revive the ſtipulation of a former treaty with the Nizam, which guaranteed to the Engliſh the Government of the Myſore country, and was deemed ſo extremely impolitic and repugnant to the intereſts of the Company, that it drew from the Court of Directors the moſt heavy cenſure on the authors of it. That in conſequence of that treaty, and ſubſequent errors of a ſimilar nature of the Company's ſervants at Madras, the Government of the Company at home thought it neceſſary to appoint the ſupervifors who went out in the Aurora, which was loſt. Mr. Hippiſley obſerved, that as the right honourable gentleman had relaxed from his original declaration on

Friday laſt, and now propoſed to acquieſce in the firſt motion of his honourable friend, he ſhould reſerve what he had farther to offer on the preſent ſituation of our affairs in India till the queſtion came on in conſequence of the production of the papers.

Mr. FOX ſaid, that he roſe merely in conſequence of an imputation which had been thrown out by the right honourable gentleman upon him, and upon thoſe who acted with him, as if they felt a pleaſure in attacking the characters of individuals, more eſpecially of officers, who were abſent on duty, and had no means of defending themſelves. He begged the Houſe would do him the juſtice to recollect, that he had ever made it a rule during the number of years which he had ſat there not to attack the character of an abſent officer. He had condemned the American, as well as the preſent Indian war, and he had paſſed ſevere cenſures on thoſe who were the authors of it; but he never went ſo far as to animadvert upon the profeſſional conduct of thoſe who were employed in commanding our forces by ſea or land. The conduct of Lord Cornwallis in that war had been often the ſubject of his approbation; as far as regarded the military capacity of that noble Lord, he was always ready to give him credit for great abilities, if his conduct ſeemed to warrant that opinion. But when he was called upon to vote an addreſs, acknowledging the able conduct of Lord Cornwallis, was he not forced, as it were, to conſider that conduct, and to enquire where the ability conſiſted? The blame, if any, ſhould reſt where it was due in this caſe, viz. on His Majeſty's Miniſters. Why was the Houſe called on to applaud Lord Cornwallis, and to compliment him as an able officer, on the experience we had of the war in India? Why was the Houſe aſked to praiſe, where they had experienced only diſappointment. This was ſurely provoking a diſcuſſion in a manner equally unfair to the character of his Lordſhip and indecent on the part of His Majeſty's Miniſters. After a ſeries of nothing but calamities and misfortunes, after a ſeries of attempts and failures, hopes and diſappointments, they were called upon to vote that the war had been ably conducted. In all thoſe occurrences he ſaw nothing like ability, nothing which could afford him ground of approbation. Forced into ſuch a ſituation, and ſuch a dilemma, what was he to do? Was he to ſit ſilent, or to conſent to tell that to the King, which he did

not believe? Or was he to deliver his ſentiments, and riſk the danger of being deemed uncandid and illiberal? Never had he felt ſuch an abrogation of the freedom of debate as that then inſiſted on. Was he to carry up falſehood to his Sovereign, to whom, as one of the moſt ſacred duties of a ſubject, he owed truth? Was he to carry up flattery and adulation to the Throne, and to applaud the conduct of Lord Cornwallis, when he ſaw no reaſon to applaud it, and when perhaps in the point of view in which it appeared there was more reaſon to conſider it as an object of cenſure? Was this fit conduct to hold out for that Houſe? Moſt unqueſtionably No! And yet this muſt be the caſe, if he was to be told he behaved with harſhneſs againſt a brave officer, when he was only doing what appeared to him at leaſt, to be his duty as a Member of that Houſe, viz. "to ſpeak "the truth without diſguiſe on all occaſions, and more eſpe-"cially when the intereſt of the people and his conſtituents re-"quired that no diſguiſe ſhould be uſed." There was an end entirely of the utility of that Houſe, if its Members, when they were delivering their opinions on the characters of the commanders of our forces, were to be ſtopped, and told that they were attacking the character of a man who was not here to anſwer for himſelf, and that we ought to ſuſpend our cenſure until he comes home. When he was put to this dilemma, the blame ought to be on thoſe who compelled him to deliver his ſentiments by their demand of approbation, and who had obliged him to take ſuch a part as he owed to his own heart, and to his duty to his conſtituents.

He owned he had entertained no ſanguine hopes of the ſucceſs of his honourable friend's motion; yet he was now happy to find that his arguments had been attended to, and that the papers called for were to be produced. He was however ſurpriſed at the difference of opinion that had taken place ſince the notice given by his honourable friend of the preſent motion, as the right honourable gentleman had certainly ſaid on a former day that he would oppoſe that motion, and every one of the ſame kind. He muſt confeſs he was far from being pleaſed with this declaration. It ſeemed to introduce a ſyſtem of which the right honourable gentleman was too fond, and looked as if he meant to haul the Miniſter's friends through all the dirt and mud of his buſineſs, by tamely and ſubmiſſively relying upon

him for their directions. Is this a light in which the House of Commons of England should be placed? Are the representatives of the people to be told that when Ministers are inclined to give information to the country, you may vote for the production of papers, but when they are not, you must resist every call for them, however proper, however necessary, or however consistently with the constitutional principles of this country.—This was pursuing too far that doctrine of confidence which had been so much brought forward last session, and with respect to which the right honourable gentleman had always used, in his opinion, the most unconstitutional arguments. The right honourable gentleman had said, that it was improper at all times to call for papers or information pending a negociation, and that the result, whatever it might be, should be sanctioned by a vote before any inquiry should be made respecting the origin, circumstances, or conduct of it; a doctrine that he would never subscribe to, because he conceived it to be fraught with every thing that was bad, and in direct contradiction to the very nature of that constitution which we are all so happy to pronounce an eulogium upon, and none could be more so than he was, when its theory was attended to, and its practice conformable to its real principles. Of those principles, the new-fangled system was more subversive than any of the wildest schemes that the wildest of modern reformers could ever have devised.

The right honourable gentleman had said, that the papers, particularly the letter from Lord Cornwallis to the Nizam, dated July 7, 1789, had been on the table three months before the last session of Parliament was concluded. It might be so; for himself he had no hesitation in declaring, at the same time that he did not offer any excuse for his negligence, in being ignorant of the contents of that manuscript paper, which, if he recollected well, was laid on the table on the very day in the last session on which the last debate on the war in India took place. The right honourable gentleman had said, it lay there for three months after, and arraigned him and his friends for their want of vigilance, by asking them why they had omitted examining that letter sooner? he would fairly tell him that he had not even read it; for it must be in the recollection of the House, that a matter of very great importance arose, to which

his attention, the attention of the House, and the attention of the country was naturally drawn. He scarcely needed to mention here the armament against Russia, a subject that excited the curiosity, and the astonishment of all Europe. So much had it occupied his mind, and so much was he convinced that his duty to his constituents, and to the people of England, called for every effort he could exert, to ward off the impending danger, that he was prevented from turning his thoughts to any other subject. He would do his friends the justice to say that he believed them equally inclined to do their duty, and he was proud enough to add, what he thought he might do without the imputation of vanity, that his exertions had not been altogether useless, and though placed in a minority, that minority was found to have acted in conformity with the wishes, and what was of much more consequence, the real interests of the country.

He would allow, that the right honourable gentleman had been extremely consistent in one point; which, of all others, he conceived to be the most dangerous and inimical to the British constitution; that was the proposition which he had often laid down respecting the confidence to be granted to Ministers, and the assertion that pending a negociation or a war, it was improper to call for any information with regard to the progress of that negociation, or the events of that war; this he had ever treated, and ever would do, as most improper and unconstitutional language, and, he trusted, never would be the sense of an English House of Commons.—What led him to speak of this more particularly, was the objection which the right honourable gentleman had made to the last of the papers, moved for by his honourable friend, which went, if produced, to shew what offers had been made by Tippoo Sultan for a peace. The right honourable gentleman had said, if all the papers moved for, and all that could be moved for, were upon the table, nothing could appear that would explain to the House what the offers of Tippoo to make peace were; and that if any thing did, he certainly should oppose their being produced. Perhaps it might be so; but when the right honourable gentleman stated that he was totally ignorant of these offers, and knew no more of them than other people, he could not help thinking it one of the most astonishing facts that ever had occurred; that Lord

Cornwallis, as Governor General of India, had been, on all occasions, writing home, that a protracted war was ruinous to the Company's finances; that a ſpeedy and honourable peace was his earneſt wiſh; and that though ſeveral offers to make peace had been made by Tippoo, none of them were of a nature that he could accept; yet that he never had mentioned what thoſe terms offered were, or what were his reaſons for not accepting them. If the Government at home had received any information of the terms that had been offered, he thought it was their duty to ſend out orders to conclude peace as ſoon as poſſible, and while it might be done honourably, at leaſt; more than could be expected, if we were unfortunate enough to experience a continuance of the ſame calamitous events.—Upon the honourable gentleman's principle of unlimited confidence, which had been ſo much argued laſt year, it was impoſſible to foretell what ill conſequences might enſue, particularly if no right was allowed to that Houſe to enquire into the conduct and expence of a negociation or war until it was ended. What, he would aſk, was become of the boaſted freedom and privileges of that Houſe, to inquire into every meaſure that could bring expence upon the country, which they, as repreſentatives of the people, muſt provide for, by laying additional burdens upon their conſtituents, without having it in their power to give an aſſent from conviction, that there was expediency, juſtice or policy in the meaſure which occaſioned that expence? What was now the language held out by this claim for confidence in Miniſters, but that they have entered into a war which muſt be attended with heavy expence, but with regard to the nature or extent of which, they would reſiſt all inquiry, and till it ſhould be concluded no means of information would be afforded. He had only to recal the attention of gentlemen for a moment to what happened laſt year, with regard to the Ruſſian buſineſs, to ſhew how decidedly this was the object of the preſent Adminiſtration. The right honourable gentleman had properly ſaid, that a day would ſoon come for diſcuſſing that buſineſs, and it was not his intention to enter into it at large now; to-morrow they were to be called upon to vote the expence of the armament, and muſt agree to pay that expence before they had received any information of the propriety or wiſdom of the negociation which occaſioned it. He ſaid,

it was not his intention to disapprove of voting the expence to-morrow; indeed, he knew it to be impossible; because, however much he and the country might disapprove of the measure, still it was obvious, that the expence incurred must be paid.

Upon this principle of first paying, and then inquiring into the cause of the expence, the right honourable gentleman had gone by far too great lengths, and such, as the House ought to beware of sanctioning; if they did not, million after million might be expended, and till the country was ruined, no satisfaction would be given, except that confidence must be placed in Ministers. It was here we saw the system of those who boasted so much and so lately, of their attachment to the constitution of their country, and to the principles of liberty; but whose practice was at variance with their profession. In vain did we boast of our attachment to the principles of a well regulated freedom. We were perpetually praising our constitution in words, and daily introducing new abuses into it in practice! Thus might we be proud in boasting that we were the most free until we had entirely lost our freedom, and that by this innovation lately introduced into the constitution; the innovation of confidence.

This confidence in individuals, in the mind of that House, was to precede the interests of the people. The Ministers by this might move and carry armament upon armament, upon the most trival occasions, on the slightest reasons, or entirely without reason, and the people had no means whatever of preventing it; nay, the Members of that House were precluded from judging of the measures at all, until they were called on to vote the money of their constituents to pay for them. And supposing, for the sake of argument, (he was not now stating it to be the fact) but supposing that these measures should turn out to be ill-advised, unnecessary, or even ruinous to this country, what mode had the people of obtaining redress?—None, except that of a criminal proceeding against the Ministers who were the cause of it. The only security the people had was the responsibility of the Ministers. Was that a sufficient security? He answered, it is not! In short, it was not any security in most cases: for, supposing the Minister who

may have been the cause of great calamities to the State, was incorrupt, but that in the opinion of the people his measures had been only unwise; or, supposing the measures to be wise, and against the opinion of the people, what remedy could there be had in either of these cases? In the first, the people would be too generous to punish, because it is against the principles of humanity, as well as the law of every good community, to punish a man merely for want of wisdom. On the second case, what would be the consequence? An innocent and meritorious man would suffer for his own virtue, merely from the misfortune of his conduct happening to be misunderstood by the Public; and he would be left to say to his misguided countrymen, "What! will you accuse me for acting as well "as I could for your interests?" What then; were we to punish such a man?—No—God forbid?—Then, as to the other man who might be incapable, what was to be done with him? Had we that Court of Criminal Justice, by which we could try a Minister on the size of his capacity? We had no such Court. But supposing, for the sake of argument, we had a Court in which all these points could be provided for, what satisfaction could result to a country drained of its wealth and resources? What retribution would the disgrace or the destruction of a Minister make to a country that had been ruined and undone? The punishment of a Minister! a poor, paltry resentment, instead of a retribution! Thus stood the political state of a country said to possess perfect liberty! a country, where, it is said, the opinion of the people is the highest authority, and their will the law! The opinion of the people, indeed, might at last prevail; but according to this doctrine of confidence in Ministers, this innovation in the constitution, the opinion of the people would not begin to operate before the country was ruined. Ruined we might be, although the people were not ignorant, nor their representatives corrupt, but merely, because the Minister might blunder and mistake. We must be undone!—because we have an imprudent and unwise Minister! If such a country could be called a country of liberty and perfect freedom, he did not know what liberty or freedom were, nor wherein consisted the excellence of its constitution.

He hoped, however, that from what he had faid, he fhould not be deemed or reprefented as fpeaking againft the conftitution of this country. If he fhould, it would be treating him unjuftly; for he fpoke not againft the conftitution of this country, but againft the theory and the practice which the late doctrine of confidence introduced. They were againft both the theory and practice of the real conftitution of this country—againft the earlieft impreffions made on him by his education. He had been taught to think, that all the evils, of which he had to-night been complaining, were to be prevented by the timely interpofition of that Houfe with its advice, when a Minifter was purfuing a plan that might be deftructive to this country. Thefe were the impreffions of his infancy, and time had not fince effaced them. He muft fay, that he hated the innovation of confidence, of which he had been fpeaking: there was nothing of the fpirit of the people of this country in it. They might as well fay to the Minifter, "To you "we give all the truft that was once delegated to our re-"prefentatives; to you we give all the difpofition of our "property; to you we give the whole care of all our in-"terefts, without control or inquiry."

The right honourable gentleman had declared that he knew nothing of the propofals of peace which had been made by Tippoo, or the reafon why they were refufed. And becaufe he was totally ignorant of the nature of thefe propofals, and whether they were fuch as might have been accepted confiftently with honour, juftice, and political expediency, were the Houfe, therefore, to be precluded from all inquiry refpecting them? Becaufe a Minifter had neglected to provide himfelf with the means of information, were they to fanction their neglect by his ignorance, or abandon thofe difcuffions, which they owed to their own duty, and the interefts of their conftituents? In order to conduct any inquiries concerning the war, or be able at all to judge of the footing upon which it at prefent ftood, it

was of the utmoſt, nay, of indiſpenſable importance, to be acquainted with the nature of theſe offers of peace. In conſequence of theſe, the war might now ſtand upon very different grounds from thoſe upon which it had ſet out; and what had been in its commencement allowed to be juſt and neceſſary, might have ceaſed to be ſo in its continuance. From the circumſtances of diſadvantage, too, under which the war had hitherto been carried on, on our part, attention to the offers of peace became a ſtill more material conſideration. Who would defend the propriety of perſevering in a war under ſuch circumſtances, if it could be concluded upon terms at all juſt and reaſonable? In ſhort, while we were kept ignorant of theſe terms, it was impoſſible to determine whether the war, as it now ſtood, was a war of juſtice and policy, or a war carried on merely from motives of ambition, and pregnant with ruinous conſequences.

The retreat of our armies in India, was a proof of the complete failure of the object which Lord Cornwallis had in view. The retreat of General Abercrombie was attended with every aggravating circumſtance of loſs and ignominy: it had been too gently ſtiled a retreat, but was in reality a downright flight, in which our baggage, artillery, and what was moſt deplorable of all, the hoſpitals of our ſick and wounded, were left behind. He did not mean to lay any blame on Lord Cornwallis or General Abercrombie; he was not, indeed, ſufficiently acquainted with circumſtances, to decide to what quarter cenſure was due. But the fact muſt be admitted, that General Abercrombie had been compelled to make a retreat, in ſuch circumſtances as were diſgraceful to the Britiſh arms. What theſe circumſtances were, or where that blame was to be attached, ought ſurely to form the ſubject of diſcuſſion, before they could, with propriety, be called upon to deliver any opinion.

As to the expence of the buſineſs now before the Houſe, that would be a matter of conſideration on ſome future day; but on that point he could not ſay that the explanation of

the right honourable gentleman gave him much ſatisfaction. If it gave the people of this country ſatisfaction, he ſhould be very much ſurpriſed. Whatever pleaſure he might feel from a repetition of the declaration, "that the day was "drawing near, when we ſhould find that it was more "likely that the finances of India would be ſuch as to af- "ford aſſiſtance to this country, rather than that this "country ſhould be called on to lend aſſiſtance to our "territories in India," he confeſſed was much abated by the right honourable gentleman aſſuring them, at the ſame time, that he knew nothing about the matter. He aſſerted, that it was impoſſible for him to calculate the whole expence with which the preſent war in India would be attended; and was even ſurpriſed that any body could conceive he ſhould, or ſhould think of ſtarting ſuch an inquiry. But if he could not calculate the expence, how could he pretend to eſtimate the advantage which this country was likely to reap from the finances of India? He muſt own, that this ſort of general aſſertion, unaccompanied by all particular proof, appeared to him by no means convincing, nor at all tended to ſet his mind more at eaſe on the ſubject. The right honourable gentleman aſſured them, that the reſult would be highly proſperous: but it was ſtated that there were ſome fooliſh trifling expences, which might interfere with this reſult; and when he was aſked, what might be their probable amount, he anſwered that he could not ſo much as gueſs; nay, was aſtoniſhed that any body ſhould ſuppoſe he ſhould! Setting theſe expences aſide, therefore, they might be aſſured the reſult would be proſperous; but he wondered to what could amount the value of ſuch an aſſurance. The concluſion might be highly gratifying, if they excluded from the premiſes the only material conſideration upon which it hinged. Theſe were artifices too palpable to deceive children. He hoped that a conſideration of theſe points would induce that Houſe to take away ſome of that confidence which, by their duty to their conſtituents, they never ought to give, and which they were now bound to recal.

He concluded with declaring, that, previous to the meeting of Parliament, he had determined in his own mind to say nothing in any debate on the subject, respecting the conduct of Earl Cornwallis; and he would never have departed from that resolution, had he not been called upon and provoked to deliver his opinion by the words of the speech, and the arguments of those who moved and seconded the address; had he not been called upon to applaud abilities, of which their conduct afforded him no proofs, and to congratulate a success, which the state of our affairs in India by no means seemed to warrant, from any information which had yet been laid before that House.

Mr. DUNDAS rose to explain. He said, the right honourable gentleman had taken unfair ground, when he complained of having been forced to allude to the conduct of Lord Cornwallis, by the mention of that noble Lord's able conduct of the war in the King's speech. No person whatever had said a syllable respecting that right honourable gentleman's allusions to Lord Cornwallis during the debate on the address. It was then properly the subject of discussion; but he had complained of Lord Cornwallis having been made so free with that day, when his name was neither comprehended in any one of the motions brought forward, nor his conduct necessarily under consideration. The right honourable gentleman had chosen extreme cases upon which to found his arguments; by this mode of reasoning there was not a part of the constitution that he might not formidably attack; but an extreme case was never a fair ground of reasoning. The right honourable gentleman, he also remarked, was peculiarly fond of talking of the practice of the constitution; if he would examine the constitution somewhat more closely, he would find, that the placing just so much confidence in the executive power, as to entrust them with the conduct of all existing negociations relative to war and peace, was a principle interwoven with the constitution itself, and inseparable from it. With regard to the right honourable gentleman's observations on the con-

fistency of his conduct, he should be ready to enter into a full discussion of his consistency on both sides of the question, whenever the right honourable gentleman thought proper. All that had passed relative to offers of peace made by Tippoo, was already before the Public in Lord Cornwallis's letters, which stated, that Tippoo had insidiously endeavoured to separate our allies from the general confederacy, and to make a peace with us, independent of their interests. That Lord Cornwallis had very properly refused him and his numerous retinue admittance into his camp, where their aim would obviously have been to corrupt his allies.

Sir JAMES MURRAY said, he rose to speak a very few words. Had the discussion and debate been confined to the propriety of producing the papers moved for, he certainly should not have troubled the House that evening, but he conceived the character of General Abercrombie, to have been so illiberally reflected on, especially by the honourable gentleman who seconded the motion, that it required from him a word or two in justice to the absent General. Sir James said, he had the honour to have served under him, during the last war in America, and knew him to be an active, able, and zealous officer, esteemed for honour, integrity and military talents. His misfortunes ought not to have been aggravated by uncandid insinuations. It was sufficiently unfortunate for a brave officer to be in a situation, wherein he could neither conduce to his own honour nor the service of his country. That General Abercrombie had found it necessary to retreat, was a matter of notoriety; and in all retreats losses were sustained, but it was very easy indeed for those losses to be exaggerated by the ignorant or malignant, when the circumstances of such losses could be little known to either side of the House.

Mr. FRANCIS. Let me intreat the indulgence of the House for a moment. The honourable gentleman, who spoke last, accuses me of having said something disrespectful of General Abercrombie, without stating what it was. I positively deny the charge; and I should have thought that honourable gentleman had not sat long enough

in Parliament to have learned the policy, common enough with his more experienced friends, of evading the force of general arguments, by endeavouring to turn them into personal reflections. What I said was, that the facts, on the face of them, are calamitous and disgraceful, though *possibly* the commanding officer may not be deserving of blame; and that if this impression be ill founded, if it bears hardly upon the conduct of any individual, it is the fault of the King's Ministers, who drive us to private letters for intelligence, and refuse to give us authentic information.

Major SCOTT said, I really did conceive, from the notice given by the right honourable gentleman, (Mr. Dundas) a few days ago, of his intention to oppose the production of any papers, that I should have had the honour, on this night, to vote with all His Majesty's Ministers, and with a very great majority of this House; but though the right honourable gentleman has changed *his* opinion, I have not changed *mine*, and I think that the few reasons which he assigned on a former day, have not been controverted even by the very able arguments of the two honourable gentlemen, who made and seconded the motion for the papers. But as neither these, nor the reasons now offered by the right honourable gentleman (Mr. Dundas) for agreeing to the motions, have at all altered my sentiments, I beg leave very shortly to state why I shall continue to oppose any production of papers. The honourable gentleman (Mr. Francis) supposes there may be some want of private intelligence from India. I do assure him that is not the case. I believe there is not an officer who formerly served the Company, who has not received as full an account of the last campaign as the Gazette contains; I hold one of those accounts now in my hand, but the House need not be alarmed, for I mean only to read a single line of it, which is directly applicable to the present subject. It comes from a very near relation of mine; an officer who commands one of the corps in Lord Cornwallis's army, which he also commanded in the last war under Sir Eyre Coote, and as he means to return home after the close of

this war, the communication of his sentiments can do him no possible harm. He has had three-and-twenty years experience in India. Speaking of the intelligence that they had received from England, and of our proceedings, he says, "I wonder Lord Cornwallis has been treated with "so little ceremony by Government at home. The pub-"lication of the treaties, and the debates thereon, may do "mischief, by giving birth to jealousies in the breasts of "our allies." With this opinion before me, confirmed as the propriety of it is, by what passed in the last war, I certainly should oppose the production of any papers while this war continues, and though I hope and believe that it is honourably and successfully concluded by this time, yet as it is within possibility that it may still be pending, I would not hazard the ill consequences of farther discussions in this House. The right honourable gentleman (Mr. Dundas) sets up a sort of distinction between the events of this day and those of the former war, because the original inquiry at the first period commenced in a Secret Committee. But the Committee reported every thing to the House; all secret consultations, minutes, and negociations, and upon these were grounded a series of criminatory resolutions now upon your journals, closing with the solemn opinion of a former Parliament, that the first subject in India, the Governor General (Mr. Hastings) ought to be removed. These resolutions arrived in India in August, 1782, the most critical moment of the last war, when the British Empire actually hung by a thread, and I can bring proof to your bar, that those mischievous resolutions stopped the ratification of the Mahratta peace for seven months, and most absurdly weakened the Government of Bengal, on which every other depended, at the time of all others, when it required every possible support from home. So thinking, Mr. Speaker, I shall certainly oppose the production of papers in this war, though our situation is so materially different, having all India with us now except Tippoo Sultan, and no European enemy to deal with; it may possibly be asked, why, think-

ing as I did, was I so anxious for the production of certain papers in the last year? I will fairly tell the House why. They were then to determine whether they would continue the impeachment now depending, and *how* they would continue it. The leading feature of that impeachment, was an alledged breach of treaty. I *know* that the only two treaties which had been concluded by the orders of the Board of Control, were broken, *avowedly* broken, and upon the plea of their being *inefficient*. My regard for the *dignity* and the *consistency* of Parliament, made me anxious that they should have an opportunity of considering how far it became them to continue a prosecution for an alledged breach of treaty against one gentleman, while they had *proofs* of a breach of treaty by others lying upon their table. The right honourable gentleman (Mr. Dundas) so fully coincided in opinion with me, that he declared he should deservedly lose all credit with the public if he continued a prosecution against Mr. Hastings for a breach of treaty, and approved of such a proceeding in others. He differed with me, *in the fact*, denying there had been any breach of treaty *at all*. The papers were produced. The fact appears from the candid and honest confession of the parties who broke the treaties, and assigned as a reason, *because they thought them inefficient*. Such a proceeding is contrary to the language held by the King's Ministers, of their sacred regard to the faith of treaties, and their determination to preserve them inviolate in India. It is equally contrary to the principles on which we go on with the impeachment of Mr. Hastings; but when the House in its wisdom *had* determined *to go on* with that cause, I dropped the subject; and being of opinion, that if the war is not yet concluded, the farther production of papers may be mischievous, I shall certainly oppose the motion.

The question was then put and carried on each of Major Maitland's motions, except the last, which was negatived without a division.

Mr. HIPPISLEY said, that when he gave notice of his motion on Friday, at the same time he fully stated to the

House his motives for so doing. Having since had some conversation with the right honourable gentleman opposite, he understood that he acquiesced. He should therefore move,

1. "For copies or extracts of any letters from the late "Sir Archibald Campbell and Brigade Major Bannerman, "relating to, or authorising the purchase of Cranganore "and Iacottah, by the Rajah of Travancore."

2. "For copies of all correspondence between the late "Sir Archibald Campbell and the Rajah of Travancore, "relative to the said purchase."

These motions were agreed to without any debate.

Mr. Chancellor PITT presented to the House, by His Majesty's command, the following Papers:

I.

Extract of a Dispatch from His Majesty the King of Prussia to Count Goltze, dated at Reichenbach, the 7th of August, 1790.

YOU will have already seen by my preceding dispatches, that, in the conferences at Reichenbach, we had proceeded so far as to sign, on the 27th of July, certain declarations, by which the King of Hungary engaged to conclude an armistice, and afterwards a definitive peace, with the Ottoman Porte, on the basis of the *status quo* before the war. These declarations, made under the mediation and guaranty of the maritime Powers, have just been ratified on each side; the ratifications were exchanged yesterday, and I send you inclosed copies of those acts, which you may communicate to the Russian Ministry. You will, at the same time, desire a conference with the Vice Chancellor Count d'Osterman, and make the following overtures to him:

That her Majesty the Empress of Russia will be pleased to recollect that I have for several years, in concert with

my allies, employed and offered my good offices, for effecting the re-eſtabliſhment of peace in Europe: that the King of Hungary and Bohemia having, on his acceſſion to the throne of his anceſtors, manifeſted to me diſpoſitions favourable to ſuch pacification, a long correſpondence enſued between us; in conſequence of which we agreed that a negociation ſhould be opened at Reichenbach, in Sileſia: that our reſpective Plenipotentiaries being there aſſembled, had proceeded to ſign, on the 27th of July, certain declarations, purporting in ſubſtance, that his Apoſtolic Majeſty would conclude an armiſtice with the Porte, and afterwards a definitive peace, on the baſis of the *ſtatus quo*, as it exiſted before the preſent war; and that he would take no farther part in it, contenting himſelf with keeping the fortreſs of Choczim, as a neutral depoſit, to the end of the war between Ruſſia and the Porte: that endeavours ſhould be uſed to aſſemble a congreſs, for the ſubſequent concluſion of a definitive peace, under my mediation and guaranty, and that of the maritime Powers, which the Miniſters of thoſe powers have alſo promiſed, by the above-mentioned declarations ſigned at Reichenbach: that, guided by my conſtant friendſhip for her Majeſty the Empreſs of Ruſſia, and by my reliance on her pacific and moderate ſentiments, I thought it incumbent on me to communicate theſe events to her Imperial Majeſty, flattering myſelf, that, according to the example of the King of Hungary and Bohemia, ſhe would be willing to accede to the principles of the pacification, of which we have laid the foundation: that I expreſsly took the liberty to invite that Princeſs thereto, and to propoſe to her to concur in a general pacification under my mediation, and under that of my allies, either in a general congreſs, or in ſuch other manner as may be agreed upon.

Theſe offers are dictated by the moſt friendly and diſintereſted principle. The reſult of my negociations with the King of Hungary clearly demonſtrates that principle; and nothing will be wanting, on my part, towards furniſhing, on this occaſion, her Majeſty the Empreſs of Ruſſia, with proofs of my ſincere friendſhip for her. Having no other object than that of re-eſtabliſhing and ſecuring general peace and tranquillity, upon juſt and moderate grounds, and ſuch as are proper for maintaining the balance of power, I am willing to flatter my-

felf that her Imperial Majefty will do juftice both to my motives and to my fentiments, and that fhe will be pleafed to give me a fpeedy and precife anfwer.

II.

Extract of a Letter from the Duke of Leeds to Mr. Whitworth, dated November 14, 1790.

THERE appears to be fome ground for believing, that the impediments to a general pacification, arifing from the determination of the Emprefs not to accede to the mediation of the allies, may be removed by their receding from that term, and by their fubftituting in its place the offer of employing their good offices for bringing about a pacification between the Court of St. Peterfburgh and the Porte.

As the production of fuch an effect is the fole object which His Majefty has in view, he is of courfe defirous of employing fuch means for its attainment as, without receding from the principle which has all along influenced his conduct, appear to be moft likely to bring about an event fo extremely defirable. With this view I think it proper to direct you, in cafe any overture on this fubject fhould be made to you by the Vice-Chancellor, to inform that Minifter, that, fhould the Emprefs agree to enter into a negociation with the Porte on the bafis of the *ftatus quo*, fuch as it exifted before the commencement of the war, His Majefty will no longer continue to urge his formal mediation, but will employ his good offices and influence, in conjunction with his allies, to engage the Turks to make peace on that principle. You will, however, at the fame time, be careful not to extend this overture, on the part of His Majefty, to any cafe in which his interference may be requefted, on any other principle than that I have juft mentioned.

As an additional proof of His Majefty's defire to bring about the wifhed for object of a peace between thofe powers, and as much as poffible to render the difpofition of the Emprefs more conciliatory, I muft farther defire that you would take an opportunity of infinuating to the Vice-Chancellor, that His Majefty will employ his good offices and influence to engage the Turks to give a formal act of renunciation of the Crimea, under the

guaranty of the allies. A concession of this important object, as it was the origin and avowed purpose of the war, cannot be unacceptable to her Imperial Majesty; and must, I should hope, be sufficient to satisfy her wishes, and to induce her to agree to a pacification, on the terms proposed by His Majesty and His allies.

III.

Extract of a Letter from the Duke of Leeds to Mr. Whitworth, dated December 24, 1790.

MY dispatch, No. 13, which was forwarded to you by Brooks the messenger, on the 14th ultimo, will have sufficiently explained to you the sentiments of His Majesty's servants on the subject of the terms on which they think the pacification in the North of Europe may be compleated, as well as the line of conduct to be pursued by yourself in your conferences with the Vice-Chancellor.

IV.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Whitworth to the Duke of Leeds, dated St. Petersburgh, January 10, 1791.

COUNT Osterman this morning communicated to me the purport of the instructions transmitted by this opportunity to Count Woronzow, and which contain nothing more than a mere reference to those lately communicated to your Grace, in which her Imperial Majesty absolutely refuses admitting the principle of the *status quo*, and consents only to accept His Majesty's good offices, inasmuch as they may tend to procure for her the indemnification she requires of Oczakow and its district.

V.

Extract of the Report of a Conference held the 22d of January, 1791, O. S between the Vice-Chancellor Count d'Osterman and Mr. Whitworth.

TRANSLATION.

THE Vice-Chancellor said to the English Envoy, that, with regard to his last communication, her Imperial Majesty ordered him to declare, that she had, in her late answers, clearly manifested how impossible it was for her to consent to the proposition made by England, touching the pacification with the Turks, on the footing of the *status quo ante Bellum*, that now she can only refer to those answers, and especially as the Court of England had not hitherto made any reply to them.

Mr. Whitworth took a memorandum of what the Vice-Chancellor had just communicated to him, in order, as he said, to make a report of it to his Court; and afterwards asked whether the answer which he had then received had already been sent to London. To which the Vice-Chancellor answered Yes, and read to him the orders sent the 16th of this month to Count Woronzow; adding, that the whole had been forwarded by the ordinary conveyance of the post. He afterwards desired Mr. Whitworth to support, on his side, in the most efficacious manner, the just demands of Russia.

VI.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Whitworth to the Duke of Leeds, dated St. Petersburgh, February 5, 1791.

COUNT Osterman having communicated to me yesterday the contents of the answer, which has been transmitted, some days ago, by the post, to Count Woronzow, I have no longer any pretext for detaining the messenger Wiffin, and dispatch him accordingly. Your Grace will, before his arrival, have seen the little effect of His Majesty's endeavours to convince this Court of the necessity of peace on reasonable conditions; and that the Empress still abides by her former resolution, with even a more determined inflexibility.

Friday, 10th February.

The Marine Mutiny Bill was read a fecond time, and committed for Monday.

The Houfe refolved into a Committee of Supply, Mr. Hobart in the chair.

Mr. Chancellor PITT faid, he rofe to move a fum for the payment of the navy debt. The amount of the debt for the year ending December 1792, he ftated to be 70,000l. lefs than it was the year preceding; and but for the armaments againft Spain and Ruffia, which were attended with unavoidable expence, the decreafe would have been more than 200,000l. The fum he meant to move for defraying the expence occafioned by the laft armament, was 131,000l., and the reafon why he did not move for more was, that the fum voted for the Spanifh armament had been found to exceed confiderably the expence of that armament. This faving was owing to the ftores, and other articles, which were fold afterwards. He did not mean to fay, that 131,000l. was the whole expence of the Ruffian armament, he knew it was much more, but it was impoffible to know the exact amount, till the proper returns were made from the different dock-yards, and the neceffary information arranged at the different offices. He therefore moved, "That a fum not exceeding 131,000l. be granted to "His Majefty for the difcharge of the navy debt."

The refolution was agreed to, and ordered to be reported on Monday.

The Houfe in a Committee of Ways and Means, Mr. Hobart in the chair, the Land and Malt Taxes were voted for the preceding year, and ordered to be reported on Monday.

Mr. DUNDAS gave notice that he fhould, on Monday next, call the attention of the Houfe to the bills which he had introduced in the laft feffion of Parliament, for regulating the payment of feamen's wages.

Mr. FOX's bill on libels was read a fecond time and committed for Monday, as was alfo the *Quo Warranto* bill.

Mr. ERSKINE faid he had in his hand a petition from the proprietors and printers of newfpapers, magazines, &c. the object of which was this: The Legiflature having thought fit

to raiſe money by a lottery, among various other expedients to prevent gambling, and the ſelling of any chances dependent on the drawing, but legal ſhares of tickets, had prohibited the publiſhing of any ſchemes of ſuch chances under heavy penalties. But it was not intended by the Legiſlature, nor underſtood by thoſe whoſe duty it more immediately was to ſee the law put in execution, that thoſe penalties were to extend to the inſertion of an advertiſement in a newſpaper in the fair way of trade. A late deciſion of the Court of King's Bench, however, had determined that the inſertion of an advertiſement of any ſcheme of chances, dependent on the drawing of the lottery, except the legal lottery ſcheme, did ſubject the printer to the penalties of the act; in conſequence of which a number of actions had been brought by perſons certainly not actuated by public motives, againſt the printers of newſpapers, for the recovery of penalties to an amount not barely poſſibly, but very probably, ruinous. The proceedings on theſe actions had been quaſhed for informality and oppreſſion, but others might ſtill be brought. The parties liable to them were innocent in point of intention, ſince they had acted according to the received conſtruction of an act of Parliament. With reſpect to them, the deciſion which ſhewed that conſtruction to be erroneous, had the effect of an *ex poſt facto* law. It had been uſual for the Legiſlature to grant relief in ſuch caſes, and even where men had ignorantly treſpaſſed againſt a penal ſtatute, that had fallen into diſuſe, as in the caſe of the coal dealers. The prayer of the petitioners, therefore, was in behalf of themſelves, and all other perſons concerned, to be relieved from the penalties incurred under the act in queſtion, previous to the deciſion in the Court of King's Bench.

The petition was brought up, and ordered to lie on the table.
The Houſe adjourned.

Monday, 13th February.

The Houſe, in a Committee of Supply, came to the following reſolutions, viz.

"That it is the opinion of this Committee, that a ſum, not exceeding 672,482l. be granted to His Majeſty for defraying the ordinary expences of the navy for 1792.

"350,000l. for the extraordinaries of the navy for 1792.

"436,090l. 18s. 0½d to make good the deficiency of grants for the year 1791.

"5,376l. 17s. 6d. for the civil establishment of Nova Scotia.

"4,520l for the civil establishment of New Brunswick.

"2020l. ditto for the island of St. John.

"1800l. ditto for the island of Cape Breton.

"1306l. 7s. 6d. ditto for Newfoundland.

"4,180l. ditto for Bahama Islands.

"580l. for the salary of the Chief Justice of Bermuda or Somers Islands.

"600l. for the salary of the Chief Justice of Dominica.

"6,565l. 7s. for the civil establishment of the province of Upper Canada.

"4,726l. for the civil establishment of New South Wales."

Mr. GREY said, that previous to the discussion of the subject of the Russian armament, which he took it for granted the House would have, in consequence of some question to be brought forward by the other side of the House, (as had been the case with regard to the Spanish armament, on account of the insult offered to the British flag at Nootka) he would take the liberty of remarking on some deficiencies in the papers that had been laid on the table and printed, and some circumstances that appeared to require farther explanation, without which he thought the House could not properly understand the whole of the subject. He stated, that the copy of the dispatch from Count Osterman and Count Woronzow was dated October 31, 1790, and the next paper, viz. the memorial from Mr. Whitworth and Count Goltze, was dated May 26, 1791. It seemed impossible to him, that during so long an interval, nothing should have taken place between the Court of Petersburgh and His Majesty's Ministers, or between the latter and the Ministers of the Ottoman Court. He proceeded to point out others that seemed equally extraordinary; the one was an extract of a dispatch mentioned in one of the papers, and referred to by his Grace the Duke of Leeds in one of his letters. He thought the extract itself should be before the House, or it would not be possible for gentlemen to understand the pro-

priety of the observations made upon it. He suggested farther papers that seemed to be wanting, and particularly the preliminaries of peace between the Empress and the Porte, that the House, after the country had nearly been drawn into an expensive and unprovoked war, might see how far His Majesty's interference had been necessary, or the armament justifiable. They ought also to know what had passed on the subject between our Court and the Court of Berlin. All these appeared to him to be material to the discussion, indeed so material, that it was scarcely possible to go into it without them. There was also another paper which he wished could have been laid on the table, viz. an account of the whole expence of the armament. The right honourable gentleman, he would readily admit, had very fairly and very candidly stated, that the 131,000l. which the House had been called on to vote, was not nearly the whole of the expence that the nation had been put to, but that he was not able as yet, for good and sufficient reasons, which he had explained, to lay before the House an exact state of the whole amount of the expence. He lamented this, because, as last year, upon the subject, they had heard a good deal of questions of confidence and questions of feeling, and as they had, year after year, voted with the Minister on questions of confidence, he did not doubt but if all the necessary papers, and the whole amount of the expence, was before the House, they would now vote a question of feeling, and agree with him that the conduct of the right honourable gentleman, respecting the negociation with Russia, had been unwise, absurd, and impolitic. Before he moved for any of the papers to which he had alluded, he begged leave to know whether any objection would be made to their production.

Mr. Chancellor PITT said, he certainly rather considered what had been said as a notice, on the part of the honourable gentleman, of some motions that he intended to make on a future day, than as any thing preparatory to an immediate motion; and if so, he hoped that some day might be fixed for the discussion of any such motions. As far as from the cursory manner in which they had been stated, he had been able to collect the nature of the papers which the honourable gentleman thought omitted, the answer to any motions for some of them

would be, that no fuch exifted. With regard to others alluded to, they were papers of a nature which it would be highly improper to lay upon the table, and if any motion was made for their production, he certainly fhould hold it to be his indifpenfable duty to refift it, and to oppofe the production of fuch papers. As to the laft paper mentioned by the honourable gentleman, viz. that relative to the expence of the armament, he had before affigned the true reafon why it was not produced, and was as anxioufly defirous of being able to lay it upon the table, as the honourable gentleman could be to fee it. Againft the day when the difcuffion fhould be brought forward, he did affure the honourable gentleman, that no pains on his part fhould be fpared to give the Houfe as full an account of all the particulars of the expence as could poffibly be made up. With regard to the fuggeftion of his propofing a day for taking the matter into confideration, he really felt no reafon whatever to propofe any queftion upon the fubject to the Houfe; at the fame time, if any other gentleman fhould wifh to bring forward a queftion for the fake of offering his obfervations upon the fubject, he fhould be perfectly ready to meet the difcuffion.

Mr. GREY faid, the right honourable gentleman he perceived meant to object to the production of the papers, the omiffion of which had been ftated by him: and as the fubject muft be difcuffed, he would make a motion for the papers being laid on the table on Monday next.

Mr. FOX declared, he was fomewhat amazed at the right honourable gentleman's objecting to the papers mentioned by his honourable friend, becaufe they moft of them would rather be documents for the defence of the conduct of Adminiftration than papers of any other defcription. There was one of them mentioned by his honourable friend, of which, poffibly by accident, the right honourable gentleman had not taken any notice; that was, a copy of the preliminaries of peace between the Emprefs of Ruffia and the Ottoman Porte, which certainly ought to be upon the table.

Mr. Chancellor PITT faid, it had efcaped him in his former reply, or he fhould have ftated that there could not be the fmalleft objection to laying a copy of the preliminaries of peace between Ruffia and the Porte before the Houfe, but that the fact was, they had not received any official copy of the preliminaries;

that probably they ſhould ſoon be able to lay before the Houſe a much more ſatisfactory paper, viz. a copy of the definitive treaty, which they knew to be concluded, from official diſpatches that had been received; and which gave them good grounds to expect a copy of the treaty very ſhortly.

Mr. Chancellor PITT ſaid, as it would be uncertain what time the buſineſs of finance could come on next Wedneſday, and as it was highly important that gentlemen ſhould know preciſely when it would come on, he gave notice that he would bring it forward next Friday.

The Houſe adjourned.

Tueſday, 14th February.

Mr. RYDER gave notice, that on Tueſday next he meant to call the attention of the Houſe to the bounties which had been given to the herring fiſheries. He ſtated, that by the laſt act for that purpoſe, which expired laſt year, a bounty of 30s. per ton had been allowed; and he thought it proper to ſtate to the Houſe, that it was his wiſh to renew that act, and continue the ſame bounty.

The order of the day being read, for taking into conſideration the petition of Mr. Froggart, relative to the Seaford election petition,

Mr. PELHAM ſaid that the circumſtances of the petition inclined him to ſay a few words on the ſubject of it. The facts ſtated, he took to be of a nature that certainly would prevent the Houſe from diſcharging it, without a hearing, and when he mentioned that, the only objection to it was, that it differed in ſome reſpect from that preſented laſt ſeſſion, yet while that variance had ariſen from miſtake, and was merely in words, and not in ſubſtance, he did not ſuppoſe that the petition would be refuſed. He was aware of the regulations fixed by Mr. Grenville's act; but not knowing any precedent ſince that act paſſed, he was in hopes, that the time for preſenting ſuch petitions being nearly out, the Houſe would grant the prayer of this petition; were it neceſſary to prove the facts, he ſhould call Mr. Froggart to the bar; but ſhould at preſent content himſelf with moving, that the petition of Sir Godfrey Webſter and John Tarleton, Eſq. complaining of an undue election for

the borough of Seaford, ſhould be taken into conſideration, or that time be given for them to prepare another petition, in the preciſe terms of that preſented laſt ſeſſion.

Mr. Chancellor PITT did not wiſh to enter into any thing like a diſcuſſion of the petition; becauſe, he thought the motion made by the right honourable gentleman was not the firſt ſtep that ought to be taken; he was ignorant, as well as the right honourable gentleman, of any precedent that applied exactly to the preſent caſe; but he believed, in the moſt ancient times, it had been the practice of the Houſe, before Mr. Grenville's act, to refer every petition of that ſort to the Committee of privileges and elections. He did not know that this ought to be done now: but, as ſince Mr. Grenville's act, no renewed petition had ever been received which differed from that preſented in a former ſeſſion, he ſubmitted to the Houſe, whether it would not be better to refer the petition either to a Select Committee, the Committee of Privileges, or an open Committee.

The SPEAKER ſtated to the Houſe, that on the meeting of a new Parliament it was uſual to form a Committee of Privileges, and another of election, but that motion was not made at the beginning of every ſeſſion, ſo that there was now a Committee of Privileges, but none of election. The petition therefore might be either referred to a Committee of Privilege, a ſelect, or an open Committee.

Mr. FOX ſaid there could be no difference of opinion on one point, which was, that if the petitioners were entitled to be heard on their firſt petition, and had not altered the ſubſtance in the preſent, it would be great injuſtice to diſcharge it, without giving them an opportunity to preſent one exactly ſimilar to that of laſt year. He had no objection to a Committee, provided it did not, by lengthening out the time, prevent the petition from being taken into conſideration.

Mr. SERJEANT WATSON ſaid he believed he recollected a caſe in point, which was, that of Morpeth, in 1775, on that occaſion both petitions were referred to a ſelect Committee to examine if there was any difference between them, and report to the Houſe.

This precedent was adopted, and Mr. Pelham having, with leave of the Houſe, withdrawn his motion, it was moved, that

the cafe of Morpeth be read, and followed with this addition, that the Committee do report, not only whether there is a difference, but what the difference is, between the two petitions. A Committee was named, and the Houfe adjourned.

Wednefday, 15th February.

Mr. STANLEY faid, that feeing an honourable gentleman in his place, he would take the liberty to afk if he had yet fixed on a day for bringing forward his motion for the abolition of the flave trade, or whether the honourable gentleman meant to bring forward any fuch motion this feffion?

Mr. WILBERFORCE faid, he certainly meant to bring forward his motion, but was not yet able to fix a particular day, becaufe he had to confult many perfons who were concerned on the fubject; when he could, he would give the earlieft notice to the Houfe.

Mr. STANLEY trufted that it would be fuch a notice, as either would bring on a call of the Houfe, or infure a full attendance.

Sir CHARLES BUNBURY faid he fhould, on fome future day, call the attention of the Houfe to the ftate of the convicts employed on board different hulks, the utility of their employment, and the propriety of continuing that mode. He had confidered the fubject a good deal, and was clearly of opinion that a plan might be adopted much fuperior to the prefent. That thefe convicts might be better employed, and at a much fmaller expence than at prefent. He had a plan to that effect to propofe; and if he could make it appear to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as he hoped he fhould, he was confident that he fhould not only have his concurrence and affent, but his thanks. Preparatory, therefore, to this plan, he had to fubmit feveral motions to the Houfe, in order that proper information might be had before the plan was propofed. He then moved,

"That there be laid before the Houfe an account of the "contract fubfifting between Government and Mr. Duncan "Campbell, refpecting the maintenance and fupport of the "convicts now employed in the Hulks, or elfewhere."

"An account of the number of fuch convicts, in what

"work they are employed, and the expence of their main-
"tenance."

These motions were agreed to.

Sir CHARLES BUNBURY said the plan of sending convicts to this distant colony called for much examination. In punishing individuals for acts of injustice, Government should take care themselves not to do any act of injustice. The sending of convicts, under the sentence of transportation for a stated time, to a place so distant, and under circumstances so distressing as to make it impossible for them to return when the time of their transportation expired, was certainly an act of injustice. From this consideration, and also from doubts which he entertained of the good policy of the scheme, he should have to submit some motions to the House. He then moved,

"That there be laid before the House an account of the expence of the stores and provisions, either sent or now to be sent, to New South Wales, since the last account has been made up."

"Copies of the letters and correspondence of Governor Philips respecting the nature of the climate, and fertility of the soil of New South Wales, and what number of persons it could in future be reasonably expected to support."

"An account of the number of persons embarked on board the *Neptune*, *Scarborough*, and *Surprise*, and how many of them arrived at New South Wales, and the state of their health."

"Copies of the contracts entered into between Government and the proprietors of ships, respecting the supplies and maintenance of such convicts."

"Such copies or extracts of letters and papers relative to the transportation of such convicts as have been received at the Navy Office, Treasury, or the Secretary of State's Office, since the last accounts had been made up."

Sir CHARLES BUNBURY commented upon the grounds of his respective motions, and observed that it was, he believed, nearly four years since the first establishment of a colony at Botany Bay, but no satisfactory accounts had yet been received that South Wales possessed fertility enough to support those who were sent there. It was indeed, a circumstance to be lamented, that after a voyage so perilous and expensive, a spot

could not have been found lefs liable to objection. It was furely becoming of Government to punifh offenders who were guilty of injuftice, but in doing fo, it particularly became them to be guilty of no injuftice themfelves. The extreme diftance of the colony and the little profpect of a power of a return home, when thofe who were fentenced to tranfportation for a given number of years, had ftaid there the full term of their fentence, amounted, in his mind, to grofs injuftice; and under all the circumftances, he confeffed he thought that Botany Bay was a fpot that ought to be abandoned, and fome new one chofen more fertile, more productive of provifion, and more likely to yield the neceffary ftores. Calamitous indeed, muft be the fufferings of the unfortunate convicts, if to the miferies they fuftained in their voyage, was to be added the want of the neceffary fertility to fupport them in the place to which they were conveyed. He fpoke particularly of the difafters and deaths ftated to have befallen thefe unhappy perfons on board the Neptune, as related in a letter figned Thomas Evans, and faid he made no doubt but that the right honourable Secretary of State, who had himfelf engaged the fhips, would attend to the matter with that attention and humanity which marked his character, and with that celerity and difpatch which the exigency of the cafe required.

Mr. Secretary DUNDAS faid, that he did not rife to make any oppofition to the motion made by the honourable Baronet; but he could not but think, from the manner in which the honourable Baronet had mentioned the fubject, that it was neceffary for him to fay a few words. He declared, he only wifhed to prevent an impreffion going abroad that no fteps had been taken to inveftigate the matter by Government. On the contrary, every meafure had been taken by him that could fuggeft itfelf as proper for the occafion. He had immediately fent to the Comptroller of the Navy, in whofe province it lay, to have the fact inquired into with all poffible diligence and accuracy; and he was ready to lay before that Houfe the whole of the refult, which would prove that the contract had been made in the moft œconomical way that it could be made, attending at the fame time to the comfort and eafe of the convicts.

Mr. ALDERMAN CURTIS ſaid, he did not riſe to oppoſe the motion, but to ſay what he well knew to be the fact, that the mortality aroſe from the elements alone; for that after paſſing the Cape, the ſhip met with the moſt tempeſtuous and worſt weather any veſſel could have experienced. The Alderman added a few words in ſupport of the humanity of the Captain and his good character.

Mr. Chancellor PITT preſented ſeveral papers on the ſubject of the Ruſſian armament.

Mr. GREY wiſhed to know if theſe were all the papers meant to be preſented, and being told acroſs the table by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that they were, gave notice that he ſhould move on Monday for ſeveral other papers, which he conceived to be neceſſary. In the mean time he ſhould make a motion, to which he conceived there could be no objection, viz. " For the dates at which the preſs-warrants were iſſued and " recalled in 1790, and 1791."

In a Committee of Supply, the Secretary at War roſe to move the ordinary and extraordinary of the army.

Mr. FOX ſaid it had not been uſual to move the extraordinary on the ſame day with the ordinary, and as it was unexpected, gentlemen, who wiſhed to make remarks on the latter, might be diſappointed.

The SECRETARY AT WAR ſaid no ſurpriſe was intended, and if any gentleman wiſhed the extraordinary to be poſtponed, he was ready to let it ſtand over to another day.

Mr. Chancellor PITT ſaid the reaſon of taking a ſeparate day for the extraordinary of the army was, that the eſtimate of it could ſeldom be preſented ſo ſoon as that of the ordinary; but as both eſtimates had been this year preſented at the ſame time, there could be no objection to voting them on the ſame day, eſpecially as notice had been given that it was intended to bring forward all the eſtimates as early as poſſible. If, however, any gentleman would ſay, that there was any thing in the eſtimate of the extraordinary, which he had not had time to conſider, he had no objection to putting it off till another day. The only difference would be, that when he came to open the general ſtate of the finances on Friday; a day of conſiderable expectation on the part of the Public, he ſhould have to men-

tion the amount on the eſtimate, inſtead of a vote of the Houſe.

Mr. FOX ſaid, it was impoſſible for him to ſay that the eſtimate of the extraordinary contained any thing to which he ſhould object; for not expecting it to come on, he had not examined it.

Mr. STEELE ſaid, that in former years when the amount of the extraordinary was conſiderable, it was impoſſible to make up the eſtimate ſo ſoon as that of the ordinary, which was the true reaſon of their being moved on ſeparate days. Now that the amount was leſs, they were both preſented, and might both be voted together.

General BURGOYNE ſaid that Members in general were not apprized of this, and it certainly would be better to adhere to the old, and he believed the invariable, rule of ſeparate days.

The SECRETARY AT WAR ſaid, he had heard enough to induce him to poſtpone the extraordinary till another day.

In the ordinary of the army he had now the ſatisfaction of being able to ſtate a conſiderable reduction; and although the defenſive force of the kingdom was not a branch of the public expence, in which he thought it wiſe to be too ſaving, he was happy to find the ſituation of the country ſuch as to admit of a conſiderable ſaving being made. In 1783 the peace eſtabliſhment of the army could not be finally ſettled, the regiments on foreign ſervice not being returned. In 1785, it was ſettled at ſeventy-three regiments, of 410 men, each divided into eight companies, with two companies *en ſecond*. In 1788 and 1789 they were formed into regiments of ten companies each. It was now propoſed, that each regiment ſhould conſiſt of 360 rank and file, divided into ten companies, without any companies *en ſecond*. A farther reduction of three men per company was intended, making the whole reduction, in each regiment, 70 rank and file.

The reaſon for the reduction of three men per company was, that in the courſe of time, the ſum appropriated for the neceſſaries of the ſoldier had fallen ſo far ſhort, that the three ſhillings a week intended for his actual ſubſiſtence, had been reduced, in ſome inſtances, to eighteen pence, and, in general, he believed, to two ſhillings. Where 360 men was the eſtab-

lishment of each regiment, it was generally found that they were five or six per company deficient. It was therefore thought practicable to reduce the establishment three men per company, without any reduction of the effective force, and appropriate the saving, to make good the deficiency in the sum appropriated for the necessaries of the common soldier, so that there might be no deduction from the three shillings for his weekly food.

In the plantations the regiments must continue on their former establishment till Midsummer, so that the saving for the present year would be less than for the year ensuing. For this year the total saving would be 45,317l. which the additional allowance to the common soldier would reduce to 23,000l. In future the total saving, including some reduction of the staff and other articles, would be 84,770l. which the additional allowances would reduce to 51,403l. the net ultimate annual saving to the Public.

A regiment of cavalry was raised for Jamaica, which he had not included in the estimate, because, if continued, it would be paid for by the island. He trusted the whole saving would be found rather more than less than he had stated it, and hoped the Committee would feel with him the pleasure which such a reduction ought to afford, not only as easing the public burdens, but as a pledge of the happiness, peace, and security, which the country enjoyed.

He concluded with moving the first of the following resolutions, viz.

285,064l. 12s. 9½d. for the charge of 17013 men for guards and garrisons, to the 24th of June, 1792. The following are what he subsequently moved.

275,140l. 19s. 3d. for the charge of 15701 men for ditto, to the 24th of December, 1792.

170,193l. 9s. 6½d. for forces in the Plantations, to the 24th of June, 1792.

149,294l. 16s. 5d. for ditto.

4,250l. 12s. 8d. for difference between the British and Irish establishment, to the 24th of June.

2,903l. 4s. 7d. for ditto, to the 24th of December, 1792.

8,345l. 16s. 2d. for pay to troops in India.

98,037l. 15s. for recruiting land forces, contingencies, &c.

15,064l. 11s. for full pay to supernumerary officers,

6,427l. 6d. for General and General Staff Officers.

53,338l. 5s. 2d. for allowance to Paymaster General, &c.

159,997l. 10s. for reduced officers of land forces and marines.

202l. 10s. for allowances to private gentlemen of the horse guards.

3,161l. 10s. 10d. for officers late in the service of the States General.

55,092l. 10s. for reduced officers of the British American forces.

4,907l. 10s. for allowances to reduced officers to ditto.

173,104l. 3s. 4d. for in and out-pensioners of Chelsea Hospital.

9,381l. 13s. 10d. for pensions to officers widows.

4,660l. for Scotch roads and bridges.

1,785l. 3s. 8d. for Garrison and Staff Officers for several periods in 1791.

877l. 11s. 2d. for expence and service performed by the Ordnance, previous to the 31st of December, 1783.

43,255l. 18s. 5d. for service performed by the Office of Ordnance in 1790.

377,898l. 1s. 8d. for charge of ordnance of land service for 1792.

General BURGOYNE said, he had formerly been an advocate for the sort of establishment now proposed, viz. a small number of men, and a great number of officers in proportion. Experience had induced him to change his opinion. The principle on which that sort of establishment was recommended, was, that in case of necessity the regiments might be filled up with men, and the officers being in constant service, a well-disciplined army could thus be soon formed. In no one instance within his recollection had this principle been adhered to. When an addition to the army was wanted, new corps were constantly raised, instead of filling up the old. He felt himself called upon to make this declaration, because the Chancellor of the Exchequer had last year defended the raising of independent companies, as the only practicable mode of re-

cruiting the army with ſufficient diſpatch. This was an avowal that the principle now adopted for the reduction was found to be a bad one. He applauded the allowance to the comman ſoldier, as equally humane and wiſe, and ſaid he was ſure that whoever planned it muſt be a military man. He wiſhed the ſituation of the ſubaltern officers had been conſidered at the ſame time; they were ſtill obliged to ſubſiſt on the ſame ſcanty pittance, although every article of ſubſiſtance was thirty per cent. dearer than when their pay was originally ſettled. He did not feel himſelf of conſequence enough to make any motion on the ſubject, but he hoped thoſe who had the means of giving effect to a motion, would turn their attention to it. There was one grievance which certainly ought to be remedied—their being kept ſo long out of their arrears. By ſome miſconſtruction of the bill, which marked the talents and the heart of its author (Mr. Burke) it was underſtood that the arrears could not be iſſued till the accounts of the regiment were ſent in and ſettled. The accounts of regiments ſerving abroad could not be ſettled till after a conſiderable interval; and from this, and other circumſtances, it actually happened that ſome regiments had ſeven or eight years arrears ſtill due. Delays in ſending in the accounts might, perhaps, be owing to Colonels, Agents, or Paymaſters, but certainly could not to ſubalterns, who were not public accountants, and it was hard that they ſhould ſuffer for the neglect of others. Four years arrears were now due to his own regiment, and he did not know of any objection to the accounts.

The SECRETARY AT WAR ſaid he was happy in the right honourable General's approbation of any part of the plan he had opened. The raiſing of independent companies was no departure from the principle on which a number of regiments on a ſmall eſtabliſhment of men were kept up; for it did not anſwer the purpoſe of recruiting the army, without adding to the number of regiments. With reſpect to the delay in iſſuing the arrears, the right honourable General was miſinformed, and he was happy in an opportunity of thus publicly correcting the miſtake. The arrears of the ſubalterns were always iſſued on proper application, whether the accounts of the regiment were ſettled or not. The accounts of the Gene-

ral's own regiment were ſettled, at leaſt as far as depended on the War Office.

General BURGOYNE ſaid, the accounts of his own regiment were ſettled only for 1787, but this he had mentioned incidentally, and not as matter of complaint. He ſhould be happy to find that he was miſtaken, with reſpect to the arrears of the ſubalterns, and wiſhed to know when the alteration had taken place; for he well recollected, as the Secretary at War might alſo do, that three or four years ago, a Gene al Officer had advanced the arrears of the ſubalterns of his regiment out of his own pocket.

The SECRETARY AT WAR ſaid, he could not call it an alteration, for he never knew it otherwiſe, and was confident that whether the accounts of a regiment were ſettled or not, the ſubalterns' arrears were iſſued, as far as depended on the War Office, when proper application was made for them, and many applications had been made in the laſt two years.

Sir J. S. ERSKINE wiſhed to know whether the arrears were iſſued on the application of any individual officer or his agent, or whether the joint application of all the ſubalterns of a regiment was neceſſary? If the former was the caſe, it was of conſequence that it ſhould be generally underſtood, as the number of late applications mentioned by the Secretary at War, ſhewed that till lately few had been acquainted with the mode of applying.

The SECRETARY AT WAR ſaid, that if any individual ſubaltern applied for his arrears to the War Office, they would be iſſued, although the accounts of the regiment were not ſettled.

Colonel FITZPATRICK ſaid, no reaſon had been given for the addition of Colonel Simcoe's corps: the Committee ought to have ſome reaſon before they voted the expence.

The SECRETARY AT WAR ſaid, the alteration in the government of Canada made that corps neceſſary.

Mr. Secretary DUNDAS roſe in reply to the obſervation made by the honourable gentleman who ſpoke laſt, relative to the new corps for Upper Canada: and he would not heſitate to ſay, that the raiſing of that corps met with his hearty approbation, and was one of thoſe meaſures which, in his opinion, reflected great credit upon Adminiſtration, as well as the ho-

nourable gentleman who is now appointed Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada. He would explain to the Committee what was the nature of that corps, and what were the advantages to be expected from it. It was certainly a military corps so far, as that those who composed it, and were sent out to that settlement, were to be under military discipline, when they left this country, and after they were there, but they were to act in another capacity: it must be well known, that there was a great part of that country which it would be necessary to clear, and those men were to be employed for that purpose; when it was effected, the intention was, that each should have a tract of land allotted to him, instead of receiving pay as a soldier, and by these means the country would not only be cleared, and rendered useful to the inhabitants, but those very inhabitants would, from having a necessary attachment to what their industry had made their property, be, in consequence of their military skill and habits, enabled to protect the province, and answer every purpose of a militia. With regard to the expence of this corps, he contended that it was trifling in comparison with that of a new regiment; it consisted only of 400 men, who were to be sent as a military force to defend and protect the province, likewise to be employed as artificers in every work that might be required, and to become to all intents and purposes inhabitants, whose interest it would be to act as militia, and who would tend to increase the population and prosperity of the colony. The expence of a new corps was something above eleven thousand pounds; the expence of this would not be so much by three thousand; so that when the utility of the measure was compared with the expence, and the beneficial consequences that were expected to take place considered, he had no doubt but the Committee would see the wisdom and propriety of the measure. This he had thought it necessary to say in explanation, on a subject which had originated since he had the honour to fill the place he now held, and which, he owned, had always met with his unequivocal support and approbation.

Mr. FOX was always ready to thank those entrusted with the administration of affairs, when they thought proper to give any satisfactory account or explanation of measures that were to increase the public expence, or take money out of the poc-

kets of the people; and so far as the honourable Secretary at War had explained the estimates that he had brought forward, the Committee was obliged to him. There was one subject which had been touched upon in the latter part of his honourable friend's speech, upon which he did not conceive that any satisfactory answer had been given; he meant the arrears due to subaltern officers. It certainly was not his intention to say, nor would he suppose that the blame lay in the honourable Secretary's Office, because he knew it could not be his wish; yet it undoubtedly was a real and a cruel fact, that this grievance had existed; and that it was now remedied, or how lately that remedy had been applied, he knew not, nor did the honourable Baronet seem to know himself when the subalterns were relieved from so unjust and severe a hardship. As to the proposed reduction, it certainly had his approbation as to the principles of it, though he by no means approved of the manner in which it was to be done, nor could he see any reason why it was not done long ago, or why it was not now carried to a much greater extent. He however approved of it, though it did not go near so far as he could have wished; but he was none of those who, because something like what ought to be was done, thought it unnecessary to enquire why more was not done, or why that was not done at an earlier period; such people would say, they have given us something good, and though it is not what we ought to have, we shall be content with it, and ask no questions why you did not do more. When he had the honour to hold a place in His Majesty's councils, he had proposed a reduction of the army, but not in the mode now adopted; he wished to reduce the number of regiments to sixty-four, instead of which the establishment had been kept up to seventy regiments, besides new corps raised for the East-Indies; and now one for Canada, and another for the West-Indies, at the very time when we are talking about a reduction of the army. He never had agreed in opinion with those who argued, that keeping up skeleton regiments was a preferable mode to having fewer in number, and those fuller of men: and though officers might naturally approve, without any imputation of blame, of regiments consisting more of officers than men, yet no one argument had ever been stated, in his recollection, whereby it

appeared that these skeleton regiments were completed in cases of urgency, with greater facility and expedition than new corps could be raised. He had often conversed with officers of experience and known abilities on this subject; but he never could learn from any of them, that this mode of keeping up a skeleton establishment was a good one, either in theory or practice. He therefore wished, that while we were serving the finances, we would serve the constitution; and he never could agree to a system which was the least in point of saving, and the greatest in point of patronage; in short, the only beneficial, constitutional, and effectual mode of reducing the army, was, in his opinion, a reduction of corps, and not of men. He came next to notice what had been said by the right honourable Secretary, respecting the nature of the Canada corps, though he confessed that great part of what the right honourable gentleman had said, was, instead of being explanatory, rather beyond the reach of his comprehension. The right honourable Secretary wished that the Committee would not consider them as a regiment, nor think them any addition to the army establishment, because, he said, they were not sent out for military purposes, but to clear the country, and afterwards to inhabit it. He trusted the Committee would beware of such arguments; we had already seen similar instances, such as the corps of artificers for Gibralter, and others that he could mention. But the honourable gentleman had said they were to become a militia to defend this settlement, after they had cleared it, and to protect the property which their industry had entitled them to possess; and they were, he understood, to people the province too. As to a militia, if the honourable gentleman was serious, he would ask, What was the necessity for sending a corps of regimented officers, and four hundred men, to form a militia in Canada? or were we to consider them as four hundred drill serjeants, sent out to instruct the inhabitants in the military art? In establishing a Government for that province, it undoubtedly was the object and wish of this country to give them one most suitable to their circumstances and situation, in short to establish a government for the people, and not as this military system would indicate, to make a people for the Government; and he would always contend that the government of any country which required the least armed force

to support it was the best, and the government the greatest army to support it, the worst. With regard to the officer who had got the command of this corps, he believed him in every respect to be a proper person, but was not at all surprised that he should wish for a regiment; indeed he knew few officers who did not, and he was no ways astonished that this officer should have recommended it to Ministers; yet that recommendation, without any farther proofs of the utility of such an increase of expence, was not sufficient grounds for the Committee to vote away the money of the people. He then noticed the proposed addition to the pay, by the allowance of bread, and expressed his satisfaction that a proposition was brought forward so beneficial to the private soldier. It had his most hearty concurrence, both as to the principle and the mode on which it was done; in short, it was a subject upon which, even in this divided country, there were not two opinions. He was sorry that he must here, however, take notice of this measure as being put in practice, without the least communication with Parliament. Certainly no Minister could imagine, that any individual in that House would have opposed so just, so honourable, and so humane a plan. Why then had this unconstitutional, and he would say, unwarrantable method been followed, he was at a loss to tell, except it was to introduce that abominable system, which he had been obliged to reprobate, in what he said in the debate on the King's speech, relative to the reduction of taxes, which had been proposed from the Throne without even the knowledge of Parliament; although no one had been hardy enough to deny the undoubted right of that House, to originate every measure that tended to call for, or appropriate, the money of their constituents. This was a system that he would ever strenuously oppose; because, if it obtained the sanction of Parliament, there would be an end to the fair and free discussion of any subject in that House. In this way, a Minister might make any proposition of his own, and have the purpose of it done, before Parliament knew any thing at all of such a proposition. Respecting the expence of the West-India corps it had been said, that it was to be defrayed by the island of Jamaica, and could not be considered as an additional regiment; certainly it was to cost this country some-

thing conſiderable at firſt, and as certainly by the appointment of officers, to give a new patronage to the Miniſter; therefore he could not help thinking that this was, ſome how or other, ſtealing in a regiment upon the eſtabliſhment.

Mr. Secretary DUNDAS was ſorry that when he was up before he had not been able to make himſelf underſtood; but he was partly relieved from his apprehenſions on that point, by having attended cloſely to the right honourable gentleman's ſpeech, by which, and his obſervation on what had formerly fallen from him, he was convinced that the right honourable gentleman had underſtood him perfectly. He again explained what he meant by ſtating that the Canada regiment was not merely for military purpoſes, but that their duty would be rather of a mixed nature. He mentioned that amongſt thoſe who were ſent out, there was every ſpecies of artificers, for the various occupations that it might be neceſſary to attend to in Upper Canada, and which would be better executed by thoſe than others; beſides, their being ſkilled for ſeveral years in military diſcipline, would enable them to protect the country as a militia; for he remarked, that it never was meant to keep them up as a regiment; after the purpoſes of ſending them out were anſwered, they were to be diſbanded by degrees, and to inhabit the country. He contended, that the difference of expence in raiſing this corps, was ſo comparatively ſmall, that they could not be conſidered as a new regiment might be. With regard to the allowance of bread to the private ſoldiers, he thought it had been carried into effect in the beſt and wiſeſt manner, for it was made known, and took place at once, without any previous hint or communication, which certainly prevented that ſpeculation amongſt the ſoldiers which would have taken place had it been firſt mentioned out of doors, or even diſcuſſed in that Houſe, that there was to be any additional pay to the army. He ſaid he had touched upon every thing in the right honourable gentleman's ſpeech that he thought required an anſwer, and he truſted had made himſelf underſtood to the Houſe; and if that was the caſe, he had too high an opinion of the right honourable gentleman's abilities and powers of underſtanding, to ſuppoſe that he could not perceive the meaning of what the reſt underſtood.

Mr. FOX said, he owned the right honourable gentleman had now explained to him more plainly the purpose of sending out a regiment for other uses besides its military capacity—they were to be artificers, and work in every employment that might be necessary. Now he certainly thought other means might have been fallen upon for this purpose, nor could he see the smallest necessity for being at the expence of a regiment, and adding to the Minister's influence, by appointing the officers, except it was the opinion of the right honourable gentleman, that whenever work was to be done, a regiment must be raised to do it; and work done in this way, he contended, wherever it happened, was not done in a cheap way for the country.

The resolutions were then severally put and agreed to, and ordered to be reported to-morrow.

The SECRETARY AT WAR gave notice that he should move the extraordinary of the army on Wednesday next.

The House adjourned.

Thursday, 16th February.

Before the report of the Army estimates was brought up,

General BURGOYNE stated, that he meant to move for an account of arrears due to subalterns of the different regiments on the British establishment: he understood the Secretary at War was to oppose the production of this account; but he hoped he would have it in readiness against Tuesday, in case the House should be pleased to order it.

The SECRETARY AT WAR said he considered this as notice of a motion, and when that motion came forward, he would make a reply.

The report was then brought up, and agreed to.

Mr. Secretary DUNDAS said, that in consequence of something that had passed last night, he had been at pains to find out the exact difference on the expence of the corps raised for Canada, from that of any other corps. He stated the first to be little more than six thousand pounds, while the latter exceeded ten thousand. He had omitted to state last night, that Colonel Simcoe, the Colonel-commandant of that corps, received no pay by his appointment to it.

Colonel FITZPATRICK said, there was another matter, which from information he had known since last night. The right honourable gentleman had said, Colonel Simcoe had been appointed on account of his local knowledge of that province; now, with regard to that officer, he believed no better, or more proper, person could be appointed; but as to his local knowledge, he had heard that the Colonel never was in Canada before in his life.

Mr. Secretary DUNDAS said, he never meant to say so; but that from the knowledge which Colonel Simcoe had acquired by his services in America, he was able to say, that there would be no occasion to recruit that corps in future from England, because there would be many in the neighbouring countries who would readily go into it.

Colonel FITZPATRICK said, he believed the House understood the right honourable gentleman precisely as he had done. They never could have an idea that he meant to mention the Colonel's future local knowledge as the cause of appointment.

Lord HOOD presented an account of the dates of issuing and recalling the press-warrants in 1790 and 1791.

The annual papers were presented from the India House.

The House adjourned.

Friday, 17th February.

In a Committee of the whole House, to consider of so much of His Majesty's speech, on opening the session of Parliament, as relates to the public revenue and expenditure, the following paragraphs from the speech being read,

"I entertain the pleasing hope, that the reductions which "may be found practicable in the establishments, and the "continued increase of the revenue, will enable you, after "making due provision for the several branches of the public "service, to enter upon a system of gradually relieving my "subjects from some part of the existing taxes, at the same "time giving additional efficacy to the plan for the reduction "of the national debt, on the success of which our future ease "and security essentially depend;

"With a view to this important object, let me also re-

"commend it to you to turn your attention to the consideration "of such measures as the state of the funds and of public cre- "dit may render practicable and expedient towards a reduc- "tion in the rate of interest of any of the annuities which are "now redeemable,"

Mr. Chancellor PITT said, that the paragraph of His Majesty's speech, which had been referred to them, and just been read, had already announced to them the most welcome information that could have been received. It had held out to them the pleasing expectation, after all the difficulties they had experienced, of the happy period being at length arrived, when they might be enabled, with safety to the country, to diminish in some degree the burdens of the people, and at the same time to give additional efficacy to the plan established for the reduction of the national debt, upon a system which could not fail of producing the most solid and substantial advantages to the kingdom, and which, therefore, he hoped, would ever be held sacred and inviolable by that House. On the first day of the session, he had taken an opportunity of stating the general result of the finances of the country, which he should then proceed more minutely and specifically to detail. In entering upon a field at once so interesting, and so extensive, it would be in some sort his duty to trespass a good deal upon the time and attention of the Committee, endeavouring, however, to compress and reduce the size of the whole as much as the nature and importance of the subject would admit. He said, he should think it particularly his duty to lay before the Committee such specific points as might enable the Committee themselves to judge of the propriety of the resolution he should have the honour to submit to them, and the ground upon which that resolution was brought forward; and in doing this part of his duty, it was a great satisfaction to his mind to reflect, that in consequence of the frequent discussion of the subject which had passed of late years within those walls, the intricacy and mystery of finance no longer existed, and that gentlemen would be able to comprehend, and decide without difficulty or embarrassment, upon the important points that he should have to detail, and which at the same time that they were all blended together in one general view, he wished to detail separately to the House, and elucidate his statement by touching on all the

[illegible] circumstances and considerations as he proceeded. He would afterwards shew how these considerations applied to the resolutions that he should submit to the judgment of the Committee, and then propose to move in the Committee of Supply and Committee of Ways and Means, other necessary resolutions, the objects of which he should have occasion to explain in the course of what he had now to submit to the Committee. Some of the articles included in the Supply and Ways and Means of the present year, were yet to be voted, but as the amount was ascertained by estimate, and they were of such a nature as not to be likely to meet with opposition, he should state, and calculate upon them as already voted. He should first state the permanent income, compared with the permanent expenditure; second, how the surplus might be applied; third, how the House might vary the mode of application on the principles already adopted; and last of all, the reasons on which they might found a probable opinion of the permanence of the present surplus.

The actual produce of the permanent taxes, from 5th January, 1791, to 5th January, 1792, was — — — £.14,132,000

The actual produce of the land and malt — 2,558,000

In the provision for the expence of the Spanish armament, there was a regulation in the stamp duties, intended to be permanent, which produced about — — — 40,000

These three sums, taken together, made 16,730,000

The year before, deducting the produce of the fifty-third week, which occurring once in six years, the fair mode of estimate was to divide it into six parts, and add one of these parts to the receipt of each year, the amount of the above taxes was — — £.16,437,000

On an average of two years, it was 16,615,000

Of three years — — 16,418,000

Of four years — — — 16,212,000

So that the amount of last year exceeded the average of four years by about — 500,000

The Committee would therefore see, that in founding his estimate of the future permanent income on the average of four

years, he was not reckoning too sanguinely on the future prosperity of the revenue; and that he was careful, as he ought to be, not to hold out a prospect of relief from public burdens, which was likely to end in public delusion.

He came next to compare this sum with the annual permanent expence, as estimated by the revenue Committee of last year, with some additions and deduction, each of which he should distinctly mention.

The permanent expence, by the estimate of the Committee, was - - -	£.15,969,000
To this was to be added an additional charge on the Sinking Fund, for the Duke of Clarence, of - - -	12,000
For the establishment of Upper Canada -	12,000
Proposed establishment for the Duke of York	18,000
Total -	£.16,011,000

From this was to be taken the following reductions in the several articles of expenditure, including the Hessian subsidy, which being now expired, His Majesty's Ministers were not of opinion that the circumstances of the country required its renewal.

In the expence of the navy - -	£104,000
Of the dock yards - - -	10,000
Of the army - - -	50,000
Hessian subsidy - - -	36,000
Total -	£.200,000

All the above savings would not take place in the first part of the present year, but they would in the course of it, and might be considered as permanent. Deducting the amount from the estimate of the Committee, with the additions as above, the future permanent expenditure would be 15,811,000l. Thus the future permanent income, estimated on an average of four years, exceeded the permanent expence, including the million appropriated to the gradual reduction of the debt, by

401,000l. which fum might be applied in aid of the million for reducing the debt, to the immediate relief of public burdens, or perhaps more wifely divided between both.

Such was the profpect for future years. Let the account for the prefent year be next examined. The Houfe had voted fupplies:

Navy—Seamen - - -	£.832,000
Ordinary - - -	672,000
Extraordinary . . -	350,000
Reduction of Debt to cover increafe by the Ruffian armament - -	131,000
Total -	1,985,000

Army—Ordinary - - -	1,474,000
Extraordinary - - -	277,000
Troops in India - - -	63,000
Total -	1,814,000

The expence of the troops in India was money advanced for, and to be repaid by, the India Company.

Mifcellaneous fervices, including 6,000l. for the expence of Mr. Haftings's trial, and a fum, he trufted, would be granted to the fettlers removed from the Mufquito fhore, 145,000l. deficiency of grants for laft year, including 123,000l. repaid of the Bank loan, and leffened by about 10,000l. the excefs of the ways and means above the eftimate 436,000l. deficiency of land and malt 350,000l. then adding 100,000l. for the produce of the new duty on Malt, if the Houfe fhould think proper to repeal it, and 400,000l. in addition to the fum for reducing the public debt, and the whole amount of the fupply would be 5,654,000l.

In this account he had faid nothing of the Loyalift's debentures, becaufe they were provided for by the lottery, nor of the floating Exchequer bills, which being annually renewed, would ftand equal on both fides.

To provide for this fupply; the ways and means were,

Land and malt - - -	£.2,750,000

The consolidated fund for three quarters, from 5th April, 1791, to 5th January, 1792, had produced a sum equal to what it was taken at for four quarters, and estimating the fourth quarter on an average of four years, it would furnish to the ways and means.

The surplus of the consolidated fund on the 5th January, 1792, was 155,000l.

The produce on estimate from 5th April, 1792, to 5th April, 1793, after repealing certain taxes, 2,300,000l.

These three made a total of ways and means of 5,691,000l. exceeding the supply by about 37,000l. The resources of the present year were therefore amply sufficient to cover the expence, the repeal of the temporary duty on malt, and the addition above stated to the sum for reducing the debt. In future years the expence would be, as before estimated, with very little variation, as far as could be now foreseen; although he did not pretend to say that there might not be some addition to the miscellaneous services. The completion of the dock yards at home would require some addition, although the principal expence was already incurred; and if the House should think proper to follow up the plan of fortifying the West-India islands, that, he was sorry to say, would require a much more considerable sum than had been at first supposed. This, however, would be matter of future consideration. He should take an opportunity of submitting a distinct proposition respecting it, on which the House would decide. He was happy, however, to acquaint the Committee, that by the care of looking into the public accounts, it was found that the balances of the public money were not yet exhausted; he expected a sum of three or four hundred thousand pounds of imprest monies to be paid into the Exchequer in the ensuing year; and was confident that the extraordinary resources would be found fully equal to the unforeseen expences.

From what he had said, he hoped the Committee would be of opinion, that there was nothing to hinder the immediate repeal of the new duty on Malt, and the partition of four hundred thousand pounds, between paying off debt and easing taxes, if they should be of opinion that it was proper to grant a farther immediate relief.

In taking off taxes, two objects were to be principally considered; first, that the relief should be clearly felt by the payers of taxes, instead of serving only to increase the profits of the dealers in a particular article, without reducing the price to the consumer, which might sometimes be the case; and second, that the relief should extend to the yeomanry, artificers, and industrious poor. Taxes raised by assessments, were well calculated to answer the first of these considerations, being paid immediately from the persons on whom they were levied, into the hands of the receivers for the Public. But there might be taxes on consumption, which would also answer this object as well as the second, being particularly felt by those whom it was most desirable to relieve. Of this description was the tax upon malt intended to be repealed. There were three others which might also be supposed to unite both considerations. The tax on female servants, paid chiefly, perhaps, by those whose industry was of the greatest importance to the prosperity of the country, amounted to 31,000l. The tax on carts and waggons affected the yeomanry and the agriculture of the country, and the inconvenience to those who paid was perhaps greater than the sum. It amounted to 30,000l. and by the repeal 90,000 persons would be relieved. The tax of 3s. on houses under seven windows was paid by those to whom he was sorry to say that sum, small as it was, formed no inconsiderable object; it amounted to 56,000l. and the repeal would be an immediate relief to between three and four hundred thousand families. By repealing a halfpenny per pound of the duty on candles, to take place on the 5th of April, and allowing a drawback of the duty on the stock in hand at that period, it might be expected that a proportional reduction in the price would immediately take place, and the industry of the country experience a considerable relief. This, with the former two, would make about 222,000l.

If the taxes he had mentioned were properly selected, the only question would be the propriety of this division of the surplus between the liquidation of the public debt, and lightening the public burdens. It did appear to him to be the wisest course, which without infringing on the system adopted for the reduction of the debt, would convince the people that their ease was seriously and effectually intended, and prevent any

rude hand from attempting to violate that facred principle of difcharging public engagements by public means, upon which national credit and national profperity fo much depended. He was therefore of opinion, that they might fafely apply the other 200,000l. to the reduction of the debt. If they looked at the progrefs already made, they would be convinced that the ultimate object was not only attainable, but brought confiderably nearer: and in the courfe of his fpeech, he fhould fuggeft fome improvement of the plan by which it was to be accomplifhed.

When the Houfe firft entered on the plan of reduction, it was a queftion, whether the commiffion fhould be allowed on the real or nominal fums redeemed, and in which of the feveral funds it was moft advantageous to buy. Fortunately, that queftion was now at an end. The remaining debt would probably be redeemed at par; he had preferred the application of the furplus million to the purchafe of three per cents, as more advantageous to the credit of the country, and perhaps ultimately to the object in view, although apparently lefs fo in the firft inftance. It would be the means of obtaining better terms for reducing the four per cents to three and a half, and then to three; and the five per cents, at a proper time. In four years the American Loyalifts would be paid, and if the Houfe fhould be of opinion with him, that a lottery was as unprejudicial, and as proper a refource as the Public could have recourfe to, there would be an addition to the public income of 300,000l. a year, fuppofing the price, of which there was no reafon to apprehend a fall, while that of every thing elfe was rifing, fhould continue the fame. By means of thefe additional aids, twenty-five millions of the three per cents would be paid off, and the Public enabled to redeem at par, or reduce the intereft of the five per cents. It was to be underftood, however, that the finking fund was to have the whole benefit of the intereft redeemed by thefe operations, to which the faith of Parliament was pledged, till the annual fum applicable to the redemption of debt amounted to four millions. When this was ftated in 1786, the looking forward to it at an early period, would have been treated as chimerical; calculating however on the income and expenditure as he had ftated them, it might be expected in 1808; fo that in fifteen years

from the present time would that surplus of four millions, which neither he, nor those who thought most favourably of the plan of redemption, a few years back have ventured, even to hope at so early a period, actually be at the disposal of Parliament. He was not so sanguine as to look for the uninterrupted continuance of those fortunate circumstances which had contributed so much to accelerate this period. He could not expect that in fifteen years no accident would happen to retard it; but of this he was sure, that as far as a judgement could be formed on present circumstances, such accidents were less to be apprehended than at any former period. It was the duty of Parliament to maintain, and if possible to invigorate, a system of so much actual benefit, and so much promise; and at all events, to allow the surplus to accumulate in the sinking fund, till it bore some fixed proportion to the debt undischarged, below which it ought not to be suffered to fall. But he wished to do something more. In 1786 Parliament did as much as was in their power, and the people chearfully contributed to give efficacy to their exertions. Having surmounted the difficulties which then surrounded them, they ought to provide against the permanent accumulation of debt in future. This he was confident was practicable, although it might not be so to raise the whole sum required by extraordinary exigencies within the year; and he should move as an amendment to the system of 1786, that on all future loans, not immediately provided for, an annual sum, over and above the interest, shall be paid from the sinking fund, bearing the same proportion to the whole loan, as the whole redemption fund to the whole of the unredeemed debt. This amendment he had in contemplation, when he moved the provision for the expence of the Spanish armament; and he should only now observe upon it, that the whole of such a loan would not operate as an additional charge, because the system of redemption, fixed and established, would obtain better terms for the Public in the rate of interest.

He now turned to a general review of his subject, observing, that by granting an immediate relief of taxes, to the amount of 200,000l. a year, the system of redemption would not be broke in upon, nor cause given to complain, that Parliament had been more attentive to temporary convenience than to future strength, and the interests of posterity. When he looked

back on the progrefs of our profperity, the profpect of its not only continuing, but improving, was flattering. The revenue of laft year, exclufive of new taxes, exceeded that of 1786 by more than two millions; and that of 1783, the year immediately after the war, by more than four. This review was fo much the more fatisfactory that the improvement had been progreffive, except in the year 1786, which failed from a temporary interruption of commerce in the contemplation of the commercial treaty, and yet that year had greatly exceeded 1783. If the particular heads of this increafe, fince 1783, were inquired into, one million might be taken as the produce of new taxes; one million as the confequence of regulations in the mode of collecting exifting taxes, by which fmuggling was fuppreffed, and the revenue benefited, even in thofe branches to which the regulation did not immediately apply, and the remaining two to an increafed confumption in confequence of increafing wealth and profperity. If they looked to the average increafe of the cuftoms in four years, it would be found that it did not confift in articles, the quantity of which varied with the feafon, as fugar; but in articles not fubject to fuch variation, and the raw materials of manufactures. In the Excife this was ftill more ftriking. The duties arifing from malt in various ways, although a commodity fubject to variation from feafons, had increafed progreffively, as had thofe on foap, candles, leather, ftarch, &c. &c. even the duty on bricks and tiles, articles of unequivocal confumption, had increafed, as had the duties on falt and the affeffed taxes. The ftamps fince 1783 had increafed 700,000l. and the revenue of the Poft-Office very confiderably; all tending to confirm the conclufion, that increafing profperity was the fole caufe of increafing revenue. This increafe was fpread over all the branches of confumption, and a correfponding increafe in the trade and manufactures of the country, which the beft accounts that could be had, although the beft were defective, all tended to confirm, put the conclufion beyond the poffibility of doubt. By thefe accounts, the imports in 1782 amounted to 9,714,000l.; in 1790 to 19,130,000l. In 1782 the exports of Britifh manufacture and produce were 9,109,000l.; in 1790 14,921,000l.; and in 1791 16,420,000l. In 1782 the exports, Britifh and foreign, were 12,239,000l.; in 1790, 20,120,000l. It was alfo

probable that our internal trade had increafed in a greater and more beneficial proportion.

When we thus faw the revenue, and the trade of the country increafing, it was natural to inquire into the caufes. Of thefe the firft was undoubtedly the induftry and energy of the country, but there muft be fecondary caufes to give to this its effect. The increafe of fkill in our artizans and manufacturers, the great improvements in the application of machinery, and the various ways by which labour is faved, fubdivided and expedited by ingenuity, had done much, and the facility of credit, arifing from the confidence in the public faith, gave great advantages to the manufacturers at home, and by enabling the merchant to extend his credit abroad, gave great advantages in the foreign market, and thus operated in a double ratio. This was firft the fign and immediately the caufe of our profperity. The enterprife of commercial men had pufhed adventure and judicious fpeculation, wherever a market was to be found or created; and the liberal policy of a more unreftrained intercourfe with France, though lefs felt from the diftracted fituation of that country, had greatly contributed to our fuccefs. But more than all other caufes had operated the accumulation of capital, the effects of which were never fully underftood, till a philofopher of our own country, who was now no more, the celebrated author* of the Wealth of Nations, with a depth and clearnefs of inveftigation, fitted to enlighten and direct the internal policy of any ftate, difcovered and pointed them out. This accumulation operated with all the effect of compound intereft: every addition to it was the immediate caufe of another, and its force encreafed in an accelerated ratio through its progrefs—

Mobilitate viget, virefque acquirit eundo.

If fuch had been the effect of fuch a principle already, what might not be expected from it in future? In the hour of difficulty and diftrefs, it was hardly to be repreffed; it mitigated if it did not prevent every national evil; and in profperity no bounds could be fet to its vigour. While therefore human fkill in any

* Dr. Adam Smith.

branch of mercantile commodity was capable of improvement; while a single spot of ground remained uncultivated; or a new mart of commerce remained unexplained, it was impossible to say that this country had reached the pitch of wealth and prosperity to which it was capable by its own energy of advancing. Every country emerging from barbarism, the advancement of every neighbouring state in the arts of life, and the increase of luxury and consumption at home; all would tend to increase the demand for, and give new activity to the produce of our wealth and our industry. Far therefore from having reached a point at which it was likely to stop, our prosperity might long be permanent and progressive. All these advantages, however, were connected with peace abroad, and tranquillity at home, although with the latter much more intimately. Under the family on the throne for a long series of years we had enjoyed the inestimable blessing of domestic quiet, with little interruption; the benefits of the constitution, as settled at the revolution, connecting liberty with law; and at once providing a barrier against the usurpations of power, and the infringements of popular innovation. To this the laborious industry of our peasantry, the skill of our manufacturers, and the enterprise of our merchants, owed their vigour and activity. While we felt and acknowledged the value of a constitution, the blessings of which were fast encreasing upon us, he would not suppose for a moment that we should be deficient in zeal or attention to preserve it; and on this he rested the permanent prosperity of the nation. As far as human speculation could be relied on, we had sure ground of confidence: The experience of the past afforded the best warrant for our future hopes. The day of anxiety and solicitude was now past; and he might say, that instead of hopes conceived in his wishes—*Jam fiduciam et robur assumpserit.* On this he congratulated the House; he congratulated the country; and made it his most earnest prayer, that they might suffer no intermission of their vigilant attention to the revenue; to maintaining with the loyalty and virtue of a free people, that domestic peace and order, to which the speech from the Throne so truly ascribed the protection and security of all the advantages they possessed.

He concluded with moving, "That it is the opinion of "this Committee that the laſt additional duty on malt do "ceaſe from and after the 5th day of April, 1792."

Mr. SHERIDAN ſaid, the ſplendor of the right honourable gentleman's ſpeech had made ſuch an impreſſion on the Committee, they had been ſo led away by the figures of rhetoric from attending to the figures of arithmetic, that he ſhould find it difficult to recal them to the true object of the diſcuſſion. He fancied, however, that this dazzling beauty would not be found ſo captivating to the people, after the rapturous accounts of proſperity which they had heard; it would be a diſappointment to them that all the accounts of ſurplus ſunk ſo infinitely ſmall. Who that had read or heard the reports of a ſurplus of 1,200,000l., of near 900,000l. being actually in hand, would have believed that in truth the ſurplus would turn out to be no more than 58,000l.?—He was generally incredulous on theſe anticipating reports; but he confeſſed, when he heard of the King's coming down, announcing a ſurplus, and the Miniſter immediately after holding out taxes to be repealed, he thought there muſt be ſome great ſtupendous increaſe of revenue; and his confidence would have been greater, if he had not unfortunately heard all the Miniſter's former pledges, and particularly that ſolemn, religious pledge, that no interruption ſhould be made to the application of our ſurpluſes until they amounted to four millions a year. He then examined the ſtatements of Mr. Pitt, and drew from his review this concluſion, that the increaſe of our proſperity had not brought with it a proportionate increaſe of our revenue. The increaſe of the latter was to be aſcribed to the new burdens laid on the people, or to the regulations of the old taxes, which, in fact, were ſo many additions to them. Taking the reports of the two Committees as his guides, he took the amount of the new and regulated taxes from the general total, and ſhewed that the actual increaſe of the permanent revenue ſince the year 1786, was 130,000l. If he were aſked fairly, whether the amount of our taxes was, from experience, ſuch as to warrant the Legiſlature to diſpenſe with a part of them, he would frankly anſwer No.—But if he were deſired to reviſe the

whole ſyſtem of our taxation, to ſee if the people might not be materially eaſed from the moſt grievous of their burdens, and the revenue be even improved thereby, he would give his chearful conſent, and think that the Houſe might render moſt eſſential ſervice to their conſtituents. The plan purſued by the right honourable gentleman, which was calculated to embarraſs the Houſe, put him and every gentleman into an inſurmountable difficulty. It was held out to the nation, that the Crown, from a motive of endearment, had propoſed the eaſe of the people, and that the Miniſter had even named the taxes which were to be aboliſhed. If they ſhould, from a ſenſe of their duty, declare that this could not be done without a deviation from ſyſtem, without hazard to the national credit, without diſorder to the finances, the Houſe of Commons was about to be made odious to its conſtituents, and the Crown was made the object of popular confidence. Such was preciſely the caſe in which they ſtood, and yet ſo far was this from being a proof of endearment, that it was a ſtratagem calculated to miſlead and betray them. It was a complete ſurrender of the principle of redemption. We were now, in 1792, to redeem leſs ſtock than we did in 1786; for it was a clear propoſition, that by the increaſed price of the funds, and by thus diverting ſo large a part of the ſurplus from its devoted and ſacred end, we were to buy up leſs annuity now than heretofore. What was the reaſon of all this? If the right honourable gentleman were called upon to ſay why, with this proſperous revenue, we were to redeem leſs debt, he would anſwer, becauſe we could not afford it. Why the right honourable gentleman did not think it right to extinguiſh the unfunded debt, a great part of which bore intereſt, and hung about our necks with great inconvenience, as the right honourable gentleman felt in his Spaniſh armament, he could not take upon him to ſay; he ſuppoſed it was that only would be a proper, but not a ſhining meaſure. It would be a great and effectual benefit to the revenue, but it would not ſerve the purpoſes of momentary fame; by taking off the odious taxes which he had laid the year before. He now proved how well he could have

opposed these taxes, if they had come from any other person; and the House would now find, by his own language, how much they had been to blame in yielding to the arguments by which they had been originally recommended.— The House would see now, that though the ungracious task had been imposed on them to lay these taxes, their constituents were not to look to them for their relief. A new sentiment of hope was to be inspired into the people—a new feeling of gratitude was to be planted in their bosoms—they were to be taught to petition for relief from taxes. It was a very delicate subject for every gentleman to speak upon; it was laying an embargo on the House. No man could put himself into the ungracious state of opposing the repeal of afflicting taxes. Who could deny to the poor family the boon of getting their candles a halfpenny cheaper? If a severe sense of duty should urge gentlemen to look the true situation of the country in the face, and to oppose this artful and insidious way of attacking the privileges of the Commons House of Parliament, he knew well how easily a cry might be raised against him, and with what facility he might be made the victim of a little well-managed misrepresentation. He remembered a verse or two of a saying made upon his honourable friend, by one of his constituents, which never failed to produce a torrent of applause; not from the elegance of the poetry, so much as from the sturdy *ad captandum* praise which it gave him. His friend, who, with all his merits, had certainly no pretension to the praise, would pardon him for repeating it—

"Whenever a tax in the House it was projected,
"Great Fox he rose up, and always objected."

Now this, which was certainly untrue, might be turned very neatly to the detriment of those who might think it their duty to inquire before they acted—to ascertain whether we really had a surplus before we gave up our income; and that at any rate the grace should come constitutionally from that branch of the Legislature which had the power of the purse, and which had been called upon so unmercifully by

the fame right honourable gentleman to draw the ftrings.—Why had he not waited, and given the Houfe the grace of originating the meafure? The truth was, it had been craftily confidered as the beft anfwer to all the imputations againft him for the Ruffian and Spanifh wars; fo at leaft other men, who had lefs candour and refpect for him than he poffeffed, would infinuate, and fay. They would draw ftrange conclufions from the circumftance, and the nation might be brought to think that blunders were more advantageous to them than wifdom: that when he was convicted of error, he threw forth to them relief: a feffion without a blunder, would be a feffion of calamity; but an armament would be defirable. I have involved you in a quarrel with Spain—here, there's a tax upon malt for you—I have made the Englifh name ridiculous all over the world by bullying Ruffia—here take back the female fervants, I have no ufe for them.—I have involved you in a war with Tippoo Saib—take your candles a halfpenny cheaper in the pound. Thus they are to be taught to love misfortune—to be enamoured of mifconduct—and if an adminiftration fhould fucceed him where wifdom and prudence produced their ufual effects of fecurity and quiet, the right honourable gentleman would be at the head of the moft violent and clamorous oppofition that ever this country faw. They would call out for a change.—"Give us back that "buftling and dangerous Adminiftration, that went on arm-"ing and difarming, taxing and untaxing; who committed "fo many blunders that they were for ever making atone-"ment; who broke our heads that they might give us a "plafter. We abhor this uniform fyftem of order and "quiet." The fentiment that this conduct was calculated to excite was tumultuous and alarming; it was appealing from the judicious to the giddy; and ferioufly fpeaking, every judicious man would know and feel, that if there had been no Ruffian armament, there would have been no repeal. He then fhewed, that, by the original ftatute, the malt tax now to be abolifhed would have endured only of itfelf a few months longer. But by this management, a confiderable part of the Exchequer bills iffued for the Spanifh armament might in 1795 come on the confolidated fund, and be a

grievous burden to us. He alluded to Mr. Dundas's aſſertion that it was infinitely more probable that we ſhould receive aid from India ſooner than we ſhould be called on for aſſiſtance to India—an aſſertion upon which Mr. Pitt, though he knew the full amount of his friend's confidence, could not ſuppreſs a degree of ſtifled aſtoniſhment. He ſeemed, on the occaſion, to feel the ſentiment expreſſed by Earl Cornwallis, "That "he hoped he ſhould never be reduced to a wretched and "precarious dependance on the buzar of his Mahratta ally." He recalled the words of Mr. Dundas, that ſuch was the awe and power of our arms in India, as to make us diſregard its united force in array againſt us. Was he to believe this on the aſſertion of Earl Cornwallis—that the finances of the Company were actually ruined by the protraction of the war? He concluded with ſaying, that in order to give to the nation the true benefit of wiſe reduction, if reduction was practicable, and to ſave them from the partialities likely to ariſe from the vanities of authorſhip, he ſhould at a future day propoſe, that a Committee be appointed to reviſe the amount, nature, and effects of the taxes, on the laborious and indigent claſſes of the community: and to report to the Houſe what abolitions might be made therein. This he ſhould at leaſt propoſe, and place upon the Journals.

Mr. Chancellor PITT ſaid, he regretted being obliged to trouble the Committee again, but it was abſolutely neceſſary to make a few obſervations on what had fallen from the honourable gentleman. He did think, from the opening of the honourable gentleman's ſpeech, that he meant to confine himſelf to arithmetical figures entirely, but found that he had altered his mind, and gone into a ſyſtem of diverſion, and what might be called well-managed miſrepreſentation. In place of arguing to the points which formed the principal part of his ſtatement, the honourable gentleman had made a variety of remarks on the Ruſſian armament and negociation. The honourable gentleman had ſaid he was not in the Houſe on the firſt day of the Seſſion, and he would ſay that if he had been in the Houſe he would have found that the buſineſs of that armament had not been ſo completely conceded as the honourable gentleman ſeemed

to think. There certainly would be a day of going into a discussion on that subject, and if the honourable gentleman would be in the House on Monday or Tuesday next, on either of which days he understood a motion on that business was to be made, he might have an opportunity of knowing that there was still a good deal to be said upon it. The honourable gentleman had gone from Russia to the East Indies, and introduced the war in that quarter of the globe. He should have thought a day might likewise be expected for discussing that subject separately; yet as it had been mentioned now, and that in a manner which ought to be answered, he had no objection to explain his own ideas fully. The honourable gentleman seemed to think that he had not agreed in opinion with his right honoutable friend, when he said that the resources of India would add to the revenues of this country, and the honourable gentleman had said that he observed a certain degree of astonishment in his face, when his honourable friend made that assertion. Now he believed the honourable gentleman would himself appear much more astonished, when he told him, that he did not merely agree with his right honourable friend on that point, if possible, stronger as to the probability of that prospect. The honourable gentleman had rather stated his honourable friend's words differently from what they were, but he believed they were, that from every appearance at present, the period when the resources of the East-India Company would aid the revenue of this country, was nearer than that which would occasion any demand from this country to aid them. This was so completely his opinion, and they were within his hearing near him who knew it, that he meant to have stated it when he was up before as one of those future resources upon which he thought he could rely, and in the multiplicity of the articles he had to trouble the Committee with, it had escaped him, although it was his intention to have included that expectation when he stated his hopes of the growing resources of the country. On this subject he wished to be perfectly understood, and to speak in the most explicit manner; what he meant to say was this, that if there was a speedy termination of the war, when the charter came to

be renewed, it was his opinion, that an opportunity would then occur for treating on liberal conditions with the holders of India ſtock by funding their debts, and after all, that a very conſiderable ſurplus would remain, which might be appropriated towards paying off the national debt. The honourable gentleman had taken great pains to ſtate, that the increaſe of the laſt year only exceeded the former year by 58,000l.; but he had forgot to mention, that the 53d week having happened in 1790, made the ſurplus actually 300,000l. The next thing the honourable gentleman had aſked, was, why he did not begin with paying off the unfunded debt? and the honourable gentleman had gone ſo far as to ſay he was pledged to do ſo before he attempted any other method of relieving the country from the burdens laid upon it. He had ſeveral reaſons for preferring the paying off of the funded debt in preference to the unfunded, which he ſtated; but the principal one was, by theſe means he would ſooner be able to reduce the four per cents. which were now redeemable, to three and a half per cent. and afterwards to pay off ſo much of the national debt as to enable him to redeem the five per cents, which could not be done until 125 millions of the national debt were actually paid off. As to what the honourable gentleman had ſaid that we were proceeding in a retrograde manner, he ſcarcely knew how to anſwer ſuch an obſervation; and as to his remark with regard to the unfunded debt, on the event of the Spaniſh armament, he could not ſee where it applied; the grants of the year, and the taxes voted for that purpoſe, had anſwered to the amount of 1,300,000l. and the Bank of England had given at the uſual intereſt 1,800,000l. which made up the whole of that expence. It had been ſtated, the new taxes were not productive; they certainly were not the firſt quarter; nor could it be expected; but the reſult had ſhewn, that within the year they exceeded what was ſtated as their probable amount. The honourable gentleman had next indulged himſelf in a ſtrange ſort of compariſon between his feelings when he laid on theſe taxes, and his feelings when he had it in his power to propoſe taking off. Now he would appeal to the Houſe whether he might not be allowed to indulge, or perhaps, even

in the warmth of his hopes to relieve the people from any part of the exiſting taxes, to expreſs his feelings as ſtrongly as he could, without being remembered, that when he laid on thoſe taxes, the ſame regard and attention to the moſt indigent and the moſt induſtrious part of the community, did not form part of his ſpeech; his reaſon why it did not, he truſted, was obvious to the Houſe, for it was neceſſary his feelings on that point, whatever they might have been, ſhould give way to his duty and the neceſſity of the time. The honourable gentleman had wiſhed the Committee to think that he was, by way of catching popularity, making a ſet-off of repealing taxes againſt the blunders of his Adminiſtration. This, to be ſure, was giving him great credit for his ingenuity, but when the honourable gentleman ſtated, that the ſurplus of the revenue, and the general proſperity of the country, was of his creation, merely for the purpoſe of atoning for the blunders he had committed, then he muſt ſay, that allowing much to the honourable gentleman's candour, this certainly was an exceſs of compliment and flattery, which he by no means merited. He recollected nothing elſe in the honourable gentleman's ſpeech, which it was neceſſary for him to detain the Committee upon.

Mr. SHERIDAN ſaid, the right honourable gentleman had completely miſrepreſented what he ſaid, and meant; if he thought he gave him any credit for the ſurplus of the revenue, or the general proſperity of the country, the contrary was the fact; for he never had aſcribed to his ingenuity, either the one or the other, though he certainly had aſcribed to his art and management the uſe that was made of both. With regard to India, he found that the honourable gentleman wiſhed to ſay, that he coincided in opinion with his right honourable colleague; but he did not know, whether the right honourable gentleman would thank him much for what he had ſaid. The right honourable Secretary had affirmed, that the fact would be as he had ſtated it; and the right honourable gentleman had ſaid, hypothetically, that if the war is terminated, he has not a doubt but it will be ſo when he comes to make conditions with the company for a

renewal of their charter. He ſtill thought, that there was ſo much dread on the part of Miniſters about the opinion of the country, on the war with Ruſſia, which, but for the timely and conſtitutional interference of that Houſe, they would have plunged us into, that they wiſhed to avoid the effects of it by ſoothing the people with an idea of lightening their burdens, and taking off taxes, moſt of which they had themſelves put on. As to the arguments for preferring the mode of taking off taxes in place of paying a part of the unfunded debt, he was perfectly againſt it, becauſe he thought that was where they ought to have begun. And he would only ſay, that the Miniſter, by taking one mode, might have done a ſilent, quiet, and eſſential benefit to the people; whereas the one he has taken is an oſtentatious, deluſive, and dangerous catch at popularity for the moment, without any regard either to principle, or the real laſting good of the country.

Mr. DRAKE, jun. ſaid, he was more than anxious to expreſs his exultation and happineſs at what he had heard; indeed ever ſince the King's moſt gracious ſpeech from the Throne, he had in common with his conſtituents, enjoyed the moſt pleaſing joy and hopes of future comfort. This made him ready to join in the chorus of applauſe to a moſt excellent Miniſter, who was to alleviate the burdens of the people; and he muſt take the ſame opportunity to praiſe our glorious, and he hoped, permanent Conſtitution. This, he ſaid, was a jubilee night in Finance. Great as it was, however, he recommended public œconomy as the beſt means of improvement; and he truſted and wiſhed, that the Gazette extraordinary of this night might be publiſhed over all this country—over all civilized countries—and he had almoſt ſaid over all ſavage countries. He concluded with a quotation, which he deemed applicable to the preſent ſituation of Britons.

O Fortunatos nimium ſua ſi bona norint!

Mr. FOX, after a ſhort alluſion to the triumph of this jubilee of finance, and ſtating that the buſineſs of this day was of the utmoſt importance, took occaſion to pay a com-

pliment to the eloquence of Mr. Pitt, and to the philosophical principles of Government on which he argued. He had enumerated the causes of national prosperity, with truth and splendor. He subscribed to his statement cordially, and if he did not himself go over the same ground, it was because he had nothing to add to what had been already said, nor could he hope to express it better. But he begged to be understood, that these reasons were all applicable to the prosperity of the country, not merely to the prosperity of the revenue. The honourable gentleman had fairly said, that above all, they were to be ascribed to the happy form of our Constitution. If this was true, and that it was so, every gentleman would concur—it was their duty to maintain the Constitution by that vigilance and jealousy which were the chief duties of that House; and to take care that no infringements should be made under any colour or pretext, to trench on any of its vital parts; and so far from thinking with the honourable gentleman who had spoken last, that we could not value our present situation too highly, he thought we were in danger from being lulled into an excess of security. He was drawn to this observation, naturally from the business of this day; for he was still of the opinion that he had delivered on the first day of the session, that there was in the manner of introducing this proposition such a violation of a most valuable principle, and such an insult on the House of Commons, as demanded their most serious reflection. It had been too often his duty to remark the variety of abuses which had been suffered in the administration of the honourable gentleman, and which, indeed, marked his ministry, more perhaps than any other that had ever occurred in this country. There seemed to be a regular and systematic intention in His Majesty's Ministers to annihilate the functions of that House, and to arrogate to Government every measure that properly belonged to them. The nation was made to look lightly on the popular branch of the Legislature, and in every instance to turn their eyes to Government, as to the fountain of every good. In this view he had stated the recommendation in His Majesty's

ſpeech from the Throne, in regard to the repeal of taxes, as an attempt to take from that Houſe, in truth, the power of deliberation, the freedom of debate. Inſtead of coming unfettered to the conſideration of the preſent ſtate of the receipt and expenditure, ſo far as to enable them to form a free judgement whether, conſiſtently with their honeſt duty to the empire, they might relieve their conſtituents from ſome part of their burdens, they were put into the unſeemly ſtate of either complying implicitly with His Majeſty's recommendation, or of being conſidered by their conſtituents as the oppoſers of the boon which he had held out to them. "I complain for the Conſtitution, violated by this proceeding —I complain for the popular branch of the Legiſlature inſulted — I complain for the People, really and effectually cheated by this inſidious intervention, calculated to divert them from their true guardian and ſervant, the Houſe of Commons, and to delude them, by fixing their hopes on the Government. I am not afraid of unpopularity in the honeſt diſcharge of my duty—I am not afraid of encountering all the hazards of artful miſrepreſentation ; but I complain that I am put into a ſituation where I cannot exerciſe my judgement, and where I cannot pronounce my opinion that this is not the moment when Parliament can ſafely, prudently, or honeſtly ſurrender any part of the exiſting revenue, and where I cannot oppoſe the meaſure without the fear of bringing on the country a greater and more alarming evil, than by complying againſt my judgement.

Not only was his Majeſty unconſtitutionally adviſed to come down and recommend this meaſure, contrary to the firſt principles of Parliament, but to add to the impropriety, the Miniſter coming immediately from the cloſet, points out as a ſecond part of the ſame ſpeech, the very taxes which ought to be repealed; thus taking it out of the hands of Parliament to reviſe the whole, and ſee which of them, if any, could be repealed, were moſt grievous to the public, and conciliating themſelves to their conſtituents by proving that they were attentive to their intereſts. Inſtead of coming forward handſomely and fairly as he ought to have done, and ſtating fairly the receipt on the one ſide, and the expenditure on the other, and calling on the Houſe to take the condition of the Revenue into their

view, and see if they could not spare something to the people; he comes down with a declared surplus, for which, by the by, he has no experience, in one hand, and a number of odious and unpopular taxes, mostly of his own imposing, in the other, and thereby makes it impossible for the House to hesitate in their compliance. And, by the bye, if the People were much obliged to him now for repealing these taxes, they were likewise indebted to him in the first instance for laying them on.—"Can I object to the repeal of the malt tax—I, who opposed it so pointedly, when imposed by the honourable gentleman last year? Can I object to the repeal of the tax on female servants, a tax which I always thought odious and abominable? I cannot—the House cannot, and, with their eyes open to the impropriety of the measure of giving up Revenue without an experience that we can afford it, we are brought into a situation, when we cannot deliberate on the measure."

The question, to have been stated fairly, should have been as follows: There is a surplus of 400,000l. Will you apply it all towards the extinction of the national debt, or towards the immediate relief of the burdens of the people, or partly to the one, and partly to the other? Stated in this manner, the House would have come fairly to the exercise of their deliberative powers; and he had no hesitation in saying, that if the question had been so stated to him, he would have answered, in the present situation of things, acting on a consistent principle, and desirous of having the benefit of experience, that the whole ought to be applied towards the diminution of the national debt. In saying this, he would at least have the credit of a sincere opinion; for evidently he courted no party on the occasion. He could not court the King, for the King had in his Speech recommended the measure. It was not a declaration by which he could expect to court the people, for evidently the repeal of a temporary burden, however it might operate in throwing disorder into the finances of the kingdom, disturbing the credit, and finally of imposing more grievous burdens, would yet be popular, and an objection to it the contrary. But if he had to answer that question simply, he would do it, and maintain it on arguments provided for him by the honourable gentleman. He would use his own words. He would take his own system. He would prove that his own principles

were clearly against the measure which he now proposed. He would shew, even from what the honourable gentleman had said this night, that when self was out of the question, he was still of opinion that the measure now proposed was erroneous and detrimental. For, said the right honourable gentleman, in the year 1808, when by the operation of the plan for diminishing the debt, there would be a sum of four millions applicable to this object, he would take care that no Minister of that day should have it in his power to do, what he was doing in this, with only four hundred thousand, instead of four millions. Here, when he was impartial, and when he was not acting for himself and his faction, he was such an enemy to the national debt, that no room should be left for popularity to any Minister, by doing so fatal a thing to the nation, as that which he was now doing himself. Such is the difference between self and principle, such is the difference between the clear, manly discharge of duty, and the subterfuges of a dextrous pursuit of popularity. He had often heard it said, that it was the character of men who were indulgent to themselves, to be severe to others. Never did he see this trait of the human mind more glaringly displayed than in this measure. For after having laid down a principle to be most obstinately persevered in, that the surplus of the Revenue should be with a sacred and inviolable hand applied to the discharge of the debt, with all its compound interest, until it should amount to an applicable surplus of four millions. Such was his Language in 1786; such was the principle of his system. Now, however, he departed from this engagement for the sake of a little momentary popularity to himself, and held out to the nation a boon of 200,000l. But, says he, I know I do wrong; I know it is a dereliction of my principles, but permit me to do this little mischief, and I will compensate for the laxity of my own system, by tying down my successors. Fifteen years hence, a period to which it was impossible to carry forward the idea of parties and partialities, he would take care that even when there were four millions the system should not be thus violated.

It would have been at least prudent to have waited until we had the experience of a single year, a single month, or a single day, in which the receipt of the county had exceeded the expenditure, to justify us in saying that there was an applicable

surplus at all. Nothing could be more indefensible than the intemperate rashness of the proceeding. He went completely upon speculation. What speculation of expenditure had not turned out to be fallacious? Every statement of the honourable gentleman, with regard to reduction and economy, remained to be fulfilled. The Committee of last year, composed of very honourable men, had given a statement of what was likely to be the peace establishment. It might, perhaps, be found exact; but let it be remembered that the statement of the Committee of 1786, a Committee equally honourable had fallen short by 500,000l. of the actual expenditure, and the subsequent statement might be liable to the same deficiency. It would have been well, at least, to have taken the benefit of one single year's peace establishment. What could be the reason of this intemperate hurry? He had no hesitation in agreeing with his honourable friend, that it was the Russian armament which pressed upon him, and which had produced this hasty, ill-timed, and, as it had been conducted, unconstitutional sacrifice to popularity. He said unconstitutional, for every thing that crippled the proceedings of Parliament, every thing that placed the Crown between the House of Commons and their Constituents, was unconstitutional and alarming.— If the question had come fairly before them, he should have given it his negative; now, however, he could not do this, since a greater evil might be incurred from the danger of a division between that House and the people, a division, which the unparliamentary and improper recommendation from the Throne might occasion. That pressed on the subject of the Russian war, sensible that his head-strong interference in a dispute had involved him in a dilemma, from which the result could afford him no argument of defence, he had thrown out this boon to the public, to divert them from the contemplation of his conduct. He did not mean to acccuse him of being so poor a logician, as to set this up as the *ratio justifica*, but he was well aware, that, tempting and agreeable, it would serve as the *ratio suasoria*.

Having thus objected to the principle, he said he equally objected to the manner in which this was done. What rule was to be established in future? In case of future surplusses, were they always to act by this precedent, or what rule was

there to be eſtabliſhed? Oppoſition at preſent could not be ſaid to be engaged in a ſtruggle for power, the other party were too decidedly ſuperior in numbers, and too much in poſſeſſion of the confidence of the country, to admit of ſuch an idea on their part: But though in the preſent ſtate of the parties of this country, perhaps no immediate uſe might be made of this manœuvre, for it could only be regarded as a ſiniſter manœuvre. But if there ſhould be in that Houſe again a ſtruggle for power, if the parties were more nearly on a par than at preſent, what miſerable uſe might not be made of this precedent? One ſide, in caſe of a ſurplus, might be for giving half to the people in taxes, another for giving the whole, and there might be inſtituted between the two an auction for power, in which the higheſt bidder would attempt to purchaſe the favour of the Country at the expence of its intereſts. The whole manifeſted a moſt blameable care for the moment, a ſubterfuge againſt charges to which he knew he was liable, and for which he felt that he had no juſtification. The Ruſſian armament ſtared him in the Face; he knew that the nation were of one mind on the ſubject of his diſaſtrous impolicy, and that the Indian ſyſtem was equally pregnant with danger and diſgrace. On the ſubject of India there was nothing more alarming than the difference which appeared in the two Miniſters on the ſubject. The one affirmed to the Houſe that there would be aſſiſtance derived from that quarter, the other coupled the aſſertion with an *if* the war was ſpeedily terminated.

In regard to the reduction of the 4 per cents, he was clearly of opinion that it was a moſt politic and proper meaſure. From the calculation that he had made on the ſubject, the nation might draw annual benefit of between 260 and 270,000l. from this branch, and he wiſhed the right honourable gentleman had ſtated what was his plan for the meaſure. A well-conceived plan for the meaſure ſhould have his ſupport.—The riſe of the funds, in his mind, was a great national benefit; for though it threw obſtacles in the way of paying off the debt, it invigorated every branch of our proſperity. In proportion as the funds were high, money for every object of commercial enterprize, of manufacture, of agricultural improvement, of trade and induſtry of all kinds, became more eaſily attainable. It

added, therefore, to the capital of the nation, it enlarged the sphere of activity, and produced the wealth which more than counterbalanced the difference which we had to pay in buying up the debts. If we considered the amount of our debt as a capital, the capital was certainly encreased by the rise of the funds. The capital of our debt was clearly more now than in the year 1786, but the annuity was less, and to the annuity he always looked as to the true debt which was our enemy. What, then, ought to be the conduct of the nation on these premises? If it was true that the rise of the funds imposed on the nation the hardship of paying a greater sum for redeeming the same quantity of annuity; but that at the same time the rise of the funds so largely promoted the general opulence of the nation as to make it more easy for us to redeem such annuity, the conclusion of the proposition clearly is, that the moment of wealth is the moment of redemption. What do we do? Instead of taking the true benefit of the opulence which the high price of the funds has given us, by opposing more vigorously our great enemy the national debt, we slacken, while this enemy goes on; for he rears his head, and if we do not, in the moment of prosperity, encrease our efforts against him he gains ground upon us. To be uniform in the combat, therefore, it is necessary that we should add as much to the sum applied to the diminution of the debt, as the proportion between the prosperous and the adverse moment. Surely, in a day of prosperity, it was easier for the nation to buy up an annuity of 42,000l. than in the day of adversity, yet we were to follow the exact contrary system by this new plan, and therefore he asserted that the Minister was courting popularity by the dereliction of principle.

It was the fashion of the day to praise the Constitution, and to labour to destroy it. They were for ever pouring forth encomiums on it in the lump, and mangling it in detail. Every stratagem was used to make the functions of that House ungracious to the people, to make them out of favour with their representatives, to make it impossible for men to act faithfully in the discharge of their trust to the empire without having odium excited against them. Confidence in the Crown was set up in the stead of confidence in the House of Commons; and the entrenchments on the Constitntion were carried on by appeals

to the passions of the inconsiderate. For himself he had so often occasion to notice this settled plan in the administration of the present day, and with so little effect, that he despaired of producing any effect on the tempers of the House.

But having frequently showed himself unawed by the influence of power, he trusted he should be able on the present occasion to maintain an equal superiority, and testify himself no less unmoved by popular prejudice and clamour; and though it would be presumptuous in any man to apply to his practice, yet he would take upon himself to apply to his sense of his duty the celebrated passage,

Justum et tenacem propositi virum
Non civium ardor prava jubentium
Non vultus instantis tyranni
Mente quatit solida——

Mr. Chancellor PITT reverted to the King's speech, and to what he had said before, and asked if any thing therein mentioned tended to call upon the right honourable gentleman for so vehement a defence of the rights and privileges of that House, when no attack was made upon them. He would only trouble the Committee with a few words. The right honourable gentleman had stated, that his arguments and propositions, if followed up, weakened the system for paying off the national debt, settled by the bill of 1786. This, however, he thought he had said enough to controvert. The right honourable gentleman seemed to think himself not at liberty to go into the question with the freedom he could have wished, but in his opinion, the only question of importance was fairly at issue between them, and that was, that upon taking an average of four years, whether there was a surplus sufficient to enable him to appropriate part of it towards discharging the national debt, and the remainder towards relieving the subjects from some of the most oppressive taxes. In his opinion we were arrived at that period when the surplus was such as might be appropriated in that way; in the right honourable gentleman's opinion, we were not, and the matter remained for the decision of the House. He contended, the present situation of the finances of this country far exceeded any expectations that

were formed of them in former years. He then came to make some reply to what the right honourable gentleman had said of his selfish attention to the moment, and his severity to those Ministers who might succeed him. How this came to be argued he was at a loss to account for, except the right honourable gentleman had a view to what might occur when he came into office. Great fault had been found with him because he proposed to follow a system that he was convinced was beneficial to the country beyond the period to which it had been originally intended to carry it; and this it was said he did to prevent any future Minister of the time from enjoying the popularity of it. His proposal went to the year 1808, and he would ask, where was the difference, with regard to whomsoever might be Minister, between this scheme and that of the Committee in 1786, but about one year and a half; but in the period of fifteen years, taking in all the vicissitudes and changes that might happen, he did not know whether he might not be as well disposed to the Minister of that day, and have as good a chance of being his friend, as the right honourable gentleman. It had happened that several gentlemen, who sat on the same side with the right honourable gentleman, had before now been out of their reckoning as to the changes of administration, and it might so happen again.

Mr. FOX said, except he was wilfully misrepresented, he could not account for the manner in which the right honourable gentleman had argued. He, when he spoke before, never meant to enter into any speculation with regard to who would or would not be Minister fifteen years hence. No such idea had ever entered his mind, and he begged the right honourable gentleman, and the House, to recollect, that when he had put that part of his argument, he stated it as asking a question of the right honourable gentleman, upon which he knew he must be impartial, and which had no reference or regard to the person who might be Minister. He, perhaps, in the right honourable gentleman's opinion, was not a man of great wisdom, but he trusted he was not so foolish as to indulge any such speculation as the right honourable gentleman hinted at. As matters at present were, he could have no hopes of success, so unequal were the numbers; nor could he think that

because he was some years older than the right honourable gentleman, that was any reason for his speculationupon being his successor fifteen years hence. The right honourable gentleman boasted, in high language, of the unexpected increase of the revenue. He allowed all the causes stated by the right honourable gentleman; but he certainly would not allow that the increase was either unexpected or unforeseen, whatever pains might be taken to spread abroad such an opinion, for the purpose of momentary popularity, which seemed to be the chief study of the present day. The Minister took every method to persuade the country that he was not only the person who could pay off the national debt, but the sole inventor of a plan for the reduction of that debt; and that it never had been thought of till he came into power to put it into practice; and that it originated entirely with him. It required, however, nothing from him to put that matter out of doubt, because the right honourable gentleman, and many in the House, must know the contrary.

Mr. Chancellor PITT then moved his resolutions severally, which were agreed to, and ordered to be reported.

The House, in a Committee of Supply, and afterwards in a Committee of Ways and Means, came to several resolutions, which were ordered to be reported on Monday.

Mr. Chancellor PITT presented the following Copy of a Treaty of Marriage between the Duke of York and the Princess Royal of Prussia. He then gave notice, that in the course of next week he should move the settlement, as agreed to be made upon the Dutchess, and the provision required for the Duke of York.

TRANSLATION OF A TREATY
BETWEEN
HIS MAJESTY AND THE KING OF PRUSSIA,
On the Marriage of his Royal Highness the Duke of York, with her Royal Highness the Princess Frederica Charlotte Ulrique Catharine of Prussia.

Signed at Berlin, 26th Jan. 1792.

In the Name of Almighty God,

Be it known to all persons now living and to come, that the

Most High and Most Puissant Prince and Lord, George the Third, by the Grace of God, King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, Duke of Brunswick and Lunenburgh, Arch-Treasurer, and Prince Elector of the Holy Roman Empire, &c. and the Most High and Most Puissant Prince and Lord, Frederick William, by the Grace of God King of Prussia, Margrave of Brandenburgh, Arch-Chamberlain, and Prince Elector of the Holy Roman Empire, Sovereign Duke of Silesia, Sovereign Prince of Orange, Neufchatel, and Valengin, as also of the county of Glatz, Duke of Gueldres, Magdeburgh, Cleves, Julieres, Bergues, Stettin, Pomerania, of the Cassubians and Vandals, of Mecklenburgh, as also of Crosnia, Burgrave of Nurenburgh, Prince of Halberstradt, Minden, Camin, Vandalia, Schwerin, Ratzeburgh, East Friezeland, and Meurs, Count of Hohenzollern, Ruppin, Marck, Ravensburgh, Hohenstein, Ticklenburgh, Schwerin, Lingen Bure, and Leerdam, Lord of Ravenstein, Rostock, Stargard, Lanenbergh, Butau, Arla, and Breda, &c. being closely united by the dearest ties of blood and friendship, consented, with the most lively satisfaction, to the marriage of their most dear children their Royal Highnesses the Duke of York and Albany, Prince Bishop of Osnaburgh, and the Princess Frederica Charlotte Ulrique Catharine of Prussia, and that this marriage has been duly and legally solemnised at Berlin, and at London, according to the laws of the two countries, and the rites of the reformed churches, there respectively established Their Majesties being desirous to reduce into the requisite forms, the engagements contained in a provisional act concluded at Berlin, on the 15th of September, 1791, by their respective Ministers, to serve as the essential basis of the future contract of marriage of their Royal Highnesses; and desiring also to provide for the entire and complete execution of the said engagements, have named and authorised for that salutary purpose their respective Commissaries, viz. His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Sir Morton Eden, Knight of the Order of the Bath, and his Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Prussian Majesty, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, his Ministers of State, of War, and of the Cabinet, Charles William Count de Finckenstein, Frederick William Count de Schulenburg,

Knights of the Order of the Black Eagle, and Philip Charles Baron D'Alvenſleben, Knight of the Order of St. John, who by virtue of their reſpective full powers reciprocally communicated and exchanged, after having diſcuſſed all the neceſſary points, have agreed on the following Articles.

Article I. His Majeſty the King of Pruſſia, gives to the Princeſs his daughter, a portion of one hundred thouſand crowns in *Frederics d'or*, viz. Forty thouſand crowns, as being the uſual portion of the Princeſſes of the Houſe of Pruſſia, and ſixty thouſand crowns, as parapharnalia. In caſe the Princeſs ſhould happen to die before her huſband, without leaving iſſue, both the ſums as well for the portion, as for the parapharnalia, ſhall revert to the King and his ſucceſſors, in as far as her Royal Highneſs ſhall not have diſpoſed of the latter; but the produce thereof ſhall belong to his Royal Highneſs her huſband ſurviving. His Majeſty has beſides provided her Royal Highneſs with a *trouſſeau* ſuitable to her birth and rank.

Article II. Her Royal Highneſs the Princeſs renounces, and by the act ſigned the 29th of September, 1791, has renounced, conformably to the uſage and family compact of the Houſe of Pruſſia and Brandenburgh, in favour of the male ſucceſſion, all right of inheritance ariſing from the ſaid Houſe, in the ſame manner, in the ſame terms, with the ſame reſervations, and the ſame validity of engagement as the Princeſſes of Pruſſia and Brandenburgh have on their marriage done to this time. And His Majeſty the King of Great Britain, in his own name, and in that of his ſon the Duke of York, confirms this renunciation, in the moſt expreſs and ſolemn manner.

Article III. His Royal Highneſs the Duke of York having promiſed to give to the Princeſs his wife, as the gift on the day after the marriage, called by the name of *Morgengabe*, the ſum of ſix thouſand pounds ſterling, the intereſt of which was to be paid from the 29th of September 1791, and to make part of the ſum fixed for pin money, and for the annual expences of her Royal Highneſs, without her Royal Highneſs having however, any power of diſpoſing of the capital, during the life of her huſband—His Majeſty the King of Great Britain confirms this engagement.

Article IV. His Royal Highneſs the Duke of York having promiſed to pay annually, and during the whole time of her marriage, to her Royal Highneſs, for her pin money, and daily expences, known by the name of *Kleider, Hand and Sprelgelder*, the ſum of four thouſand pounds ſterling, of which her Royal Highneſs ſhall have the free diſpoſal, for her own uſe, without defraying out of that ſum, the charge of the maintenance of the perſons attached to her ſuite, and intended for her ſervice. His Majeſty the King of Great Britain has been pleaſed to take upon himſelf the full and entire execution of the ſaid engagement; and His Majeſty in conſequence, promiſes and engages to ſecure to her Royal Highneſs the Dutcheſs of York, the annual payment of four thouſand pounds ſterling, including the intereſt of the ſum of ſix thouſand pounds ſterling, mentioned in the third article.

Article V. His Majeſty the King of Great Britain grants as a counter portion to the portion given by His Majeſty the King of Pruſſia, the like ſum of one hundred thouſand crowns in gold.—His Britanick Majeſty alſo engages to ſecure to the Princeſs, in caſe of the unhappy event of mournful ſeparation, by the death of his Royal Highneſs the Duke of York, the annual ſum of eight thouſand pounds ſterling for her jointure, together with a reſidence, and a ſuitable eſtabliſhment.

Article VI. This treaty ſhall be ratified by His Majeſty the King of Great Britain, and by His Majeſty the King of Pruſſia, and the letters of ratification ſhall be exchanged in the ſpace of ſix weeks, or ſooner, if poſſible, to be computed from the day of the ſignature. In witneſs whereof, we the Plenipotentiaries of His Majeſty the King of Great Britain, and of His Majeſty the King of Pruſſia, by virtue of our reſpective full powers, have ſigned the preſent treaty, and put thereto the ſeals of our arms.

Done at Berlin the 26th of January, 1792.

(L. S.) M. EDEN. (L. S.) CH. WILL. COUNT DE FINCKENSTEIN.

(L. S.) F. W. COUNT DE SCHULENBERG.

(L. S.) F. C. D'ALVENSLEBEN.

Monday, 20th February.

Mr. HOBART brought up the report of the Committee of Supply. The resolutions of which were read.

On the reading the vote for four hundred thousands pounds for the present year, for the liquidation of the national debt,

Mr. FOX said, he understood that upon this subject, there was to be an anticipation of a quarter, and to calculate from the fifth of April to the fifth of April, instead of taking it from the fifth of January, to the fifth of January. On this point he had nothing to urge himself; but he had reason to believe, there were gentlemen in that House who considered this as a great objection, and who wished to state their opinion upon it.

Mr. Chancellor PITT said, that if any gentleman thought there would be any particular inconvenience in discussing this resolution at the present moment, he should be happy that some other day should be appointed for the discussion of this resolution separately; as also the ways and means for raising this supply. Wednesday was appointed for that purpose.

Mr. GREY said, that he regretted the necessity from which he now felt himself compelled to come forward with a motion for papers. From His Majesty's speech he had hoped that the House would be furnished with all the necessary information respecting the object and effect of the measures of Administration. He had trusted that the period had at last arrived for a discussion suitable to the importance of the subject and the dignity of that House, in which they should be able to shew themselves faithful stewards of the Public, whose money they had voted away, and influenced by no motives but regard to their own duty and the interests of their constituents. He had hoped, and he still hoped, that the House would never be so blindly attached to a system of confidence in Administration, or so remiss in the discharge of its first and most sacred avocation, as to neglect all inquiry. In this hope he trusted he was not deceived, and was still sanguine in spite of that opposition, which had already been but too successfully exerted against all attempts to bring forward the means of discussion. On the present occasion he was more especially sanguine, as the only pretext that had formerly been urged for withholding papers

was now completely removed. This was now the third time in which he had come forward for a similar purpose to move for the production of papers, and no ill success should discourage him from persisting in what he regarded as his duty. 1st, When he had moved for papers on the subject of the Spanish armament, it was then urged as an objection, the necessity which there existed of secrecy, and the danger with which the production of papers would be attended, pending a negociation. 2dly, When he had taken an opportunity to renew that motion, when called upon for a vote of approbation, it was found, that though the negociation was over, the reign of confidence had not ceased. The same confidence which had before been alledged as a pretext for withholding information, was then found to have equal weight in suppressing inquiry, and it was stated that no papers ought to be produced except there appeared some ground for blame on the face of the transaction, and that no such ground was afforded, as the object for which the armament had been entered into was completely obtained. The case was now different, *habeo reum confitentem*, the Minister's own declaration afforded ground for examination and censure. Yet even now the person suspected was allowed to exercise his discretion with respect to what papers were to be produced. To his fidelity and zeal was committed the care of affording all such information as he should deem necessary and proper, and there was no doubt that in the discharge of this duty he would be careful to bring forward such materials as might not tend to criminate himself. Thus, with confidence, pending negociations, and confidence after their conclusion, the Minister appeared to have got a general indemnity. Pending a negociation, such papers are only to be produced as the Minister thinks proper; and now that the negociation is at an end, he takes a new ground, and says, "Trust to my candour for the production of such papers as may be necessary!" Such conduct was a gross insult to the House, and in which they, he trusted, would never tamely acquiesce. From the papers already on the table, there appeared to him ground for crimination, since by these papers it would be found that the business had at first been undertaken without any justifiable cause, and afterwards meanly and basely abandoned. The

Minifter himfelf had confeffed that, in his object of fecuring the poffeffion of Oczakow to the Turks, which had been held out as the great object of the armament, he had completely failed. It yet remained to be proved, how far this object was of a nature which affected us, or our allies; and, if it did affect either, what fteps had been taken on the occafion, if it affected us, whether we had called for their fupport, or if it affected them, what application had been made on their part for affiftance. He fhould now ftate what farther papers he wanted for this purpofe, and which he meant to make the fubject of his prefent motions. It had at firft been ftated that the influence of the Turkifh empire in Europe was confiderable, and that its diminution would be injurious to the interefts of our ally the King of Pruffia. In this cafe it affected us only collaterally, and fo far as the interefts of our ally were concerned. And as it could not be fuppofed that Minifters fhould be fo officious as to interfere without being defired, it was material to know what reprefentations and requifitions had been made by the King of Pruffia on the occafion, in order that it might be afcertained upon what principles the nation had been embarked in this undertaking. The treaty of this country with Pruffia was purely defenfive; what then was the nature of the engagements, or thofe grounds upon which we had been led to take part in an object entirely unconnected with our interefts? There had been rumours, that we ftood pledged by an engagement with the Court of Pruffia in a manner very different from that which was openly fpecified in the treaty between us and that Court, laid upon the table a confiderable time fince. If thefe rumours were without foundation, it was a duty the Minifter owed to himfelf, and to the public to refute them. If they were true, they were indeed alarming, and the people of this country ought to know the fact. One of his objects, therefore, was to know the extent of our engagement with the Court of Pruffia. He afked no private papers, no inftructions that had been given to the Minifter at Berlin. But ftill it might be ftated there would be danger in the production of papers. What danger? The only danger which he could perceive would be in refufing them. If the views of miniftry were really fuch as were ftated, they would only be confirmed by their production. Otherwife his reafoning was conclufive.

For if other views were entertained, if there had been formed schemes of conquest, or the object had in reality been to put Dantzick and Thorn into the hands of the King of Prussia, it was of consequence to guard against the machinations of a weak and corrupt Ministry, and assert the good faith of the country which their conduct had endangered. Was the treaty with Prussia, that had been laid upon the table, the only treaty, and was it the whole of the treaty? Was there no secret article of a different tendency than was correspondent with a defensive treaty? He believed that it was generally agreed by writers on the constitution of this country, that the advantages of state secrecy and dispatch were amply compensated for by the observance of good faith in regard to our treaties. Last year had proved the consequences of the system of state secrecy, and how little this country had to expect from its boasted advantages. This production of papers, for which he meant to move, might possibly operate to the advantage of His Majesty's Ministers, and it was also possible, that it might have a different tendency. He did, however, think it highly proper that the House should be made acquainted with what had passed between our Court and that of Berlin.

The next papers he wanted, were those which contained an account of any representations or requisitions which had been made by the Porte, or any engagements which we had come under to that quarter. It would be very strange, indeed, if it should be found that we had interfered in a dispute where our aid had not been desired, and proffered an assistance for which we had received no thanks. He should only name the other papers for which he intended to move, viz. an account of our recommendation of terms of peace to the Porte, and the answer; an account of the mediation of the King of Denmark, &c. as he wished to discover what were the feelings of the powers of the Baltic upon the occasion; and lastly, all those papers relative to the negociation that had passed between the Courts of London and Petersburgh. How else could they be competent to decide on the object of that negociation, and the manner in which it had been conducted? If it were asked, what was the intention of the production of these papers? he should answer, that the House might be fully acquainted with

the whole of the negociation, and not rely solely on the garbled extracts and scraps prepared by the right honourable gentleman, who stood before them as an accused person. The question was, whether they should on that occasion act as became the honest representatives of a free people, or like the sycophants of the Crown, and the flatterers of the Minister. He reminded the House of her Imperial Majesty's answer to the arrogant demands of the right honourable gentleman. She had said, that there was a duty which she owed to her subjects, and that she was bound to convince them, that their blood and treasure had neither been wantonly nor unnecessarily expended. He lamented that it should be necessary to quote the opinion of an absolute and despotic monarch, who well knew, that absolute as her power was, as her subjects themselves confessed it to be, and extensive as her dominions were, the existence of the one, and the integrity of the other, depended on opinion. She well knew, that in this country, obedience to the Government implied protection to the subject; and it was incumbent on that House to take up her language, and say, "that there was a duty which they owed to their "constituents, and that they were bound to convince them, "that their treasure had not been wantonly or unnecessarily "expended." If they were to accuse the right honourable gentleman, was he himself to direct the evidence that was brought forward to support the accusation? They had heard of the excellence of the British constitution, in the speech from the Throne, and they had heard it described by the right honourable gentleman, in a strain of admirable eloquence, that animated and warmed the heart of every Member present.—What was the subject of his panegyric, ought with them to be matter of practice. Let the right honourable gentleman praise the constitution; let them defend it.

"We too are friends to loyalty. We love
"The King who loves the law, respects its bounds,
"And lives content within them. Him we serve
"Freely and with delight, who leaves us free.
"But recollecting still that he is man,
"We trust him not too far. King tho' he be,
"And King in England too, he may be weak

"And vain enough to be ambitious ſtill,
"May exerciſe amiſs his proper pow'rs,
"Or covet more than freemen chuſe to grant;
"Beyond that mark is treaſon. He is ours,
"T' adminiſter, to guard, to adorn the State,
"But not to warp or change it. We are his,
"To ſerve him nobly in the common cauſe,
"True to the death, but not to be his ſlaves *."

Should the moſt valuable functions and privileges of that Houſe be ſuffered to fall into diſuſe, the loſs would ſoon be felt by the Public. They might be regularly honoured by what Lord Chatham had once termed "the annual opiate of a ſpeech from the Throne;" but though, at preſent, conſidered as a queſtion of feeling, there could appear to be little danger to the conſtitution, there were thoſe who looked beyond the price of the funds for the proſperity of their country.

There were thoſe who, notwithſtanding they were told that the conſtitution would laſt till time ſhould be no more, ſaw, in the extent to which the new-fangled doctrine of confidence was carried, ſymptoms of decay, no leſs alarming than in a fall of ſtocks or a decline of credit, and with regret perceived that they were daily beſtowing praiſes on a conſtitution into which they were daily introducing abuſes. If they ſuffered Miniſters to ſpend the money of their conſtituents in uſeleſs and expenſive armaments, without due inquiry, they need not boaſt of the excellence of the conſtitution, or the privileges and functions of that Houſe, for little was left of the character or importance of either.

He would not trouble the Houſe with a recapitulation of the arguments he had uſed, but would move,

"That an humble addreſs be preſented to His Majeſty, that he will be graciouſly pleaſed to give directions, that there be laid before this Houſe, copies or extracts of all repreſentations or requiſitions made by the Court of Berlin to His Majeſty's Miniſter at the ſaid Court, or by his Pruſſian Majeſty's Miniſter at this Court, to His Majeſty's Secretary of State for the Foreign department, or other Miniſters at home, relative to

* Cowper's Taſk, a Poem.

the war between Russia and the Porte, together with the answers that were given to such representations or requisitions; and also, copies or extracts of all representations made by His Majesty's Secretary of State for the foreign department, or other Ministers at home, to his Prussian Majesty's Minister here, or by His Majesty's Minister at the Court of Berlin, together with the answers to such representations, upon the subject of the said war;

"That an humble address be presented to His Majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there be laid before this House, an account of all offers made to the Ottoman Porte by His Majesty's Minister at Constantinople, for the purpose of proposing conditions of peace to the Empress of Russia, together with the answers to such offers; and of all representations or requisitions made by the Ottoman Porte relative to the war with Russia, and the answers to the same; and also, of such engagements as may have been entered into by His Majesty's Ministers with the Ottoman Porte relative to any assistance to be afforded to the said Power, by His Majesty and his allies, in case of a continuation of the war;

"That an humble address be presented to His Majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there be laid before this House, an account of the steps taken by His Majesty and the King of Prussia, to propose to the Ottoman Porte, the conditions of peace, consented to by Messrs. Whitworth and Fawkener, and Count Goltze, in their memorial, dated July 22d 1791, according to the engagements entered into in the said memorial, and of any answer that may have been returned to such recommendation, on the part of their Britannic and Prussian Majesties, by the Porte;

"That an humble address be presented to His Majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there be laid before this House, an account of the overtures made by his Catholic Majesty and the Court of Denmark, for the purpose of terminating the war between Russia and the Porte, referred to in the memorial of Messrs. Whitworth and Fawkener, and Count Goltze, dated June 29th 1791;

"That an humble address be presented to His Majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there be laid before this House, an account of all memorials, representations,

and requisitions, together with the answers to the same, that may have passed between the Courts of London and Petersburgh, relative to the war between Russia and the Porte, from the 19th of December 1789 to the present period, inclusive, that do not appear among the papers already presented to the House."

Mr. MINCHIN contended, that we might have made Russia give better terms to the Porte than she had done, if the negociation had been left to its due operation and effect. He entered into a description of the importance of Oczakow, and the territory adjoining, which he said was equally advantageous to Prussia and the Porte, from its situation, as Gibraltar was advantageous to us as a key to the Mediterranean. He spoke of that fascinating eloquence, on the other side of the House, which had, on a former occasion, been successfully employed to make "the worse appear the better reason." To that eloquence, which he had often heard with pleasure, but which he then heard with an apprehension that had been justified by the event, he ascribed the change of popular opinion; and when the Minister found that the majority of the people were averse to a Russian war, had he pursued a measure that was unpopular, it would have argued him to be out of his senses. He maintained that our conduct in the negociation was formed on a plan of wisdom and justice, and he was persuaded that the peace would be the peace of a day only, and that the country would have reason to lament, that our armament had not fully attained its object. They would find also that the boasted triumphs that they had heard of from the other side of the House, would not prove to be trophies of honour, but monuments of disgrace. With regard to the question of confidence, when he saw a Minister lay a plan, and bring it to a successful issue, he could not but grant him confidence, and trust that he would be equally successful when another occasion required it. Did not the soldiers and sailors place confidence in their General and Admiral? With regard to the right honourable gentleman opposite to him, did not his friends place confidence in him, and support him as far as they could in his opposition to the measures of Administration? For these reasons, he should give his negative to the motion.

Mr Chancellor PITT begged to ſtate ſhortly the ground which appeared to his mind fit to be brought forward againſt the motion juſt made by the honourable gentleman. He ſeemed to take two grounds in ſupport of his motion. The one was founded on the general principle of examining into all the circumſtances of a negociation after it was concluded; and for which purpoſe all communication between the different powers that could poſſibly be ſuppoſed to tend to explain the negociation, muſt be laid before the Houſe. This was claimed in the preſent caſe as a principle in the conſtitution of this country. The other ground depended on the neceſſity of the preſent information for the purpoſe of inquiring into, and forming an opinion on, the merit or demerit of the preſent Adminiſtration, in their conduct reſpecting the late armament.—One of theſe points had already been very much the ſubject of diſcuſſion in that Houſe, as had been allowed by the honourable mover on the preſent occaſion. From what he had this day heard, he was not able to collect what was the conſtitutional principle on which the object of the motion could be ſaid to reſt. To maintain that Government ſhould expect from that Houſe, on any occaſion, a blind, unlimited, and diſgraceful confidence, he was as far from wiſhing as any man in that Houſe. He was as ready as any man in that Houſe to join in the principle that maintained it to be a part of the conſtitutional power of that Houſe; nor was it any diſparagement of the State, that the Houſe of Commons had the power to inquire, the right to inquire, to interpoſe its advice to the Throne, and on a ſufficient ground to proceed to the puniſhment of delinquents, and to correct abuſes. This power the Houſe certainly had; and there might be caſes where it would become their duty to exerciſe that power. This was not, however, to be done, but where ſtrong ſuſpicion, at leaſt, accompanied the conduct of the officers acting under the executive branch of the State. This he was ſo far from denying, that he admitted there might be circumſtances that would call for the exerciſe of that power, even pending a negociation. But on the other hand, whenever there ſhould, either in fact or in apprehenſion, be any danger in the caſe, or where the party aſking for information did not make out the neceſſity, he maintained there might be many points of information that ought not to be laid

before the Public. This was a principle that not only was to be found in the theory of our conſtitution, but was alſo the daily practice of thoſe who were beſt acquainted with it, and had acted under it. There were none, even among thoſe who might be friends to the moſt vigilant inquiry, who would not allow that it might be improper to diſcloſe ſome particulars pending a negociation; and it was generally admitted, that ſuch information ſhould not be granted, unleſs there ſhould be ſtated ſomething that would counterbalance the evil which might await the diſcloſure. He believed he did not go too far when he ſaid, there ſhould be ſomething of a very extraordinary nature ſtated, before it would be prudent for Miniſters to give to the Public all the information poſſeſſed by Government, by which they might diſcloſe various circumſtances belonging to different States in Europe; for by declining that, the other parts of the information would be rendered uſeleſs, and by a full diſcloſure of facts of this nature, they might effect the diſſolution of all alliance, and the utter deſtruction of all treaties, without having the chance of a renewal of either; and therefore, he could not for a moment think that it would be conſiſtent with the ſpirit of our moſt excellent conſtitution, or with the ſafety of any regulated State, to give way to motions for papers, unleſs the production of them was manifeſtly neceſſary; becauſe a compliance of that ſort, as a matter of courſe, would, in its nature, be deſtructive not only to our conſtitution, but ſubverſive of all the order in our, or any State, and fatal to all attempts to carry on any negociation in future; indeed the honourable mover had not gone to the full extent of ſaying he was entitled to call for information in this manner. But he ſhould beg leave to obſerve, that all the arguments he urged in favour of his motion, were of that nature, although they were not puſhed to that extent. The honourable gentleman wiſhed to repreſent the Miniſters of the Crown as aſking for, and the Houſe giving, a portion of confidence, that was new and dangerous, and that it was ſuch as a Member of Parliament could not do, without foregoing his duty to his conſtituents; and that Miniſters were endeavouring to introduce a principle which was contrary to the opinion of our anceſtors, and the practice of former times.

This charge against Ministers and the House, brought the subject to a question. "Was the conduct of the Ministers "and of the House, who sanctioned their measures, unconstitutional?" The power of making war and peace in the ordinary course of events, was given in the first instance to the executive part of the state, and a little while ago he should have been ashamed of asking the question, "Whether this was "not wisely given?" or to ask "whether Parliament had not "the power of examining into the wisdom of the measures "adopted by the executive branch, and if displeased with "them, to withhold supplies?" "Or to proceed to the punishment of those who had advised the Crown to adopt unwise measures? "Or, on pressing occasions, to interrupt "Ministers in the pursuit of bad measures, and to address the "Throne to avoid the impending danger!" These were all of them clear points. What then was the case here to be argued? It was, that the House was called on to interfere with the prerogative of the executive power, to examine into its exercise, although no one instance was adduced of its being abused. That the conduct of Administration was to be examined, and obliquely censured, when there was not one instance in which they had abused their power. What was this but maintaining that the very foundation of the principle of confidence in any thing, or in any instance, wherein the Government was concerned, should be utterly and at once destroyed? That in some cases there must be an examination he admitted; but to say that it was an useful principle to be laid down, that no confidence should be reposed in the existing government on any occasion, was a proposition so monstrous that it could not be maintained for a moment. It sapped the very essence of all government. It tore up the very roots of society itself; for the legislature altogether was no more than a trust which Government had provided in the state for the benefit of the community. Whatever therefore might be said against the principle of confidence, he was ready to confess that without a reasonable degree of confidence in the Ministers of State, there could be no regular Government, and that the whole state would fall back into its original mass, where the law was nothing but the individual will, and where we should be in a condition in which we might give the name of method

to anarchy and confusion. Let us then, he said, see whether the confidence in this case was against the spirit of the constitution of this country; and let us feel on the other hand, if it is not, whether it may not be requisite to allow it, in certain cases. The question was, "Whether there was that sort of "case in the present instance, that made it reasonable the "House should give the confidence which had been asked, "pending the negociation?" And now that the negociation was concluded, "whether there was ground of suspicion against "the Ministers on the manner they had conducted themselves, "so as to make an inquiry into their conduct necessary?" He said, he thought it material, that the principle on which these points were to be governed, should not be misunderstood; and he thought that the Members of the House would hardly go to the length which the honourable mover seemed to adopt. He did not believe they would dispute the proposition that he had just mentioned on the principle of confidence. That a reasonable share of confidence in Administration was not only allowed by, but called for in, the constitution of this country. Here he could not help reminding the House of the difference of conduct in the gentlemen of the opposition. He had not forgotten the opprobrium with which he and others with whom he had the honour to act in the year 1784 were loaded, upon his expressing a difference of opinion from the gentlemen on the other side of the House, upon the principle of confidence.— They had seemingly forgot that at that time confidence was the cry of their party, when this country might be said to have been without an executive Government. Then they all declaimed upon the absolute necessity of confidence; and to such a pitch did they carry this point, that by a small majority they agreed to address, and did address, the Throne, upon the choice of Ministers, and this too aganist the decided voice of the people, and under circumstances by which it was understood that the party were then of opinion that there was no constitutional way of knowing the voice of the people but by the medium of that House. Such was their opinion then, but now it was changed, and no confidence was to be given to Ministers, nor was any respect to be due to the majority of that House, who had supported the measures now under discussion. So well could

they qualify or disqualify any opinion, or any system, just as they should happen to be circumstanced; and the voice of the House of Commons was either the voice of the whole people of this country, or the voice of faction, under the direction of some particular persons, as it might suit the purpose of those gentlemen. These things, when they came to feel them, and cooly to reflect on them, would induce them to suspect they had been too hasty in their opinions on each side of the question; and that perhaps they had been in some degree deceived in both; and that they then carried their ideas of confidence, as usual, too high, as now they were disposed to bring it too low. They were then hurried by their passions, and were now misled by their disappointment. It, therefore, should seem to the House that the confidence now asked was neither against the theory nor the practice of the constitution, but was such as, under similar circumstances, might be granted safely to Ministers in any well-regulated State. But to come to the present point. It seemed the House had a criminal who confessed the charge. He must observe that this was the first time he heard of it. He had yet to learn that there was any accusation brought against him, for at present he stood in a very singular situation, for he was said to have confessed a charge which, till this moment, he did not know had been laid. This was severe beyond all precedent in the course of criminal jurisprudence; for he always understood that when a criminal was brought to the bar to answer to any charge exhibited against him, he was always advised by the Court or Judge to plead, Not guilty. If he was to be put on his trial to the bar upon a charge in this case, he should beg leave to plead the general issue; Not guilty. "But then if the charge against him was not made, he knew "it would be made." To this he answered that there is enough on the face of the transaction as disclosed to the Public, through the medium of the papers on the table, to induce the House to approve of the conduct of Ministers on this occasion, as there had been in the case of the armament against Spain; the case was different, indeed, in some of the circumstances, but not so as to render the House suspicious of the integrity of Ministers in the one case, any more than in the other. He confessed, however, freely, that had the case rested where the first vote of address was given, had not His Majesty, at the open-

ing of the prefent feffion of Parliament, ordered the papers before the Houfe, and which were now before them, he fhould, fpeaking as an independent Member of that Houfe, fay there was not fufficient for the Houfe to approve of the conduct of Minifters; but now, with this information, he muft fay there was quite as much as the Houfe could reafonably require. It was very true that the late armament againft Ruffia had failed in a great degree of its intended effect. We had not obtained what we intended to obtain. We had endeavoured to do what, as it turned out, we were not able to do. But upon the papers before the Houfe, they could form an opinion without making any farther inquiry. It appeared by thefe papers what it was we wifhed to obtain, and what it was we had obtained. Did it not appear that what we wifhed to obtain was no more than what we had a right to expect? The point of the negociation having terminated without our obtaining one object, was a matter for argument on fome future day; he did not wifh to enter into the merit or the demerit of the determination now; but he faid, that it appeared from the document now before the Houfe, or at leaft muft appear to every reafonable man, that there could not be any blame on His Majefty's Minifters in this cafe. It appeared that the demands of the Emprefs on the Porte were larger than what fhe afterwards had really obtained. That fhe applied to this country to fecond her views, and that this country had given difcouragement to her demand; and that after a length of negociation we had refufed to accede to her demand; fhe ftill infifted on poffeffing that, which this Government, whether right or wrong, he would not now fay, or argue, thought important to the balance of power in Europe that fhe fhould not retain, and alfo fo particularly to interfere with the claims of our allies and the immediate interefts of this country, that the matter of difpute became fufficient to give rife to an armed negociation, the particulars of which he fhould detail on a future day, when he fhould enter on that particular fubject. The Minifters of this country thought fit to enter into this armament, on which the approbation of Parliament was had, in order to enforce the object of our negociation, in the courfe of which we infifted on a ceffion by the Emprefs of Oczakow, but which fhe afterwards refufed to give up, and as we had obtained fome points on her part, which we did not

mean to insist on very strenuously, and as the Empress insisted on retaining this, it was deemed adviseable not to persist in that point any longer. This was the conduct of Administration, and this was, what he confessed, if it was the proper object for censure, he must submit to that censure. He was ready to say, that he had nothing more for the purpose of his defence, if accused, than to say that the system on which Ministers had acted on this occasion, was convincingly to him the best they could have adopted, and that the terms agreed upon, under all the circumstances of the case, were the best they could obtain; and that better terms had been stipulated on the part of this country, and would have been obtained, the particulars of which he should not now detail, but for circumstances which he must say did not depend on Government. He did not profess to give to the House all the circumstances that passed on this negociation, nor had put the House in possession of all the reasoning of His Majesty's Ministers on the whole of this subject; but he submitted to the House, it was not necessary he should do so. He desired them to approve of his conduct, as it appeared before them, and in doing so, they would reflect on the relative situation of Europe, and the impropriety of disclosing those things, so as to endanger the situation of our public alliances. Every thing that ought to be disclosed, was disclosed already; and points that might be known without danger were, by means of the papers, now before the Public, accessible to every man in Europe; but the disclosure of more, was as unnecessary as it would be tumultuary and dangerous. There were but too ways of considering this transaction. To know the terms which we had obtained, and the terms which we had insisted on, and by comparing them with all the circumstances, a just opinion might be formed. If the House should appear dissatisfied with what Ministers had done, he should then desire them to place themselves in the situation of negociators under these circumstances, and then to ask themselves, "What they should have done in that situation, upon "the full view of the whole of the case, containing, as it did, "the relative situation of almost all the powers of Europe?" He was sure that the House, from principle and a sense of its duty to the Public, would not impede the progress of public business, or call for papers to put Ministers on their trial un-

necessarily: much less would they proceed to censure without all the evidence, requisite to prove guilt; and this they could not expect to have (even granting, for the sake of the argument, what he denied in fact, that there was ground of suspicion), without a minute detail of all the secret transactions of the different Courts of Europe. He was sure the House would see the danger of the disclosure: He should trouble the House no farther. He trusted he had said enough to entitle him to give his negative to the present motions.

The Hon. Mr. WYNDHAM, in reply, thanked the Minister for having stated the question in the proper point of view, and declared himself ready to meet the question of confidence, as it had been argued. He readily agreed that there had been a vast change in the language and sentiment of confidence, since the period of 1784, alluded to by the right honourable gentleman, but he begged to state that change. It was true that those with whom he had the honour to act, had stated confidence to be an essential ground-work for the existence of a Minister; they considered it as a necessary, an indispensable evil, which was to be granted no farther than circumstances required, and never allowed to pass beyond certain bounds; but it was not with them the change of sentiment consisted, but in those who, upon that occasion, formed the minority.—They then maintained, that, so far from confidence being necessary on the part of the Commons, their essential duty was an unremitting watchfulness of the conduct of Ministers, and an unremitting jealousy of their measures. So far, therefore, he held the change of sentiment to be theirs, who had now degenerated into the opposite extreme of unlimited confidence.

In applying the question of confidence to past transactions, he agreed, that, in the first instance stated by his honourable friend, the commencement of the Spanish armament, there was ground of refusal of communication of papers pending negociation, which had been so successfully urged at the time.

The next period in which confidence had been urged against production of specific documents, was upon the conclusion of that business, when Administration were driven a step farther; and having no longer the former plea to urge, they now had resort to the argument of the absurdity of calling for particulars, when the object having been apparent, and the success

of that object equally so, the futility of all investigation must be evident.

They next naturally came to the commencement of the late armament, when they were again driven to the same resource as to the commencement of hostilities; and lastly, on the present occasion, they had arrived to the acmé of the principle of confidence, when there appearing a *prima facie* evidence of misconduct on the part of Ministers on the conduct and conclusion of the business immediately before them; still they were to be told that they were not to demand more than it was thought proper to communicate to them, and that by the very person who was himself the object of consideration, and upon a review of whose conduct it was to be decided how far he had acted well or otherwise upon the occasion. Thus the right honourable gentleman was placed in the most absurd situation at once of criminal and accuser.

The honourable Mr. DUDLEY RYDER was content to rest the general question of confidence upon the masterly statement of it that had been made by his right honourable friend. With respect to the application of it to the cases already mentioned, it was agreed on all hands, that pending negociation, it was unwise to give up papers; at the conclusion of the Spanish negociation, papers had been again refused, because the object having been attained and fully for which they had committed themselves, atonement having been afforded for the insult, and satisfaction for the injury, which had been offered, there was no farther occasion for investigation; and here he begged leave to state the difference between that case and the one immediately before them. In the present case, neither the immediate object, nor the event, had been directly communicated to the House; and therefore what had been properly refused in the one case, had, in the present, been as properly offered to their consideration. How far the papers already communicated were sufficient or not, was to be judged by considering their object; that was, what were the demands which the armament was intended to obtain, and how far what really had been obtained fell short of these demands; and if so, how far the Ministry were blameable or otherwise in the defalcation; now the papers before them were confessedly adequate to those points, and therefore he should certainly give his vote against the motion

for the production of farther, and consequently useless papers. But if, as had been stated, there were gentlemen who saw in the papers already produced, ground of accusation, why did they not take the proper means to enforce that accusation? Why did they not summon those whom they considered as culpable to the bar of the House? Why did they not proceed to a minute investigation of their conduct, and either pass a vote of censure or inflict particular punishment on all the parties concerned? Why did they not, instead of moving for papers, at once have recourse to the utmost extremity?

Nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum.

Lord NORTH said, that the late negociation had disgraced us in the eyes of all Europe, and called aloud for investigation; that without the papers that were called for, it was impossible to have a clear insight into the transaction. He contended, that it was the privilege of the House to examine and inquire, and that if the papers were refused them, their most essential functions were infringed. If the right honourable gentleman would say, that the production of the papers would give the Empress of Russia the least degree of chargin, he would not, press for a single paper. He declared that no more papers were necessary to criminate Ministers; enough for that purpose had been produced already. It was generally believed in every Court in Europe that Great Britain was the instigator of the war, and this belief would not certainly be weakened by an opposition to the present motion.

The Minister had praised the constitution in a former debate with all the eloquence of a Cicero. He hoped that he would afford no reason for insinuations similar to those which were advanced against that great man, that that constitution which he praised he wished to destroy. With respect to the constitution itself, he trusted that it would not experience the truth of that observation, *Laudandum—Ornandum—TOLLENDUM.*

Mr. HALHEAD spoke against the motion, and enlarged on the importance of Oczakow.

Mr. THOMPSON said, that from the timely notice given by his honourable friend of the motion which he had that day

made, and which ſo materially involved the character and conduct of His Majeſty's Miniſters, and alſo from the declarations made from the Throne at the opening of the ſeſſion, he had no idea that the preſent queſtion would have undergone diſcuſſion. It was the duty which Miniſtry owed to themſelves, to produce every document by which the Houſe might judge of the wiſdom and propriety of the armament for which they were to provide. Gentlemen on the other ſide of the Houſe were inclined to treat it as a queſtion of confidence; he muſt conſider it as a grand conſtitutional queſtion. It was the prerogative of the Crown to make peace and war, to treat and negociate; it was the prerogative and duty of that Houſe to inquire into the neceſſity of ſuch negociations and armaments, before they gave them their ſanction, by a vote for defraying the expences. That they might ſo far diſcharge their duty, was the intent of his honourable friend in the motion he had brought forward. It has been ſaid, that you are to conſider whether confidence is to be repoſed in the executive power; between that Houſe and the executive power *confidence* ſhould be mutual; *pending a negociation* we are to give them confidence for the well conducting the affairs for the honour and dignity of the country; at the cloſe of the negociation, we are to receive confidence from the executive power, that we may fully and thoroughly examine the proceedings, before we give them our applauſe, by voting for the payment of them. The only other doctrine of confidence is that repoſed by the conſtituent in the repreſentative, that their rights and freedom will be aſſerted and maintained, and to which they pledge themſelves in being deputed to that Houſe. If gentlemen acknowledge another doctrine to be repoſed in Miniſters, they ſhould at leaſt receive the ſame pledge which they themſelves have made; from the preſent Miniſtry no ſuch pledge can be received; in aſſerting this, he meant not to deal out the acrimonious language of party, but to ſtate fairly the opinion of the moſt ſacred authority in this country, *the verdict of an Engliſh jury*; and, Sir, it ſtands recorded at this day, that His Majeſty's Miniſters were privy to, and inſtrumental in, trampling down an Engliſhman's deareſt right, the freedom of election. That queſtion, he hoped, would be again diſcuſſed in another ſhape. If after a review of this tranſaction, too important to be obli-

terated from the memory of any man present, gentlemen are still determined to repose confidence in Ministers, and blindly to credit their assertions, not to examine their actions with that jealousy which he has been taught to consider the duty of the representative of a free people, then he could only lament, that it was not in the power of his honourable friend to gain that which the people have a *right* to demand, *all information in the possession of Ministers, regarding the necessity of an armament, for the expences of which they were to be called on to provide.*

The Hon. Mr. COCKS said, he thought the armed negociation with Russia a harsh measure, on its first introduction; he was still of the same opinion. It would require more eloquence, he thought, than even that which had lately been employed to describe the prosperity of this country, to justify a measure which put its prosperity so much to hazard! Had papers been called for early in the progress of the negociation, he should have approved of the motion, but such a motion seemed now unnecessary.

Mr. FOX said, the question had been so ably debated by those who thought on it as he did, that were he to suppose he could add to the clearness or the force of their arguments, he must be vain indeed. There were circumstances, however, that obliged him to trouble the House, although he could have been well contented to let the debate rest on the grounds on which those who preceded him had placed it. A sort of general challenge had been thrown out to all who indulged in what were termed rhapsodies on the constitution, and declamations on confidence. Now as he had often enlarged on the dangers to which the confidence claimed by Ministers exposed the constitution, he could not but feel himself challenged to support the principles for which he contended, and the arguments by which he endeavoured to maintain them. An attempt, it was said, had been made to excite an alarm on the subject of confidence, and had, in one point of view, been but too perniciously successful. He was ready to own, that he felt it his duty to sound that alarm within the House, to give it force and efficacy by every means in his power; and whenever he had an opportunity of delivering his opinion to any number of his constituents, not merely those by whom he was

immediately returned as a Member of Parliament, but the whole collective body of the people of Great Britain, who were, in his ſenſe of the word, the conſtituents of every Member, from the moment he was elected by any part of them—to ſound the alarm to them alſo, and to tell them that if thoſe whom they had choſen to repreſent them, thoſe to whom they had given their confidence, ſhould transfer that confidence to the Miniſter, they were betrayed, not repreſented; that where their repreſentatives neglected to exerciſe that vigilance which was the moſt important of their functions, it was their duty to watch for themſelves; to ſubſtitute for the control of Parliament, the control of public opinion, and to ſee that their money was not voted away, but on that ſtrict examination of the neceſſity, and the object, without which the conſtitution muſt moulder and fall to ruin. Confidence in Miniſters, the right honourable gentleman contended, was an acknowledged, a vital principle in the conſtitution. The general propoſition no man would deny; but in every good, or at leaſt in every mixed Government, and he doubted whether any but a mixed Government could be a good one, the portions of confidence ought to be diſtributed, ſo much to one branch, ſo much to another, as the nature of their ſeveral functions required, but in no caſe could it be required that the whole ſhould be given to one. His honourable friend who brought forward the motion, had very properly ſtated, that on the diſpute with Spain, the Houſe had firſt been refuſed an account of the preciſe period at which the grounds of the diſpute were known, becauſe the negociation was depending; when the negociation was no longer depending, they were again refuſed information, and called on to provide for the expence of an armament, becauſe no preſumption of miſconduct appeared on the face of the proceedings; in the diſpute with Ruſſia, they were neither informed of the object nor the cauſe, pending the negociation, and now that the negociation was at an end, by a climax in confidence, they were again forbidden to aſk for information, a ſort of confidence which to him ſeemed incredible, and which to utter required an incredible degree of confidence in another ſenſe.

With reſpect to the challenge that had been thrown out, whether information was, or was not, to be granted pending a

negociation, taken as a general queſtion, it was abſurd. It could be ſtrictly true in neither extreme, and was proper only when particular information, or particular papers, were ſpecified. How did this apply to the ſeveral caſes in the laſt ſeſſion of Parliament, and the preſent? On the diſpute with Spain, the Houſe was informed of the nature of the offence, and the reparation demanded. They thought the cauſe of offence ſufficient, and the reparation proper; they paſſed a vote of credit on theſe good grounds of confidence. When the armament was at an end, they deſired to be informed, whether it had not been longer continued than there was occaſion for, and whethether the reparation obtained, might not have been obtained ſooner, or without any armament at all. The anſwer to this was, "We are ſo well pleaſed with the event, that we will "not inquire into the manner of its accompliſhment; we ſee "no ground for blame on the face of it, and we will look for "none." Thus the treaſure of the country was laviſhed, and what was of much more importance than treaſure, the liberties and the properties ſacrificed of thoſe men, who, on all occaſions of alarm, were preſſed into the public ſervice, for reaſons which the Houſe of Commons would not inquire whether adequate or not. Such was the confidence then demanded; but blameable as it was, he diſapproved ſtill more of the confidence granted laſt ſpring, which was carried to ſuch an unwarrantable extent, that unleſs done away by the well-known ſenſe of the people on the ſubject of it, the conſtitution muſt be conſidered as gone. If confidence was a neceſſary evil in the conſtitution, that evil was much increaſed, when it was laid down as the principle of the conſtitution, that the King was to appoint him, in whom the Houſe muſt confide, without any means, on their part, of objecting to his choice. Yet ſuch had been the practice of the Government ſince 1784, very different, certainly, from what it had been at any former period ſince the acceſſion of the Houſe of Brunſwick. There were ſtill ſome caſes in which they could not, conſiſtently with their duty, act on confidence. That of voting the money of their conſtituents was one. The King, it might be ſaid, had the right of declaring war, but the Commons had the right, as full and undoubted, of granting or withholding the means of carrying it on. The ſtrict exerciſe of both theſe rights,

where they happened to clash, was impossible; from which it followed, that there must be concession on the one side or the other. Now it was surely more reasonable, that in such a case, the right of the King should be conceded, than the money of the people be taken from them without their consent, and for a purpose of which they did not approve. But this new mode of voting money on confidence, and paying for armaments without inquiry into the necessity, or the use, was an attack on the fundamental principles of the constitution; on the most important functions of the representatives of the people, whose peculiar duty it was to watch over the money of their constituents. If they were delegated for this purpose, if it was an essential part of their trust, they could have no right to rest that trust in the Minister, to make him the sole judge of fit occasions and objects of expence, and open the public purse on his simple requisition without examination, without inquiry, without any exercise of their own judgement. Such however had been their conduct, and where was the remedy. An expence had been incurred on a vote of credit, and they all agreed that the money must be paid, be the manner of the expence wise or foolish, useful or pernicious. This was the necessary result of that cursed confidence, which neglecting to inquire in the first instance, did not dare to do it in the second; which induced men first to betray and then to shrink from their duty; and the monstrous consequence was the expenditure of public money without the efficient control of Parliament. To illustrate this point, he would suppose not an extreme case, but one of the most moderate that could occur. Suppose a difference of opinion to arise on the justice and expediency of a war; on the war in India, were that a national war, and the propriety of supporting the Rajah of Travancore. Suppose this a case on which honest and well-informed men might differ in opinion, the majority of the House of Commons, supported by a large majority of the people, to take one side, and the Ministers the other; money must be wanted for this war, and whose opinion is to prevail? That of the majority of the House of Commons, and the people at large, or that of the Minister? Was there a man in the House who would say, that the Ministers ought? It might indeed be said, for the sake of cavil, that the King had the undoubted right of making war; though an undoubted right,

without the means of exercising it, was a solecism. But he would not enter into this question farther than to say, that the solecism would be less, in the King's yielding to the sense of the people, than in exercising his prerogative against it, without the power of doing so with effect. The answer to the question, which he had put, did not admit practically of a moment's hesitation. The doctrine of confidence was the reverse of all this. By it the expence was first incurred, and when the object was obtained, the people might think that it was not worth obtaining, or that they would rather have paid money to prevent its being obtained. Could the House in that case refuse to pay the expence? Certainly not.

But then it was said, they might impeach the Minister, and carry an address to the Throne, filled with axes, halters, and gibbets. What! impeach a Minister for differing from them in opinion; for differing honestly and conscientiously too as the case supposed? Cruel, indeed, would that majority be who should say to a Minister, We confided in you because we thought what convinced you of the propriety of an armament would convince us. You tell us for what you armed, and we are not convinced: the expence is incurred, and the people must pay; but we will hang you, because we gave you more confidence than we find you deserved. Why did not this strike men's minds more forcibly? Why but because people generally thought that the Minister could not only guess, but create the opinion of the majority? But if he persuaded them to vote on confidence in the first instance, without discussion, he might, indeed, dictate, but could not guess their opinion, and that might happen which had just been stated. In the case now before the House, the opinion of the Minister was directly opposite to that of the whole body of the people. The House voted money in support of his opinion, and it was spent. Supposing him to be asked by his constituents why it was gone, he might say he had done all in his power to prevent it, but in vain. His constituents would anwer, "You were over-ruled "by the majority who inquired into the cause, and thought it "a fit object of expence." What must he answer to this? What must the majority answer for themselves?- That they had refused to inquire, that they had voted the money without in-

quiry, and that being spent, whether well or ill applied, the people must bear the loss.

Having said so much on the general principle, he came now to the production of the papers moved for. They who called for them saw much to blame in those already produced, and were desirous of seeing the rest, which might furnish either matter of aggravation or excuse. They who opposed the production said, they would not look into the papers, not for the reason assigned by the honourable gentleman who spoke immediately before him, because he was convinced they could afford no extenuation of the misconduct of Ministers, but because they were determined to see nothing to blame. The Minister himself said, that if they called for these papers, they must call for those of a more private nature, which it would be dangerous to produce. This must arise from the nature of the defence he intended to make, and if the Minister referred to such papers, the House must see them.

This undoubtedly would be a great evil, but if he must choose between it and that of taking millions of money from the people, and exposing thousands of men to death, without the means of judging on the necessity of such sacrifices, he would say at once, discharge all your negociators, forego all the advantages of your alliances, rather than resign your constitution. But this dilemma was not presented to him. He was not obliged to ask for papers, the disclosure of which would be dangerous. If the Minister thought it necessary, the House would grant much to the rights of self-defence, and could appoint a secret Committee to examine such as ought not to be submitted to an open examination. His honourable friend who moved for the papers had not said, as the right honourable gentleman had tried to misrepresent, that he wanted to search in them for ground of accusation. He had said that the papers on the table afforded matter of crimination, but that he, on the part of the Public, had a right to see the whole extent of it. In this he was perfectly justifiable, for it was to be presumed, that there could be nothing secret where there was nothing wrong. Maintaining the sufficiency of our alliance with Prussia had been much insisted on last year, as if Prussia had been in danger of being prevented from rendering us the services we

expected by the ascendancy of Russia; and we had interfered on a Prussian interest. However, this might be, it had been the common rumour at Berlin, that Prussia had been drawn in for the sake of a British interest, and it was fit to know exactly what the sentiments of the Court of Berlin had really been; what offers were made through the Court of Denmark; what was the opinion of Denmark on the equity of those offers; what engagements we had with the Porte, and how we had fulfilled them; whether or not we had even proposed the terms we undertook to propose?

It was also rumoured, that the Porte, far from courting, felt an objection to our interference; that had a British fleet sailed for the Black Sea, its entrance would have been opposed by those whom it came to aid, so that the first thing we should have had to do would have been to conquer our allies. Was not all this matter of strong aggravation, and what the House ought to examine, whether true or false? But they were told they had full information of the object of the armament, and that the object had not been obtained, which was all they had occasion to know. If the Minister was to be considered as accused, he was the most improper person to judge of the extent of his own accusation, or to select the evidence. If he was not accused, the House ought to have before them the whole of the information, on which alone they could judge whether he deserved to be accused or not. He was the more anxious in supporting these principles, because the opposition to them was grounded on that extravagant extension of confidence which tended to destroy the very vitals of the constitution. If they shrunk from their duty in this point; if, instead of inquiring, in order to judge, they thought proper to confide, they might indeed have the form and semblance of the constitution, perhaps that not long, but they would have nothing of the substance. He was happy to find the language on confidence somewhat softened, which was perhaps to be ascribed to its late ill success.

It was not the magnitude of the sum spent upon it that constituted the objection or the excuse. The principle was as bad on half a million as on ten. There were exceptions to

this, as to almoſt every political and moral rule, but it was not the leſs a rule. If he were told that Miniſters had information of ſome ſecret but imminent danger, which was not yet ripe for explanation, he would vote money on confidence, and ſuſpend his judgement till an explanation could be given. But if the occaſion for expence were doubtful, as in the caſe with Ruſſia, if he did not exerciſe his judgement before he gave his vote, he knew not why he ſat in the Houſe.

If they were to transfer their functions to a Miniſter ſelected by the King, on the ground of poſſeſſing their confidence, the only ground of ſelection under former Princes of the Brunſwick line, that would be bad and abſurd enough; but to do this to a Miniſter with whoſe appointment their confidence had nothing to do, was ten times more abſurd and intolerable. But his principle reſted on the conſtitution itſelf, in which nothing was written in ſtronger or more legible characters than that the right of diſpoſing of the public money, of examining and judging of the reaſons for granting or withholding, was in the Houſe of Commons, and not in the Crown.

The honourable Mr. COCKS ſaid a few words in explanation.

Mr. DUNDAS contended that no confidence either had been or was now demanded which was not ſtrictly conſtitutional. There could be no difference on the neceſſity of confidence, the only diſpute was reſpecting the degree. If Parliament had been ſitting in 1787, when this country interfered in the buſineſs of Holland, all that Miniſters could have told the Houſe, without ruining the object, would have been, that they thought it for the intereſt of this country on a due conſideration of all the circumſtances, to interfere by an armament. The object of the armament againſt Ruſſia had been preciſely ſtated laſt year, viz. to effect a peace between Ruſſia and the Porte. With reſpect to the aſſertions which the right honourable gentleman had made reſpecting Pruſſia, he had no doubt of the pains which he took to procure accurate intelligence.

Mr. FOX ſaid, the right honourable gentleman ſeemed to miſtake the means for the object, which made the whole of his argument a fallacy. The rumours to which he alluded had reached him in London, and were matter of notoriety. It

was therefore proper to inquire whether or not they were true. With respect to taking pains to obtain accurate information, if he or any man took pains to inform himself on subjects in which the interest of his country was materially concerned, were he even to go abroad for the express purpose of obtaining such a knowledge of the dispositions and intentions of foreign Courts as might enable him to give useful advice at home, he would be entitled to thanks instead of blame.

Mr. DUNDAS said, he did not mean to impute blame to any man for collecting information that might be useful to his country.

The House divided on Mr. Grey's first motion.

The other motions were severally put and negatived.

Ayes, 120; Noes, 235.

The House adjourned.

Tuesday, 21st, and Wednesday, 22d, February.

There not being a sufficient number of Members, on either of those days, to ballot for a Committee on the Newcastle Election, no business was done.

Thursday, 23d February.

Mr. Chancellor PITT moved, "That the report of the "Committee of Supply, postponed till Wednesday last, be "now taken into consideration."

Mr. SHERIDAN said, that several gentlemen who wished to be heard on that report, were not in the house, not apprehending that it would come on to-day; and after some conversation between him and Mr. Chancellor Pitt, it was agreed that it should be postponed, together with the report of the Committee of Ways and Means, till to-morrow.

General BURGOYNE said, that having conversed with the Secretary at War, he understood that he meant to lay such papers before the House as would be satisfactory on the subject, on which he intended to have made a motion. He therefore now gave notice, that on Thursday next he would call the attention of the House to the consideration of those papers.

The SECRETARY AT WAR faid, he trufted the papers, which he meant to produce, would fufficiently juftify what he had faid on a former day, that there was no improper delay at the War Office in the payment of arrears to fubalterns, becaufe it would appear that he had given it out as a public order, that any fubaltern who might have arrears due to him, would receive them by applying at the War Office, without any regard to the agents' accounts.

General BURGOYNE was glad to hear that the fact was fo; but though he did not wifh to provoke a debate now, he certainly believed that it was not fo underftood by the army in general.

The SECRETARY AT WAR faid, that he had the papers in his pocket, and if the honourable General was not difpofed to move for them, he would do it himfelf; accordingly, after fome obfervations on what had paffed on a former day, about the arrears, he moved for the feveral papers which had been called for, and immediately after prefented the papers.

He then gave notice, that if the bufinefs of to-morrow did not go into any great length, he fhould move the extraordinaries of the army.

In a Committee on the American Intercourfe bill,

Mr. FOX afked, if this was intended to be an annual bill, or whether any permanent fyftem was intended? It was nine years fince the powers granted by this bill to the King and Council were thought too great to be trufted to the perfons then in power for only five months.

Mr. Chancellor PITT faid, that no opportunity for forming a permanent fyftem had yet occurred; but he was happy to have an opportunity of mentioning, that a Minifter had been lately appointed to negociate with the American States on that fubject; and until the event of that negociation was known, he conceived there could be no objection to this bill. Ordered to be reported to-morrow.

The Houfe adjourned.

Friday, 24th February.

In a Committee on the Greenland Whale Fifhery,

Mr. RYDER faid, he had learned that a bill for continuing

the bounties to December next, had been passed last year, but in that sort of haste in which bills were sometimes carried through the House, it passed unnoticed, so that not only he but the officers of the Custom House were ignorant of its existence. It had been long since in contemplation to lower the bounties, and he meant to propose 30s. from December next for three years, and 25s. for three years after that. He meant also to propose, that ships not complying with the conditions required to obtain the bounty, should be allowed to import their oil duty free.

The resolutions to this effect were opposed by Mr. Duncombe, Mr. Bramston, Mr. Thornton, and Mr. Alderman Watson, on the ground that the bounties were already as low as the conditions required to obtain them would bear; and supported by Mr. Ryder and Mr. Montague.

They were agreed to, and ordered to be reported on Monday.

The adjourned report of the Committee of Supply was taken into consideration, and the resolution for taking 400,000l. from the consolidated fund, in addition to the million for the reduction of the public debt, being read,

Mr. SHERIDAN rose to call the attention of the House to the mode of anticipation, which the Minister seemed inclined to pursue in his system of finance. He considered that anticipating the produce of a fifth quarter, was nothing but a loan from the ensuing year, because the money which was asked to be applied towards reducing the national debt, was really not in our possession; and voting money which we had not, without encroaching upon the produce of the ensuing year, appeared to him laying on a debt, by borrowing from ourselves, and was worse than any other loan that we could obtain. He said, by this mode of anticipation, it was impossible that any actual statement of the public accounts could be made up or settled till after the 5th of April, and of course the revenue bills would all of them come to be discussed, as had been the case for several years past, in thin Houses, and at a season of the year when it was not probable either that the attendance of Members could be secured, or these revenue bills meet with that attention which their importance required. That this had

been the case in former years, he believed no one could deny, and the unprecedented hurry and bustle which had accompanied those bills in their progress through the House, was in the recollection of every gentleman, as by anticipating the quarter, ending the 5th of April, not one of those bills could be passed till after the Easter recess; and he insisted, that bills of the utmost consequence had been passed in a manner without any notice. The House had received a very striking instance, in what had fallen from a right honourable gentleman opposite to him, on the bill for granting and continuing bounties on the Greenland whale fishery, which, though brought into the House by himself, he seemed to have no knowledge of at all, and he had said, with truth, that it passed last year without any notice. With regard to the attendance being thin after Easter, it might be said, if the revenue bills remained to be passed, it was the duty of Members to attend; this was true, but experience had repeatedly shewn us that it was not practicable. Upon this part of the subject, he begged leave to address himself particularly to that respectable set of men, the country gentlemen, and no man could entertain greater respect for them than he did. The delaying of the revenue bills till a late period was a matter particularly interesting and important; it was their duty, in common with the rest of the House, and even more particularly so, to observe that vigilance and regard for the public income and expenditure, and that scrupulous attention to every measure that took money from the pockets of their constituents, so much and so properly enforced in the conclusion of the right honourable gentleman's celebrated finance speech. They were the stewards of the public purse; and he would ask how it would become them to meet their constituents before the public business of the session had been entered upon? Might not their constituents say, we are very glad to see you; but pray tell us, is all the business of the session over? Would they answer, No, the tax bills and all the other revenue laws are still to be passed, but so late in the session, we could not wait till they came on; we have left the whole of that business to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whom we believe to be a very good sort of man, and who will not think of doing any thing wrong.——This, he imagined,

would not be thought quite doing the duty of a Member of Parliament. He next disliked this system of anticipation, because there was no saying how far it might be carried, and the greater the ability of the Minister, there was the more cause to fear its pernicious effects. If we could anticipate the produce of one quarter, by borrowing it from the ensuing year, might we not, upon greater emergency, anticipate two quarters, or three?—The advantage which this system held out, when compared with the many and great inconveniences attending it, was very small indeed; and if the right honourable gentleman would wait till he had got the money, certainly his plan would not be much deranged; perhaps it might fortunately happen, that the three quarters of next year might be equal to the wants of the whole year, and in that case, the right honourable gentleman would have the surplus of the other quarter to appropriate as might appear proper; but until that was known to be the case, they were voting away money which they really had not to give. So much for the system itself, now for the application of it. If we really had a sum of 400,000l. to apply, it ought to be applied towards paying off a part of the unfunded debt, which, it had been stated by the Committee of 1786, ought never to be allowed to exceed 1,700,000l. It was now considerably more, and part bearing interest of 4 per cent. By doing this, instead of buying up 3 per cents, he said, the country would be a gainer, and with regard to the probability of being sooner able to come at the 5 per cents, by the actual reduction of 25 millions of the national debt, he could not see that the right hon. gentleman's scheme would answer that purpose: for certainly, while such a load of unfunded debt remained unpaid, he could not by any fair construction of the law, or by any thing but a kind of juggle, pretend to redeem the five per cents. The discharge of such part at least of the unfunded debt as bore interest, would undoubtedly be a more proper application of the money, although not perhaps so sounding and popular.

His third objection was, that the money would be wanted for the expences of the year, unless it was meant to have recourse to a lottery, a mode of raising money which he had often deprecated as infinitely more injurious to the morals and the industry of the people, than it could possibly be advantageous

to the revenue. It was formerly never resorted to, but in time of war and public necessity, and he was sorry to hear it mentioned as to be continued in time of peace.

He concluded with stating that his first proposition would be, that the 400,000l. should go to the ways and means of the year, so that the accounts of income and expenditure might in future be made up on the 5th of January; and if he should fail in that, his second, that it should be applied to the discharge of the unfunded debt; but in order to introduce either of these, it was first necessary to move that the report be re-committed.

Mr. ROSE said, he rose to rescue the House from the imputation thrown upon it by the honourable gentleman, of hurrying the tax bills through without notice. His situation had obliged him to attend closely to those bills, and he was sure none had ever passed without discussion and opposition from one side of the House. He considered the honourable gentleman's speech as a continuation of the debate on the budget, and could not avoid noticing the contradictory manner in which he now argued. He had completely abandoned his former arguments. Anticipating the quarter ending the 5th of April, 1793, could in no respect whatever be called a loan. When the honourable gentleman held the situation in which he now was, this anticipation did not strike him as improper, for in 1783 the produce of the sinking fund was anticipated up to the 10th of October.

Mr. STEELE said, when the honourable gentleman opened his speech on the budget, he promised them nothing but a dull statement of figures, but had forgot his promise, and only endeavoured to amuse the House and divert their attention from the question before them; this night he followed the same line of argument, and introduced his old joke, repeatedly mentioned before on the subject of the anticipation of a quarter. He too, was surprised at the change in the honourable gentleman's opinion since 1783. His right honourable friend had a good right to borrow from the growing produce of the taxes, and it was better to reduce the funded debt than to pay off any part of the unfunded navy debt. But the point of most consequence was, that the honourable gentleman having found only this application of the surplus on which he could found an objection, must be considered as having abandoned all the other

topics of revenue and expenditure, on which he had debated, and endeavoured to delude the House and the Public for six years. He must now admit that there was a surplus million to apply to the extinction of debt, and all the other statements, which he had formerly denied, as fictitious.

Mr. FOX said, he came down to the House to hear this subject discussed, in a state of mind, and in health, that did not induce him to enter much at length into this debate. He thought it a question perfectly free from all personal considerations, and that the House should hear temperately what was to be done upon the suggestion of the Minister; and, notwithstanding what he had heard, and had witnessed in the conduct of some honourable gentlemen, he thought he had resolution enough to keep his mind to the question before the House. He trusted, that notwithstanding every thing that had been said, and every attempt that had been made to provoke him, and others on that side of the House, to enter into points not immediately before them, he should abstain from any asperity in what he had to say, although he must observe, that one of the honourable gentlemen who had just preceded him, had done every thing that was in his power to produce that sort of unpleasant conversation; and to direct the attention of the House from the important ground on which all the discussion of the subject ought to be formed. But before he viewed that subject, he begged leave to appeal to the House, whether he, or any of those with whom he acted, ever complained personally of any attendance at a late period of the session, when they were charged with complaining of the Minister's negligence; and whether, in point of substance, their complaint was not confined to this, "that the Minister delayed business of the greatest importance to the end of the session, and the country gentlemen, who, without intending to reproach them, might be called the aristocracy of that House, and men whom, from the great interest they had in the country, were certainly those to whom the House would naturally look for their sentiments, were gone into the country, and consequently the Public deprived of their assistance as representatives of the People?" As to himself, and those few who did attend, he did not wonder that gentlemen on the Treasury Bench should be displeased with their efforts,

or ſhould charge them with inconſiſtency, for it was an opi nion which belonged to thoſe gentlemen, "that every perſon "was inconſiſtent if he did not agree with them."

Another attack made on himſelf and others was, that they had oppoſed tax bills, and by doing ſo, had oppoſed the increaſe of the revenue of the country. He deſired the Chancellor of the Exchequer to review all his taxes, and find out how many of them had been oppoſed that were not oppreſſive to the public, and were not afterwards repealed by the conſent of the Chancellor of the Exchequer himſelf. This accuſation, therefore, was groundleſs. Theſe, and other things, were very improperly brought forward by the two laſt gentleman who had taken part in this debate, the latter of whom, indeed (Mr. Steele), was leſs exceptionable generally in his conduct than the other; he was a little more conciliating in his manner than the former. It had alſo often been ſaid, that he and others had been endeavouring to impreſs the people of this country with ideas, that our finances were not in a flouriſhing condition, and that the ſtate of them now refuted their inſinuations. This was a groundleſs accuſation alſo; for all they ſaid on that ſubject was applicable only to the ſtate of this country, comparing income and expenditure, in which they were juſtified in all they ſaid. He was always ſanguine in our revenue, but he had often expreſſed a wiſh to ſee our expenditure reduced. He then took up the point immediately before the Houſe, and argued that this reſolution ſhould be recommitted. The queſtion was ſimply, by the motion, for this recommitment, "Whether it was better to have the accounts made up from April to April, or from January to "January?" In the one caſe the account would be fair and clear, in the other a quarter muſt certainly be anticipated. This he placed in ſeveral points of view, and came to another point, which was, ſuppoſing that we had this money, then a queſtion would ariſe as to the application of it. There were who thought, and he was of that opinion too, that it would be better that it ſhould be applied to reduce the unfunded debt. This appeared to him on the face of the thing itſelf to be the better mode. In doing this we paid off a debt which bore an intereſt of 4 per cent. He ſaid, he had not heard any, even general reaſons, for ſuffering the unfunded debt to grow, parti-

cularly when it was confidered, that if by thus fuffering the unfunded debt to grow, we fhould be able to pay twenty-five millions of the funded debt, without in fact reducing our real debt, we fhould be entitled to redeem the five per cents. This would be a fraud on the holders of that ftock; he granted that in this cafe the amount was fmall; but then it was the principle to which he objected; if this was admitted, any thing elfe to any extent might in fome cafe of neceffity be afterwards adopted. The navy debt, for inftance, which came under confideration in this cafe, was fuch as never, if it could poffibly be avoided, fhould be fuffered to increafe; becaufe it was well known, that although navy bills did not bear intereft until a certain time after they were iffued, yet this diftinction was merely nominal, for that virtually they always carried intereft, as in all contracts on them the individual gained and Government loft; and this from the nature of things was unavoidable. Having preffed this and many other points with his ufual force, he concluded with obferving, that he had not heard any thing in favour of taking this account in April; he had heard much in favour of taking it in January. On the one hand he had heard fome advantage, and on the other material difadvantages; that he felt no difficulty in giving his opinion in favour of taking this account in January. In one cafe the whole would be under the eye of Parliament, the publicity of whofe proceedings was the beft fecurity for the rectitude of its conduct; in the other, bufinefs would actually be driven to a feafon of the year in which they would not have the attendance which the importance of the cafe demanded.

Mr. Chancellor PITT obferved, there was no neceffity for him to trouble the Houfe much at length upon the prefent fubject. He fhould not enter into many of the points, which had been brought before the view of the Houfe by Mr. Fox; becaufe this was not, properly fpeaking, the feafon for their difcuffion. He excufed his friends from the charge of having taken the fubject up too warmly; and he obliquely hinted, that Mr. Fox himfelf had not been free from the failing which he imputed to others. He muft, however, obferve, that on the fubject of taxes, to which reference had been made by Mr. Fox, he certainly had oppofed moft of them. He had op-

posed pretty generally, if not all, the measures of Government, particularly those that in their nature gave rise to any popular clamour; and also all those measures that were brought forward to increase the revenue, by putting an end to the frauds that were practised on it; and it did so happen, that all those measures which he had proposed, and which Parliament had afterwards adopted, had increased the revenue, without being oppressive to the parties on whom they were intended to operate; and yet of these very measures, at the time they were proposed, it was said that they were of no use ultimately to the revenue, and sure to be oppressive to the parties. He then entered into a history of the revenue for several years, and maintained, that at present, it was in a very flourishing state, in the course of which he vindicated the statement of Mr. Rose, respecting the carrying forward of an anticipation from the beginning of the year to the month of October, being three quarters, precisely in the same way as this one quarter was now proposed to be anticipated.—On the point of delay, he assured the House it was never agreeable to him;—that the Budgets, it was true, were opened in general at a late period of the session, but that was from inevitable necessity, and which he hoped would not be the case in future, for that he should endeavour, while he had the honour of holding his present situation, to bring it forward every year as early as possible. He then came to the point immediately before the House, and maintained, in opposition to what Mr. Fox had argued—first, that the money was in our possession; and secondly, that being so, the mode which he now proposed was the best for its application, and that this was not making any anticipation by which the public would have any loss. On this head he enlarged considerably, and contended in favour of his own resolution. The unfunded debt was far from being what it was stated to be, "More than the country is properly "able to bear." He believed that he should be able this year to have Exchequer Bills circulated at a less interest than they have been, and from that circumstance it was not probable that the unfunded debt was more than the people of this country can bear, or that they think so. He then answered the observation of Mr. Fox on the paying off of twenty-five millions of the national debt, and maintained that there wa

no apprehension of fraud to the holders of stock on the 5 per cent, from this one circumstance of defraying part of the funded by adding to the unfunded debt. Supposing there should be any thing of that nature attempted, he was sure the House would watch it carefully, and would be ready enough to decide in favour of the holders of property in the funds. After taking a view of the state of the revenue, and declaring the sufficiency of it for all the purposes of defraying all charges with which it was so loaded, he concluded with dissenting from the motion of recommitment.

Mr. SHERIDAN, after expressing his hopes, that the House would indulge him in greater latitude of explanation, than was strictly regular, on account of the turn which the debate had taken, said he should leave the two gentlemen who had given it this turn, to the silent rebuke of the contrast between their mode of treating the question and that of their right honourable friend. They seemed to think, that they had a claim upon him to be dull when he spoke on finance, and were offended at his attempting to enliven a discussion on which they were determined to be harsh and dry. He had revived, what they were pleased to call, the old joke; because he was called to do so by the old subject, by the mode of making up the public accounts, which had hitherto postponed the most important business to so late a period of the session, as prevented a full attendance. He thought he was doing the honourable gentleman who first replied to him a service, by recommending a mode of proceeding which would enable him to seek the shade of his forests early in the summer, and smooth and civilize his mind by classical pursuits, from the asperity and moroseness it might have contracted, in the less grateful exercise of parliamentary debate. No captious opposition had been made to new taxes, from those who sat on the same side of the House with him. That when they did object, their objections were well founded; they had now substantial proof, for the shop tax, the additional tax on candles, the tax on female servants, the additional tax on malt; in short, all the taxes they had opposed, were either abandoned in the first instance, or since repealed. The regulations of taxes they had not opposed as unproductive, but as doing what no increase of productiveness could justify—sacrificing the constitution, and

the liberty of the fubject to revenue. Yet even thefe regulations had, in many inftances, effected nothing that might not have been effected without them. If, for inftance, the produce of the tobacco licences, in all refpects a new tax, were deducted from the amount of the duties, it would be found, they were not more productive under the management of the excife, than they had been at a former period. The intimation that the Budget fhould in future be opened at an earlier period, although not amounting to an abfolute promife, was at leaft fomething, and he rejoiced in having been the means of obtaining it. It was a lame mode of reviewing an annual account before that account was clofed, and this Mr. Chancellor Pitt feemed to feel, by his never having attempted it before. But if by this mode, lame as it was, part of the inconvenience arifing from the anticipation of the confolidated fund would be obviated, the impropriety of the application ftood precifely where it did. A charge for the intereft of navy debt of about 20,000l. was admitted, which charge 500,000l. would extinguifh, and might be much more advantageoufly applied to that purpofe, than to the purchafe of three per cents. The revenue Committee of 1786, and the Houfe, by adopting their report, had given an affurance to the public, that in future the navy debt fhould never be allowed to accumulate fo as to bear intereft. Surely, if any regard was due to the reports of Committees, and the affurances held out by the fanction of the Houfe, the terms ought to be kept, when they had the means of keeping them.

An honourable gentleman (Mr. Rofe) had faid, that when he was in the high and important office of Secretary to the Treafury, the finking fund had been anticipated for three quarters, as if a perfon, in that fubordinate fituation were to be refponfible for all the meafures of finance. The character of a meafure might fometimes point out the author; and when he faw dull and blundering tax bills brought forward with little of mind, and nothing of liberality, in which cunning was fubftituted for wifdom, and tricking for intelligence, he could not help fuppofing that they were not the production of any man in the fuperior departments of office, and attributing them to fome of his fubordinates. In juftice, however, to the honourable men who thought him worthy of a fituation

under them, it was neceſſary to remark, that they had never propoſed the anticipation alluded to as part of a ſyſtem, and that it was with them only a temporary and unavoidable expedient, to cover an old deficiency.

He had avoided a general diſcuſſion of the revenue and expenditure, becauſe he was bound by propriety, and the order of debate, to confine himſelf to a particular point. But did it follow from that, as had been inferred, that he abandoned all the other points he had maintained? On the contrary, he was ready to maintain them every one, whenever called upon to debate them collectively or ſingly. It was indeed a moſt curious mode of arguing, that as often as he objected to any one of the conteſted ſtatements on finance, he muſt either go through all the reſt, or be underſtood to admit them as true. It was equally curious to infer that, becauſe he admitted there was at laſt a ſurplus of revenue to juſtify the application of a million annually to the extinction of debt, he admitted alſo, that there was ſuch a ſurplus ſix years ago, and every year ſince that time. They might as well tell him he had pledged himſelf to prove, that the revenue would not exceed the expenditure in the preſent century, or in the next, or that the deficiency muſt be eternal.

While they maintained this verbal diſpute, they had paid him the ſubſtantial compliment of adopting his opinions. They had taken an average of four years, as the proper eſtimate of future revenue; they admitted, that the eſtimate of expenditure, by the Committee of 1786, could not be realized, and added 500,000l. to it by the eſtimate of 1791; and they had admitted, as he contended, that the eſtimate of 1791 was larger than it ought to be, and propoſed a reduction. But they impoſed on the Houſe of Commons the ungracious taſk of propoſing an addition to the expenditure, and now took to themſelves the more pleaſing office of ſuggeſting a reduction, although they were the real authors of both, while they were making a reduction of 200,000l. in appearance, had, in fact, made an addition of 300,000l. to their own eſtimate of 1786. He referred to the Houſe whether a caſe had been made out to induce them to vote an anticipation, the invariable conſequence of which had hitherto been to put off the important buſineſs of finance till a ſeaſon of the year when many gentlemen could

not attend the discharge of their duty. He intreated them to consider what that duty had been, and what it was likely to be in future. It had hitherto been to impose on their constituents some fresh burdens, or some new restraint, in the shape of a regulation. The fortunate period was at length arrived when they were told it would be in their power to alleviate those burdens, and it was of great importance that the people should not be taught, that for taxes and penalties they were indebted to their representatives, but for ease and relief to the crown.

Mr. ROSE in explanation said, it was of little importance whether he spent the summer in civilizing his mind in his forests, or the honourable gentleman in preparing entertainment for the Public at his play-house—[a call to order.] He should never be deterred from stating his sentiments, by any remarks on his manner of doing so. Except the reduction of the land tax, there were only two instances of a repeal of taxes in the present century, both of which had been more directly and pointedly recommended from the Throne than the present. The House, instead of objecting, came to a unanimous vote of thanks on the recommendation, and the Speaker, on carrying up the bill for the repeal, said to the King, on the Throne, "Sir, your faithful Commons have now completed what "your Majesty was pleased to recommend to them at the open- "ing of this session of Parliament."

Mr. Chancellor PITT said it had always been his wish, and would be so in future, to open the budget at as early a period of the session as possible; but he could not make a positive promise on a subject that must be governed by circumstances.

Mr. FOX wished that when gentlemen meant to support a measure by precedents, they would prepare the measure and the precedent at the same time, that both might be examined together. There were precedents even on the journals of the House, more to be shunned than followed, and of this nature was the precedent just mentioned. He argued at some length on the loose and imperfect manner in which accounts of revenue and expenditure must be examined when debated, before they were closed, as must always be the case on an early budget, if the accounts were not made up till the 5th of April; observed that some of the Exchequer bills bore an interest of two-pence halfpenny a day, more than three-quarters per cent.

than they now ought to bear; and said no complaint had been made by opposition of the budget's being opened too early this year.

Mr. Chancellor PITT rejoiced to hear that all such complaint was disclaimed; for it had been thrown out in a former debate, that the budget had been insidiously hastened to divert attention from other matters. Some of the Exchequer bills did bear an interest of two-pence halfpenny a day; and he had proposed to the Bank to reduce to two-pence. To this proposition he had received no answer, but he expected it would be complied with.

Mr. SHERIDAN said, he had not charged the right honourable gentleman with opening his budget too early, but with stating of what it was to consist on the first day of the session.

The question being put, that the report be committed,

Mr. SHERIDAN said, that part of his object being obtained, viz. that the business of the finance should not be postponed in future till the summer months, he should not divide the House as he had before intended.

The motion was negatived, and the report agreed to.

The SECRETARY AT WAR gave notice that he should move the army extraordinaries on Monday.

The House adjourned.

Monday, 27th February.

The House in a Committee of Ways and Means for raising a supply, agreed, that five millions and five hundred thousand pounds be raised by loan, on Exchequer bills.

The House adjourned.

Tuesday, 28th February.

Mr. DUNDAS presented a petition on behalf of the Governor and Company of the Bank of Scotland, praying for leave to increase their capital, &c.

Referred to a Committee.

The House adjourned.

Wednesday, 29th February.

Major SCOTT gave notice of a motion which he intended to make on Friday, relative to the expences of the trial of Mr. Haſtings. His motion related to the immenſe detail to which theſe expences had ſwelled out. On the ſubject of this motion, there paſſed ſome converſation between the Major and Mr. Burke.

Mr. WHITBREAD having firſt moved, " that the Houſe " do now reſolve itſelf into a Committee of the whole " Houſe, to take into conſideration the papers on the table, " reſpecting the late armament againſt Ruſſia," and that motion, upon the oppoſition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, being withdrawn, began by ſaying, That it was with ſenſations of great diffidence and anxiety he roſe to the performance of the important taſk he had undertaken; in the execution of it he hoped for the patience and indulgence of the Houſe. Had ingenuity, he ſaid, been requiſite to invent, or eloquence to inforce the arguments which might be adduced at the opening of the buſineſs then before the Houſe, he had not ſtood in the ſituation in which he then did, but as the facts from authority before the Houſe were notorious, and open to common attention; as the inferences from thoſe facts were deducible by the plaineſt underſtanding, he had come forward with zeal and alacrity upon the occaſion; a zeal and alacrity inſpired by a ſenſe of the duty he owed to his conſtituents, by the ſincere conviction, which he felt, that in the tranſaction then under diſcuſſion, His Majeſty's Miniſters had offered violence to the dignity, reputation, and intereſts of this country. In the courſe of what he ſhould have the honour to offer, in order to ſupport the reſolutions he ſhould ſubmit to the conſideration of the Houſe, he ſhould abſtain from all exaggerated praiſe of the conſtitution. Feeling as he did a ſincere reverence and affection for the conſtitution under which he lived, determined as he was to act up to its principles and its purity, to deſcant upon the beauties of its theory, upon all occaſions to dwell upon its various excellencies, was, in his mind, unneceſſary; if they all united in reſtoring and giving energy to its functions; if they united in maintaining their own rights and privileges, in which

were comprehended the rights and freedom and proſperity of their conſtituents; in guarding them againſt the encroachments of craft and of power, in cleanſing them from all adventitious polutions, compliment and adulation would be unneceſſary; it was poſſible, he ſaid, to flatter and to betray; but a ſeries of conduct tending to one point, uniform in its conſtitutional means to attain conſtitutional ends, could not be miſtaken, and needed neither flattery to gloſs, nor commentary to explain it. He truſted that gentlemen would, that night evince to the world, that they loved the conſtitution they ſo laviſhly commended; that if he, and thoſe far abler than him, with whom he had the honour to think and to act, ſhould prove, from the evidence upon the table, that Miniſters had miſconducted themſelves; that they would not ſhrink from the painful and neceſſary part of their duty, that of inflicting cenſure where, in his conſcience, he believed that cenſure was moſt indiſputably due. If they were not able to prove the aſſertions they had made, he at leaſt truſted that the reſolution he ſhould offer would not be got rid of, by any ſide blow, by any motion for previous queſtion, that he and his friends ſhould be met face to face upon the ſubject; that gentlemen would not throw away the laſt remnant that was left of the boaſted privileges of Parliament, viz. the power of calling Miniſters to account for their conduct; that they would not demoliſh that laſt rampart, under the maſk of which almoſt all the other fortreſſes of the conſtitution had been deſtroyed. In giving his attention to the papers then upon the table, as a repreſentative of the people, he had been indignant in obſerving the abſurd and ridiculous purpoſe for which the money of his conſtituents had been extorted from them; as an Engliſhman he had bluſhed for the ſtate of degradation to which Miniſters had reduced the Britiſh name; but he had ſingular ſatisfaction in recollecting, that he was one, though of the humbleſt individuals of that reſpectable minority, whoſe voice was confeſſed to have been in uniſon with the voice of the people; whoſe activity and exertion prevented the converſion of a cauſeleſs, abſurd, and expenſive armament, into a ſtill more cauſeleſs, abſurd, and deſtructive war. It ſhould be a circumſtance recorded, and worth recording, to all poſterity, that a firm and conſtitutional oppoſition did, by their

patriotic efforts, arrest the progress of a Minister in the zenith of his popularity, and supported by a large and confiding majority of the House of Commons, towards involving his country in a fruitless war, from which she might not have escaped without national bankruptcy, and from which she could not have escaped without very pressing national calamity and distress.

Mr. Whitbread said, he was convinced that the commercial interests of Great Britain were so well understood by every person who heard him, that he would not detain the House by expatiating upon the advantages that were derived from our commercial intercourse with Russia, which were of such a nature, as not to render any slight ground of quarrel with that country justifiable.

He did not imagine that any politician would contend that, because, the immediate balance of trade between the two countries appeared to be in favour of Russia, therefore we derived no advantage from that trade. If there were, however, any person who maintained such doctrines, he would refer him to a book that had been lately so ably quoted by the right honourable gentleman (Mr. Pitt,) "Smith's Wealth of Nations." In the deep researches of that great political philosopher, he would find his short-sighted opinions amply discussed and amply refuted. By our trade with Russia we gained an extensive and wholesome nursery for our mariners; from thence we procured, (every consideration had) at the most advantageous rate, those stores which form the existence of our navy; from thence we procured those gross commodities, which, after employing an immense quantity of productive labour at home, re-produced and exported again, returned the capital originally laid out upon them an hundred fold.

Neither did he imagine that doctrine which had been insinuated, but not avowed, last year, would now be revived; namely, that Russia had formerly done us disservices, particularly in the instance of the armed neutrality; and that this had been a good opportunity of revenge. It must be remembered, that Prussia was the contriver of the armed neutrality; it would therefore have been but fair to have punished Prussia, the principal, before we proceeded to vengeance upon Russia, the accomplice. He was aware, that these grounds were in themselves not tenable, nor avowed; but such insinuations

having gone forth, he had thought proper briefly to touch upon them. In the debates that had taken place the preceding year, on the subject of the Russian armament, Ministers, he said, had so prudently involved themselves in political obscurity, that no clue was given by which could be discovered either the causes of the war itself, or of our interference, or of the ends we purposed attaining. Gentlemen in opposition were told that they had no authority to argue upon, and that their speculations it was not worth while to answer. Now, however, it *did* appear, from the documents upon the table, that the original cause of the war, was a desire on the part of the Turks to rescue the Crimea, and the countries adjacent, from the dominion of Russia. It was well known, that the total Sovereignty of the Crimea was ceded to Russia by the Porte by treaty in 1784. It was therefore a war of injustice and aggression, on the part of the Porte; of defence and justice on the part of Russia. It was stated by Count Osterman, in his letter to Mr. Whitworth and Count Goltze, dated June 6, 1791, that the "*Courts of London and Berlin at the time avowed that* "*Russia had been unjustly attacked.*" That statement remaining uncontradicted, he should take it for granted it was true. An opinion had prevailed in Europe, and it had been suggested in that House, and as far as his knowledge went, the suggestion had not been refuted, that Great Britain had stimulated the Turks to this war of injustice. If that be a calumny, said Mr. Whitbread, let it be speedily contradicted, and by such authority as will give the contradiction weight; let that foul stain be washed from us, and from our nation. If it be true, detested by all good men be that wretched policy which can risk the sacrifice of the lives of thousands and the happiness of millions of our species to attain its own short-sighted ends.

From the first paper on the table, dated in December 1789, it appeared that the Empress then requested the interference of Great Britain, to bring about a pacification, upon certain terms, which were, that she should extend her frontier to the Dniester, and that the provinces of Moldavia, Bessarabia, and Wallachia, should be created into an independent principality, under a Christian Prince. The Court of St. James's, in answer, declare the impossibility of attempting to mediate upon those terms; and as the Empress immediately after entirely

abandoned them herself, he should put the consideration of them wholly out of the question, as in fact they had no more relation to the subject immediately before the House, than the partition of Poland, which took place some years past between the three allied Powers, or than the projected partition of the Mysore country by the allies in India. He trusted, for the sake of ministerial consistency, that these claims of Russia had been considered upon maps of a confined scale; for in casting our eyes over too wide a description of the globe, we should find that the acquisition of territory, and extermination of Princes, which was considered as inordinate ambition, and dangerous aggrandizement, in Europe, in Asia was no more than sound policy, the plan of British Ministers, supported by British Ministers. However, in *May* 1790, the Empress came forward with terms, upon which she declared herself willing to make peace, and upon which peace was actually concluded in *December* 1791. Her propositions are, that all her former treaties should be renewed, and rendered valid, and that she should be put in possession of Oczakow, and the whole territory, from the Bog to the Dniester; the last river to serve as a boundary to the two empires. To these terms our uniform answer was, that no consideration would be paid to any terms not resting upon the basis of the *status quo*. He said, there were some propositions so self-evident, that to attempt their elaborate proof, was only to detract from the original truth and clearness in which they appeared. Of that kind he took to be the proposition which asserted, that no arrangement respecting Oczakow, and its district, could in any way affect the political or commercial interests of Great Britain. If there was a spot in Europe, to which no ramification of the British commerce extended; if there were seas upon the face of the globe, on which no British merchantmen sailed; that spot, and the seas adjoining to it, for which we had negociated, and for which we had armed, were precisely in that situation. We exported nothing thither, we imported nothing from thence: but he would rest the truth of the proposition on this single ground, which he was sure would not fail him, viz. that no British merchant (alive as that respectable body of people always were, and always ought to be, to their own interests,) should be able solely from the operation it would have

upon the commerce of this country, to discover, in any given time, whether Oczakow was ceded to the Empress, or remained in the hands of the Turks. Pruffia, our ally, he took to be as little interested in a commercial point of view as we could be; excepting only one case, which however could not be avowed. This was, that some secret negociation had taken place, and that the King of Pruffia wished to stipulate with the Empress, that if she would suffer him to take possession of Thorn and Dantzic, he would not object to her taking Oczakow, and its district. In this light it would certainly be most material to the commercial interests of Pruffia; but this, he repeated could not be avowed. To either country it was immaterial, in a political point of view, excepting as it might affect the balance of Europe; which could only be in two ways either that, when in possession of the Porte, it gave to the Turks a more secure frontier against the inroads of Russia, or that in possession of the Empress, it would, afford that Princess easier means of prosecuting those plans of inordinate ambition which were attributed to her. Historical experience proved to us, that in neither of these cases was it *at all material.* When Marshal Romanzow dictated the disgraceful peace of Kainardgi in the year 1774, he had been foiled before Oczakow, and that fortress was in the hands of the Turks. When the peace was signed by the Empress, upon those terms which he should always contend to be moderate and equitable terms, in December 1791, she had been in possession of Oczakow three years. These arguments, said Mr. Whitbread, are, I think, sufficient to prove the assertion I have made; but we are all aware that such is the force of custom, such the facination of habit, upon the minds of men; such their subjugation to the opinions of those, to whose judgements they are used to look up, that authority has often produced that conviction, of which the clearest demonstration has failed; and I am happy, on this occasion, in being able to adduce, in support of my opinions, the authority of one whose influence is greater in this House; I mean the authority of the right honourable gentleman over against me himself. If by the balance of Europe any thing is meant, if they are not mere chimerical sounds, without the attachment of any specific idea to them, this must be understood, viz. so nice an equipoize of the interests of the different powers,

that no one ſhall be in danger from the other; and thus the permanent tranquillity of Europe be eſtabliſhed. But ſince Oczakow has been in the power of Ruſſia, we have been told, from the mouth of His Majeſty, "that the friendly aſſurances "he receives from foreign powers, and the general ſtate of "affairs in Europe, appears to promiſe to his ſubjects the "continuance of their preſent tranquility. Under theſe cir-"cumſtances he is induced to think, that ſome immediate re-"duction may be ſafely made in our military and naval eſtab-"liſhments."

The right honourable gentleman himſelf, in his place, declared, that he expects our tranquillity to be permanent. He has acted upon that principle; he has ſupported his declarations by his deeds; and notwithſtanding an arrangement has taken place, which he contended would deſtroy the balance of power, he has adviſed His Majeſty to diminiſh his eſtabliſhments, and to part with a portion of the revenue. Of his two opinions I will chuſe that upon which he acted; and I do contend that I have his unequivocal authority for aſſerting, that the intereſts of this country were in no degree involved in any arrangement that could have taken place reſpecting Oczakow and its diſtrict. Sir, I will preſs the matter no farther; but I do truſt that the right honourable gentleman has himſelf now ſounded an alarm upon the doctrine of confidence, which will penetrate the ears of the moſt dull and lethargic of thoſe who have ſlumbered and ſlept upon that poſt, which ought to be occupied with vigilance, jealouſy, and attention. Let us conſider the ſituation in which the confiding friends of the Miniſter are placed. Laſt year they yielded him the public purſe, which he employed for an object, in the attainment of which the intereſts of this country were ſaid to be deeply involved: he fails in his purſuit; and now he comes forward and tells them, that notwithſtanding this failure, we are in the moſt proſperous ſituation, with every proſpect of tranquillity before us. How can they account to their conſtituents for having ſuffered their money to be laviſhed for an object of no value? Sir, I hope that having been betrayed by a confidence in that wayward policy, which is every thing by turns, and nothing long, which ſees every thing through the medium of its own immediate intereſt, and now places the fate of the empire on the fate of a petty fortreſs,

and a distant desert, and now declares their insignificance in the most pointed terms; that they will learn from practice and experience, what the most powerful eloquence and convincing argument have been unable to teach them, that the doctrine of confidence, which they have contended to be constitutional, cannot assimilate with any one principle of the constitution.

Mr. Whitbread said, he should proceed to prove, that this absurd object, for which we had negociated and for which we had armed, for which Ministers had thought necessary to force the nation to so great an exertion, had been entirely abandoned, and that without any assigned reason. It was remarkable, that in the very first memorial, which was presented after the King's message of last year, by Mr. Whitworth and Count Goltze, we begin to talk of a modification of the *status quo*, according to the suggestion of *respectable powers*. It was to be observed that the Danish memorial, which he supposed must be here alluded to, dated on the 8th of March, and that the King's message did not come down to the House till the 28th of March, it was more than probable that memorial had reached the Court of London in less than twenty days, but no abatement of the strict *status quo* is talked of till after we had the arms in our hands to enforce the terms we had proposed. What was to be inferred from this, but that we expected to find in Russia that dastardly spirit with which we knew ourselves to be actuated; that we expected to find the Empress a mere bully, to be terrified into compliance by the first shew of resistance and force. Still, however, there was something of the gigantic in the conduct of Ministers, an appearance of menace and greatness; but as they had stalked into this business giants, we should find them slink out the merest pigmies that ever disgraced a Political Theatre. Now came the humiliation of Great Britain, now came that disgraceful memorial, which at once was to concede all that we had negociated, threatened, and armed to maintain. He hoped the House would excuse him if he dwelt a little upon this memorial, dated June 29, 1791, signed by Messrs. Whitworth, Fawkener, and Count Goltze. It was of a nature so extraordinary as to demand his serious attention. He had not, he said, been thrown into situations where he might become acquainted with

the general ſtyle of diplomatic negociation, and from his ignorance, perhaps, might ariſe the ſurprize he felt at one of the opening paragraphs of the memorial then before him,' was, the intercourſe between one nation and another ſo wholly different from that which took place in tranſactions of importance between man and man, that probity, candour, fairneſs, and inviolable regard to truth which ought to be the leading features, and were the wiſeſt policy in the one, ſhould be entirely baniſhed from the other, and inſincerity, cunning, and a diſregard for all principle, be ſubſtituted in their ſtead; or was it meant as a ſatire upon this curious negociation only, that it was ſaid by the memorialiſts, "the calmneſs they thus "ſhew, and their candour, which *is ſo different from the or-* "*dinary courſe of negociation*, will be conſidered as an indubi-"table proof of the ſincere and diſintereſted deſire of the "Kings their maſters to make their friendly intervention "conduce to the ſpeedy re-eſtabliſhment of a peace." Was it neceſſary to ſend out Envoy Extraordinary upon Envoy Extraordinary to declare that you were going to tell the truth; to ſay, all that we had been talking of for twelve months paſt was folly and nonſenſe; we meant nothing by it: we were now come to tell what our real intentions were. Had our dealings with the Court of Peterſburgh been ſo crooked that it was neceſſary to ſpecify that you were about to be candid and honeſt? The negociators then proceeded to ſtate three propoſals, beyond the laſt of which they declare it impoſſible for them to offer any thing to the Turks. The firſt propoſal was, that the diſtrict of Oczakow, from the Bog to the Dnieſter, ſhould be declared neutral, and to be inhabited by the ſubjects of neither power; the ſecond propoſal was, that Oczakow and it's *immediate* diſtrict ſhould be ceded to the Empreſs, reſerving, however, to the Turks a line of demarcation on the eaſtern ſide of the Dnieſter, ſuch, for inſtance, as the lake Telegot, "for the allied Courts do not think they ſhall be able to en-"gage the Porte to conclude a peace on the condition of leav-"ing Oczakow fortified in the hands of Ruſſia, unleſs this ſa-"crifice, ſo dangerous for her, ſhould be compenſated by the "ſecurity of the two banks of the Dnieſter." Here he believed the Dnieſter was mentioned for the firſt time as the object upon which every thing reſted; but now it ſeemed as if

the free navigation of the Dniester was the only thing we had very seriously set our thoughts upon. The third proposal was, that Oczakow and its district should be yielded in sovereignty to Russia, but that the fortress itself should be demolished, and no other fortifications raised. It was curious to observe the conclusion of this disgraceful memorial: the negociators said, "Her Majesty's lively solicitude for the repose of Europe, "her love towards her people, her desire to restore peace to "them, and to prevent the further effusion of human blood, "afford the surest confidence to the undersigned, that this im-"portant decision will be speedily signified to them, and that "it will be favourable; *more especially as complying with every "thing Her Imperial Majesty has appeared to desire, they ask "from her goodness and generosity only some slight modifications.*" That Princess, whose inordinate ambition had been represented as endangering the tranquillity of Europe, who regardless of the distress and miseries of her subjects, was willing to attain her object by wading through their blood, was now converted into a sovereign, possessing every virtue which could adorn or dignify a throne, and our Ministers were reduced to ask, as suppliants, from the *goodness and generosity* of that power, whose destructive progress we had armed to impede, *some slight modifications of those terms* which we had invariably declared we could, upon no consideration, give ear to; and what was this slight modification to effect? was it to procure any advantage to the Turks! It was strange that such had been the supineness of the Porte in circumstances where we conceived their interests to be most materially involved, that the navigation of the Dniester was not taken the smallest notice of in the treaty of peace which was signed at Galacz in December 1791. He believed that what he stated upon this subject was authentic; if it was not, it would be contradicted; and in truth he could not but express his surprize that the Grand Vizier and his colleagues should have treated the right honourable gentleman and his colleagues so cavalierly that they had no authentic copy of the peace to lay upon the table. The Empress's answer to this memorial maintained the same steadiness and firmness of mind which had been the leading feature of her conduct from the commencement of the nego-

ciation. Count Osterman said, in her name, that the last was the only proposal which the Court of Petersburgh could take into consideration; and upon that it was observed, that the demolition of the fortifications of Oczakow was incompatible with the ideas that were entertained of total sovereignty, and therefore she could not listen to such a condition; but added, that *so far from having any intention of disturbing the navigation of the Dniester, that it had been the invariable plan of her reign to protect the commerce of friendly and neutral nations.* She might well have said, Why did you not tell me all this fourteen months ago? Let us for a moment consider the situation of our unfortunate allies whilst we were nogociating in their behalf. Was there an aweful suspense, such as might be expected, whilst so great a nation as Great Britain was mediating, and was armed to enforce her mediation? Was the sword for a single instant withheld, or the victorious progress of the Empress stopped? No. The profusion of Turkish blood that was shed, the repeated defeats of our miserable allies, would testify to the contrary. The ears of our Ministers were constantly insulted by the *Te Deums* that were chaunted for victories gained over an enemy, for whom we had negociated, for whom we had armed, for whom we were at last reduced to petition. Count Osterman's answer was concluded by expressing a doubt whether we had any authority from the Turk to mediate in his behalf at all. He believed the fact was, that we had no authority, and that the preliminaries were signed without our concurrence or advice. To what a degraded state was this glorious country reduced? To that detested and abandoned situation of misery and despair where no friend was found to acknowledge our friendship, no foe that dreaded our enmity. The answer of the three Ministers to this memorial of Count Osterman's, stated that as her Imperial Majesty had given her word that she would not disturb the navigation of the Dniester, they totally receded from all their former stipulations; that she might now possess Oczakow and its district in total sovereignty, do what she pleased with its fortifications, and if the Turks did not make peace upon those very terms which we had declared we could not venture to offer to them, we would abandon them to the course of events; to the vengeance of an ambitious, insulted, and victorious enemy. He

thought he need not detain the House much longer to prove that the object for which we had negociated and armed, such as it was, had been entirely abandoned; and he concluded that the House would not disagree with him in pronouncing that His Majesty's Ministers had throughout this affair grossly misconducted themselves, but an aggravation of this misconduct still remained behind; for it could be proved that they had continued the armament after having determined entirely to relinquish the object for which it had been made. He contended that from the moment Mr. Fawkener went out we ought to have disarmed, because at that moment we had resolved upon unconditional submission to the Empress's terms. To this it might be answered, that the Empress, upon our disarmament might have increased her demands. Was it probable that that Princess, who had adhered from the beginning to one steady line of conduct, who had never varied her language, whether we mediated, threatened, or intreated, would, at this juncture, have departed from conditions, not that we had imposed, not that she was brought into by coercion, but which she herself had offered during the course of more than twelve months? it was not probable that she would, but it might be answered, it was possible. How, then, did we disarm at last? At that period, what security had we that she would perform what she had agreed to? To use the words of the memorial, "Her Imperial Majesty's word; that most certain pledge of the engagements she contracts;" that Imperial word which two months before was not to be taken, is now a sufficient ground for us to disband our armament. Press-warrants were actually recalled on the 29th of July, and the preliminaries were not signed till August 11, 1791. The money of the subjects had been taken from them, they had been deprived of their liberty, that Ministers might a little conceal the disgrace they were conscious awaited them.

There was a source of domestic misery arising from the capricious system of arming and disarming, of manning and unmanning our navy, which he imagined must come home to the feelings of every man who heard him; he meant the wanton abuse of the unconstitutional power which was vested in the executive Government, of pressing for the sea service. Here he begged to be understood as by no means intending to assert,

that it was a power which, upon great emergencies, could be dispensed with; he feared it could not; but it was a stretch of authority which no slight cause could justify. By the frequency of armament which had lately taken place, the industrious poor had been torn from those situations of comfort and honesty which they occupied to their own benefit and that of their country; dragged to our ports, and violently forced into situations from which they had no means of escape. If the safety of the empire required it, the evil, though great, must be tolerated; but in the instances before us, no State necessity required such a sacrifice; and these unhappy persons were in a short time vomited up again, not the wholesome food that had been taken in, but a mass of profligacy, disorder, and want.

Mr. Whitbread said, before he sat down, he should touch upon two topics which had been insinuated, by way of palliation of that conduct, for which no open defence could be attempted. It had been much the fashion without doors, copied no doubt from the practice so successfully carried on within, to divert the public attention from the transaction then under discussion, by a reference to the flourishing state of our finances. It had been attempted to throw the gaudy veil of national wealth, and commercial prosperity, over the mutilated monument of political arrogance and political imbecility, then before them. It had been said, nothing but faction can find fault with a Minister, who has raised the finances of the country to the pitch at which they now stood. Three per cents at 96, is a complete refutation of every argument you can bring against his political conduct. Here we feel the pulse of the nation, and whilst that continues to beat high and firm, we will not believe that any thing is amiss. The pulse, he said, was a good, though not an infallible, criterion of the health of the frame. In the political, as well as the human body, artifice or incentive might accelerate the circulation; and the paroxysm once over, the patient would return to a more hopeless state of languor and debility than that from which he had been roused. That accident, certainly not of the contrivance, and as certainly beyond the control of the right honourable gentleman, that artifice, probably of his contrivance, but for the future effects of which he could by no

means anſwer, had contributed to the preſent high ſtate of the funds, muſt be apparent to the commoneſt obſerver; but he lamented that the great extenſion of the national debt had, among others, produced this alarming evil; that it had converted us into ſuch a nation of ſtock-jobbers, that with our eyes fixed upon the fluctuation of the money market, we could ſuffer the honour of the country, our deareſt rights and privileges, to moulder away, without obſervation or regret. It had been alſo ſaid, that the magnanimity of the right honourable gentleman, in yielding his opinion to that of the people, ought to protect him from any cenſure. Great magnanimity was, he obſerved, diſplayed, when an individual, of ſplendid talents, departed from an opinion he might have formed from a conviction that that opinion was founded in error. The ſtrength and energy of the human mind never appeared in more glowing colours, than in that triumph of reaſon over paſſion. Great magnanimity was diſplayed, when an individual of exalted rank, high in the councils of his Sovereign, having, in concert with his colleagues, adopted ſome plan which he conceives highly beneficial to his country, but thwarted in the execution of his project, true to his principles, but regardleſs of the emoluments of office, or the faſcination of power, departs from a ſituation he can no longer fill with honour to himſelf, or, as he conceives, advantage to his country; and, to the honour of our time, it might be ſaid, that ſuch inſtances would not be wanting to the hiſtory of the preſent day: but he avowed his ſurpriſe, that the right honourable gentleman ſhould have ſubmitted to the mortification he confeſſed to have felt, at having been obliged to relinquiſh his opinion to the opinion of the people, and the complexion of the times; thinking, as he did, the intereſts of this country materially involved in the proſecution of the plan he had formed; ſo materially, as to call for that exertion to which he had forced the country, to ſupport it. He ought, as it appeared to him, rather to have yielded his ſituation, or even his life, than his opinion. In departing from it, unconvinced, he had departed from the noble character ſo ably quoted by his right honourable friend on a former night, and from which he was certain he would never ſwerve. "*Juſti & tenacis propoſiti viri.*" He had given ear to the voice of the multitude,

as he thought, "*prava jubentium.*" He had made a compariſon between his opinion and his place, and had elected the latter and the worſe. He had ſacrificed to a momentary popularity, the conviction of his own mind; to his love of power, the approbation of his own underſtanding. After apologizing for having detained the Houſe ſo long, he read the three reſolutions, the firſt of which he moved.

"That no arrangement, reſpecting Oczakow and its diſ-"trict, appears to have been capable of affecting the political "or commercial intereſts of this country, ſo as to juſtify any "hoſtile interference on the part of Great Britain between "Ruſſia and the Porte."

Colonel MACLEOD ſeconded the motion, and ſaid, that he felt himſelf called upon to give ſomething more than a ſilent vote in ſupport of it. The conduct of the right honourable gentleman in the negociation with Ruſſia, and in ſome other tranſactions, had induced him totally to withdraw that confidence, which he had before ſo freely given.

Without intending to examine the conduct of the honourable gentleman ſo minutely as the honourable mover of the queſtion, he could not avoid noticing one argument, which had been uſed in his ſupport. It had been ſaid, that though the Miniſter prepared for a war, he had not intended to commence it. To ſuch an argument, few perſons would chuſe to be indebted. If it was applicable, it told the diſgraceful circumſtance, that the Miniſter had induced this glorious, warlike and high-ſpirited nation to draw its ſword, at the ſame time that he had determined never to uſe it.

When the ſword was unſheathed, he had proſtrated himſelf with it before the Empreſs, and it muſt be owned, that ſhe had made a moſt vigorous uſe of her imperial foot. In this conduct, he had ſhewn a wonderful ignorance of the ways of the ſex; and it was as wonderful that the right honourable gentleman, his friend, had not given him better information—Women might ſometimes yield to force, but ſeldom to intreaties; they might be taken by ſtorm, but not by a feint; and in the next affair which the right honourable gentleman ſhould have with the Empreſs, he would adviſe him to raviſh thoſe favours which ſhould be denied to his courtſhip.

If, however, the Minifter had credit for the intention of going to war, he muft have been either ignorant of the general wifh of the people, or determined to oppofe it. He muft have oppofed alfo his own fpeeches in that Houfe, ftating both the neceffity and the probability of peace. How then could the Houfe continue that confidence to a Minifter, who, after poffeffing, for feven or eight years, all the channels of political information, domeftic or otherwife, had fhewn either fuch dangerous ignorance, or fuch wilful obftinacy!

Upon former occafions, in which the authors of plans deliberately formed in confultation with their friends had found them rejected, a very different conduct had been purfued. He did not mean to refer to Demofthenes, and Athens, and all that; his example was taken from the Demofthenes of this country, Lord Chatham. Where was now his fpirit? Certainly not where it was moft to have been expected. When that nobleman found the people adverfe to his plan of a Spanifh war, he refigned his office. He difdained to act, where he could not lead. The Minifter admits, that his rivals, the gentlemen who oppofe him in that Houfe, chiefly fway the opinion of the people; but, "What of that;" fays he, "I kept my "place."

There were circumftances which efpecially characterifed the conduct of the prefent Adminiftration; a reftlefs difpofition for experiments, and an unalterable attachment to office. The firft led them to the frequent neceffity of retracting their plans, or of purfuing them againft the will of the nation; the laft induced them, upon the leaft rifk of their places, or of their confequence in that Houfe, to furrender their opinions. They then ftopped in their career, refting upon oars, till another opportunity occurred for new plans and farther experiments.

The progrefs of philofophy had of late been very rapid in Europe, and the fondnefs for peace muft confequently have increafed. Still, however, he feared that wars would occur from the many collifions of intereft and of ambition between rival nations and Princes. It muft be fome time, at leaft, before a contrary fyftem could be confirmed. And, when the Emprefs fhall next happen to be at war with any power, whofe interefts we may affect to adopt, how will our interference be refpected? We may arm; but the trick is found out. "I don't mind

" Great Britain," ſhe will ſay, " I know ſhe won't fight." Thus had our national dignity and character been ſacrificed, to recover which a war might one time really become neceſſary, at the expence of fifty, or an hundred millions.

Profeſſions of love for the conſtitution had been very frequent of late. Though bred a ſoldier, he had ſtudied the conſtitution with delight, and he loved it as well as any man. He had been ſhocked to perceive how much it was violated by the laws for the collection of the revenue. Our debts, he knew, muſt be paid, and that by taxes; but, ſince the laws for collecting the latter were, for the moſt part, ſo injurious to the conſtitution, whoever occaſioned an increaſe of taxes, leſſened the ſecurity of our liberties. Our debts were paid not only by the ſweat of our brows, but by the ſacrifice of our conſtitution. The projects of the Miniſter had frequently increaſed our liſt of taxes, and had thus injured the conſtitution more than it could ever be benefited by his praiſes.

A very ſlight peruſal of the hiſtory of this country would ſhew, that in the glorious reigns of William and Anne, the Miniſters had never aſked for taxes to carry on a war, till the people had called for hoſtilities, and had ſhewn that the war was their own.

What, perhaps, had occaſioned ſo much laughter on the other ſide of the Houſe, was, that, in the laſt ſeſſion, he had ſupported the Miniſter through all the queſtions of confidence. He confeſſed this with ſhame, with contrition, with ſorrow. He lamented his own conduct. If any circumſtances could afford an excuſe for it, they were, that the right honourable gentleman had not, at that time, ſo clearly diſcovered how much he could miſuſe the confidence of the Houſe; and that he himſelf had not had opportunities of perceiving the general danger of giving confidence to Miniſters.

For this error he would endeavour to compenſate, by dedicating the remainder of his life to the oppoſition of ſuch a ſyſtem.

Much credit had been attempted to be given to the right honourable gentleman, on account of the proſperity of the country. The proſperity of a great country, he would beg leave to ſay, was dependent on other cauſes than the life or exertions of any one individual.

The honourable ROBERT BANKS JENKINSON (son of Lord Hawkesbury) gave his maiden speech in support of Administration. The honourable gentleman said, though he rose for the purpose of objecting to the resolutions moved, he felt himself obliged to the honourable gentleman who had made them, as an opportunity was thereby given, that misrepresentation might be done away, and pleasure afforded to every friend of Administration to meet and discuss the question. It should be his endeavour, he said, to prove the system taken up by administration, and the principles upon which they had acted, to be such as the wisest and soundest policy at the time dictated. It had been admitted by the first politicians in this country, that the principles upon which England ought to act was, to establish continental alliances—to consider France as our rival—to keep Holland from falling into her hands—to obtain by alliance a sufficient land force to protect Holland—and upon every occasion to divide the power of France. These principles admitted, the question would be, to what power were we to look to form alliances with? Politicians agreed, that it would be wise to ally ourselves with the whole of Germany against France; but to this there were many apparently insuperable difficulties, and among them the equality of the powers of Brandenburgh and Austria; which then of these two leading powers was it prudent to connect ourselves with? The disputes that had arisen respecting the navigation of the Schelde would have rendered an alliance between Austria and Holland impracticable. Austria was besides at that time in connection with France, and till that connection could be completely dissolved she would have answered no one purpose for which Great Britain could have desired an ally. On the other hand, the connection of Prussia with Holland, and the interest we had in Holland, shewed the wisdom of choosing Prussia. If then that treaty, already sanctioned by the House, was advantageous, it certainly would be wise to prevent Prussia from falling into a situation by which she would be rendered less likely to give an effectual

aid in times of neceſſity, than ſhe was in at the time of our forming an alliance with her; it was therefore neceſſary to ſupport Turkey as a check upon Auſtria, for as long as the Porte maintained its importance, ſo long would Pruſſia be to us a valuable ally. When Auſtria was in alliance with this kingdom, France, as a check, had an alliance with the Turks; when therefore Auſtria was allied with France, it was natural and politic for us to be in alliance with Turkey. The honourable gentleman then begged the Houſe to conſider in what a dreadful ſtate the affairs of Turkey were prior to our interference. He wiſhed them to conſider, that the ſupport of the Turks was involved in our alliance with Pruſſia; that our interference was therefore neceſſary; for if no ſuch interference had taken place, Pruſſia, by her alliance with us, would have been expoſed to Auſtria and to France, and have been rendered unable to afford us aſſiſtance. In caſe of a war between England and France, Auſtria would have taken up the whole attention of Pruſſia; but by Turkey being ſupported, ſhe would take off, or create a diviſion in the force of Auſtria, and Pruſſia be left at liberty to aid us with the whole, or a conſiderable portion, of her ſtrength. The honourable gentleman ſaid, he would readily admit that France was now in no ſituation to occaſion alarm—he would readily admit that ſhe was in a ſtate the moſt deplorable; but the probability was, that in a few years ſhe would be in poſſeſſion of a vigorous government—if that government ſhould be a reſtoration of the old ſyſtem, or of any thing near it, we ſhould be again ſubject to her intrigues; but ſhould ſhe be enabled to obtain a new conſtituted free government, ſhe would become a more powerful nation, and a more formidable rival than ſhe had ever yet been. If France was united, ſhe would riſe again with the greateſt ſplendor—ſhe wanted nothing but a wiſe government to make her the terror of her neighbours. In her preſent ſituation, he would be the laſt to adviſe any meaſure that might add to her troubles and difficulties; but he conſidered it the duty of Miniſters, and the policy

of Great Britain, to take the advantage of her present debility, by promoting treaties with continental powers, that might add to our strength, and secure us against all events. The alliance with Prussia presented itself as the first and principal step to our continental connection: Prussia, when Holland was endangered, marched an army into that country for its preservation from the grasp of France, and for the maintenance of our interest in the safety of the States: Prussia was as much endangered by the progress of the Russian and Austrian arms against the Porte, as we had been by the attempt to overrun Holland:—as Prussia came forward on that occasion for our interest, we were bound in honour to come forward on the present in support of the interest of Prussia. The honourable gentleman having thus stated the policy of our alliance with Prussia, and having argued the danger to which that power was exposed, by the progress of the Imperial arms against the Porte, he entered into a refutation of the assertion, that the war, on the part of the Turks, was a war of aggression; he took a review of the conduct of the Empress, in her obtaining the Crimea, in her promoting a rebellion in Egypt, in her laying claim to Bessarabia, Wallachia, and Moldavia, and into the repeated concessions she forced from the Porte, until they were under the necessity of hazarding a war for the safety of their remaining dominion in Europe. Our interference, he said, began for the purpose of obtaining the best possible terms of peace for the Porte, so endangered. In proposing terms of peace to nations at war, it was always necessary to consider on whose side the justice and the success of that war was. In the present, all the justice was found on one side, and all the success on the other. In that situation the terms most likely to conciliate, were those founded on the *status quo*; but though those terms were not fully obtained, it could not be denied that the Empress had lowered her terms as soon as she became acquainted with the interference of England and Prussia in support of the Turks; for, prior to such interference, she had stated, as *her ultimate terms*,

founded in extreme moderation, the demand of the ceſſion of Oczakow, and the erection of Beſſarabia, Wallachia, and Moldavia, into an independent ſovereignty, under a Prince profeſſing the Chriſtian faith; and which, if agreed to, would nearly have put an end to the Turkiſh empire in Europe. After her propoſal of thoſe terms, the Imperial arms were attended with continued and conſiderable ſucceſs; what then induced her to lower thoſe terms, and to forego *her moderate demand*, of taking from Turkey three of its principal provinces, to erect into a ſovereignty for a Prince, whom it would not have been difficult to gueſs, was intended to have been honoured with it, but our armament? By the interpoſition of England and Pruſſia, the *ſtatus quo* had been obtained of Auſtria; and by the ſame interpoſition, Ruſſia had lowered her claims. But it was contended, that immediately upon Ruſſia's claiming only Oczakow, and the diſtrict between the Bog and the Dnieſter, we ſhould have given way, and the terms ultimately obtained, ſhould at firſt have been acceded to. This, he contended, would have been groſsly impolitic; for to have given better terms to Ruſſia than to Auſtria, when both were equally ſituated, might have given occaſion to the Emperor, who never was remarkable for good faith, to have ſeized the opportunity of refuſing to fulfil his engagements; the conſequence of which would have been, that the Turks would again have been involved in a double war, and this country expoſed to the ridicule of Europe, for not having gained by their interference a ſingle advantage for the power whoſe intereſt they had eſpouſed. When Government had obtained ſuch advantageous terms for the Turks from Auſtria, their policy was naturally to ſecure peace upon thoſe conditions. The only means of effectually ſecuring it was, by acting fairly towards the Emperor, to take from him every poſſible pretence for not fulfilling his engagements; and this could be only done by demanding the ſame terms from Ruſſia which he had acceded to; as Oczakow was, moreover, a place of conſiderable importance in the hands of the Turks, it could be

only a place of defence: in the hands of Ruſſia, in might be a place of offence. It was particularly for our intereſt to keep it, if poſſible, out of the hands of Ruſſia, as we know, from the evidence before us, that it is the particular ambition of the Empreſs to ſtretch her arms as far as poſſible in that quarter, and as ſo conſiderable an acquiſition as Oczakow may be of great ſervice to her in the purſuit of any future project. The honourable gentleman ſaid, he was confident that had it not been for the diviſion in that Houſe, and for the diviſions promoted out of the Houſe, the Empreſs would not have contended for thoſe terms ſhe ultimately did contend for. One of his reaſons for maintaining this opinion aroſe from a comparative view of the commerce of the two countries: the goods imported from Ruſſia into Great Britain are more than double the quantity of the goods imported from Great Britain into Ruſſia. What Great Britain receives from Ruſſia ſhe might get from other countries; what Ruſſia ſends to Great Britain ſhe could ſend no where elſe. It was certainly therefore the intereſt of Ruſſia, when war was her only alternative, rather to give up Oczakow than to involve herſelf in a war with this country at ſuch a riſk; but would not this be the ſame in the other caſe? certainly not: for the country being then divided, and there being a party in that Houſe to oppoſe the conduct of Adminiſtration, the chance of ſucceſs on the part of Ruſſia was ſo much the greater; beſides the Empreſs might have been led to hope that the conſequence of war might be the overthrow of the Adminiſtration, and the introduction, by that means, of a party into power more favourable to her views. There is a fact, however, in confirmation of his opinion, which he ſhould take the liberty of ſtating. To his knowledge all Peterſburgh was in a conſternation for ſome hours on firſt hearing the news of our armament; nor was the panic diſpelled till the arrival of diſpatches from Count Woronzow, which probably gave an account of the diviſion in the Houſe of Commons, and the divided opinion of the people on the ſubject.—The gentlemen on

the oppoſite ſide of the Houſe had not, in his opinion, ſaved their country from a war, but had prevented a ſucceſsful termination to the negociation. The honourable gentleman juſtified Adminiſtration, in ultimately admitting the ceſſion of Oczakow, which they at firſt oppoſed, upon this ground, that that policy might be wiſe when a war was uncertain, and ſucceſs probable, which might not be wiſe when ſucceſs was doubtful and war certain. No reaſonable conceſſion, he declared, could be any diſgrace to this country; for though it has been proved that we had a national intereſt in the concerns of the Porte, yet Ruſſia had an intereſt both more immediate and more apparent, and if ſhe ſaw no objection, under the particular circumſtances, for the ſake of facilitating peace, to conſent to a modification of her original demands, it was much more wiſe for Great Britain to accede to it than to involve herſelf in a war with the particular diſadvantages under which ſhe would have laboured in the proſecution of that war.—He ſaid, he was one of thoſe who thought that the public opinion out of the Houſe ought to be attended to, and admitted that upon the preſent occaſion Miniſters might, conſiſtently with their duty, act upon ſuch opinion. There were caſes, however, in which, by acting upon public opinion, they might render their country much miſchief, and among thoſe caſes would be a breach of treaty as a breach of national faith. In reply to the accuſation againſt Adminiſtration, for not having diſarmed as ſoon as the propoſals of the Empreſs were made known, he ſaid, we ſhould not then have obtained any modification; ſhe certainly was not bound by her laſt propoſals, they having been rejected when firſt offered to us; nor would ſhe have obtained them, had ſhe not have been enabled to avail herſelf of a diviſion and a party in this country. In the courſe of the negociation, the Empreſs, he ſaid, obtained three great victories over the Turks; it ought then to be matter of joy that ſhe did not avail herſelf of theſe victories, and of our diviſions, to increaſe her demands. In reply to what has been advanced relative to the article for

the free navigation of the Dneiſter not having been inſerted in the treaty of peace, he ſaid, he could not advance any thing, not having yet ſeen the treaty; but he conceived the declarations of the Empreſs in her notification to be equally binding. The freedom of the navigation of that river he could not think as ſlightly of as ſome gentlemen had wiſhed the Houſe to conſider it; to him it appeared to be of much future importance. Poland, ſince her revolution, was likely to become a power of no inconſiderable conſequence; her commerce was likely to be extended, and the Porte might conſider it advantageous to form an alliance with her; the ſervice of the free navigation of that river would then be no longer doubted. Referring again to the interference of this country, he ſaid, it was not taken up for the purpoſe of merely interfering in the war, but for the purpoſe of preventing the ruin of Turkey, and the conſequent injury of an ally.

It had been aſked, whether we were bound by treaty ſo to have aſſiſted Pruſſia? He would admit we were not; neither was Pruſſia bound to aſſiſt us by treaty in preventing Holland from falling under the attempt of France—the principle in both caſes was the ſame, it was a mutual and honourable attention to the intereſts of each other. He ſaid, it was the duty of His Majeſty's Miniſters to watch with a jealous eye every change in the affairs of the continent, and to attend to the maintenance of the balance of power, which, though it might not accord with the opinions of many of the preſent times, would be found, he had no heſitation to declare, an attention founded both in policy and in juſtice; which policy, had it been adopted, would have prevented the long and bloody wars in the time of King William and Queen Anne. He thanked God, the preſent times were not favourable to wars of ambition and conqueſt, they were now reprobated throughout Europe, but in England, above all other countries, it was right they ſhould be reprobated, for on peace our greatneſs as a nation depended—the intereſts of the country reſted on permanent peace. Let gentlemen therefore

consider what has been gained by the interference of Administration; let them look to what was the state of Europe in 1790, and what the probable future increase of wars, before the interference of Prussia and England, and then let them compare the small expence of obtaining the peace of Europe with the great increase of our revenue, occasioned by that peace. He trusted, that when gentlemen examined into the subject, they would find that His Majesty's Ministers had acted neither as impolitic nor as bad men; but that what they had originally proposed was light; that what they had obtained was considerable; and that they would have gained still more, had the same confidence given to the Minister on that side of the House, been given to him also from the other.

Mr. PYBUS said, that he had last year opposed the series of propositions that came from the other side of the House, respecting the Russian armament, because then there were no documents before them on which to frame a right judgement.—The papers on the table afforded the fullest information necessary, and he was happy to come to a fair and full discussion.

He had then distinctly stated, that his opinion of the Minister's merits, though high, was not the grounds of his vote. Though the very striking proofs of integrity, and ability, which his right honourable friend had given in the transaction with Holland, allowed the most sanguine hopes of his good conduct in future, yet he had not used this argument for confiding in him, because he was furnished with a more general one, namely, that it was the true spirit of the constitution.

He thought that if ever an occasion arose, when it was necessary for England to interfere, it was at that particular time. She was almost without a continental ally, till a fortunate combination of circumstances led her to a connection with Prussia.

But he should not enter upon the advantages resulting from this alliance, since it would be only to set his own inferiority in contrast with the very splendid talents of his honourable friend who preceded him; but one topic he had left untouched; he meant the naval importance, that would accrue to Russia from the acquisition of Oczakow. At present the marine force of

the Empreſs was inconſiderable, becauſe balanced by that of Turkey; but if ſhe once extended her conqueſts ſo far as to get poſſeſſion of Conſtantinople, it would be too little to ſay, that ſhe would rival England, ſhe would in a ſhort time become the moſt formidable naval power in the univerſe.

Mr. J. T. STANLEY ſaid, he ſhould not trouble the Houſe with many words, as he had on a former occaſion delivered his opinion at ſome length, concerning the ſubject of the preſent debate. More convinced than formerly of the propriety of our interference, to prevent the overthrow of Turkey, he ſhould give a decided vote againſt the reſolutions, which had been moved; but he owed, however, his thanks to thoſe gentlemen, who had brought forward the preſent diſcuſſion. It was neceſſary, that the merits or faults of a negociation, during the courſe of which the nation had been expoſed to the chance of a war, ſhould be canvaſſed; it was uſeful, that a queſtion ſo important, as whether it was prudent for England to let the Turkiſh Empire be ſubdued, ſhould be examined.

Mr. Stanley ſaid he was of opinion that the intereſts of this country would be very ſeriouſly affected if the Empreſs of Ruſſia ever carried her deſigns into execution. What theſe deſigns were, muſt be obvious to every thinking man. If ſhe ſhould ſucceed in gaining poſſeſſion of Conſtantinople, he entreated gentlemen to conſider what conſequences would neceſſarily enſue. All thoſe provinces bordering the Mediterranean, now under the power of Turkey, would fall under her dominion, and, would England have no cauſe for apprehenſion, when the reſources which thoſe rich countries (particularly Egypt,) offered to enterprize and ambition, were brought into activity? Mr. J. T. Stanley ſaid, he foreſaw how ſerious cauſes for alarm, he foreſaw ſuch new routes would be opened to commerce, ſuch emporiums of trade would be formed, not only on the Coaſts of the Mediterranean, but on thoſe of the Red Sea, where every temptation would be held out to bold and ſpeculative adventurers, that much of that tide of wealth, now flowing from all quarters, to this happy land, would be diverted into other channels. He believed our proſperity ſo firmly founded, ſo ſolidly ſecured, that its continuance muſt be for ages; but perhaps we

were on the eve of feeing it transferred far away from us; the confequences were beyond calculation if fuch a revolution in trade and commerce as muft take place if ever Turkey and Egypt fall into the hands of a fovereign like the Emprefs of Ruffia. Thinking in this manner, Mr. Stanley faid, that he muft confider Oczakow, as a place of great importance; by its ceffion to Ruffia, no means were now left of counteracting any of thofe defigns, againft which it fo much behoved us to be on our guard. Nothing could well be undertaken againft Turkey, fo long as it remained a fort to protect its frontier; at leaft, that could endanger Conftantinople. And the months which muft have paffed before it could have been taken, would have given both time to the Porte and to her allies to take meafures for their defence. He lamented, that the public opinion of this country had been fo prejudiced as to force the Minifter to abandon his firft intention of obliging Ruffia to give up Oczakow, but he could not difapprove of the Minifter's conduct in fo doing. He confeffed it would have given him fatisfaction had more information been given to the Houfe, when its affiftance was firft afked to enable His Majefty to fit out an armament. And when he gave his confidence to the Minifter he did believe fome treaties (which it would have been unfafe to allude to,) had exifted between this country and the Porte; he had been much difappointed in learning there had been none; but notwithftanding, he did not repent having given his confidence to the Minifter, and he fhould ever feel inclined to give him a confiderable degree of it, while he obferved that refpect was paid to the opinions of the public.—As it was his wifh that public opinion fhould always be the chief rule for the conduct of a Minifter of this country.

Sir JAMES MURRAY faid he fhould only fpeak to one point—the extenfion of the naval power of Ruffia; this was in his opinion, a matter to which this country ought to turn its attention. The armament was wifely fet on foot for that purpofe, and had fo far obtained that end. He fubfcribed to all that fell from the honourable Member who had fpoke early in the debate, and who had ufed arguments in fo irrififtible a manner, and in fuch elegant language, that he would not fo much as attempt to repeat one of them, left he fhould disfigure

them; he should, therefore, leave them to make that deep impression which he was certain they had made on every unbiassed mind in the House.

The Honourable SAINT ANDREW SAINT JOHN supported the motion. He entered into the views of Prussia, and the probable effects of our armament, had it been carried on. He refuted the arguments of those who maintained there was sufficient evidence on the table to form an opinion, and to pass a vote of approbation of the Minister in this measure. He maintained the justice of the demands of the Empress, as stated in the documents on the table, for the expences which she had been at in defending her rights.

Mr. GREY said, he should distinguish the grounds on which he should support the motion of his honourable friend. It was not his intention to argue all the general propositions which had been laid down on the balance of power in Europe. The points most strenuously maintained in that respect, were such as he never felt any disposition to dispute, nor did he believe it was the idea of any considerable part of that House to dispute them. The first part of the resolution embraced the consideration of our armament, on the question of its object and necessity, and when in discussing it, to the point that the armament was not in its probable effect connected with the political or the commercial interest of this country. The commercial interest in the present debate had not been much noticed; but if it was true that our commercial interest with Russia was great, then it would follow inevitably that some very extraordinary reasons should be assigned for its being put into an hazardous condition. Some very good reasons should be given for disturbing the trade, if it should appear it was such as to be greatly beneficial to this country, and by which we had gained so much, and our manufactures considerably been promoted. But he should hear it said, that the trade of this country with Russia, and the advantages of it, had been over-stated, and that it would appear by the books at the custom-house that those statements were too high. Upon this he was of opinion that the objection was unfounded, and that the books of the custom-house were not conclusive upon that subject, and that no fair calculation could be made upon them. It was formerly stated that the whole of the exports of the woollen trade,

amounted to no more than 62,000l., whereas it appeared that two manufacturers in a town in Yorkshire alone, exported more than to the amount of 200,000l. Attempts had been made to bring forward the antiquated and exploded system of the balance of our trade with Russia, appearing to be against us, when, in truth, we imported the bulky raw material in such considerable quantities, as to employ the industry of our manufacturers, whose productions are afterwards exported with a considerable profit. He considered as ridiculous the speculative talk of a trade to be opened with Poland, and the Lord knows where:

"'Twas better far to bear the ills we have,
"Than fly to others that we know not of."

The book to which the right honourable gentleman had alluded, (the Wealth of Nations) when he opened his budget, contained, among other excellent observations, a most satisfactory explanation of the nature of trade. That valuable work would assist the House, when they were arguing upon the balance of trade, and upon all its speculative and probable advantages; and upon the views which it afforded, he would say, that the commerce of this country with Russia was of great importance; and though this trade was not destroyed by the armament, yet it was what had been a very injurious evil; much alarm and apprehension had been created by the measure. But he should not trouble the House with any farther observations on that part of the subject, as it had already been abandoned by gentlemen on the other side of the House.

With respect to the subject of our political interest, and the manner in which it was affected by the armament, he should beg leave to call the attention of the House. He was not called upon from the arguments of the gentlemen on the other side, to argue whether any general acquisition to the strength of Russia was such as required us to interfere, or whether the destruction of that power was a desirable object, but whether the acquisition of Oczakow to Russia was of such a nature as to be dangerous in any sense to this country? Much had been said with regard to the policy of preserving the general balance of power, by the honourable gentleman who had spoken in the

course of this debate (Mr. Jenkinson), and who had delivered his sentiments with such eloquence of manner and correctness of expression, that if a stranger had come into that House to hear him, he would not have readily supposed it was the first time of his speaking. But whatever ability he had displayed in the course of his speech, he had failed to produce conviction on his mind. On the general topic he would say, that as we were the less remote from danger, we ought to shew ourselves the less susceptible of jealousy, and the less ready to take alarm. The maintenance of the balance of power was certainly a laudable object, when not pursued to too great an extent. That it ought not to be prosecuted too far, had been pointedly proved by an expression that could never be forgotten. When the power of France had not been reduced to its present enervated situation, it had been said by a right honourable gentleman in a debate on the balance of power, "that it was a mockery and "an insult to the poor thatched cottager to talk to him of "the balance of power." That Great Britain had pursued this object too far would not be denied, when it was considered that in her progress after it she had travelled as far as the banks of the Black Sea.

In all debates on this subject, those who had supported the armament, had studiously endeavoured to lead the House from the main question, by recurring to the affair with Holland. In that transaction opposition had concurred with their support and had not been backward in bestowing their applause, but from that period the heads of the Members of Administration had been turned, nay even the Minister himself could not withstand the infection. He had become elated in such a manner, that it came into his head that he could parcel out kingdoms, and conduct negociations with the same ease that he laid on taxes, or supplied the want of arguments by the division of majorities in that House. His friends, and those that pretended to be his friends, flattered him into that belief. We heard no more of that pacific spirit inculcated, the language of which is usually accompanied with firmness, and in the end productive of substantial profits and well-earned applause. His friends longed for war, in which he might distinguish his talents in conducting the vessel of the commonwealth through all the thunder of cannon, with the same ease that he conducted it

in the gentle tide of peace; nay, he feemed to wifh for it himfelf. He would appear to have been as much affected as Don Quixotte by the perufal of the Books of Chivalry. Amufing himfelf by curveting in this Court—prancing in that—menacing here—vaunting there; the laurels of his father faded in his eyes—he out-Heroded Herod. An apportunity prefented itfelf, and he was furprifed to find that in all the ardour of military renown, he did not fnatch it on the firft prefentation—the Spanifh affair.

After all his pompous pretenfions, after all his ridiculous menaces, he had in every inftance given up his object, or rather had found none who would be at the trouble to contend with him; after having difgraced himfelf in all the Courts of Europe by much gafconade and blufter, he had met in each nothing but difcomfiture and difgrace. Indeed the happy fituation in which this country had been placed, by various circumftances, during the prefent Adminiftration, feemed to have had no other tendency than to fhew the people of this country how far they might afterwards be punifhed by Providence, by neglecting their duty, difregarding its bounty, and criminally confiding in their heedlefs leaders. What had we adopted in our political conduct towards other States? Not that bold, candid, and manly mode of behaviour, which our character demanded, or which the peculiar circumftances of the political affairs of Europe afforded us an opportunity of fhewing; but inftead of it, we feemed to affect a fpecies of low intrigue and petty policy, adopted by other Courts, which formerly we had always been accuftomed to reprobate in the ftrongeft terms. We feemed, in fome cafes, to imitate the practice of the Court of Louis the Fourteenth of France. We, like him, had difcovered of late a thirft for univerfal dominion, highly difgraceful to our national character. But above all, he hated that fort of dictatorial interference in the affairs of other Courts, without the fmalleft neceffity or caufe, except thofe of our own creating; this conduct had rendered us odious in the eyes of Europe. But the point to be debated was, "Whether the ceffion of Oczakow to the Emprefs was fuch, as to affect the intereft of this country, or prove dangerous to the balance of power in Europe?" The conceffion of fome of the gentlemen on the other fide, fettled this point; they had agreed on it;

themſelves, that neither of theſe conſequences was to be apprehended, now that the point was given up; and yet, at firſt, theſe were the grounds on which they aſſerted that the object was well worth contending for. They involved themſelves into ſtrange contradictions and abſurdities; they continually defeated one obſervation, by inſiſting on the force of another, which went to prove directly the contrary. They ſaid Oczakow was not worth going to war about, but it was worth the riſk of fitting out a fleet. Worth fitting out a fleet, but not worth a war! Could he, as opponent of thoſe meaſures, want any farther conceſſion for this purpoſe? But he had ſtill ſtronger proof of the impropriety of the conduct of Miniſters, from the firſt authority, and that was from the right honourable gentleman himſelf! By his own evidence, the whole of Adminiſtration would appear to deſerve cenſure. If the poſſeſſion of Oczakow by the Empreſs was dangerous to the balance of power, which he had inſiſted, there was a proof we had abandoned it to that danger; for Oczakow was, after all, ceded to the Empreſs! This point was ſo plain, that he confeſſed he could not argue on it any longer. The alternative was no better for the Miniſter; for if Oczakow was not worth our contention, why then did we contend for it? The truth, indeed, was, that there was no propriety in any part of our behaviour in this caſe; nor was there any juſtice in the war againſt the Empreſs: ſhe was unjuſtly attacked by the Turks, and yet we pretended to juſtify our interference againſt her in the conteſt.

He would only ſay he wiſhed, that when gentlemen laid down principles, they would either defend them by argument, or abandon them; particularly when there was an inſtance in which we were concerned in a caſe ſomething ſimilar to that of the Empreſs; for what was our conduct in the Eaſt Indies with regard to Tippoo Sultan? Did we not openly and avowedly ſay, that becauſe he had attacked one of our allies, we muſt revenge the inſult; and yet when the Empreſs is moſt unjuſtly attacked we deſert theſe principles with regard to her, and declare not only that ſhe ſhall not proceed upon the very ſame principles that we act upon, but that it is highly inexpedient ſhe ſhould be ſuffered ſo to do. This argument indeed he did not rely upon much, it was to be conſidered rather as an argument *ad hominem*, than in any other light; and

and here he ſhould leave it, by calling on gentlemen who thought fit to adopt theſe principles, to reflect on their inconſiſtency. But the Empreſs, it ſeems, had poſſeſſion of the Crimea. What if ſhe had; was it taken lately by her? No; and be it remembered that on this very occaſion, when this country was called on to interfere, it refuſed all interference; and if ſo, now it muſt be too late to talk of the danger of it, or to diſpute her original title, for the ſame mode of argument might be applied to our own dominions.—In Jamaica, for inſtance, ſuppoſe there was an attack made upon us, would we be willing to hear from any power pretending to mediate for us, that our poſſeſſion of that iſland was obtained by violence? He would go farther, for he would ſay that we had guaranteed the Crimea to the Empreſs, and we had no right now to make any objection to her property in that quarter. As to what he had ſaid on a former occaſion, reſpecting the right of a nation going to war, he wiſhed that he might neither be miſrepreſented nor miſunderſtood. What he had ſaid on that occaſion he would repeat on this. A nation had, in his opinion, three points on which it could reaſonably go to war.—An attack on itſelf or its ally—to recover a right withheld—and laſtly, to prevent danger. This, however, was not to be determined on looſe or vague apprehenſions of danger; but on a clear appearance and rational apprehenſion of danger, ſo that miſchief would almoſt ſeem inevitable from neglect. Such was not the caſe here, nor any thing like it; in ſhort there was no appearance of any ſuch caſe. But the manner in which attempts had been made to find apologies for the conduct of Miniſters on this armament, were more curious ſtill than any thing he had yet ſtated. It had been ſtated, not in that Houſe, for he believed that no Member of it would ſubject himſelf to the ridicule which would attend the abſurdity, but it had been ſtated in other places, that our territories in India were in danger from the ſucceſs of the Empreſs againſt the Turks, that the Great Mogul would fit out ſhips to go down the Ganges, and to proceed to Bengal, to make an attack on our territories. It is thus hiſtory, geography, and all the principles of common ſenſe and common obſervation were violated for the purpoſe of finding, or ſeeming to find, ſome pretext for this uſeleſs armament,

In order to blacken the character of Russia farther, she had been accused of fomenting disturbances in Egypt. But was there any proof of the truth of this accusation?—No. The House, therefore, could not proceed to give judgement on a question where no information at all had been produced. He left the House to reflect on the pitiful attempts that were made to defend the Ministers, and to reflect also on the cause that needed such a defence.

Great Britain and Prussia, with all their resources, had been humiliated, and Russia had pointed out to herself a line of conduct which she had invariably pursued.

He then came to the second resolution. He could hardly say any thing upon this, because it was self-evident, and he hoped that his honourable friends had been completely successful on that subject—But by way of compensation to us for our trouble and expence in this armament, it seemed that the Empress had given us the navigation of the Dniester.—What was gained by this?—Nothing.—It was well known to be the line of demarkation, a thing which of course is open to all powers in the time of peace, and the right honourable gentleman would hardly say we should have this freedom in time of war.—This was therefore gaining nothing.—Nor could we boast of our having obtained the freedom of the Black Sea for the Turks.

The next observation that appeared to be most material was that of the Minister having desisted from his original plan in this measure, not from his own conviction, but from the opinion of the people; but before he proceeded on that point he must by the way take a view of the bad effect of this hasty measure. It not only occasioned a temporary stagnation to our commerce, but operated to the distress of the most valuable members of our community. He must allow that until better means be found out, the practice of impressing seamen must be entrusted to the care of the executive power, but it was doubly culpable in Ministers to pursue unnecessarily a scheme which called these useful and laborious persons out of these occupations, in which they were employed, so much to the benefit of our commerce. It seemed to be a piece of wanton and capricious cruelty that they should be torn from their families, without having any opportunity afforded them to render themselves useful to the state. This was the way to make them unhappy

and discontented with their condition; a circumstance which a wise or a humane Minister would be equally solicitous from motives of policy or of feeling to prevent.

He then took a view of the strange conduct of our court, not only towards the Empress, whom it was unwise in us to irritate, but also to the Turks, to whom we had proffered our alliance. Our conduct in first entering into this measure was unnecessary and wanton: its outset had been marked by nothing but arrogance and injustice; and its conclusion by nothing but pusillanimity and meanness. The Empress had a right to the recompence she sought; had a right to retain Oczakow, and did retain it, and laugh at our haughty pretensions and ridiculous menaces. Those allies, the Turks, whom we pretended to support, but afterwards betrayed, had given the highest proof of their abhorrence and contempt of our conduct. He knew not whether he should be blamed or ridiculed for what he had done, but he had taken all the pains he was able to procure the best information on the subject, and he had obtained a copy of the Grand Vizier's answer to Sir Robert Ainslie, our Ambassador at Constantinople, which he should read to the House—of which the following is the substance:

"The Grand Signior wars for himself, and for himself "makes peace—he can trust his own slaves, servants and sub- "jects—he knows their faith, has experienced their virtue, "and can rely upon their fidelity. A virtue long since banish- "ed your corner of Europe. If all other Christians tell truth, "no reliance is to be had on England, she buys and sells all "mankind. The Ottomans have no connection with your "King, nor your country—we never sought for your advice, "your interference or friendship; we have no Minister, no "agency, no correspondence with you; for what reason of- "fer ye then to mediate for us with Russia? why seek ye to "serve an empire of Infidels, as ye call us Musselmen? we "want not your friendship, aid, or mediation. Your Vizier, "of whom you speak so highly, must have some project of "deception in view, some oppressive scheme to amuse your na- "tion whom we are told are credulous, servile, and adorers "only of money. Avarice, if we are well informed, is your "chief characteristic—you would sell and buy your God—

"Money is your Deity—and all things is commerce with "your Miniftry, with your nation.—Come ye then to fell us "to Ruffia? No, let us bargain for ourfelves: When fate "has fpun out the thread of our good fortune we muft yield; "what has been decreed by God and the Prophet of men muft "and will come to pafs. We Ottomans know no fineffe.— "Duplicity and cunning are your Chriftian morals. We are "not afhamed to be honeft, down-right, plain and faithful in "our State maxims. If we fail in war, we fubmit to the "will of Heaven, decreed from the beginning. We have "long lived in fplendor the firft power on earth, and we glory "having triumphed for ages over Chriftian infidelity and de- "pravity, mixed with all forts of vice and hypocrify—We "adore the God of Nature and believe in Mahomet—You "neither believe in the God you pretend to worfhip, nor in "his Son, whom you call both your God and your Prophet. "What reliance can there be upon fo facrilegious a race? "Truth you banifh, as you do virtue, from all your conduct "and actions with each other—read the catalogue of the com- "plaints, manifeftoes, declarations and remonftrances of all "the Chriftian Kings, Monarchs and Emperors, who have "lived and warred with each other—you find them all equally "blafphemous, equally perfidious, equally cruel, equally un- "juft and faithlefs to their engagements.—Did the Turk ever "forfeit his promife, word, or honour? Never! Did ever a "Chriftian power keep an engagement but while it fuited his "own avarice or ambition? No! How then do you think we "are to truft you, a nation at this moment, if told truth, "ruled by a perfidious adminiftration, without one grain of "virtue to guide the machine of State? The Grand Signior "has no public intercourfe with your Court—he wants none— "he wifhes for none. If you wifh to remain here either as a "fpy, or, as you term yourfelf, an Ambaffador for your Court, "you may live with thofe of other Chriftian nations, while "you demean yourfelf with propriety, but we want neither "your aid by fea or land, nor your council or mediation. I "have no order to thank you for your offer, becaufe it is by "the Divan deemed officious; nor have I any command to "thank you for the offer of your Naval affiftance, becaufe it "is what the Porte never dreamed of admitting into our feas.

"What you have to do with Russia we neither know or care, "our concerns with that Court we mean to finish as suits our- "selves, and the maxims of our laws and state policy. If "you are not the most profligate Christian nation, as you are "charged to be, you are undoubtedly the boldest in presump- "tion and effrontery, in offering to bring such a Power as "Russia to terms; such as you and some other trivial Christi- "ans united fancy yourselves equal to command—we know "better, and therefore this effrontery of yours amounts rather "to audacity, and to an imbecile dictation, which must "render your councils at home mean and contemptible, and "your advice abroad unworthy of wisdom, or attention from "any Power, much less the regard of the Porte, which on all "occasions wherein its Ministers had listened to you, have ex- "perienced evil, either in your designs or in your ignorance— "His Sublime Highness cannot be too much upon his guard "against the attempts and presumption of a nation so perfi- "dious to the interests of its subjects (or colonists)—but it is "the usual way of Christian Princes to sell and cede over their "subjects to each other for money. Every peace made amongst "you, as we are well informed, is made favourable to the "King that best bribes. The Ottoman Ministry have too long "and too often given ear to European Councils, and as often "as they so did, they either were betrayed, sold, or deceived— "away then with your interference for the Porte with Russia.

"It has been your aim to embroil all mankind, and there- "after to profit by your perfidy. We ask not, want not, "nor desire your Commerce, because our Merchants have "been sacrificed to your double dealings—you have no religion "but gain—avarice is your only God, and the Christian faith "you profess but a mask for your hypocrisy—we will hear no "more from you—therefore you are commanded to make no "reply."

Such were the sentiments of the Grand Vizier on our conduct, and such was the contempt to which that pitiful intriguing spirit, to which Ministers gave the name of policy, exposed us. He thought he had now stated tolerable reasons for the support of the motion. But if any thing farther was wanting, he would maintain, that the armament had been conti-

nued when the circumſtances of the caſe rendered that continuance no longer neceſſary.—It would be ſaid, perhaps, that the continuance of it prevented Ruſſia from renewing her claims. Did it?—No—but if ſhe had renewed them, it would have been infinitely better to have commenced a freſh armament.—The dates in this point were material; preſs-warrants were iſſued on the 31ſt of March; the Duke of Leeds being thwarted in the Cabinet, reſigned on the 21ſt of April, by which time it was very generally believed that the meaſure had been given up.—The armament, therefore, from that period was not only not diſcontinued, but abſolutely begun.

And again, the time in which the fleet was to ſail, being July, it was too late in the ſeaſon for it to affect Ruſſia. Thus ſuppoſing us to be right in the adoption of the meaſure, the purpoſe of it would have been defeated by the mode in which it was carried on. As to the exiſting circumſtances, of which the Chancellor of the Exchequer talked ſo much, he owned he did not comprehend them; but he knew full well that defective as the information was from the papers on the table, there was ground for blame, but not ſo much as he was confident would appear if every thing in this negociation was laid before the Houſe. He could not help contraſting the expreſſion of the Miniſter, that he ſhould give no more information, unleſs there was already cauſe for cenſure, with another expreſſion in the ſame ſentence that they could not judge of the whole caſe without better information; this was, as his honourable friend had ſo properly deſcribed, "drawing the majority through "the dirt and mire."

He recurred to the general charge which had been made on that ſide of the Houſe, oppoſing the meaſures of Government. He obſerved that thoſe who were called the oppoſition in that Houſe did nothing but their duty, and it would be well if Adminiſtration, inſtead of thus calling for confidence, and perpetually betraying it, would do theirs. The confidence to which he alluded had been ſtated to be neceſſary, it had been affirmed, that there was no public ſtation in which there was no confidence to be repoſed. It was true, ſoldiers ſhould confide, as had been ſaid, in their General, and ſervants in their maſter; but he hoped that theſe caſes bore no ſatirical alluſion to the majority of that Houſe. A reaſonable degree of confi-

dence he felt himfelf ready to allow, and where the Minifter had deferved it he had received it from even the oppofition of that Houfe; if he afked for more than he was entitled to, the fault was his own; and it was natural enough that he was difpleafed to find himfelf fufpected:

"Let the gall'd jade wince, our withers are unwrung."

He obferved, that there fhould be an explanation of this bufinefs, that fomething muft be done or the Public will not be fatisfied. There muft be either a vote to condemn or approve. Would the Minifter's friends come forward with a vote of approbation? No! they dare not. They fheltered themfelves under the general negative—fatisfied that they would be able to efcape a vote of cenfure. He felt himfelf, by his duty to his conftituents, whofe interefts were not to be facrificed without fome reafon, bound to adopt the motion of his honourable friend.

Mr. GRANT began with declaring that he had not been able to collect with fufficient precifion whether they were to difagree or not as to the firft part of the refolution, which involved in it no particular principles, and fell far fhort of the principles laid down and infifted on in the debates on the fame fubject laft feffion. They had then heard it afferted that they had no right to interfere, that Ruffia was an independant power, and had a right to judge for herfelf and act accordingly. This pofition was furely pufhed to a degree of extravagance, for it went to the length of maintaining that no confideration of the danger of the balance of power being expofed, fhould weigh with Parliament in this cafe, for agreeing to this armament. Thefe arguments need not be oppofed, for they were given up; and now the queftion was narrowed in fome degree, and compreffed into fomething like a fizeable point. It was "Whether, in this particular inftance Government "did right in entering, under all the circumftances, into this "armament?" In the confideration of this point, it appeared to him that there was reafon in the meafure adopted by the Minifter. It was a material thing, in his opinion, for the intereft of this country, that Ruffia fhould not gain a maritime afcendancy. Every thing that was great and valuable might be

affected by it. As to the value of Oczakow, that point had been unfairly treated.—Gentlemen on the other ſide of the Houſe argued from what they called the admiſſion of their opponents, and had charged them with maintaining ridiculous inconſiſtency. That at one time they regarded Oczakow as a very valuable acquiſition, and at another as a place of no value whatever. The truth was they did no ſuch thing; they ſet a value on it as they would on any thing elſe; they conſidered the place of ſome value, but they never undertook preciſely to ſtate what the amount was of that value. Its real value was more likely to be found between the two extremes, than to be really either the one or the other. In order to aſcertain that it was not altogether inſignificant, he called the attention of the Houſe to the firſt terms propoſed by the Empreſs, as the ultimate conditions on which ſhe would grant peace to the Porte, among the foremoſt of which was, a propoſition to form the provinces of Beſſarabia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, into an independant kingdom, to be put under the Government of a Chriſtian Prince. The facility with which ſhe abandoned her firſt propoſition, with regard to the formation of the provinces of Beſſarabia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, into an independant kingdom, but the ſteadineſs, with which the Empreſs inſiſted on keeping Oczakow, afforded, he ſaid, a clear proof that however barren the diſtrict, or inſignificant the place, ſhe deemed it of great importance to her political views. Being therefore a place of ſome value, it followed as a matter of courſe, that it was worth making ſome reaſonable effort for it. Nor was there any contradiction in ſaying, that although this place was worth making an effort, it was not worth a war. And in ſaying it was not worth a war, it muſt be taken with an explanation, that it was not worth a war under all the circumſtances with which the war might be attended. And here it was obſervable, that if we proceeded to a war it might be a doubtful war, and there might be diſſenſions and eternal diviſions upon it. Theſe were circumſtances, the conſideration of which ought to make a Miniſter cautious how he acted.—There was another conſideration in this caſe. The intereſt of Pruſſia was to be attended to; and it was not ſufficient to ſay that Pruſſia had actually loſt nothing in this conteſt, or was not even attacked, for it

was very possible that the situation of Prussia might be materially altered, from the alteration of the state of its neighbours; for the state of all the European powers was relative, and was to be considered as they stood, in regard and with reference to each other. As to the real value of Oczakow, he thought that the better way to estimate the worth of it to the contending parties would be, to reflect on the manner in which they had contended for it, for they must be allowed to know something of the matter.

As to the question of policy, he observed it could not always, in the affairs of state, be estimated by the actual value of the thing contended for, but by things to which it might lead. More depended on the care to avert distant danger than was generally imagined, and it frequently happened from not looking farther than the present, the foundation of consequences infinitely mischievous to the dearest interests of a state was laid, as it were, imperceptibly at the moment. He instanced the alliance which Oliver Cromwell entered into with France, and which had since been considered by most politicians as extremely unwise and impolitic, although its mischiefs were not foreseen at the time it took place; but it was in consequence of that alliance, that many years after those wars began, which cost this country and all Europe, so much blood, and so much treasure. He alluded to the wars occasioned by the ambitious views of Lewis the Fourteenth. By the alliance Cromwell had entered into with France, he gave France a predominating balance in the scale of European powers, and sunk that of Spain below it proper degree. Having at that time overturned the balance, it cost immense armies, and immense sums, to restore it to a due equipoise, in the reigns of King William and Queen Anne. He was reminded likewise of the history of Philip of Macedon and the Athenians, and particularly his famous letter to them, in which he expressed his sentiments of justice and moderation, and in which he gave assurances of his good disposition to the liberty of Greece; but solicited some small towns, which the Athenians granted; many of them saying they were so obscure, and of so little value to them, that they did not know even of their names.—"True, " said Demosthenes afterwards, you did not know the names " of these small towns, but they were keys to provinces, to

"which Philip will find his way, and endanger your liber-"ty."—Philip paſſed from town to town, and from province to province, until at laſt he had the dominion of all Greece. So in this the Empreſs might profeſs moderation, and add fortreſs to fortreſs, until ſhe became ſole miſtreſs of the Mediterranean, and Egypt. At the ſame time he could ſee diſtinctly, that important as Oczakow might be, it might not be worth a war, under the peculiar circumſtances with which a war muſt have been carried on againſt Ruſſia. With regard to the right honourable gentleman having put the country to the expence of an armament purpoſely to keep Oczakow out of the hands of Ruſſia, and neverthelefs having given it up, that was by no means a matter that might not be amply juſtified. Many points had been again and again given up by negociators, not only after armaments had been ſet on foot, but after battles had been fought and victories actually obtained. Inſtances might be quoted in almoſt every reign, and from every page of hiſtory, wherein objects had been relinquiſhed, that were deemed of great importance at firſt, and to obtain which, great national expence had been incurred. To refer only to the reign of Queen Elizabeth, that Princeſs, in the reign of Henry II. of France, inſiſted on regaining Calais, ſhe armed, went to war, but concluded her negociation for peace, without obtaining Calais. She next made terms with the Huguenots, and promiſed them protection, on their delivering up Havre, which ſhe thought might help her to Calais; ſhe afterwards abandoned them, when they made terms with the King of France. Yet would any body ſay that the Miniſters of Elizabeth did not act wiſely in attempting to recover Calais? They certainly did, but they abandoned it when they found the object more difficult to obtain than they had at firſt imagined it would prove. So it might be ſaid with regard to our efforts to regain Oczakow; to a certain point it was proper to perſiſt, but circumſtances altered the caſe. It had been ſaid, however, by an honourable gentleman, if the Miniſter thought his opinion right, and he was obliged to change it, he ought to have reſigned his place. If the Miniſter's opinion had been over-ruled in the Cabinet, by the opinion of another Miniſter, it would have been magnanimous to have reſigned his office. Undoubtedly it would;

nay, it would not perhaps have been honourable, but the reverse, for him to have held it afterwards; but the case was surely different, where the Minister did not yield to the superior and predominating opinion of any other Minister, but to the opinions of the majority of the people of England, which, in so important a point as commencing a war, ought always to be attended to. He defended the keeping up the armament, after the Minister had changed his opinion, by observing, that although the Empress had declared three years ago, that let her successes be what they would, she would not encrease her demands, yet as we then peremptorily refused to accede to those terms, we had no manner of right to claim them afterwards, but she might fairly say, "No, they were terms I would have "granted then; when I offered them, you would not accept "them, I am not bound to grant them now." In answer to what gentlemen had thrown out in reproach of the Minister, for his fondness for armaments, he said, he had never heard but of one armament, that had been at all questioned, or found fault with, viz. the last. The Dutch armament had met with the express approbation of the other side of the House, and so had the Spanish armament. With regard to the paper purporting to be a memorial delivered from the Vizier to Sir Robert Ainslie, at Constantinople, that paper, even if authentic, related to a mediation, not to a negociation, and was, however harsh and severe, no satire on the present Ministers in particular, but might just as well apply to the gentlemen on the other side, who were in all possibility as good christians, as the Members of the present administration. He expressed a hope that the House would that night shew, that it was their opinion, that Ministers had acted rightly, with declaring that he should vote against the Motion, from a conviction, that Ministers had done the best they could, under the circumstances of the case.

Mr. WYNDHAM said, it was a pleasure to follow the honourable gentleman, notwithstanding his great ability, because he put the question on ground on which it could be fairly met. A fallacy, however, had slipt into his argument, the detection of which would be an answer to the greatest part of it. He supposed the proposition moved to be put in the extreme, which was not the true state of it. They who moved

and they who ſupported it, were not bound to adopt a more broad ſtatement than was neceſſary; and to what extent they did ſtate it, the propoſition itſelf ſufficiently explained. It was neither ſtated in the propoſition, or the arguments in ſupport of it, that Oczakow was of the higheſt degree of importance, nor that it was of no importance at all, but only that it was not of ſufficient importance to juſtify the hazard of a war, and that by thoſe who ſeemed to think it of the moſt importance it had been afterwards abandoned. The examples of Cromwell ſupporting the deſigns of Louis XIV., and of the Athenians neglecting to counteract thoſe of Philip, would have been applicable, had it been maintained that we were never to guard againſt any diſtant danger. The queſtion was not on the general propoſition, but on the degree of diſtant danger which it was fit to oppoſe, at the riſk of incurring the calamities of war.

Was that to which we had been expoſed ſuch a danger? This was the true queſtion, and he thought the anſwer was clearly a negative. We had juſt concluded a convention with Spain, which we were told not only ſettled all exiſting differences, but took away the grounds of future diſpute. France, our ancient rival, was in a ſituation which, more than at any other period, freed us from apprehenſion on her account. In the midſt of all this apparent ſecurity, a war was carrying on in the moſt remote part of Europe; ſo remote, and ſo little intereſting, that many of the people of this country did not even know of it; and while thoſe who did, were looking on as unconcerned ſpectators, the ſcene was ſhifted, as by the ſignal of the prompter's whiſtle, and ſhewed the ſtage full of armed men; and they were told, that the ſituation they had been contemplating, might immediately be their own. *De te fabula narratur*. Nor was it the diſtance alone; the intereſt and the danger were at leaſt as remote as the place? for which of our poſſeſſions, or what branch of our commerce was ever relatively concerned in the events of that war? The neceſſity of interference, in the caſe of any foreign power, depended much on the proximity of place, and our own poſitive and immediate intereſt. With regard to the theatre of the war, it was, in point of local diſtance, the very ſpot the moſt remote

from us that could poſſibly be found on the globe. If it were moved towards the weſt, it would be nearer to us and our intereſts. If moved more to the eaſt, it would approach the Indies where our territories were. It was the very phyſical diſtance, and it might be termed the very moral diſtance, as no one intereſt of ours was connected with it. In the affair in Holland, the caſe was different. There we had an immediate poſitive intereſt, that required our interference. In the war between Ruſſia and the Porte we had no intereſt whatever, unleſs we had eſtabliſhed it as fit for us to act always in politics on that maxim, which was ſo excellent in reſpect to humanity,

Homo ſum, humani nihil a me alienum puto.

For our interference there was nothing to alledge but the balance of power; and this was a pretext ſo extenſive, that it applied to every thing. On the balance of power we were called on to interfere, for reaſons, as it was ſaid, that could not then be explained. The State cabinet was now unlocked, and never did any cabinet diſplay a more beggarly account of empty boxes. Nothing appeared but the ſame remote cauſe, the ſame undefined balance of power. An honourable gentleman, who ſpoke early in the debate, and who, it was to be hoped, for the information of the Houſe, would ſpeak often, had very ably ſtated a chain of cauſes and effects, by which the ſucceſs of Ruſſia might affect our intereſts. But what were theſe but a chain of probabilities, many depending on circumſtances, and many on the lives and diſpoſitions of ſovereigns, any link of which broken deſtroyed the whole. Surely this could be no adequate cauſe of war, more eſpecially at a period when almoſt every Court of Europe was producing ſuch changes as mocked all political ſpeculation. Thoſe who defended the conduct of Miniſters, argued as if they had ſucceeded in their object, while the fact was directly the reverſe. Their object was almoſt a political nothing, and that nothing they had failed to obtain. They had not even the plea of a great aim and a glorious failure. They had aimed at trifling objects, and their ſucceſs was ſtill more diminutive. It reminded one of the account of an invalid, who could ſwallow *nothing*, and

even *that* would not ſtay upon his ſtomach! Or to expreſs it more claſſically,

> "*Nil habuit Codrus, attamen infelix ille,*
> "*Perdidit totum nil!*"

When they ſaid that Ruſſia would not have kept her word if we had diſmiſſed our armament, or rather never equipped it, they were bound to give ſome proof of that aſſertion. It would be a moſt ſingular rule in politics, that the moment any two powers agreed on terms was the moment for both to arm, to prevent a breach of the agreement. The Miniſter was not blamed for having yielded to the public opinion, but for having put himſelf into ſuch a ſituation as that he could neither proceed without loſs, nor retreat without diſgrace. The boiſterous tones which he had at firſt aſſumed, and for which he afterwards ſubſtituted the moſt humiliating conceſſions, reſembled a ſudden guſt which terminated in ſobs and ſighs. The papers on the table, furniſhed no one reaſon why, inſtead of ſending out preſs warrants, we ſhould not have ſent our determination to the Ruſſian Ambaſſador in Harley ſtreet.—If there was any perſon who ſought for explanations from theſe papers, they muſt look to cabaliſtic annotations, or ſome mode of decyphering; they certainly were not viſible to common-place underſtandings. Much had been ſaid of the honour which had been gained by Miniſtry in the late negociation; he wiſhed that the claim had been locally aſcertained. It was certainly not in Ruſſia, in Sweden, or with our new allies, the Turks, that we had gained this credit. Nor did he want the reſcript of the Turkiſh Miniſter to inform him, that the country had been diſgraced, that we had incurred the contempt of our enemies, and the execration of our allies. He was not ſo much the enemy of the right honourable gentleman, as to wiſh him the honours which he would experience on a public entry into the capital of the Ottoman empire. That our armament was deſpiſed in Ruſſia was evident, ſince it had not extorted a ſingle conceſſion; and that the cauſes of it were inſufficient in the eyes of other powers, appeared from the alarm it had excited in France, the oſtenſible cauſe being abſurd, the ſecret cauſe was naturally ſuſpected.

For this cause, we had dragged our seamen by force from their employments, a subject to which he trusted the House would turn its attention, and find a proper remedy; for the mode of pressing, necessary as it was, till a substitute could be found, had the character both as a despotic and a barbarous Government. If it was asked, what temptations Ministers had to act wrong, he was not bound to tell, although many could be assigned, such as the pride of dictating to contending Potentates, and partitioning states and provinces. The question, if it applied to any charge of misconduct, would apply to every one, which was obviously absurd.

He called upon those who had refused to exercise their most valuable function of prevention, to exercise that of rigorous inquiry into a measure which had cost perhaps half a million of the public money, at a time, too, when they were selling the very morals of the people for money by a lottery. If this expence had been unnecessarily incurred, the Minister was not entitled to their confidence; if they refused to inquire into it, they were not entitled to the confidence of their constituents.

Mr. SHERIDAN said, that nothing should have induced him at so late an hour to trespass on the almost exhausted patience of the House, but his astonishment at the contemptuous silence of the Minister, that consistency of insult, that climax of haughtiness, with which he had treated the House, and now refused to answer on the day of his trial. He had formerly told them, that when the day of discussion came, he would assign the reasons for his conduct. The day of discussion was come, and he was silent. If he thought himself sufficiently defended by those who had undertaken to plead his cause he was much deceived; for he had involved himself in such a labyrinth of difficulties, as had not a path that did not lead to disgrace. If he had any defence to make, it was a secret locked up in his own breast, neither communicated to his friends, nor imparted to his colleagues. Every succeeding defender confuted the defender that had gone before him.

If they had asked how they should plead his cause, he could not tell. If they maintained that Oczakow was of no consequence, they could not answer his exposing the country to the hazard of war on account of it; if they maintained that it was

of consequence to justify an armament, they could not answer his giving it up. If they said that he yielded to the opinion of the House, they must be told that the majority of the House was with him; if they said, that he yielded to the opinion of the Public, the opinion of the Public was against his arming. On neither side could he escape. If he was wrong in his principle, he ought to be disgraced; if he was right, he ought to be impeached for abandoning it. If, indeed, Russia, commanding a numerous and hardy race of subjects, possessing great extent of territory, without disunion, and accumulation of power without unwieldiness, were to take possession of Constantinople, to occupy the Euxine, the Hamoaze and Catwater, with her fleets, where no European eye could see or examine their force till they poured into the Mediterranean, then he would admit, that her power might be dangerous to this country; but before he admitted that we were to arm to prevent this danger, the Minister should prove that it was probable; and if he did this he must stand convicted of a great crime in abandoning an object of so much importance, without laying such information before Parliament, as would enable Parliament to compare the probability of the danger with the practicability of preventing it. An honourable gentleman, whose more than promise of great abilities men of all parties must have rejoiced to hear, had execrated the impolicy of the Ministers of Charles the Second, in not opposing the early ambition of Louis XIV. If one side of the Minister's defence was well founded, he might live to execrate his impolicy in neglecting to oppose the ambition of Russia, after equipping an armament for the purpose. If his own majority forgave him, the minority readily might. To the latter he had bowed as the organs of the public voice; to the former, he said, in deeds more forcible than words, "I know what stuff my majority is made of, and how little its voice can be called the voice of the Public." It was common for him to change his principles, to come forward with propositions on commerce, fortifications and armaments, with "unless these are adopted I cannot be useful as a Minister. I cannot be accountable for the defence of the country, I cannot answer for the balance of Europe."—And the moment they were

rejected or abandoned, to congratulate the Houſe on the proſperity of commerce, the ſecurity of the nation, and the favourable ſituation of the European Powers. Theſe were charges which he muſt not be ſuffered to put upon the Houſe. The minority would bind him to the principle they had oppoſed, and convict him on it—he had almoſt ſaid the Majority, which he thought they might, but hoped they would not be, that they might not be miſtaken for the former majority on the ſame ſubject.

The honourable gentleman, to whoſe ſpeech he before alluded, had found it neceſſary, in explaining his ſyſtem, to take into the account the reſtoration of France, in order to provide us with a proper enemy. If ſomething, he had ſaid, like the old Government ſhould be reſtored in France, we ſhould then have all the ambition, treachery, and chicane to deal with, of which he formerly complained. If a free Government ſhould be eſtabliſhed, we ſhould then have a neighbouring power leſs likely, indeed, to be at war with us, but much more formidable whenever war ſhould occur. How then ought we to prepare ourſelves for meeting the energy and vigour which a free Government might give to France? How but by fortifying our conſtitution, by recalling it to its true principles, and baniſhing from it this proud reſerve in Miniſters, which diſdained to give information, and this unmeaning confidence in Parliament, which could vote money without it. Inſtead of this we were adviſed to take up the vices which France was throwing away; we muſt meddle and interfere in the affairs of other powers; we muſt have Holland for our ally, and Pruſſia to protect Holland; that Auſtria may not attack Pruſſia, we muſt excite the Turks againſt Auſtria; and to enable the Turks to defend themſelves againſt Ruſſia, we muſt get Sweden to make war on Ruſſia;—however far we went on, ſomething more was ſtill wanting. Like the earth, ſupported by an eagle, the eagle by an elephant, the elephant by a tortoiſe, &c. A ſupport was always wanted for the laſt ſupporter. All this we had done; and what had we got by it?—diſgrace, contempt, and reprobation.

He would adviſe the honourable gentleman who traced out this ſyſtem, to abjure it in time, as neither according with the

English constitution, nor the English character. Double dealing might be of service to despotic Governments; it might serve a despotic Minister, and perhaps be of temporary service to a country; but the occasional advantage was more than ten times overbalanced by the mischiefs it brought with it. The mere clerks of despotism, in this respect, would be an over-match for the Legislators of a free State. The character of our constitution was manly, frank, and undisguised. He loved to see the Minister assimilate his character to that of the constitution. He would love in it those qualities which he himself possessed; every sympathy of his nature would dispose him to reverence and to cherish them; and pursuing ostensible objects by direct and honourable means, he would tower, by the natural energy of candor and wisdom, above the miserable props of chicane and cunning. If, instead of this, a Minister should assimilate the character of the constitution to his own, his progress might be towering indeed in lofty misery, but it would be bottomed in shallow craft.

The honourable gentleman, whose speech he had more than once quoted, had unguardedly, in the course of his speech, talked of the want of good faith of the Emperor. Such language, when speaking of crowned heads, was always improper, because generally unwise, and frequently dangerous.—How did the honourable gentleman know, that we might not soon have occasion to court the Emperor, as we had lately courted the Empress, of whose breach of faith, a few months since, that House and the country rung again, though now we had changed our minds so much, that her bare word was considered by us as a sufficient security for engagements of the most serious and important nature.

He now came, he said, to the papers. He referred to the memorable speech of a worthy magistrate, Mr. Brook Watson, whose eloquence was easily remembered, as it was never flippant and unemphatic. He had called on the House to turn their eyes from the S. W. of America to the N. E. of Europe, as the true destination of the armament then preparing. The right honourable gentleman thought proper to deny this account given of the destination of the fleet, and Parliament had been pestered with it in a double sense. He should, from the pa-

pers, ſuppoſe that they had in truth been treacherous even to Ruſſia, and he quoted a paſſage, to ſhew that they held a double language to that Court, and pretended to follow up and act upon its ſyſtem, while in reality they were offering to Ruſſia their good offices, evidently to get themſelves out of the dilemma in which they were involved. They prayed only for the free navigation of the Dnieſter as an *adouciſſement*. This was the term made uſe of as a ſweetener, or as a ſimilar term had been once called, a *dulcifior*, to ſatisfy the people. The Empreſs, with a vein of ſarcaſm, granted them the ſweetener, but by making them parties, and, as it were, allies in her new ſyſtem of armed neutrality; for ſhe made it a ſtipulation that they ſhould go to the Porte, and demand the ſame on their part.—The entry of the Grand Vizier (Mr. Pitt) into the Divan, accompanied by the *Reis Effendi* near him, (Mr. Dundas) muſt have been a very curious ſpectacle!

He thanked his honourable friend for the thought——What ſort of reception, and what ſort of dialogue, muſt have taken place!—Well, they muſt have aſked him, What glorious terms have you procured with your grand fleet? Have you humbled Ruſſia? Does ſhe tremble at your power? Does ſhe crouch? Have you burnt her fleets for us? Have you demoliſhed Peterſburgh?——A melancholy No muſt have been the anſwer to all theſe interrogatories. What! does ſhe not repent that ſhe provoked you? But have you made her give up Oczakow? that your Sovereign has pledged himſelf for! No, none of all this. Inſtead of telling them to be tranquil in their minds, inſtead of aſſuring them that the pigeon of Mahomet might perch in ſafety, and no longer fear that the eagle of Ruſſia would pounce upon the harmleſs victim—they muſt ſay, No, none of all this. But we have engaged that if you do not comply with every tittle that ſhe demands of you before we preſumed to interfere, we ſhall abandon you to all the conſequences of war.

He challenged the right honourable gentleman with continuing the armament not to produce acquieſcence in his demand, but it had its continuance in a deeper cauſe—from that proud obſtinate ſpirit that would not confeſs its error. It was kept up, and all the violence of impreſſing continued, to preſerve a haughty appearance of character for himſelf, when he had ſa-

crificed the dignity of his Royal Master, and the fleet of England was made to ride in affected pomp, but in truth a disgraceful array at Spithead, exhibiting in novel manœuvres the zig-zag type of his own crooked conduct. He then spoke of the confidence which had been the topic of discussion, and he laid it down as an invariable maxim in the constitution, that no money should be called for, and taken out of the pockets of the people, without stating the positive use to which it was to be applied.

Mr. DUNDAS said the honourable gentleman had, in very harsh and very unaccountable language, accused his right honourable friend for not having thought it necessary as yet to rise, and say any thing in answer to the observations that had been thrown out. He would give him a very explicit answer; if he wished that his right honourable friend should rise; the right honourable gentleman opposite (Mr. Fox) should have come forward, and have given his friend to know the full amount of the charges that lay against him, that he might have entered fairly and fully into his defence. If the honourable gentleman had arranged the matter in this way, said Mr. Dundas, he would have saved himself and me the trouble of speaking.—For the honourable gentleman, however, I am glad that he has spoken—he has discharged all that monstrous quantity of bile from his stomach, which otherways must have given him an uneasy night. I confess, I have nothing new to say on the subject—I do not know the real sentiments of gentlemen on the other side of the House. Do they think, that it is for the interest of this country to preserve the political equilibrium of Europe? At one time I have been inclined to think they admit, and at another that they deny, the doctrine of a balance. One gentleman has said, that undoubtedly it is the invariable policy of England to maintain the balance; another admits the doctrine generally, but confines it in a very limited way;—and talks of contingencies—of circumstances—and of situations—by which it is to be tried and determined. I assert, that it is the invariable policy of Great Britain—that we must ever act upon the principle—and that we must not shrink from the duty, but must act upon it, even if its effects should not appear in the same age. This was the principle upon which we did act in this instance. The basis of our system was

laid at the time of the revolution of Holland. At that time, when to recover and save an ally, we entered into a treaty with Prussia; the ground was laid and the principle adopted, on which this very measure with regard to Russia was to be tried and defended. Then we engaged undoubtedly to do that for our new ally, which, in that instance, she did for us. We embraced the system, and immediately after we had occasion to act upon it. An alliance of a truly alarming kind was formed between Austria and Russia—formed after a personal interview of the two Sovereigns at Cherson. The alliance of two powers so formidable, which had for its object their mutual aggrandizement by the overthrow of the Ottoman Porte in Eu rope, could not be viewed with indifference by our ally, nor was it indifferent to ourselves. Surely it would not be said, that the existence of the Ottoman Power in Europe was not an object of importance to the maritime states of Europe.—France had always viewed the existence of their power as of the utmost consequence; and surely to our ally this meditated ruin was of the utmost importance. The safety of Prussia demanded that these formidable powers should not acquire an accession of territory. To ourselves it was almost equally important; for we surely could not see Russia take possession of the Black Sea, and erect herself into maritime consequence in the Mediterranean, without alarm. Here the right honourable gentleman recalled to the memory of the House what he called the ungrateful return which Russia had made to England for having in truth created her marine. We had manned her fleets—had led them from the Baltic to the Mediterranean—and the gallantry of an Englishman, Lieutenant Dugdale, had achieved the famous conquest which crushed the naval power of the Turks. In return for all this, when Great Britain was involved in war with all the world, Russia had become our most insidiour enemy, and had led the van in an act of hostility the most marked. He desired to know, after this proof of indisposition towards us, what right we had to expect the friendship of Russia, if her power should become formidable by sea? Let it be recollected that the islands of the Archipelago were the finest nursery for seamen in the world; and he owned he should fear for our possessions in India, if Russia were mistress of those islands; of Egypt and the Red Sea.—That Oczakow was a great object,

those who knew the interests of Russia and the Porte best made no hesitation in declaring.—Lord Malmsbury, whose authority would not be slighted, had positively declared that it was of great importance to the Porte, for by it they were able to overlook what Russia was doing in that quarter.—She could not form an equipment without being observed.—It was the watch tower of the Black Sea.—It was asked why go on with the armament?—Why because it was their intention to use it. Then why recede?—Honestly, because they found their ideas on the subject had excited a great division of sentiment in the country; a division known to the Empress—a division which would have made it very difficult to go on—and which if they had gone on, would have given confidence to the Empress. So that though they might have had but one campaign, she would have known that at the beginning of the next session, the great party in the country, who were against the war, would have objected to the supplies.—For this reason they gave up the point. There had been many detached observations to which he could not reply at so late an hour. A paper had been read by an honourable gentleman, purporting to be a manifesto—a memorial—or something.—Certainly no such paper had ever come to Government from Sir Robert Ainslie—and he believed it had not travelled so far as Constantinople.—The stale question of confidence had again been resumed—he thought it had been finally scouted, as they certainly demanded no blind confidence. He concluded with objecting to the motion.

Mr. GREY in explanation said, the paper that he had produced, he really believed to have come from Constantinople, and to be authentic, but he could not strictly vouch for its authenticity. He did assure the House, that he would never knowingly produce to them a paper that was a fabrication.

Mr. FOX rose and said, there was something extraordinary in the manner in which the right honourable gentleman had so pointedly called upon him to state his sentiments; that although one Member of Parliament had no right whatever to impose such a task on another, yet that after the right honourable gentleman had called on him in so new a manner, he had made it impossible for him not to deliver his opinion upon the subject; before he did so, however, he submitted it to the House as a matter for their consideration, whether at that ex-

treme late hour, they would wiſh him to proceed, or whether it might not be generally deemed more convenient to adjourn the debate? Mr. Fox declared he was perfectly ready to go on then, if the Houſe thought proper.

Mr. Chancellor PITT ſaid, that on a ſubject ſo perſonally intereſting to himſelf, as a charge of the importance of that urged againſt him, on the other ſide of the Houſe, it muſt naturally be imagined, that he was extremely anxious to hear the whole that could be advanced againſt him, in order that he might ſtate ſuch arguments, as led him to conceive, that there was no real foundation for any part of the accuſation, and that when he ſhould have done ſo, he ſhould neceſſarily be not the leſs anxious, to know the ſenſe of the Houſe on the ſubject; he therefore could give no opinion upon the ſuggeſtion of an adjournment, but muſt leave it entirely to the Houſe itſelf; he was perfectly ready to continue the debate, and to hear what the right honourable gentleman had to ſtate, in additional evidence of a charge, which that right honourable gentleman's honourable friend had, half an hour ago, been pleaſed to declare had been fully and completely proved already. With regard to the idea of an adjournment, the Houſe would conſult its own convenience.

Mr. FOX ſaid, he ſtood exactly in the predicament of the right honourable gentleman. He was ready to go on, if the Houſe thought proper, or willing to adjourn, if they required it, for their convenience. With regard to the remark of the right honourable gentleman, that he wiſhed to hear what he had to ſay in additional evidence of a charge, which an honourable friend of his had half an hour ago pronounced to have been fully proved already, he ſaid, he had nothing to add, but agreed entirely with his honourable friend, that the charge had been fully and completely proved, and nothing like a defence ſet up. The pointed manner, however, in which the right honourable gentleman oppoſite to him (Mr. Dundas) had called upon him, made it impoſſible for him not to ſtate his ſentiments on the queſtion before the Houſe.

Mr. M. A. TAYLOR ſaid, he was really quite exhauſted, and when the late hour was conſidered, and it was recollected that he, in common with other gentlemen, had been in the Houſe by twelve in the forenoon, in the Hall till near five,

and in the Houſe ever ſince, he conceived the Houſe ought to adjourn. He moved the queſtion of adjournment accordingly.

Which was ſeconded and put.

Sir JAMES JOHNSTONE ſaid, they ought to conſider that the Miniſter was on his trial, and they were his jury; they ought therefore to act like conſcientious jurors, and not ſeparate before they had heard all the evidence, and the defence, and given their verdict.

Mr. GREY reminded the Houſe, that there were ſome gentleman, who as Managers of the trial of Mr. Haſtings, had been in the Hall all day, and muſt be there again by twelve this day. He appealed therefore to their feelings, whether it would not be better to adjourn?

Mr. RYDER ſaid, there certainly was ſomething of weight in the honourable gentleman's obſervation. He therefore would not oppoſe the queſtion of adjournment.

Mr. DUNDAS ſaid, the Houſe ſhould alſo recollect, that the Speaker likewiſe had been on his duty in the Hall all the forenoon, and in the Chair ever ſince, and that he muſt do the ſame this day.

Mr. Chancellor PITT ſaid, before they came to the queſtion, if the Houſe ſhould agree to adjourn, he hoped it would be underſtood on all hands, that the debate would be reſumed to-morrow as he was extremely anxious to have the ſubject fully diſcuſſed, and therefore, if the Houſe did agree to adjourn, he would move to put off the ballot for an election Committee, that ſtood for to-morrow till Friday.

The ballot was put off accordingly.

The Houſe adjourned.

Thurſday, 1ſt March.

Mr. THOMPSON gave notice, that having ſeen a pamphlet, called the Trial of George Roſe, Eſq. a Member of that Houſe, containing ſeveral groſs charges againſt perſons high in office, he would bring forward a motion on that ſubject on Friday ſe'nnight.

Mr. FRANCIS moved the order of the day, but gave way to

Mr. MARTIN, who ſaid, he was extremely glad that the debate had not been preſſed on the preceding evening, when ſome Members were dead aſleep, others half famiſhed, and exhauſted for want of food, and others were riotous from having ate and drank too much, but that it had been adjourned to that evening, when they might coolly and diſpaſſionately diſcuſs a buſineſs of ſuch ſerious importance. Mr. Martin complained of the practice that prevailed of late, of ſix or ſeven of the firſt ſpeakers on each ſide of the Houſe riſing and holding arguments of an hour each, by which monopoly of debate, plain men, like himſelf, who wiſhed to occupy a few minutes of the time of the Houſe, and were deſirous of ſtanding well with their conſtituents and the Public, by letting them know the ſentiments they delivered in that Houſe, were prevented from having an opportunity of giving their opinions. Mr. Martin ſaid, he had always been againſt the Ruſſian buſineſs, becauſe he did not underſtand voting away the money of his conſtituents on an uncertainty. In private life, and in public buſineſs, wherever an over great degree of ſecrecy was affected, he was always apt to ſuſpect much treachery and fraud, and therefore he diſliked ſecrecy. He declared he had much rather vote with the right honourable gentleman, than againſt him, as he was no party man; but as he had heard no good reaſon given for withholding the papers, he ſhould certainly vote for the motion of the honourable gentleman who opened the debate the preceding evening, unleſs, before the queſtion was put, a ſufficient reaſon was aſſigned.

Some Members under the gallery then very irregularly called upon Mr. Fox, but they were controlled by the Speaker, who perſiſted in naming, and pointing to

Mr. FRANCIS, who ſaid, that it had been his intention, if an opportunity had offered on the preceding day, as it was ſtill, to have ſubmitted his thoughts to the Houſe, in ſupport of the motions propoſed by Mr. Whitbread; that he had formed his opinion by a careful examination of the papers on the table, and no man, he thought, who attended the laſt debate, could be much ſurpriſed at his declaring, that the opinion he brought with him had been powerfully fortified and confirmed by every thing that paſſed

on that occaſion. If, neverthelefs, it ſhould eventually happen, that the expectation, which the friends of the Miniſter profeſs to entertain, ſhould be realiſed; if their hopes ſhould be accompliſhed; if the right honourable gentleman ſhould meet the queſtions fairly, if he ſhould anſwer them diſtinctly, and, in a plain intelligible way, remove the enormous weight of difficulties and objections, with which his conduct has been loaded; in ſhort, if, before the cloſe of this diſcuſſion, he ſhould acquit himſelf ſubſtantially of all blame, which at preſent I deem to be little leſs than a moral impoſſibility, then, Sir, I deſire it to be underſtood, that I hold myſelf at liberty not only to withdraw my ſupport from the motion of cenſure, not only to give my vote for his acquittal, but to add to that vote a direct and expreſs tribute of admiration, for the moſt exalted effort of human ability that I am capable of conceiving; for ſomething more than human, for a power of eloquence approaching to magic and faſcination. But I muſt tell the right honourable gentleman, that this ſucceſs and honour is not to be obtained by artifice. He muſt abandon all crooked lines and circuits, and march directly up to his object. The anſwers I expect from him muſt be ſtrict and in point. The explanations he gives us ought to be ſpecific. The language of the right honourable gentleman, on this occaſion of all others, ſhould be frank, plain, and popular, adapted to the nature of the ſubject, a plain, popular intereſt; and ſuited to the capacity of thoſe who are concerned in it, the people of this kingdom. It is poſſible to perplex, but impoſſible to convince them by ſoundiag circumlocutions or pompous declamations. In *their* name, as well as my own, I proteſt againſt the uſe of logical diſtinctions; all refinement of abſtract reaſoning; all intricate inference from doubtful premiſes; all idea of poſitive obligation to be derived from ſpeculative ſyſtems; all tricks and ſyllogiſms, that catch the mind in falſe or unintelligible concluſions.

The papers on the table have, indeed, ſuffered ſome lights to appear, and ſome diſcoveries to eſcape, which I believe were not intended. But as to the explanations, which we

had reaſon to expect, I affirm they furniſh none. They tell us nothing but what in effect we knew before,—that our Government had interfered in the quarrel between Ruſſia and the Porte; that we had armed to ſupport our interpoſition; that we had preſcribed peremptory conditions to one of the parties; that we had abandoned thoſe terms, and that a peace had been concluded, under His Majeſty's ſuppoſed mediation, including a direct ſurrender and avowed ſacrifice of every one of thoſe pretended objects, for which the expence and diſtreſs of a great naval armament had been impoſed upon this country. But, with what right or reaſon we interfered; what intereſt induced us to riſque a war; what authority we had to dictate; by what arguments we ſupported, or on what rational ground we retracted our interpoſition, are queſtions, on which it would be in vain to look for information in any of the documents communicated to this Houſe. We ſee nothing but the reſult of an unſucceſsful negociation; neither how it was conducted, nor why it was defeated. When I allude to ſounding circumlocutions and pompous declamations, believe me, Sir, I do not mean to extend that character to a ſpeech, which we heard laſt night, from an honourable gentleman *, who ſpoke for the firſt time. Without pretenſions myſelf to qualifications of this kind, at no time perhaps within my reach, and now too late to be acquired, I am not ſo unread in the learning of former ages, or ſo inattentive to the talents that diſtinguiſh our own, as not to perceive that the honourable gentleman has choſen the beſt models of antiquity for his imitation, and that, proceeding as he has begun, he may rival the moſt eminent eloquence of the preſent times. His ſpeech appeared to me to be a maſterpiece of workmanſhip, in which the labour ſo completely outvalued the materials, that no compariſon could be made, no proportion could be obſerved between them. It looked like a beautiful piece of lace, of the fictitious value of many pounds, wrought from a ſkain of thread not worth ſixpence. The honourable gentleman, I think, accompliſhed

* Mr. Jenkinſon.

every purpoſe of eloquence, except one. He did not convince, becauſe, without ſubſtantial truth and reaſon, conviction is not to be obtained. The Miniſter himſelf muſt follow another courſe. Circumſcribed and contracted as the rights and duties of this Houſe are now, in effect, by modern doctrines and new principles, which, I ſee with regret, are advancing and gaining ground upon us every day, we have one undiſputed function, however, left; one right and duty, which, though virtually abandoned in practice, has not yet been conteſted in terms: that, when the money of our conſtituents is taken from them, we are bound to inquire, and have a right to be informed, for what national purpoſe it was demanded; for what ſpecific intereſt of this kingdom it was taken; in what manner it has been applied; and what preciſe benefit to the people has been obtained by it. If this privilege too ſhould be denied or evaded; if this duty, like all the reſt, ſhould be ſuffered to merge in the abyſs of confidence, the Houſe of Commons will not only be uſeleſs, but a burden and a curſe to the country. If we are to ſit here for no purpoſe but to regiſter the edicts of the Miniſter pretending to repreſent the volition or opinion of our conſtituents, while in reality we abandon even our own, and ſheltering the operations of a deſpotic Government under the forms of a free one, the people had better ſubmit at once to the executive power, and ſave themſelves at leaſt from the expence and delay of a formality, from which they derive no benefit or protection. The trade and commerce of the kingdom have been diſtreſſed, the public creditor alarmed, and all Europe kept in ſuſpence, by military preparations, which have ended in nothing. I call upon the Miniſter to tell us, why theſe things have been done. What general concern had England, more than any other nation, in the queſtion between Ruſſia and the Turks? What ſpecific intereſt of ours could, by any poſſibility, be affected by the ceſſion or reſtitution of Oczakow? If we had ſuch an intereſt, do that now, which no perſon yet has done, ſhew us plainly and diſtinctly what it was. I aſk the right honourable gentleman, whether this was an Engliſh or a Pruſſian quarrel; and in

what rational ſenſe it could even be material to Pruſſia to diſpoſſeſs the Empreſs of a fort and a deſert on the ſhores of the Black Sea? Were we bound by obligation, or in honour? If there be ſuch an article in the treaty with Pruſſia, we may lament the fact, but I know we muſt ſubmit to it. The public faith muſt be preſerved. Is there a poſitive proviſion? None. Is there any thing that virtually comprehends the caſe by inference or implication? Nothing. Will you allow the executive power to bind you, not only by expreſs terms, with foreign powers, but by deductions of their own, and to any amount? Will you permit the King's Miniſters firſt to contract for you to a definite extent, and under a plain preciſe limitation; then to tell you that, in the ſpirit of the engagement, other objects are included, other views are implied; and finally, to involve you in a complicated ſyſtem of politics, againſt which, if you thought of it at all, you thought yourſelves ſecured by the very treaty that plunges you into it? Can the nation be ſafe for a moment in a foreign alliance, if the intent and meaning be not limited by the terms; if they, who act for you, be at liberty, firſt to engage your faith by ſtipulation to one thing, and then to pledge your honour by conſtruction to another? But general principles of policy are reſorted to at laſt. The ſuppoſed intereſt of Pruſſia has been but little inſiſted on, and not at all explained. Gentlemen have been reduced to call in the balance of power in Europe to their aſſiſtance. In this place, Sir, I wiſh I had ability to attract the attention of the Houſe, and to fix it, if poſſible, on ſome conſiderations, connected with the ſubject in debate, and eſſential, in my mind, to the future peace and ſecurity of the kingdom. I have lived to ſee great changes in the government and policy of nations, in France, in Holland, in Poland, and America. But I declare moſt ſeriouſly, and moſt ſolemnly, that I have ſeen no revolution among nations ſo extraordinary as that which has taken place, in my own time, in the temper and character of this country. The countenance that expreſſed, the features that diſtinguiſhed, the character of England, are faded and effaced. We have now neither prejudices nor prin-

ciples; nothing original, nothing of our own. When I first came into life, when, without experience or capacity to judge, I had opportunity to observe upon public transactions, and national dispositions, I do affirm, that the prevailing principle, the favourite language, not only at Court, but universally through the kingdom, was, to reprobate German alliances and to withdraw from continental connections of every kind. This was the declared system of the Government at His Majesty's accession, with an evident concurrence of the country. The policy of the Cabinet takes the opposite direction, and the people follow it. The very language, which I now hold, which thirty years ago would have been received with applause both by Court and people, at this day, for ought I know, may expose me to the fury of the populace, and to have my house pulled down, as if I had declared myself an enemy to Church and King. In the actual temper and habits of the country, I see nothing like an appropriated system. We stick to nothing. We are not properly a nation of merchants, nor of farmers, nor of manufacturers, nor of soldiers. A gentleman said yesterday, we were a nation of stock-jobbers. I say we are a nation of three per cents, and nothing else. The late King of Prussia complained to all Europe that he was deserted and sacrificed by the peace of 1763, and that we had defrauded him of the subsidy due to him by treaty. Who was then at the head of the King's Councils? The Earl of Bute. The station he held entitles me to name the noble Lord. Who was then the prime adviser, the intimate confidential Secretary of Lord Bute? a noble relation* of the honourable gentleman, whose political opinions at that time were as publicly known, as publication of every sort could make them. Nor, among all the changes we have seen, is it an instance of conversion the least to be admired, that the doctrines, we have lately heard, should have been learned in that school, and that such a stream should issue from such a fountain. But, agreed;—let us surrender our understanding for a moment, Let it be admitted in ar-

* Lord Hawkesbury.

gument, that the balance of power was in danger, and could no way be recovered or preserved, but by the restitution of Oczakow. If that be true, the affair is over; for Oczakow is not restored. But I desire to know why it was *our* particular concern, how it came to be *our* specific interest, rather than that of the continental states of Europe, to support this imaginary balance? If the cause be common, why should *we* take the lead in it? Why is this island for ever to be the victim of continental politics? The position, that separates, ought to secure us. But systems are created to counteract nature. Our situation gives us no advantage. We are insulated in vain. I would warn the country, if I could, against plunging, as we have done too often, into a labyrinth of continental politics. The nature and essence of a labyrinth is to be very easy to enter, and very difficult to get out of it. Let us attend to our own affairs; and beware how we follow these wandering fires, this Will with a wisp, that carries us away, through bogs and quicksands, and, instead of landing us at our own door, abandons us at last in some foreign desert, worn out and benighted, to find our way home again. Still however it is affirmed, with unabating confidence, that Great Britain was materially concerned in the recovery of Oczakow for the Turks. If some gentlemen are feeble in evidence, I confess they are stout enough in assertion. Be it so. It seems we had an interest. Does it follow that we had a right? Does every interest convey a right? Let us see upon what principle of reason, justice, or the law of nations, we were intitled to interpose; and how the right honourable gentleman will establish the right of dictating terms of peace to two independent belligerent powers, with whose original quarrel we had no concern. I lay the justice of the war out of the question, though I believe it to be universally admitted that, on the part of the Empress, it was purely defensive. To *my* argument, it is perfectly immaterial, whether the Turks were the aggressors or not. We had no jurisdiction, and our judgement has not been appealed to. If the contrary be true, let us hear it asserted, let us see it made out. To shelter the fact, you must establish your right to

say, as in practice you have done, to the contending parties, "Thus far I have permitted you to contend; but now I interpose. The events of the war shall have no influence over the peace. You, who have succeeded, shall gain nothing by your success. The decision of Providence is in your favour; but it shall be *my* care to make it a naked judgement, without costs or damages; no recompence or retribution for the blood you have lost, or for the treasures you have wasted. You, who have failed, shall suffer nothing by the war, but the calamities that belong to it, in common with your opponent. Return to the point from which you departed. I am determined to replace you both in *statu quo*." Such a rule, I confess, might be a blessing to mankind, if it were universally admitted and enforced. It would be some restraint to the madness of ambition, if Princes were effectually instructed by authority, as they are in vain by experience, that conquest is never to be profitable; that the expences of victory are never to be repaid. But unless the rule be made general, we have no right to the instant use of it. It is partiality and injustice, unless it operates upon all. In parallel circumstances, would we submit to it ourselves? or have we a different measure for the interests of others and our own? You have heard a comparison stated between Oczakow and Gibraltar, with respect to their importance. To make it applicable to the case, you must suppose that Gibraltar was of as much consequence to the security of Spain, as you pretend that Oczakow is to that of the Turks; for no man, I think, will affirm, that Gibraltar is an outpost of Great Britain; that our island would not be safe, that it would be open to invasion, if we lost the possession of that place. Such language might possibly be held by Spain. In her eye at least Gibraltar is an eye-sore. By what right does England withhold it? By conquest, and no other. The Ministers of Queen Anne, who made the peace of Utrecht, insisted on keeping Gibraltar and Minorca, not as a bulwark and security to England—in that view the comparison fails us—but as the just and natural consequence

of success, the recompence of our efforts, and some retribution of our expence. Why was the conduct of the Tory Ministry in that transaction reprobated by the Whigs? Was it because they took an unreasonable advantage of the situation of France; because they demanded more than they had a right to? No, Sir. They were reproached with treachery for not obtaining enough; for not insisting on terms *proportioned to the successes of the war**; and for relinquishing the superior advantages, which they might have obtained by adhering to the alliance, and prosecuting the war. Suppose, at that period, that an Empress of Russia had interposed, and threatened us with a declaration of war, if we refused to relinquish our acquisitions, and to revert to a *status quo*. I call upon the right honourable gentleman to declare to this House, and to his country, whether, if he had been Minister of England, and entrusted with the conduct of the treaty of Utrecht, he would have yielded to that menace, and surrendered Gibraltar. If he would, he is bound by his practice to avow it: if he would not, his principles are a contradiction to his practice. On this point, I have authority, as well as precedent, to appeal to; a respectable, a powerful, I wish it were a living authority; a name, never to be mentioned by me without respect, without an expression of even more than filial reverence. On what principle did Lord Chatham condemn the peace of 1763? Why did he *solicit some friendly hand to deposit him on this floor*, but to declare, as he did, that the advantages of the peace *were not adequate to the successes of the war?* On what principle did he consent to enter into a negociation, in the year 1761, with Monsieur Bussy? Was it on the ground of a *status quo?* Would he have suffered such a preliminary to be stated to him? No. I affirm, with knowledge, that he would have rejected it with scorn. The principle of that negociation was an *uti possidetis*. We were to keep all our conquests, unless the contracting parties should agree upon exchanges for their mutual convenience. I attended those conferences. The documents are in print. But I have other evidence, if possible more in point, and drawn from the same authority. The anecdote I allude to is of a

public nature, and muſt appear in the records of the Secretary of State's office. When the Court of Spain interpoſed, and endeavoured to reduce us to terms advantageous to France, what was the anſwer of Lord Chatham to the Spaniſh Ambaſſador, I think it was the *Condé de Fuentes?*— I am ſure of the ſubſtance; I could almoſt anſwer for the words: "What, ſhall the Court of Verſailles, the common "diſturber of the peace of Europe, perpetually profit by her "ſucceſſes, and keep her acquiſitions; but when the events "of war have been againſt her, is ſhe to be reinſtated with-"out loſs; is ſhe to ſuffer nothing from defeat?" Would Lord Chatham have ſubmitted to the haughty interference of a neutral power? The fact is before you. Is the principle diſputed? is the authority inſufficient? or is it in human effrontery to avow, that you inſiſt upon a general principle at one moment, and refuſe to abide by it at another?

Now, Sir, let us turn to the concluſion, and ſee how it correſponds with the outſet of this honourable tranſaction. In the face of truth and treaſon, let it be granted, that our intereſt and our right, as well as the importance of the object, have been proved to demonſtration. The right honourable gentleman would do well to conſider, where that conceſſion leaves him; and whether he had not better reſort at once to the original folly of his conduct, ſuppoſed to be corrected by better information or experiment, than perſiſt in aſſerting that the intereſt, which he has ſacrificed, was eſſential; that the right he has ſurrendered, was indiſputable; and that the conditions he has retracted, were of importance ſufficient to juſtify the armament, and fit to be ſupported at the hazard of a war. In one way, he has a chance of being right. In the other, he pronounces his own condemnation, Privileged as he is, he will not tell us, I preſume, that both ſides of the contradiction are true; that he acted wiſely in demanding, and vigorouſly in retracting; that to arm for a certain object, and to diſarm without obtaining it, is an equal proof of conſummate wiſdom, and of exalted reſolution. Until adverſe propoſitions, ſuch as theſe, are made

to concur, I must continue to think as I have been taught, that, among nations as well as individuals, moderation is the pledge and foundation of firmness; that insolence and arrogance generally lead to meanness and submission; and that he, who draws his sword without reason, is very likely to put it up again without honour. The transaction, taken together, is ridiculous, as well as odious. To shelter us from universal hatred, the right honourable gentleman thinks it sufficient to make himself the scorn of Europe. Compare the opening, how pompous! with the conclusion, how contemptible! The miserable vanity of a foolish musician, who alarms you with a grand, martial overture, with drums, trumpets, and clarinets,—pride, pomp, and circumstance—and ends it with a flat, insipid *finale*, some low, vulgar tune, performed upon a dulcimer and a bagpipe?

For what rational purpose has the right honourable gentleman taken such pains to alienate and exasperate Russia? What advantage has he gained by it in another quarter? Has he conciliated the gratitude or friendship of the Turks? What, by giving up every point, which we had declared to be necessary to their security, which we knew they had most at heart! A letter from the Vizier to our Ambassador at Constantinople was read yesterday. I believe it to be authentic. If not, let it be contradicted. But a denial is not sufficient. Give us some direct proof, out of the correspondance of Sir Robert Ainslie, that the Ottoman Porte is in fact satisfied with our conduct. For myself, I have no doubt that the Turks are infinitely more exasperated, as in reason they ought to be, against England than against Russia.—Avowed hostility, compared with base professions, and treacherous friendship, is hardly an object of resentment. Why was the dignity of the Crown of Great Britain committed, if you were not prepared and determined to maintain it? Why was it declared, in His Majesty's name*, that *the most just and reasonable proposition appeared to be that of the status quo?* or, if it were so, why did the Minister engage His

* 15th June, 1790.

Majesty's honour afterwards, by mediation or concurrence, in the support of other terms, incompatible with that which he had pronounced to be *most just and reasonable?* In the course of another year, we relax gradually, and lower our terms; but there we make our stand: "the Court of London "*cannot propose any thing* beyond these conditions to the Ot-"toman Porte." In less than a month, however, even this ultimatum is abandoned; and then, when we have relinquished every point, which the Turks, relying on our declared opinion, or professed friendship, had a right to expect, with admirable serenity we say *, "If, *contrary to all* "*expectation*, the Porte should be unwilling to yield to the "advice and representations of the allied Courts, &c. we "promise to abandon the termination of the war to the "course of events," that is, to leave the Turks to their fate. Such folly and such perfidy may have existed in other times, but never appeared till now under the hand and seal of a great nation. The whole transaction is of a piece. Can any mortal mind conceive why Mr. Faulkener was sent to Petersburgh? I pass by the useless, unnecessary expence of the appointment. What occasion was there for two Ambassadors at the same Court, and on the same subject? Let me entreat the House to look at this proceeding. As long as the right honourable gentleman thought it necessary to exact, or safe to threaten, one Minister was sufficient. While there was something difficult to be negociated, or hazardous to be declared, he was contented to rely on the abilities and firmness of Mr. Whitworth. But, when he determined to lower his tone, when nothing but concession was in question, then, it seems, the business could not be done without a reinforcement of talents, without an infusion of personal spirit, to support the negociation; and this is the purpose for which he chuses a man of distinguished character to assist Mr. Whitworth. Now, Sir, it may be a vile, degrading office, but it cannot be a difficult task, to yield every thing, and submit to any thing. Concession, on the face of it, implies no great

* 22d July, 1791.

difficulty, [illegible] you employ a man of honour to make it.— The plane is inclined, and the weight descends of itself. But the principle of this miserable negociation has even infected the form of it. Compare the stile and composition of our papers with those of Russia. How poor, dry, and insignificant are the documents on our side!—Sometimes a stately reserve, or an obscure threat. Then a torrent of official phrases, and general assurances about pacific dispositions and purity of intentions; without argument, dignity, or precision, or the ray of a reason for any thing. Mr. Whitworth and Mr. Faulkener I believe to be men of abilities, and am sorry to see them so wretchedly employed. So barren and impracticable is the subject, that cultivation is thrown away upon it; no human industry can make it productive. Not so the Empress of Russia. See with what vigour she enters into the debate, with what dignity and reason she supports it! For instance: "Our Ministers declare * their readiness, *as the* "*last resource*, to propose to the Ottoman Ministry to cede "to Russia the district of Oczakow *in full property and sove*"*reignty*," with this curious proviso, *that her Majesty shall demolish the fortress and shall not rebuild it*. How such a limitation can be reconciled to the terms of the cession, or included in the grant of *a full property and sovereignty*, is a mystery, which the underwritten Ministers have very prudently left to shift for itself, and to find its way, if it can, into the human understanding. You might as well pretend to convey an estate, *in fee simple*, and then tell the purchaser that he must not repair the House, that he must pull down the mill, or demolish the bridge. You may annex these conditions to a gift, but it is nonsense to say that you grant an estate in fee. Observe the answer of the Empress; how ably she argues the question; with what temper she maintains her pretensions. "That a restriction of this na"ture would imply a contradiction of the principle of abso"lute property and sovereignty; that it is not equal, or re"ciprocal, since the Turks are left at liberty to preserve,

* 29th June, 1791.

"on their Bank, their ancient fortifications, [illegible] and new "ones; and that the construction of fortresses in general does "not indicate any intention of attacking, but is connected "with measures of precaution and defence, &c." To these unexpected arguments our Ministers submit without reply. But it seems we have obtained the free navigation of the Dneister, for any persons of any nation, whose curiosity may lead them to visit those countries; and this grand concession is supposed to be extorted from the Empress by the respectable authority of Great Britain. The Empress, I confess, is extremely civil in her answer; because, in this article, she considers it as her own interest to comply. She takes care to tell us, "that she will not disturb the navigation of the Dneister, "but, on the contrary, afford it all favour and protec- "tion." Why? "because, during her whole reign, she "has acted upon an invariable principle of encouraging, by "all possible means, the commerce and navigation of neutral "and friendly nations."

I cannot conclude, Sir, without reminding this House, and the nation, that, while the Councils of England have been occupied in these vain pursuits, and most dishonourable negociations, the real substantial interests of the kingdom have been utterly neglected and forgotten. In behalf of the commerce and manufactures of England, I call upon the Minister to inform us, why the commercial treaty with Russia, which expired in 1786, has not been renewed. We were once the most respected and favoured of all foreign nations in Russia. Respect and favour are gone. Let the nation consider, whether the measures lately taken were likely to reinstate us. I am authorized and instructed by one of the first houses in the city, connected with Russia, to say, that "the reasons which prevented the renewal of the treaty, might have been removed. That, in the course of last winter, Russia had offered to give up her objections, on the subject of the conveyance of naval stores in neutral bottoms; and that she had made this offer not as the purchase of any concession on our part, but merely as a preliminary to shew her good will. This was the favourable opportunity which the whole

t[illegible] was wishing for since the expiration of the treaty; we should have been restored to the possession of the rights we had enjoyed under the former treaty, with every farther advantage which we had to desire; that this favourable moment was thrown away and the trade sacrificed to a mere fancy. The chief disadvantage we labour under, from the want of a treaty, is, that we pay a duty, which is now equal to thirty per cent, or nearly one third more than other nations; whereas, during our treaty, all other nations paid that duty more than the English, though, from the less unfavourable course of exchange, the difference was never so great. The questions I have stated to the right honourable gentleman are strictly connected with the subject. They are parliamentary, plain, and intelligible. We shall hear, whether his answers are equally distinct and in point. A majority of the House of Commons may be easily satisfied; but it is not on such objects and interests as these, that the people of this kingdom can or ought to be contented with ingenious discourses, or with eloquent declamations.

Mr. POWYS rose next, but the cry still loudly continuing for Mr. Fox, he desired to be heard only three or four sentences. He said, he understood the right honourable gentleman reserved himself to be the last speaker, that he might first hear all that was said against him. He should have thought, that the right honourable gentleman should have permitted the House to have put itself into such a form as to have had a right to reply and then the right honourable gentleman might have explained as often as he thought proper. He declared if it was to be understood by the motion that the right honourable gentleman was to be censured for having abandoned his project, he could not vote for that, because he thought the right honourable gentleman, by doing this, had served his country more than he would have done by continuing it. The motion, he observed, censured the right honourable gentleman for not obtaining with an armament what he might have obtained without one, and that after the Cabinet had agreed to quit their object, they [illegible] to increase the expence of the armament. To those [illegible] points, he could not say no without an explanation. He said, if Ministers had explained their conduct when they called

for confidence, there was no caufe to think that Parliament would have differed from them. It had fortunately happened, however, that their obftinacy in refufing all explanation laft year produced an oppofition that ultimately faved the country from the calamities of a war, when the meffage was delivered in March. But he thought fome explanation ought to have been given, and he contended from the tenor of the King's fpeech, which he caufed to be read, that affurances were held out of every profpect that could lead Minifters to ftate to the country that there was no probability of any difturbance in Europe, by which the interefts of this country were likely to be affected, or its tranquillity broken in upon. The truth of this declaration he confidered Minifters pledged for, from the folemn manner in which they introduced it. As to the affected object of the armament, and the total failure in obtaining it, that point certainly required explanation from Minifters, when the refult of their conduct had been attended with fo much expence to the people of this country. Laft year they had demanded and obtained the confidence of the country pending a negociation, during the feffion of Parliament. In the interval, and after that negociation was concluded, he thought it would have been much more manly, honourable, and refpectful, both towards the country and themfelves, to have prepared againft this time all the materials proper to juftify their meafures, than to follow the conduct which they feemed to do.

The Houfe becoming extremely clamorous, Mr. FOX next rofe.

[*Thofe who fhall attempt to report a fpeech of Mr.* Fox, *will do well to convince themfelves, that with whatever aid their memories may be furnifhed by their reflections, any promife of reporting it correctly, muft give birth to comparifons very fatal to their purpofe. This is a difficulty that increafes with the excellence to be imitated. It becomes us, therefore, rather to fay what our pretenfions are not, than what they are; and thus we fhall hope to juftify an appeal to the indulgence of the Public, large and liberal, indeed, as muft be that indulgence, confidering that it muft increafe in proportion to their difappointment, and that we want it moft when they can fpare it leaft. The fpeech delivered this night by Mr. Fox, ranks with the moft*

successful efforts of his genius; and its impression upon the public mind will be deep and lasting.]

After the challenge which was thrown out to me, in the speech of a right honourable gentleman, (Mr. Dundas) last night, (said Mr. Fox) I did consider it my duty to trouble you somewhat at length on this important question. But before I enter into the consideration of it, I will explain why I did not obey a call made in the beginning of the day, and repeated several times, in a manner not very consistent either with the freedom of debate, or with the order which the right honourable gentleman has himself prescribed for the discussion of this day. Why any Members should think themselves entitled to call on an individual in that way I know not, but why I did not yield to the call is obvious. It was said by an honourable gentleman last night to be the wish of the right honourable gentleman to hear all that could be said on the subject, before he should rise to enter into his defence. If so, it certainly would not become me to prevent him from hearing any other gentleman who might be inclined to speak on the occasion; and as he particularly alluded to me, I thought it respectful to give way to gentlemen, that I might not interrupt the course which he has chosen for himself, as it seems he reserves himself till I have spoken. This call on me is of a singular nature. A Minister is accused of having rashly engaged the country in a measure, by which we have suffered disaster and disgrace, and when a motion of censure is made, he chuses to reserve himself, and speak after every one, that no means may be given to reply to his defence—to expose its fallacy if fallacious—or to detect its misrepresentations, if he shall chuse to misrepresent what may be said. If the right honourable gentleman is truly desirous of meeting the charges against him, and if he has confidence in his ability to vindicate his conduct, why not pursue the course which would be manly and open? Why not go into a Committee, as was offered him by the honourable gentleman who made the motion, (Mr. Whitbread) in which the forms of this House would have permitted Members on each side to answer whatever was advanced by the other, and the subject would have received the most ample discussion? Instead of this honourable course, he is determin-

ed to take all advantages. He ſcreens himſelf by a ſtratagem which no defendant in any proceſs in this country could enjoy; ſince no man put upon his defence in any Court of Juſtice could ſo contrive as not only to prevent all reply to his defence, but all refutation of what he may aſſert—all explanation of what he may miſrepreſent. Such are the advantages which the right honourable gentleman is determined to ſeize in this moment of his trial; and to confeſs the truth, never did man ſtand ſo much in need of every advantage! never was there an occaſion in which a Miniſter was exhibited to this Houſe in circumſtances ſo ungracious, as thoſe under which he ſtands before it in the preſent moment! For what is our preciſe ſituation? Laſt ſeſſion of Parliament we had no fewer than four debates upon the queſtion of the armament, in which the right honourable gentleman involved this country, without condeſcending to explain the object which he had in view. The minority of this Houſe ſtood forth againſt the monſtrous meaſure of involving the country, without unfolding the reaſon. The Miniſter proudly and obſtinately refuſed, and called on the majority to ſupport him. We gave our opinion at large on the ſubject, and with effect, as it turned out, on the public mind. On that of the right honourable gentleman, however, we were not ſucceſsful; for what was his conduct? He replied to us, "I hear what you ſay—I could anſwer all your charges, "but I know my duty to my King too well to ſubmit at this "moment to expoſe the ſecrets of the State, and to lay the "reaſons before you of the meaſure on which I demand your "confidence. I chuſe rather to lie for a time under all the "imputations which you may heap againſt me, truſting to the "explanations which will come at laſt." Such was explicitly his language. However I might differ from the right honourable gentleman in opinion, I felt for his ſituation. There was in this excuſe ſome ſhadow of a reaſon on which it might be poſſible to defend him, when the whole of his conduct came to be enquired into. I thought it hard to goad him; when, perhaps, he conſidered it as unſafe to expoſe what he was doing. But when the concluſion of the negociation had looſed him from his fetters, when he had caſt off the trammels that bound him, I thought, that like the horſe deſcribed by Homer, (if I re-

membered I would quote the lines) exulting in the fresh pastures after he had freed himself from the bridle, the right honourable gentleman would have been eager to meet us with every sort of explanation and satisfaction. I thought that, restrained by no delicacy, and panting only for the moment that was to restore him the means of developing, of expatiating upon, every part of his conduct that was mysterious, of clearing up that which had been reprobated, of repelling on the heads of his adversaries those very accusations with which they had loaded him—the right honourable gentleman would have had but one wish, that of coming forward in a bold and manly manner, and endeavouring to make his cause good against us, in the face of the world. Has he done so? has he even given us the means of inquiring fully and fairly into his conduct? No such thing. He lays before us a set of papers, sufficient, indeed, as I shall contend, to found a strong criminal charge for misconduct against him, but evidently mutilated, garbled, and imperfect, with a view of precluding that full inquiry which his conduct demands, and which we had every reason to expect he would not have shrunk from on this day. We call for more. They are denied us. Why? "Because," say the gentlemen on the other side, "unless the papers now before you shew there is ground for accusation, and unless you agree to accuse, it is not safe or proper to grant you more." But is this a *defence* for the right honourable gentleman? Do these papers exculpate him? Directly the reverse. *Prima facie* they condemn him. They afford us, in the first instance, the proof of disappointment. They shew us that we have not obtained what we aimed to obtain, and they give us no justification of the right honourable gentleman for that disappointment. I have heard much ingenuity displayed, to maintain that there was no guilt. But what is the fallacy of this argument? When we called for papers during the Spanish negociation, we were answered, "the negociation was pending, and it was unsafe to grant them." Very well. But when it was over, and the same reasons for withholding them could not be said to exist, we were told, "Look to the result—the nation is satisfied with what we have got, and you must lay a ground of criminality before we can admit your principle of calling for papers." Thus we were precluded from all in-

quiry into that bufinefs; but now the right honourable gentleman, confcious that the country feels fomewhat differently, admits the ground of criminality to have been laid by producing thofe documents on your table, imperfect as they are. It is from his own confeffion, therefore, that I am to pronounce him guilty, until he proves himfelf not to be fo; and it is enough for me to contend, that the papers now before us afford him, *prima facie*, no juftification; but, on the contrary, afford ftrong proof of his guilt, inafmuch as they evince a complete failure in the object he aimed at obtaining. Sir, the right honourable gentleman is fenfible how much thefe circumftances render it neceffary for him to take every poffible advantage his fituation can give him; inftead, therefore, of fhewing himfelf anxious to come forward, or thinking it his duty to explain why it was inconvenient or impolitic for him to ftate laft year the true grounds on which he had called upon us to arm, what was the object of that armament, and why he had abandoned it, he lays a few papers on the table, and contents himfelf with an appeal unheard of before.—"If you have any thing to "fay againft me, fpeak out, fpeak all—I will not fay a word "till you have done—let me hear you one after another—I "will have all the advantage of the game—none of you fhall "come behind me—for as foon as you have all thrown forth "what you have to fay, I will make a fpeech, which you fhall "not have an opportunity to contradict, and I will throw "myfelf on my majority, that makes you dumb for ever."—Such is the fituation in which we ftand, and fuch the courfe which the right honourable gentleman thinks it honourable to purfue!

I chearfully yield to him the ground he chufes to occupy, and fubmit to the call addreffed perfonally to myfelf (although perhaps not in a manner very decorous) of ftating to the Houfe what I have to offer, before the right honourable gentleman will open his lips.

Having made thefe preliminary obfervations on the manner in which this bufinefs has been conducted, I will proceed frankly to ftate the reafons upon which I found the vote of cenfure, in which I fhall this night agrée. Much argument has been ufed on topics, not unfit, indeed, to be mixed with this queftion, but not neceffary; topics, which undoubtedly

may be incidentally taken up, but which are not eſſential to the diſcuſſion. In this claſs I rank what has been ſaid upon the balance of Europe. Whether the inſulated ſtate of policy which diſdained all continental connection whatever, as adopted at the beginning of the preſent reign—whether the ſyſtem of extenſive foreign connection, ſo eagerly inſiſted on by a young gentleman who ſpoke yeſterday for the firſt time—or whether, as I am inclined to ſuſpect, is the true and wiſe courſe—the medium between theſe two, be our intereſt, are certainly very proper topics to be diſcuſſed, but as certainly not eſſential topics to this queſtion. Of the three, I certainly think the middle line the true political courſe of this country; I think that, in our ſituation, every continental connection is to be determined by its own merits. I am one of thoſe who think that a total inattention to foreign connections might be, as it has proved, very injurious to this country. But if I am driven to chuſe between the two extremes, between that of ſtanding inſulated and aloof from all foreign connection, and truſting for defence to our own reſources, and that ſyſtem, as laid down in the ſpeech of an honourable gentleman, who diſtinguiſhed himſelf ſo much laſt night, to the extent to which he preſſed it, I do not heſitate to declare that my opinion is for the firſt of thoſe ſituations. I ſhould prefer even total diſunion to that ſort of connection, to preſerve which we ſhould be obliged to riſk the blood and the reſources of the country in every quarrel and every change that ambition or accident might bring about in any part of the continent of Europe. But in the queſtion before us, I deny that I am driven to either of theſe extremes. The honourable gentleman, who ſpoke with all the open ingenuouſneſs, as well as the animation of youth, ſeemed himſelf to dread the extent to which his own doctrines would lead him: he failed, therefore, to ſuſtain the policy of the ſyſtem he deſcribed, in that part where it can alone apply, namely, to the degree in which it is neceſſary for us to ſupport a balance of power. Holland, for inſtance, he ſtates to be our natural ally. Granted. "To preſerve Holland, and that "ſhe may not fall into the arms of France, we muſt make an "alliance with Pruſſia." Good. But Pruſſia may be attacked by Auſtria. Then we muſt make an alliance with the Ottoman Porte, that they may fall on Auſtria. Well, but the

Porte may be attacked by Ruſſia—then we muſt make an alliance with Sweden, that he may fall on Ruſſia. His natural ingenuity pointed out to him, that in caſting up the account of all this, it did not produce a favourable balance for England, and he evaded the conſequence of his own principle, by ſaying, that perhaps Ruſſia would not attack the Porte: for when we ſpeculate on extreme caſes, (ſays the honourable gentleman) we have a right to make allowances: it is fair to expect that when we are in alliance with the Porte, Ruſſia will feel too ſenſibly the importance of the commercial advantages ſhe enjoys by her intercourſe with this country, to riſk the loſs of them by an attack on the Porte.—— Are we then to ſuppoſe, that in that ſcene of univerſal conteſt and warfare, this ambitious Power, that is perpetually and ſyſtematically, as it has been reproached her, aiming at the deſtruction of the Porte, and while the reſt of Europe has been at peace, has been in a ſtate of reſtleſs and unceaſing hoſtility with her, will then be the only power at peace, and let ſlip ſo favourable an opportunity of deſtroying her old enemy, ſimply becauſe ſhe is afraid of loſing her trade with you in the Baltic? If the honourable gentleman means to ſtate this as a rational conjecture, I would aſk him to look to the fact. Did her ſenſe of theſe advantages reſtrain her in the late war, or compel her to deſiſt from the demands ſhe made before we began to arm? Certainly not. We find from the documents before us, that ſhe adhered to one uniform, ſteady courſe, from which neither the apprehenſion of commercial loſs, nor the terrors of our arms, influenced her one moment to recede. What then are we to conclude from this intricate ſyſtem of balances and counterbalances, and thoſe dangerous theories with which the honourable gentleman ſeemed to amuſe himſelf? Why, that theſe are ſpeculations too remote from our policy; that in ſome parts, even according to the honourable gentleman's argument, they may be defective, after all, and conſequently, that if the ſyſtem he builds upon it fails in one of its poſſibilities, it fails in the whole of them Such muſt ever be the fate of ſyſtems ſo nicely conſtructed.—But it is not true, that the ſyſtem neceſſary to enable this country to derive the true benefit from the Dutch alliance, ought to be founded upon thoſe involved and myſterious politics which

make it incumbent upon us, nay, which prove its perfection, by compelling us to ſtand forward the principals in every quarrel, the Quixotes of every enterpriſe, the agitators in every plot, intrigue, and diſturbance, which are every day ariſing in Europe, to embroil one ſtate of it with another. I confeſs that my opinions fall infinitely ſhort of theſe perilous extremes; that poſſibly my genius is too ſcanty, and my underſtanding too limited and feeble, for the contemplation of their conſequences, and that I can ſpeculate no farther than on connections immediately neceſſary to preſerve us, ſafe and proſperous, from the power of our open enemies, and the encroachment of our competitors: that this I hold to be the only teſt by which the merits of an alliance can be tried, which I ſhould eſteem either valuable or uſeleſs, in proportion to its ſtrict adherence to this principle. I did think, for inſtance, that when the intrigues of France threatened to deprive us of our efficient ally, Holland, it was wiſe to interfere, and afterward to form an alliance by which that evil might be prevented.—But every ſtep beyond the alliance we then formed, every link in the chain of confederacies ſo largely expatiated upon by the gentlemen on the other ſide, brings us more and more remote from its true principle; the broad and clear lines of your policy become narrow and leſs diſtinct, until they are carried at laſt to an extremity of Europe, where every trace of them is loſt.

Other topics have been introduced into the diſcuſſion. The beginning of the war between Ruſſia and the Porte has been referred to. What poſſible connection that has with our armament I know not; but of that I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak by and by.

I come, however, Sir, to a queſtion more immediately before us, and that is, the value and importance annexed in the minds of His Majeſty's Miniſters, to the fortreſs of Oczakow; and here I muſt beg leave to ſay, that they have not once attempted to anſwer the arguments ſo judiciouſly and ably enforced by my honourable friend who made this motion. It was explicitly ſtated by the gentlemen on the other ſide, as the only argument for our interference at all, that the balance of Europe was threatened with great danger, if Oczakow was ſuffered to remain in the hands of Ruſſia. Of no leſs im-

portance did Ministers last year state this fortress of Oczakow, than as if it were indeed the *talisman** on which depended the fate of the whole Ottoman empire.

But if this, from their own admission, was true last year, what has happened to alter its value? If it then excited the alarms of His Majesty's Ministers for the safety of Europe, what can enable them now to tell us that we are perfectly secure? If it was true that her bare possession of Oczakow would be so dangerous, what must be the terror of Europe, when they saw our negociators put Russia into the way of seizing even on Constantinople itself? This was the strong argument of my honourable friend (Mr. Whitbread), and which he maintained with such solid reasoning, that a shadow of an answer has not been given to it. To illustrate the value of Oczakow, however, one honourable gentleman (Mr. Grant) went back to the reign of Elizabeth—nay, to the days of Philip and Demosthenes. He told us, that when Demosthenes, urging the Athenians to maks war on Philip, reproached them with inattention to a few towns he had taken, the names of which they scarcely knew, telling them that those towns were the keys by which he would in time invade and overcome Greece, he gave them a salutary warning of the danger that impended. But if the opponents of that great orator had prevailed, if they had succeeded in inducing their countrymen to acquiesce in the surrender not only of those towns, but of considerably more, as in the present instance, with what face would he afterwards have declared to his countrymen, "True "it was that these sorry and nameless towns were the key to "Archopolis itself, but you have surrendered them; and "what is the consequence? You are now in a state of the "most perfect security—you have now nothing to fear—you "have now the prospect of sixteen years of peace before you!" I ask, Sir, what would have been the reception even of Demosthenes himself, if he had undertaken to support such an inconsistency?

* This was an allusion to a part of Mr. Grey's speech, who had quoted a passage from Mr. Hastings's Narrative of the Benares Expedition, to much the same effect.

Let us try this, however, the other way. In order to ſhew that His Majeſty's Miniſters merit the cenſure which is propoſed, I will admit that the preſervation of the Turks is neceſſary for the ſecurity of a balance of power. I truſt, at the ſame time that this admiſſion, which I make merely for the argument, will not be diſingenuouſly quoted upon me, as hypothetical ſtatements too commonly are, for admiſſions of fact. What will the right honourable gentleman gain by it? The Turks, by his arrangement, are left in a worſe ſituation than he found them in; for, previous to his interference, if Ruſſia had gone to Conſtantinople, he would have been unfettered by the ſtipulations which bind him now, and he and his ally might have interfered, to ſave the Porte from total deſtruction. Now, however, the poſſible and total extirpation of the Ottoman power is made to depend on a point ſo precarious, as their accepting the propoſal which the right honourable gentleman thought fit to agree to for them, within the ſpace of four months. And what is this propoſal? Why, that the Turks ſhould give up not only the object of the war they had begun, but this very Oczakow, which of itſelf was ſufficient, in the hands of Ruſſia, to overturn the balance. If, therefore, it was ſo important to recover Oczakow, it is not recovered, and Miniſters ought to be cenſured. If unimportant, they ought never to have demanded it. If ſo unimportant, they ought to be cenſured for arming; but if ſo important as they have ſtated it, they ought to be cenſured for diſarming without having gotten it. Either way, therefore, the argument comes to the ſame point, and I care not on which ſide the gentlemen chuſe to take it up; for whether Oczakow be, as they told us laſt year, the key to Conſtantinople, on the preſervation of which to Turkey the balance of Europe depended, or, as they muſt tell us now, of no comparative importance, their conduct is equally to be condemned, for diſarming, and puſillanimouſly yielding up the object, in the firſt inſtance; for committing the dignity of their Sovereign, and hazarding the peace of their country, in the ſecond. But they tell us, it is unfair to involve us in this dilemma; there was a middle courſe to be adopted. Oczakow was certainly of much importance; but this importance was to be determined upon by circumſtances. Sir, we are become nice, indeed, in our political arithmetic!

In this calculating age, we ascertain to a scruple what an object is really worth. Thus it seems that Oczakow was worth an armament, but not worth a war: it was worth a threat, but not worth carrying that threat into execution. Sir, I can conceive nothing so degrading and dishonourable, as an argument such as this. To hold out a menace, without ever seriously meaning to enforce it, constitutes, in common language, the true description of a bully; applied to the transactions of a nation, the disgrace is deeper, and the consequences fatal to its honour. Yet such is the precise conduct the King's Ministers have made the nation to hold in the eyes of Europe; and which they defend by an argument, which, if urged in private life, would stamp a man with the character of a coward and a bully, and sink him to the deepest abyss of infamy and degradation. Sure I am, that this distinction never suggested itself to the reflection of a noble Duke, whose conduct throughout the whole of this business has evinced the manly character of his mind, unaccustomed to such calculations! From him we learn the fact. He said, in his place, that his colleagues thought it fit to risk a threat to recover Oczakow, but would not risk a war for it. Such conduct was not for him! it might suit the characters of his colleagues in office, it could not his. But they say, it might be worth a war with the public opinion; but worth nothing without it. I cannot conceive any case, in which a great and wise nation, having committed itself by a menace, can withdraw that menace without disgrace. The converse of the proposition I can easily conceive—that there may be a place, for instance, not fit to be asked at all, but which being asked for, and with a menace, it is fit to insist upon. This undoubtedly goes to make a nation, like an individual, cautious of committing itself, because there is no ground so tender as that of honour. How do Ministers think on this subject? Oczakow was every thing by itself, but when they added to Oczakow the honour of England, it became nothing. Oczakow, by itself, threatened the balance of Europe, Oczakow and honour weighed nothing in the scale. Honour is, in their political arithmetic, a *minus* quantity, to be subtracted from the value of Oczakow. Sir, I am ashamed to state this reasoning; nor can I reflect on the foul stain it has fixed on the English name, without feeling mortified and

humbled indeed! Their late colleague, the noble Duke, urged his sentiments with the feelings that became him; feelings that form a striking contrast to those that actuate the right honourable gentleman. He told his country, that when he had made up his mind to the necessity of demanding Oczakow, it was his opinion that it might have been obtained without a war; but having once demanded it, he felt it his duty not to shrink from the war that might ensue from the rejection of that demand, and preferred the resignation of his office to the retracting that opinion. Far different was the conduct of the right honourable gentleman, though his advice was the same; and those were the scruples he felt in tarnishing the honour of his Sovereign, whose name he pledged to this demand, and afterwards obliged him to recede from it.

They tell us, however, and seem to value themselves much upon it, that in abandoning the object for which they had armed, they acted in conformity to public opinion. Sir, I will state fairly my sentiments on this subject too. It certainly is right and prudent to consult the public opinion; it is frequently wise to attend even to public prejudices, on subjects of such infinite importance, as whether they are to have war or peace. But if, in the capacity of a servant to the Crown, I were to see, or strongly to imagine that I saw, any measures going forward that threatened the peace or prosperity of the country, and if the emergency were so pressing, as to demand the sudden adoption of a decisive course to avert the mischief, I should not hesitate one moment to act upon my own opinion. If the public opinion did not happen to square with mine; if, after pointing out to them the danger, they did not see it in the same light with me, or if they conceived that another remedy was preferable to mine, I should consider it as due to my King, due to my country, due to my own honour, to retire, that they might pursue the plan which they thought better, by a fit instrument, that is, by a man who thought with them. Such would be my conduct on any subject where conscientiously I could not surrender my opinion. If the case was doubtful, or the emergency not so pressing, I should be ready perhaps to surrender my opinion to that of the Public; but one thing is most clear in such an event as this, namely, that I ought to give the Public the means of forming an opinion.

Do I ſtate this difference fairly?——If I do, and if the gentlemen over againſt me will admit, that in the inſtance before us the public opinion ought to have influenced them, it follows, that the public opinion ought to have been conſulted, before we were committed in the eyes of Europe, and that the country ought to have had the means, and the information neceſſary to form their judgement upon the true merits of this queſtion. Did the King's Miniſters act thus? Did they either take the public opinion, or did they give us the means of forming one? Nothing like it. On the 28th of March, the meſſage was brought down to this Houſe. On the 29th, we paſſed a vote of approbation, but no opinion was aſked from us, no explanation was given us; ſo far from it, we were expreſsly told, our advice was not wanted; that we had nothing to do with the prerogative of the Crown to make war; that all our buſineſs was to give confidence. So far with regard to this Houſe; and I cannot help thinking this conduct ſomewhat hard upon the majority, who certainly might have counted for ſomething in the general opinion, when the right honourable gentleman was collecting it, if he meant fairly ſo to do. I grant, indeed, that there are many ways by which the feeling and temper of the Public may be tolerably well known out of this Houſe, as well as in it. I grant that the opinion of a reſpectable meeting at Mancheſter, of a meeting at Norwich, of a meeting at Wakefield, of public bodies of men in different parts of England, might give the right honourable gentleman a correct idea of the public opinion. Permit me to ſay alſo, that in the ſpeeches of the minority of this Houſe, he might find alſo the ground of public opinion—both what might give it riſe, and what might give it countenance. But was the majority of this Houſe the only body whoſe opinions were not worth conſulting? "I travelled to Norwich, to York, Man-"cheſter, Wakefield, for opinions," will the right honourable gentleman ſay? "I liſtened to the minority, I looked to Lord "Stormont, to the Earl of Guildford; but as to you, my truſty "majority, I did not look to you! I had other buſineſs for "you! it is not your office to give opinions; your buſineſs is "to confide! You muſt pledge yourſelf, in the firſt inſtance, "to all I can aſk from you, and perhaps ſome time in the next "year I may condeſcend to let you know the grounds on

" which you are acting." Such is the language he holds to us, if his conduct were to be explained by words, and a conduct more indecent or prepoſterous is not eaſily to be conceived. For it is neither more nor leſs than to tell us,—" When I thought the Ottoman Power in danger, I aſked for " an armament to ſuccour it. You approved and granted it " to me. The public ſenſe was againſt me, and without " minding you, I yielded to that ſenſe. My opinion, how" ever, remains ſtill the ſame; though it muſt be confeſſed, " that I led you into giving a ſanction to my ſchemes, by a " ſpecies of reaſoning which it appears the country has ſaved " itſelf by reſiſting. But they were to blame. I yet think " that the exact contrary of what was done, ought to have been done; and that the peace and ſafety of Europe depended upon it. But never mind how you voted, or how directly oppoſite to the general opinion, with which I complied, was " that opinion I perſuaded you to ſupport. Vote now that I " was right in both—in the opinion I ſtill maintained, and in " my compliance with its oppoſite. The peace of Europe is " ſafe; I keep my place, and all is right again."——But after all, the right honourable gentleman did not act from any deference to the public opinion; and to prove this, I have but to recal to your recollection dates. The meſſage was brought down, as I ſaid before, on the 28th of March; and in leſs than a week, I believe in four days, afterwards, before it was poſſible to collect the opinion of any one public body of men, their whole ſyſtem was reverſed. The change, therefore, could not come from the country, even had they been deſirous of conſulting it. But I have proved that they were not deſirous to have any opinion from any quarter: they came down with their purpoſes maſked and veiled to this Houſe, and tried all they could to preclude inquiry into what they were doing. Theſe are not the ſteps of men deſirous of acting by opinion. I hold it, however, to be now acknowledged, that it was not the public opinion, but that of the minority in this Houſe, which compelled the Miniſters to relinquiſh their ill-adviſed projects; for a right honourable gentleman, who ſpoke laſt night, (Mr. Dundas) owned the truth, in his own frank way. " We certainly," ſaid he, " do not know that the opinion of " the Public was againſt us; we only know that a great party

" in this country was against us, and therefore we apprehend-
" ed, that though one campaign might have been got through,
" at the beginning of the next session, they would have inter-
" rupted us in procuring the supplies." I believe I quote the right honourable gentleman correctly; and here, Sir, let me pause, and thank him for the praise which he gives the gentlemen on this side the House. Let me indulge the satisfaction of reflecting, that though we have not the emoluments of office—not the patronage of power—yet we are not excluded from great influence on the measures of Government. We take pride to ourselves, that at this moment we are not sitting in a Committee of Supply, voting enormous fleets and armies to carry into execution this calamitous measure. To us he honestly declares this credit to be due; and the country will, no doubt, feel the gratitude they owe us, for having saved them from the miseries of war. An honourable gentleman, indeed (Mr. Jenkinson) has told us, that our opposition to this measure in its commencement, occasioned its having been abandoned by the Ministers; but he will not allow us the merit of having saved the country from a war by our interposition, but charges us with having prevented their obtaining the terms demanded, which would have been got without a war. I am glad to hear this argument; but must declare, in the name of the Minority, that we think ourselves most unfairly treated by it, and forced into a responsibility that belongs, in no manner whatsoever, to our situation. The right honourable gentleman, when repeatedly pressed on this subject, during the last session, was uniform in affirming that he had reasons for his conduct, to his mind so cogent and unanswerable, that he was morally certain of the indispensable necessity of the measures he was pursuing. He has said the same since, and to this hour continues his first opinion. If, therefore, the right honourable gentleman thought so, and thought at the same time that our arguments were likely to mislead the country from its true interests, why did he continue silent? If public opinion was so necessary for him, that without it, as he tells us now, he could not proceed a single step, why did he suffer us to corrupt the passions, to blind and to pervert the understandings of the Public, to a degree that compelled his sacrifice of this essential measure? Why did he quietly, and without concern,

watch the prevalence of our false arguments? why did he sanction their progress, by never answering them, when he knew the consequence must necessarily be, to defeat his dearest object, and put the safety of his country to the hazard? Why did he not oppose some antidote to our poison? But having neglected to do this, (because of his duty to preserve State secrets, as he would have us believe) what shadow of a right, what possible pretext has he to come forward now, and accuse us for thwarting his views, or to cast the responsibility of his failure and disgrace upon us, whose arguments he never answered, and to whom he obstinately and invariably refused all sort of information, by which we might have been enabled to form a better judgement, and possibly to agree with him on this subject? The right honourable gentleman, however, (Mr. Dundas) judges more fairly of us; and I thank him for the handsome acknowledgement he paid to the true character of the gentlemen on this side of the House; for by owning, that because we did not happen to approve of this armament it was abandoned, he owns another fact—that we are not what another honourable gentleman (Mr. Steele) chose to represent us, an indiscriminate faction, that disapproves of every thing, right and wrong. This is clearly manifest from his own admissions, for giving up when they found we disapproved, they must have begun in the idea that we should approve. We approved in the case of Holland, and in the case of Spain. In the first case we did so, because the rectitude of the thing was so clear and manifest, as that every well-wisher to England must approve. We did so in the case of Spain, because the objects were explained to us—The insult given, and the reparation demanded, were both before us. But had the right honourable gentleman any right, because we agreed to the Dutch and Spanish armaments, to anticipate the consent of Opposition to this? It was insulting to impute the possibility to us!——What, agree to take the money out of the pockets of the people, without an insult explained, or an object held up! It is said the object was stated, and that the means only were left to conjecture. That the *object* proposed to the House, was an armament to make a peace, and Oczakow was supposed to be the *means* by which that peace was to be effected. Sir, it is almost constantly my misfortune to be differing from the right

honourable gentleman about the import of the words *object* and *means*. In my way of using these words, I should have directly transposed them, and called the armament the *means* of effecting peace, and Oczakow the *object* of that armament.—And the event proves that Ministers thought as I do; for they gave up that object, because they knew they could get the end they proposed by their armament without it. This object, indeed, whatever was its importance, whether it was or was not, as we have alternately heard it asserted and denied, the key of Constantinople, nay, as some wild and fanciful people had almost persuaded themselves, the key to our possessions in the East Indies, the King's Ministers have completely renounced; and seem by their conduct to have cared very little what became of that or Constantinople itself. The balance of Europe, however, is perfectly safe, they tell us; and on that point we have nothing more to apprehend. The enormous accession of power to Russia, from the possession of Oczakow, so far from affecting Great Britain, is not likely, according to what the Ministers must assure us, to disturb the tranquillity of her nearest neighbours. I must here remind an honourable gentleman (Mr. Jenkinson), who spoke so much on the balance of Europe, that he did not seem to pay sufficient attention to Poland, as if that country, now become in some degree able to act for itself, from the change in its constitution, was of no moment, or incapable of influencing in any manner upon his system of treaties and attacks. That Oczakow, therefore, was at any time an object sufficient to justify their interference, I have stated many reasons for concluding will not be alledged this night. Some of the gentlemen on the other side, indeed, have advanced other grounds, and told us (I confess it is for the first time) that in this war the Empress of Russia was the aggressor; that on her part the war was offensive, and that it became us to interfere to stop her progress. They tell us of various encroachments in the Cuban, of hostilities systematically carried on in violation of treaties, and many other instances; not one of which they have attempted to prove by a single document, or have rested on any other foundation than their own assertions. But to these, Sir, I shall oppose the authority of Ministers themselves; for, in one of the dispatches of the Duke of Leeds to Mr. Whitworth, he desires him to communicate

to the Court of Peterſburgh, that if they will conſent to make peace with the Turks on the *ſtatus quo*, the allies will conſent to guarantee the Crimea to them, "*the object of the war*," as he ſtates it to be. I deſire no farther proof than this, that we always conſidered the Turks as the aggreſſors; for it follows, that where any place, in the poſſeſſion of one Power, is made the object of a war by another, the Power claiming that object is the aggreſſor. If, for example, we were at war with Spain, and Gibraltar the object, Spain of courſe would be the aggreſſor: the contrary, if the Havannah were the object. The King of England, therefore, by the diſpatch which I have quoted, has, in words and in fact, acknowledged the Turks to have been the aggreſſors in this war, by making pretenſions to a province ſolemnly ceded to Ruſſia in the year 1783. I can ſcarcely think that Miniſters mean to contend that ceſſion by treaty does not give right to poſſeſſion. Where are we to look, therefore, to aſcertain the right of a country to any place or territory, but to the laſt treaty? To what would the oppoſite doctrine lead? France might claim Canada, ceded in 1763, or we Tobago, ceded in 1783. It might be urged that they took advantage of our diſpute with our own colonies, and that the treaty gave no right. Canada, Jamaica, every thing might be queſtioned, Where would be the peace of Europe, if theſe doctrines were to be acted on? Every country muſt continue in a ſtate of endleſs perplexity, armament, and preparation. But happily for mankind, a different principle prevails in the law of nations; there the laſt treaty gives the right, and upon that we muſt aver, that if, as the diſpatch ſays, the Crimea was the object, the Turk was the aggreſſor. What, therefore, was the right claimed by the right honourable gentleman to enter into this diſpute?—I will anſwer, The right of a proud man, anxious to play a lofty part. France had gone off the ſtage—the character of the miſerable diſturber of empires was vacant, and he reſolved to boaſt and vapour, and play his antic tricks and geſtures on the ſame theatre. And what has been the firſt effects of this new experiment upon the policy and character of the Britiſh nation? That in the pride and zenith of our power, we have miſerably diſgraced ourſelves in the eyes of Europe—that the name of His Majeſty has been ſported with, and ſtained; that the people of England have been in-

flamed, their commerce diſturbed, the moſt valuable citizens dragged from their houſes, and half a million of money added to the public burdens. And here, Sir, in juſtice to my own feelings, I cannot paſs over wholly in ſilence the fate of that valuable body of our fellow-citizens, who are more particularly the victims of theſe falſe alarms, and by whom the moſt bitter portion of the common calamity muſt be borne. I am compelled to admit, that every State has a right, in the ſeaſon of danger, to claim the ſervices of all, or any of its members; that the "*ſalus populi, ſuprema lex eſt.*" Tenderneſs and conſideration in the uſe of ſuch extenſive powers, is all I can recommend to thoſe whoſe buſineſs it is to call them into action. But here I muſt lament, in common with every feeling mind, that unneceſſary barbarity which dragged them from their homes, deprived them of their liberty, and tore them from the induſtrious exerciſe of thoſe modes of life by which they earned ſupport for their families, wantonly, cruelly, and without pretext, becauſe without the ſmalleſt intention of employing them. The gentlemen well know what I ſtate to be a fact; for they know that their ſyſtem was changed, and their object abandoned, before even they had begun to iſſue preſs-warrants.

I return, Sir, to the diſagreeable condition in which the right honourable gentleman has involved us. Let us ſee whether what I have ſaid on this point be not literally true. The Empreſs of Ruſſia offered, early in the year 1790, to depart from the terms ſhe had at firſt thrown out, namely, that Beſſarabia, Wallachia, and Moldavia, ſhould be independent of the Ottoman Power. This, it appears, ſhe yielded upon the amicable repreſentations of the allied Powers, and ſubſtituted in the room of them thoſe conditions which have ſince been conceded to her, namely, that the Dnieſter ſhould be the boundary between the two empires, and all former treaties ſhould be confirmed. "Then," ſay Miniſters, "if we gained this by "ſimple negociation, what may we not gain by an armament?" Thus judging of her puſillanimity by their own, they threatened her. What did ſhe do? Peremptorily refuſed to depart one atom from her laſt conditions; and theſe I aſſert were in the poſſeſſion of His Majeſty's Miniſters long before the armament: they knew not only this early in the month of March, but likewiſe the reſolution of the Empreſs not to riſe in her demands,

notwithstanding any farther success that might attend her arms. The memorial of the Court of Denmark, which they have, for reasons best known to themselves, refused us, but which was circulated in every Court, and published in every newspaper in Europe, fully informed them of these matters. But the King's Ministers, with an absurdity of which there is no example, called upon the country to arm. Why? Not because they meant to employ the armament against her, but in the fanciful hope, that because, in an amicable negociation, the Empress had been prevailed upon not to press the demand of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia, as independent sovereignties, they should infallibly succeed, by arming, and not employing that armament, in persuading her to abandon all the rest! And what is the end? Why, that after pledging the King's name, in the most deliberate and solemn manner; after lofty vapouring, menacing, promising, denying, turning and turning again; after keeping up the parade of an armament for four months, accompanied with those severe measures, to be regretted even when necessary, to be reprobated when not, the right honourable gentleman crouches humbly at her feet; intreats, submissively supplicates of her moderation, that she will grant him some small trifle of what he asks, if it is but by way of a boon; and finding at last that he can get nothing either by his threats or his prayers, gives up the whole, precisely as she had insisted upon having it.

The right honourable gentleman, however, is determined that this House shall take the whole of this disgrace upon itself. I heard him, with much delight, on a former day, quote largely from that excellent and philosophical work, "The Wealth of Nations." In almost the first page of that book, he will find it laid down as a principle, that by a division of labour in the different occupations of life, the objects to which it is applied are perfected: time is saved, dexterity improved, and the general stock of science augmented; that by joint effort, and reciprocal accommodation, the severest tasks are accomplished, and difficulties surmounted, too stubborn for the labour of a single hand. Thus, in the building of a great palace, we observe the work to be parcelled out into different departments, and distributed and subdivided into various degrees, some higher, some lower, to suit the capacities and

condition of thoſe who are employed in its conſtruction.—There is the architect that invents the plan, and erects the ſtately columns; there is the duſtman and the nightman to clear away the rubbiſh. The right honourable gentleman applies theſe principles to his politics, and in the diviſion and caſt of parts for the job we are now to execute for him, has reſerved for himſelf the higher and more reſpectable ſhare of the buſineſs, and leaves all the dirty work to us. Is he aſked why the Houſe of Commons made the armament laſt year? He anſwers, "the Houſe of Commons did not make the armament! "I made it. The Houſe of Commons only approved it."—Is he aſked why he gave up the object of the armament, after he had made it? "I did not give it up!" he exclaims: "I "think the ſame of its neceſſity as ever: it is the Houſe of "Commons that gives it up: it is this Houſe that ſupports "the nation in their ſenſeleſs clamour againſt my meaſures: "it is to this Houſe that you muſt look for the ſhame and guilt "of your diſgrace." To himſelf he takes the more conſpicuous character of menacer. It is he that diſtributes provinces, and limits empires; while he leaves to this Houſe the humbler office of licking the duſt, and begging forgiveneſs:

"Not mine theſe groans—
"Theſe ſighs that iſſue, or theſe tears that flow."

"I am forced into theſe ſubmiſſions by a low, contracted, "grovelling, mean-ſpirited, and ignorant people!" But this is not all. It rarely happens, that in begging pardon, when men determine upon that courſe, they have not ſome benefit in view, or that the profit to be got is not meant to counterbalance, in ſome meaſure, the honour to be ſacrificed. Let us ſee how the right honourable gentleman managed this.—On the firſt indication of hoſtile meaſures againſt Ruſſia, 135 Members of this Houſe divided againſt the adoption of them. This it was, according to a right honourable gentleman who ſpoke in the debate yeſterday, (Mr. Dundas) that induced Miniſters to abandon their firſt object; but not like the Duke of Leeds, who candidly avowed that if he could have once brought himſelf to give up the claim of Oczakow, he would not have ſtood out for the raſing its fortifications, or any ſuch

terms. The Miniſters determine that the nation at leaſt ſhall reap no benefit from the reverſal of their ſyſtem. "You have "reſiſted our projects," ſay they; "you have diſcovered and "expoſed our incapacity; you have made us the ridicule of "Europe, and ſuch we ſhall appear to poſterity: you have "defeated, indeed, our intentions of involving you in a war; "but *you* ſhall not be the gainers by it! *you* ſhall not ſave your "money! We abandon Oczakow, as you compel us to do, "but we will keep up the armament, if it is only to ſpite you!" Determined to act this diſgraceful part, their next care was to do it in the moſt diſgraceful manner; and as they had dragged Parliament and their King through the dirt and mire, they reſolved to exhibit them in this offenſive plight to the eyes of Europe. To do this, they did not care to truſt to the Miniſter we had at Peterſburgh; a gentleman diſtinguiſhed for amiable manners, and by the faithful, the vigilant, and the able diſcharge of his duty. Why was the management of the negociation taken from him? Was he too proud for this ſervice? No man is too proud to do his duty; and of all our foreign Miniſters, Mr. Whitworth I ſhould think the very laſt, to whom it could be reproached that he is remiſs in fulfilling the directions he receives, in their utmoſt ſtrictneſs. But a new man was to be found; one whoſe reputation for talents and honour might operate, as they hoped, as a ſort of ſet-off againſt the incapacity he was to cure, and the national honour he was deputed to ſurrender. Was it thus determined, becauſe in looking round their diplomatique body, there was no man to be ſelected from it, whoſe character aſſimilated with the dirty job he was to execute? As there was honour to be ſacrificed, a ſtain to be fixed upon the national character, engagements to be retracted, and a friend to be abandoned, did it never occur to them that there was *one man* upon their diplomatic liſt, who would have been pronounced by general acclamation thoroughly qualified in ſoul and qualities for this ſervice? Such a perſon they might have found, and not ſo occupied as to make it inconvenient to employ him; they would have found him abſent from his ſtation, under the pretence of attending his duty in this Houſe, though he does not chuſe often to make his appearance here. Inſtead of this, however, they increaſed the diſhonour that they doomed us to ſuffer, by ſending a gentle-

man endowed with every virtue and accomplishment, who had acquired, in the service of the Empress of Russia, at an early period of his life, a character for bravery and enterprise, that rendered him personally esteemed by her, and in whom fine talents, and elegant manners, ripened by habit and experience, had confirmed the flattering promise of his youth. Did they think that the shabbiness of their message was to be done away by the worth of the messenger? If I were to send an humiliating apology to any person, would it change its quality by being entrusted to Lord Rodney, Admiral Pigot, my honourable friend behind me (General Burgoyne), Lord Cornwallis, Sir Henry Clinton, Sir William Howe, or any other gallant and brave officer? Certainly not. It was my fortune, in very early life, to have set out in habits of particular intimacy with Mr. Fawkener, and however circumstances may have intervened to suspend that intimacy, circumstances arising from wide differences in political opinion, they never have altered the sentiments of private esteem which I have uniformly felt for him; and with every amiable and conciliating quality that belongs to man, I know him to be one from whom improper submissions are the least to be expected. Well, Sir, these gentlemen, Mr. Whitworth and Mr. Fawkener, commence the negociation, by the offer of three distinct propositions, each of them better than the other, and accompany it with an expression somewhat remarkable, namely, that this negociation is to be as unlike all the others as possible, and to be "*founded* "*in perfect candour.*" To prove this, they submit at once to the Russian Ministers "all that their instructions enable them to "propose." Who would not have imagined, according to the plain import of these words, that unless the Empress had assented to one of these propositions, all amicable interposition would have been at an end, and war the issue? The "perfect candour" promised in the beginning of their note, leads them to declare explicitly, that unless the fortifications of Oczakow be rased, or the Turks are allowed as an equivalent to keep both the banks of the Niester, the allies cannot propose any terms to them. What answer do they receive? An unequivocal rejection of every one of their propositions; accompanied, however, with a declaration, to which I shall soon return, that the navigation of that river shall be free to all the world, and a refe-

rence to these maxims of policy which have invariably actuated the Empress of Russia in her intercourse with neutral nations, whose commerce she has at all times protected and encouraged. With this declaration the British Plenipotentiaries declare themselves perfectly contented: nay more, they engage that if the Turks should refuse these conditions, and continue obstinate longer than four months, the allied Courts "will abandon the "termination of the war to the events it may produce." And here ends for ever all care for the Ottoman empire, all solicitude about the balance of power. The right honourable gentleman will interpose no farther to save either, but rests the whole of a measure, once so indispensable to our safety, upon this doubtful issue, whether the Turks will accept in December those very terms which, in July, the British Ministers could not venture to propose to them!

Sir, we may look in vain to the events of former times for a disgrace parallel to what we have suffered. Lewis the Fourteenth, a monarch often named in our debates, and whose reign exhibits more than any other the extremes of prosperous and of adverse fortune, never, in the midst of his most humiliating distresses, stooped to so despicable a sacrifice of all that can be dear to man. The war of the succession, unjustly began by him, had reduced his power, had swallowed up his armies and his navies, had desolated his provinces, had drained his treasures, and deluged the earth with the blood of the best and most faithful of his subjects. Exhausted by his various calamities, he offered at one time to his enemies to relinquish all the objects for which he had begun the war: that proud monarch sued for peace, and was content to receive it from our moderation. But when it was made a condition of that peace that he should turn his arms against his grandson, and compel him by force to relinquish the throne of Spain—humbled, exhausted, conquered as he was, misfortune had not yet bowed his spirit to conditions so hard as these. We know the event: he persisted still in the war, until the folly and wickedness of Queen Anne's Ministers enabled him to conclude the peace of Utrecht, on terms considerably less disadvantageous even than those he had himself proposed. And shall *we*, Sir, the pride of our age, the terror of Europe, submit to this humiliating sacrifice of our honour? Have *we* suffered a defeat

at Blenheim? Shall we, with our increasing prosperity, our widely-diffused capital, our navy, the just subject of our common exultation, overflowing coffers, that enable us to give back to the people what, in the hour of calamity, we were compelled to take from them; flushed with a recent triumph over Spain, and yet more than all, while our old rival and enemy was incapable of disturbing us, shall it be for us to yield to what France disdained in the hour of her sharpest distress, and exhibit ourselves to the world, the sole example in its annals of such an abject and pitiful degradation? But gentlemen inform us now, in justification as I suppose they mean it, of all these measures, that to effect a peace between Russia and the Porte, was only the ostensible cause of our armament, or at least not the sole cause; and that Ministers were under some apprehension lest the Emperor, if the allies were to disarm, should insist on better terms from the Turks, than he had agreed to accept by the convention of Reichenbach. This I cannot believe. When His Majesty sends a message to inform his Parliament, that he thinks it necessary to arm for a specific purpose, I cannot suppose that a falsehood has been put into His Majesty's mouth; and that the armament, which he proposes as necessary for one purpose, is intended for another.— If the right honourable gentleman shall tell me, that although the war between Russia and the Porte was the real cause of equipping the armament, yet that being once equipped, it was wise to keep it up when no longer wanted on that account, because the Emperor seemed inclined to depart from the convention of Reichenbach; then I answer that it was his duty to have come with a second message to Parliament, expressly stating this new object, with the necessary information, to enable the House to judge of its propriety. Another of the arguments for continuing the armament after the object was relinquished, is, that Russia might have insisted on harder terms, not conceiving herself bound by offers which we had refused to accept. I perfectly agree with gentlemen, that after the repeated offer of those terms, on the part of Russia, and the rejection of them by us, the Empress was not bound to adhere to them, in all possible events and contingencies. If the war had continued, she would have had a right to farther indemnifications for the expence of it. But was it not worth the Minister's

while to try the good faith of the Empreſs of Ruſſia, after ſhe had ſo ſolemnly pledged herſelf to all Europe that ſhe would not riſe in her demands? The experiment would have been made with little trouble; by the ſimple expedient of ſending a a meſſenger to aſk the queſtion. The object of his armament would have ſuffered little by the delay, as an anſwer from the Ruſſian Court might have been had in five or ſix weeks. Was it reaſonable in Miniſters to ſuppoſe, that becauſe, in the early part of the negociation, the Empreſs had ſhewn ſo much regard to us, as actually to give up whatever pretenſions ſhe had formed to other provinces of the Turkiſh empire, ſolely with the view of obtaining our concurrence to the principle on which ſhe offered to make peace, ſhe would revert to thoſe very pretenſions the inſtant ſhe had obtained that concurrence on our part, for the benefit of which ſhe had ſacrificed them? Surely, as I have ſaid, it was worth while to make the experiment: but ſimple and obvious as this was, a very different courſe was adopted. Oczakow, indeed, was relinquiſhed before the armament began, as we may find by comparing the date of the preſs-warrants with that of the Duke of Leeds's reſignation. As ſoon as the King's meſſage was delivered to Parliament, a meſſenger was diſpatched to Berlin with an intimation of the reſolution to arm. This, perhaps, was raſhly done; as they might have foreſeen that the meaſure would probably meet with oppoſition, and much time could not have been loſt by waiting the event of the firſt debate. No ſooner was the diviſion known, than a ſecond meſſenger was ſent off to overtake and ſtop the diſpatches of the firſt: and this brings me to another argument, which I confeſs appears to me very unlikely to help them out. They tell us, that the King of Pruſſia having armed in conſequence of our aſſurances of ſupport, we could not diſarm before we knew the ſentiments of the Court of Berlin, without the imputation of leaving our ally in the lurch. Did we wait for the ſentiments of that Court to determine whether Oczakow was to be given up or not? Sir, when that meaſure was reſolved upon, the right honourable gentleman actually had abandoned his ally; and that ſuch was the general ſenſe of the Court of Berlin, I believe can be teſtified by every Engliſhman who was there at the time. No ſooner did the ſecond meſſenger arrive, and the contents of his diſpatches be-

come known, than a most general indignation arose against the conduct of the right honourable gentleman; and I am well enough informed on the subject to state to this House, that not an Englishman could shew his face in that capital, without exposing himself to mortification, perhaps to insult. But, between the 28th of April, when the message was brought down to this House, and the 2d or 3d of April, when the second messenger was dispatched with the news that Ministers had abandoned the object of it, the armament could not have been materially advanced. Why then was it persisted in? The right honourable gentleman cannot argue, that he kept up the armament in compliance with his engagements with Prussia, when the armament, in fact, did not exist, and when it had been begun but four or five days previous to his renouncing the object of it. That could not have been his motive. What then was the motive? Why, that he was too proud to own his error, and valued less the money and tranquillity of the people, than the appearance of firmness, when he had renounced the reality. False shame is the parent of many crimes. By false shame, a man may be tempted to commit a murder, to conceal a robbery. Influenced by this false shame, the Ministers robbed the people of their money, the seamen of their liberty, their families of support and protection, and all this to conceal that they had undertaken a system which was not fit to be pursued. If they say that they did this, apprehensive that without the terror of an armament Russia would not stand to the terms which they had refused to accept, they do no more than acknowledge that by the insolence of their arming, and the precipitancy of their submission, they had either so provoked her resentment or excited her contempt, that she would not even condescend to agree to her own propositions when approved by them. But however they might have thought her disposed to act on this subject, it was at least their duty to try whether such would have been her conduct or not.

To prove that the terms to which they agreed at last were the same with those they before rejected, all I feel it necessary for me to observe, is that the free navigation of the river Dniester, the only novelty introduced into them, was implied in proposing it as a boundary; for it is a well known rule, that the boundary between two powers, must be as free to the one

as to the other. True, says the Minister, but we have got the free navigation for the subjects of other powers, particularly for those of Poland. If this be an advantage, it is an advantage he has gained by concession; for if he had not agreed that the river should be the boundary, the navigation would not have been free. The Turks offered no such stipulation, had they been put in possession of both the banks; besides which, as a noble Duke, whom I have already quoted, well observed, it is an advantage, whatever may be its value, which can subsist only in time of peace. It is not, I suppose, imagined that the navigation will be free in time of war. They have then got nothing that deserves the name of a "modification," a term, I must here observe, the use of which is not justified even by the original memorial, where the sense is more accurately expressed by the French word "*radouciſſement*." Was it then for some *radouciſſement* that they continued their armament? Was it to say to the Empress, when they had conceded every thing, "We have given you all you asked; give us something that we "may hold out to the public, something that we may use "against the minority; that minority whom we have endea- "voured to represent as your allies. We have sacrificed our "allies, the Turks, to you; you can do no less than sacrifice "your allies, the minority, to us?" If I had been to advise the Empress on the subject, I would have counselled her; grant the British Minister something of this sort. I would even have advised her to raze the fortifications of Oczakow, if he had insisted on it; I would have appealed from her policy to her generosity, and said, grant him this as an apology, for he stands much in need of it.—His whole object was to appear to gain something, no matter what, by continuing the armament, and even in this last pitiful and miserable object he has failed. If, after all, I ask, whether these terms are contained in the peace that we have concluded for the Turks, or rather which the Turks concluded for themselves, the answer is, "We have no au- "thentic copy of it." Is this what we have got by our arms, by distressing our commerce, dragging our seamen from their homes and occupations, and squandering our money? Is this the efficacy of our interference and the triumph of our wisdom and our firmness? The Turks have at length concluded a peace, of which they do not even condescend to favour us with

a copy, so that we know what it is only by report, and the balance of Europe, late in so much danger, and of so much importance, is left for them to settle without consulting us! Is it for this that we employed such men as Mr. Fawkener and Mr. Whitworth? They were sent to negociate for the materials of a speech, and failed. But what are the complaints that private friendship has a right to make to those of an insulted public? Half a million of money is spent, the people alarmed and interrupted in their proper pursuits by the apprehension of a war, and for what; For the restoration of Oczakow? No; Oczakow is not restored. To save the Turks from being too much humbled? No; they are now in a worse situatiou than they would have been had we never armed at all. If Russia had persevered in that system of encroachment of which she is accused, we could, as I observed before, then have assisted them unembarrassed. We are now tied down by treaties and fettered by stipulations; we have even guaranteed to Russia what we before said it would be unsafe for the Turks to yield, and dangerous to the peace of Europe for Russia to possess. This is what the public has got by the armament. What then was the private motive?

Scilicet, ut Turno contingat regia conjux,
Nos, animæ viles, inhumata infletaque turba,
Sternamur campis———

The Minister gained, or thought he was to gain, an excuse for his rashness and misconduct, and to purchase this excuse, was the public money and the public quiet wantonly sacrificed. There are some effects, which, to combine with their causes, is almost sufficient to drive men mad! That the pride, the folly, the presumption of a single person, shall be able to involve a whole people in wretchedness and disgrace, is more than philosophy can teach mortal patience to endure. Here are the true weapons of the enemies of our constitution! Here may we search for the source of those seditious writings, meant either to weaken our attachment to the constitution, by depreciating its value, or that loudly tell us we have no constitution at all. We may blame, we may reprobate such doctrines, but while we furnish those who circulate them with arguments

such as these; while the example of this day shews us to what degree the fact is true, we must not wonder if the purposes they are meant to answer be but too successful.

They argue, that a constitution cannot be right where such things are possible, much less so when they are practised without punishment. This, Sir, is a serious reflection to every man who loves the constitution of England. Against the vain theories of men, who project fundamental alterations upon grounds of mere speculative objection, I can easily defend it: but when they recur to these facts, and shew me how we may be doomed to all the horrors of war, by the caprice of an individual, who will not even condescend to explain his reasons, I can only fly to this House, and exhort you to rouse from your lethargy of confidence, into the active mistrust and vigilant control which is your duty and your office.

Without recurring to the dust to which the Minister has been humbled, and the dirt he has been dragged through, if we ask for what has the peace of the Public been disturbed—for what is that man pressed and dragged like a felon to a service that should be honourable? We must be answered, for some three quarters of a mile of territory on the banks of the Dniester! In the name of all we value, give us, when such instances are quoted in derogation of our constitution, some right to answer, that these are not its principles, but the monstrous abuses intruded into its practice. Let it not be said, that because the executive power, for an adequate and evident cause, may adopt measures that require expence without consulting Parliament, we are to convert the exception into the rule; to reverse the principle; and that it is now to be assumed that the people's money may be spent for any cause, or for none, without either submitting the exigency to the judgement of their representatives, or inquiring into it afterwards, unless we can make out ground for a criminal charge against the executive Government. Let us disclaim these abuses, and return to the constitution. I am not one of those who lay down rules as absolute, but I maintain the general rule to be, that before the public money be voted away, the occasion that calls for it should be fairly stated, for the consideration of those who are the proper guardians of the public money. Had the Minister explained his system to Parliament, before he called for money to support

it, and Parliament had decided that it was not worth supporting, he would have been saved the mortification and disgrace in which his own honour is involved, and by being furnished with a just excuse to Prussia for withdrawing from the prosecution of it, have saved that of his Sovereign and his country, which he has irrecoverably tarnished. Is unanimity necessary to his plans? He can be sure of it in no manner, unless he explains them to this House, who are certainly much better judges than he is of the degree of unanimity with which they are likely to be received. Why then did he not consult us? Because he had other purposes to answer in the use he meant to make of his majority. Had he opened himself to the House at first, and had we declared against him, he might have been stopped in the first instance: had we declared for him, we might have held him too firmly to his principle, to suffer his receding from it as he has done. Either of these alternatives he dreaded. It was his policy to decline our opinions, and to exact our confidence, that thus having the means of acting either way, according to the exigencies of his personal situation, he might come to Parliament, and tell us what our opinions ought to be; which set of principles would be most expedient to shelter him from inquiry, and from punishment. It is for this he comes before us with a poor and pitiful excuse, that for want of the unanimity he expected, there was reason to fear, if the war should go to a second campaign, that it might be obstructed. Why not speak out, and own the real fact—he feared that a second campaign mignt occasion the loss of his place. Let him keep but his place, he cares not what else he loses. With other men, reputation and glory are the objects of ambition; power and place are coveted but as the means of these. For the Minister, power and place are sufficient of themselves. With them he is content; for them he can calmly sacrifice every proud distinction that ambition covets, and every noble prospect to which it points the way! Sir, there is yet an argument which I have not sufficiently noticed. It has been said, as a ground for his defence, that he was prevented from gaining what he demanded, by our opposition, and, but for this, Russia would have complied, and never would have hazarded a war. Sir, I believe the direct contrary, and my be-

lief is as good as their aſſertion, unleſs they will give us ſome proof of its veracity. Until then, I have a right to aſk them, what if Ruſſia had not complied? Worſe and worſe for him! He muſt have gone on, redoubling his menaces and expences, the Empreſs of Ruſſia continuing inflexible as ever, but for the ſalutary oppoſition which preſerved him from his extremity of ſhame. I am not contending that armaments are never neceſſary to enforce negociations: but it is one, and that not the leaſt, of the evils attending the right honourable gentleman's miſconduct, that by keeping up the parade of an armament, never meant to be employed, he has in a great meaſure deprived us of the uſe of this method of negociating, whenever it may be neceſſary to apply it effectually. For if you propoſe to arm in concert with any foreign Power, that Power will anſwer, "What ſecurity can you give me that you will perſevere "in that ſyſtem? You ſay you cannot go to war, unleſs your "people are unanimous." If you aim to negociate againſt a foreign Power, that Power will ſay, "I have only to perſiſt—"the Britiſh Miniſter may threaten, but he dare not act—he "will not hazard the loſs of his place by a war." A right honourable gentleman (Mr. Dundas) in excuſe for withholding papers, aſked what foreign Power would negociate with an Engliſh cabinet, if their ſecrets were likely to be developed, and expoſed to the idle curioſity of a Houſe of Commons?—"Better have no dealings with them at all," I ſhould anſwer, "if the right of inquiry into every part of a negociation they "think fit, and of knowing why they are to vote the money of "their conſtituents, be denied the Houſe of Commons." But there is ſomething like reaſon why no foreign Power will negociate with us, and that a much better reaſon than a dread of diſcloſing their ſecrets, in the right honourable gentleman's example. I declare therefore, for the genius of our conſtitution, againſt the practice of His Majeſty's Miniſters: I declare that the duties of this Houſe are, vigilance in preference to ſecrecy, deliberation in preference to diſpatch. Sir, I have given my reaſons for ſupporting the motion for a vote of cenſure on the Miniſter. I will liſten to his defence with attention, and I will retract wherever he ſhall prove me to be wrong.

Mr. Chancellor PITT said, the vehemence and violence which had been employed, and the splendid eloquence of the right honourable gentleman who had just sat down, had called the attention of this House to the subject now before it. His eloquence, for whatever purpose it was directed, was always powerful; and he was happy that his arguments on this debate had been brought forward, and that he had taken the opportunity, at a time when it was fully awake, to draw their attention to his sentiments. He was also happy in the circumstance of the adjourned debate, as it had allowed the House to go more fully into the subject, and it was with peculiar satisfaction to him that, after having heard stated every thing that had been said on a former evening, as well as on this, he now rose with a very different temper, and a different view from that right honourable gentleman, to recall the attention of the House from that brilliant display of language, and that forcible appeal which had been made to their passions and imaginations, to what appeared to him to be the proper subject before them, and the real point in dispute between them, and upon which their judgement ought to be exercised, and then he should leave the whole to the deliberate wisdom and impartial justice which he was confident that House would exercise on this important subject, in which our national policy was involved, and on a point particularly affecting the character of the deliberative, as well as the executive part of Government.

In stating the grounds on which he should have to call the attention of the House, after it had heard the arguments of the right honourable gentleman, and also after having heard the debate of the preceding night, to which he had satisfaction in reverting, he should endeavour to be as clear and as concise as possible; and notwithstanding the eloquence with which they had just heard one side of the subject maintained, he still referred with confidence to the principles developed in the debate of yesterday, and in a speech, which was still in the recollection of this House, and regarded as a specimen of that clear eloquence, strong sense, justness of reasoning, and extensive knowledge, which he believed was wholly unexampled in any public assembly on a first essay, and would do honour to the most practised speaker or statesman that ever delivered his sentiments within the walls of this House.

In ſtating whatever occurred to him on this ſubject, and the grounds he ſhould lay before the Houſe, he begged to ſay that he did not feel it neceſſary to enter into the grounds of ſome of the reaſoning which the Houſe had heard in the courſe of this debate; becauſe the general queſtion of ſyſtem is one part neceſſarily connected with the merits of the exerciſe of that ſyſtem, and becauſe it is impoſſible to ſeparate the conduct of Miniſters from the principle on which they acted, before the armament which forms the matter of diſpute was entered into, and having done ſo, then he ſhould proceed to ſtate the grounds on which this ſubject was taken up on that ſyſtem.——That part, therefore, which goes to ſeparate thoſe two points is unneceſſary, and being no material part of the debate, he ſhould therefore diſmiſs all conſideration of that ſort of reaſoning, as the paying attention to that diſtinction would only create confuſion in conſidering the real points before the Houſe. He ſhould therefore take the liberty of confining the ſubject to its real limits, as they appeared to him; in the courſe of which he ſhould lay it down as an argument, that the meaſure in queſtion, was founded on policy, and that ſucceſs was not unreaſonably to be expected in the iſſue.

The way in which the queſtion was to be debated, appeared to him to be firſt, by deſiring the Houſe to recollect the principle of the meaſure, or the foundation of our continental connection; and then the policy, under all the circumſtances of this caſe. Theſe points will be governed by the relative ſituation of this country with regard to its alliances with foreign powers. By a conſideration of the danger and inconvenience to which we might have been expoſed by an extenſion of the maritime power of Ruſſia. The wiſdom or folly of the whole ſyſtem will, in a great meaſure, depend on what is called the balance of power in Europe.

Many gentlemen ſeemed to think that the queſtion of the balance of power has been improperly introduced into this ſubject, and that it had nothing to do with the diſcuſſion of this caſe, but was totally inapplicable. Theſe points, indeed, are not ſtrenuouſly maintained, and therefore need not be dwelt upon; but he noticed them, not for any particular application they have to the ſubject, but for the ſake of the principle which the refutation of thoſe ſentiments tends to ſupport. The foundation of

the matter, which he ſhould urge to the Houſe, reſts on this: The general balance of power, as applicable in this caſe to the arguments on the whole of the ſubject, has by ſome been the object of argumentative attack, and decried, and by others treated with affected ridicule; but on the regular diſcuſſion of this, much, in his opinion, depended. He had heard it allowed that the balance of power was a queſtion in which both ſides of the Houſe agree in principle. Gentlemen on the other ſide admit the neceſſity of maintaining this balance, and ſay that we differ only in degree; and yet the length to which they carry their arguments againſt our interference will, notwithſtanding this admiſſion, defeat the very principle which they affect to ſupport; and thus the ſyſtem which they pretend to favour cannot regularly be applied at all.

When gentlemen admit that there is ſuch a thing as the balance of power, what is it but ſaying, that if we are ourſelves, or if our ally is, in a ſituation of danger from the overgrowth of another power, we ſhould, from due regard to the tranquillity of Europe, uſe our endeavours to check the growth of that power; and indeed we may be engaged ourſelves immediately in the calamity of a war by neglecting this principle, when applied to one ally only. He did not mean immediately in the ſenſe of time; but that we ourſelves might become the objects of attack, in conſequence of inattention to the principle of the balance of power. Whether this was material to Great Britain, or to any of her allies, at the time of the armament, was another queſtion which he ſhould not endeavour to argue here; that would come in much better in another ſtage of the argument. The point which he had here to contend was, that the principle of the balance of power was ſuch as we ought to regard with vigilance and attention, becauſe we are ſo deeply intereſted in its conſequences.—And what he objected to on the part of gentlemen, who argue on the other ſide was, that what they admit in terms on this ſubject, they deny in ſubſtance, and he believed that no one nation in Europe would, for a moment, be ſecure in its tranquillity, if the ſpirit of theſe doctrines were to be the governing principle of its Council. He was perſuaded, that notwithſtanding all we have heard to the contrary, that the balance of power is a thing on which depends much of the hap-

pineſs of the world, becauſe, though in ſome particular inſtances it led nations to war, it contributed on the whole to promote the general tranquillity, and to render wars of ambition leſs frequent and leſs deſtructive. This principle being admitted, and it cannot reaſonably be denied, the firſt queſtion then will be, whether the ſituation of the Turkiſh empire was ſuch as to be affected in any great degree by the projects of the Imperial Court; and if ſo, whether this would, in fact, or probably might, have any effect on the balance of power in Europe? Whether that kingdom was indebted to this for any, and what degree of intervention, in its favour? Whether that intervention was rightly employed? Whether it was carried as far as, under all the circumſtances, was prudent and wiſe, and no farther? Theſe are the queſtions on which the whole of this debate will turn, and on which he was of opinion the juſtice of the Houſe would decide.

He had heard it very much contended in this debate, which made it neceſſary for him to trouble the Houſe ſo much upon the ſubject, that the balance of power, as applied to the Turkiſh empire, was a wild and chimerical idea. Indeed, it was contended laſt year ſpecifically, that the whole of the queſtion of the balance of power was irrelevant. Gentlemen do not chuſe to go to that length in the courſe of the preſent diſcuſſion; and yet the right honourable gentleman who ſpoke laſt, went, if he was not miſtaken with reſpect to what he had ſaid, very nearly to that extreme. He went very near to the point of contending, that if the Turkiſh empire were deſtroyed, it would have no effect on the balance of power in Europe, and would be a matter of total indifference in that reſpect to the other powers of Europe. He believed, however, that if this was his opinion, he would find himſelf ſingular in that idea.

He ſhould not, for the purpoſes of his defence, enter much at length into the nature of the empire of Turkey, but it was material to the Houſe, for the proper underſtanding of the ſubject in diſpute, to reflect for a while on the ſyſtem of our alliance. They would remember, that we had formed an alliance with the Court of Pruſſia, and that it was due to the intereſt of that power that England, as its ally, ſhould not neglect to notice and to check the ſudden growth of a maritime power, which might, and probably will be, an inconvenient

neighbour to that power. It was of importance to England itſelf, as a maritime power, independent of all alliance with any other; and as to the neceſſity there is of regarding the Porte as a power to be the object of attention to Europe, he believed that it would be found, that from the earlieſt periods of the Turkiſh empire, down to the preſent, it had been held eſſential to the balance of power, that no other ſhould be ſuffered to have too great a maritime aſcendancy over this power. France, ever ſince the reign of Francis I., had been conſidered as forming a very material part of the balance of power of Europe. In this country, ſince the reign of King William, in every memorable æra, down to the preſent period, it had been regarded in the ſame light. The principal Powers of Europe had entertained the ſame opinion of it. Its importance to the balance of Europe is held out by the beſt authors who have written upon the ſubject. It is remarked by Monteſquieu; nor has it ever been denied by any author of any authority whatever. If this be true in general, how much more ſo muſt it be of the Turkiſh empire, when conſidered as threatened by the aſcendancy of ſo great a maritime power as that of Ruſſia. Indeed Ruſſia of itſelf, to any power, if ſuffered to increaſe its naval ſtrength, will be very formidable, and deſtroy that balance on which we all allow ſo much depends. Was it not wiſe then for this country to interfere, for the purpoſe of checking the growth of this formidable power? The time might come when we ſhould not have that in our power, and although, for the happineſs of mankind, Providence ſeemed to have ordained that empires, when they became of an unwieldy ſize, worked their own deſtruction, yet it was wiſe in us to do all we could to prevent the exceſſive growth. And here he believed it would be granted him, that the progreſs of Ruſſia was great and rapid, and the character of the Empreſs, whatever virtues ſhe may poſſeſs, not entirely free from ambition.

Of the truth of this we had ſome recent ſpecimens; and the Houſe would, he hoped, ſee, that if no interference had taken place on our part between thoſe contending parties, that the advantages which the Empreſs would have gained over the Turkiſh empire, would have given her the entire command of the Black Sea. He affirmed then, that not only as an ally of

Pruſſia, but alſo on the general principle of ſelf-preſervation, our interference was dictated.

Having ſtated diſtinctly his opinion on the principle of the balance of power, that it applied to Turkey as well as to any other power, and that the intereſt of this maritime country, which muſt be affected by the aggrandizement of Ruſſia, even independent of any alliance, in conſequence of our alliance with the Court of Berlin, became ſtill more immediately connected, and that theſe conſiderations cannot be ſeparated, the queſtion then is, Whether there was a ſerious and reaſonable apprehenſion of danger towards us or our ally, ſo as to render our interference, and to render a prevention of the farther aggrandiſement, a rational policy on the part of this country; and whether Miniſters are to be accuſed of having gone ſo far in the riſks they entered into, for what appeared to them at leaſt to be for the future advantage of this country?

Our conduct, in the firſt inſtance, was certainly not cenſurable; for as to our commencement of the interference, it was at the requeſt of her Imperial Majeſty. She deſired that we, in conjunction with our ally the Court of Berlin, would repreſent to the Porte the moderation of her demands. Theſe demands were, that Beſſarabia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, ſhould be ceded to her, and this requiſition her Imperial Majeſty was pleaſed to term a ſpecimen of her moderation.—Now, he wiſhed the Houſe to reflect what would have been the conſequence, and whether it would not have been to the diſadvantage of the Turkiſh empire; and he thought this point ſo clear, that he might leave it to the Houſe, without farther comment.

He agreed with the right honourable gentleman who ſpoke laſt, that the laſt actual attack was unqueſtionably commenced on the Empreſs by the Turks, and that the claims of the Turks, taken by themſelves, were unjuſt, and not included in any treaty; but then the point of offenſive or defenſive war was not the queſtion to be conſidered by thoſe who were to interfere for the ſake of preſerving the balance of power, nor is the actual commencement of hoſtility the real aggreſſion between ſtates; theſe points are often governed by a conſideration of the ſyſtem adopted by either party. There was a regular ſyſtem on the part of Ruſſia for an incroachment on the Turks. This

he believed was the origin of the dispute between the parties, and if so, it is not very material even on the point of justice, much less on the system of the balance of power, who struck the first blow; and that, but for our interference, the final accomplishment of the views of the Empress would have followed, is a point which he believed would not be denied. If it cannot be denied, the intervention of this country has in this case been successful; if our representations have been such as to induce Russia to desist from part of her project, how can it be said we have gained nothing? Was the compelling the Empress to give up Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bessarabia nothing? These she originally stipulated should be ceded to her instead of Oczakow; and because the other object was not obtained, are the Ministers to be censured? We armed for the obtaining what appeared to us necessary; but all our object was not obtained, and for this he should state reasons hereafter.

Gentlemen, when they argue upon the value of Oczakow, seem to me to be wide of the real point to be considered. The truth is, that it is not of any great value as to its population or its commerce, but it is relatively so as a fortress which commands the Dniester; and so formidable is it to ships navigating this river, that they must pass within the reach of the guns of the fortress. He did not state this place to be of great value, but he stated it to be important as a point to be gained by the Empress on her system of ambition. If he was right in the principle, namely, that it was a point worth contending for; it follows of course, that it was our duty to resist the scheme of ambition of this Imperial Princess, and where there is a probability of success, he would ask any man in this country, whether the object intended to be gained was not worth the risk. He would ask any man if he was put into our situation, to determine for himself, whether he would not suffer the inconvenience, or the hazard of the miscarriage of the project, for the sake of what he had reason to hope he would gain.

The object that was to be attained by the arming, though not worth all—was worth some risks. The contest between them, was only with regard to the application of the principle; feeling as he did feel, the justice of this balance of power, to undergo a small inconvenience in order to avoid a greater, this principle had been admitted and recognized in many of the

most brilliant periods of the hiſtory of this country. It was a principle which had been conſtantly acted upon from the time this country began to hold any rank amidſt the ſurrounding nations of Europe.

It was the duty of the King's Miniſters to compare the changes that had happened with this principle, to compare the means with the end, the difficulty of the object with the proſpect of obtaining it, and its importance when obtained. He conceived he did his duty in adviſing the relinquiſhment of the object when he thought it could only be procured at too high a price. It had been ſaid by ſome people, that the ſenſe of the nation was againſt the meaſure, and that therefore the King's Miniſters had abandoned their plan; others had alledged, that they had abandoned their original idea on account of the oppoſition of that Houſe, that is of 135 gentlemen. Neither the one nor the other of theſe was true. It was a meaſure of a certain degree of importance, and was worth the going to a certain ſpecific length, but was not worth the going farther. It had been aſſerted, that after we had engaged in the war, they ought not to have changed their opinion, although that was a circumſtance that took place almoſt in the hiſtory of every war. It might happen that you would be diſappointed in certain objects, and you would not then ſacrifice more than the object was worth. But how were the circumſtances altered—ſome were alarmed at the expences, which created great apprehenſions in the country. He did not find fault with any opinion that had been delivered from real conviction. By theſe and a number of ſimilar circumſtances, the difficulties of this war were increaſed, and therefore they took into their moſt ſerious conſideration the difficulty of obtaining their object, and compared it with the real value of it when obtained. But had it not been for that oppoſition, that which was by that means unattainable, in his judgement, might have been obtained at no greater expence. He ſhould ſay, that the oppoſition, inſtead of claiming to themſelves the merit of preventing this country from being plunged into a war, had prevented the eſtabliſhment of peace in ſo ſolid and ſo ſubſtantial a manner as might otherwiſe have taken place in the country.

As to the cauſe of the Empreſs having refuſed to comply with our terms, he believed that the reſiſtance f her Imperial

Majesty to the requisitions of our Court was owing in part to the arguments used by opposition in this country. He did not mean to call in question the propriety of any Member of Parliament delivering his opinion, although the effect might afterwards turn out to be against the interest of his country, if he should, at the time of delivering his sentiments, be of opinion that a greater inconvenience would arise to the State from his concealing than from his stating his opinion. He did not mean to blame this, even although it might be apparent, that the effect of delivering such an opinion would be attended with a certain degree of inconvenience to the country, by embarrassing Government.

Such opinions were delivered on this subject, and he was of opinion, that they had contributed to increase the disposition of the Empress to a resistance to our requisitions. But he did not charge opposition with any principle hostile to the State. He was bound to admit the purity of their motives, unless he could prove the contrary; and other evidence than their own professions he could not have. But whatever might be their opinions, he must say, that as far as they had any tendency, they did tend to induce the Empress to refuse to comply with the requisitions of this country. It cannot be disputed but they did tend to diminish the effect of our intervention; and but for these opinions he firmly believed that our negociation would have been successful, This is mere matter of opinion; but he could not help saying, that such was the situation of Russia, and such the situation of this country, that with a small additional expence we should have had it in our power, for we had the means, of inducing her Imperial Majesty to comply with our terms. That this was certain he did not affirm; but he affirmed, there was ground for this country to expect it. He asserted that the division in this country encouraged the temper of resistance in Russia, and, if to save expence was right, we should have done so, but unfortunately the enemy of our country was encouraged by an opposition, who now take merit to themselves for rendering that useless which, but for their effort, would have been attended with success, and that in his opinion without much expence; and they now triumph in what they have done. But he did not envy them their triumph; it was not a triumph over the enemies of their country, but over the Coun-

cil of the King. And now, as he was on the subject of triumph and of popularity, he must observe, that if he and his right honourable friend (Mr. Dundas) were to go to the capital of the empire, whom opposition have thus served, certain he was, that they should not be found in any place of glory between two orators (alluding to the bust of Mr. Fox placed by the Empress between those of Demosthenes and Cicero) and that he did not believe that if he were to go to the capital of the empire, whose interest we have been endeavouring to protect, that he should receive the same sort of address from the Grand Vizier as that which was read yesterday, by an honourable Member of this House. Indeed he did not know what to think of that composition. Of its authenticity he could say nothing. The honourable gentleman told nothing of it, but that which he was pleased to read of it. Whether he read the whole of it—what was its date—from whom it came—to whom—and why, he could not possibly guess. All he could say was, that having inquired of the persons most likely to be able to inform him, he had not been able to find out any such paper, or any thing at all like it.

The honourable gentlemen on the opposite side, have laid much stress upon a question which they have very frequently put to Ministers during this discussion; Why did we not disarm the moment that we knew the terms upon which Russia would conclude a peace with the Porte? and they have all along argued, that the only reason which he and his colleagues have given for that conduct is, that we were afraid that Russia might increase her demands, or make new claims if we had disarmed. That this was the only ground of their conduct he completely denied, because he conceived, that no person, acquainted in any degree with the actual situation of Europe at the time, could be ignorant, that there were other reasons that ought to claim attention, and which, to have overlooked, would have been a failure of duty, and a total disregard to the interests of the country. The next point that he must notice, was the management of this negociation, which has been so much misrepresented by the other side of the House, and which he was of opinion could be fully justified, and will be so, in the opinion of the House, on the result. He should therefore not follow the right honourable gentleman into a detail of particulars, during its progress,

because he conceived it to be perfectly unnecessary; and if the conduct of Ministers has produced such advantages, or greater than the country expected from the negociation, he left it to the House and the country to determine, what degree of censure was due to them. On the point of censure, the right honourable gentleman and his friends seem to have made up their minds so completely, that he has declared, whether our reasons for arming were right or wrong, we are equally wrong and equally deserving of censure. This, he considered as a species of argument which, however ingeniously put, can have little weight; for that Ministers, whether they are right or wrong in their object for arming, ought to be censured, is a doctrine that even the most unsuccessful result of a negociation could not justify. There next occurred to his recollection a part of the right honourable gentleman's speech which he was sorry was not omitted, but which he could not allow to pass without a reply. He meant his allusion to the gentleman who was sent as a Minister to Russia—a person in whom Ministers had every reason to confide, and who justly merited the compliments which the right honourable gentleman bestowed upon him; but the allusion made to another person, or rather the attack made upon him in his absence, was highly improper, and, in his opinion, very unlike the usual liberality of the right honourable gentleman; and he would say in the presence of this House, and to the Public, that there is no man whatever who has been in the diplomatic line, to whom this country owes more than to the honourable person alluded to; the services he has performed, the country can be no stranger to, and the exercise of his abilities will always be of importance when called into action.—With regard to the importance of Oczákow, the right honourable gentleman seems to have barred that question being brought to issue, because, as he had remarked just now, he has said, that whether it was, or was not, of importance to the balance of power in Europe, it could, in no shape whatever, be a ground for our interference between Russia and the Ottoman Porte; and by this manner of arguing he did maintain, that the whole jet of all the arguments of the right honourable gentleman and his friends, both on this, and the former nights of discussion, comes to this, that he will, upon the question of the Russian armament, admit any premises, provided the conclusions

tend to censure Ministers, although the very first of the resolutions brought forward, states directly, that Oczakow was not of sufficient importance to require our interference; to establish this, great pains have been taken to impress upon the House a belief that we have been guilty of the grossest iniquity, and most unwarrantable treachery towards our allies. That we had stimulated Turkey to the war in which she had been engaged, a fact which he disclaimed, and which could not be made good. That we had deserted Sweden at a critical juncture, which likewise he would not allow; and that by our interference and mediation nothing had been gained or secured to Prussia. That our intervention in the affairs of Brabant was improper; and that wherever we had employed our influence, or wished to favour an ally, we had met with disgrace, and our allies with disappointment. Upon this subject he was perfectly at ease, nor did he conceive that there were any just grounds to reproach Ministers upon. As to the duplicity in their negociations, which has been ascribed to the system of continental alliance, he did not believe the House had gone with the right honourable gentleman on that point. He must therefore say, that with regard to the moderation of the first terms offered by the Empress, and the propriety of acceding to those we finally got, that matter being so fully in possession of the House, he left it to their judgement. As to their motives, he could likewise rely, that these should be judged by their actions, whatever were their reasons, both on this and every other occasion, where the interest of the country was concerned; and he owned that his chief hopes were rested upon the advantages that had been gained by the system both of foreign and domestic policy, which His Majesty's Ministers have pursued, and the actual prosperity of the country, to whatever causes gentlemen may ascribe it. He wished for no discretionary power, that was not necessary for the functions of the situation in which he might be placed, and he knew, as well as any body, that the conduct of the present time, good or bad, must affect posterity. Having stated the leading grounds for his opposition to the resolutions moved, he must contend, that if any obloquy attended the measures of Government in the Russian negociation, it proceeded from misrepresentation. From what motives that misrepresentation proceeded he did not mean to give

any opinion; and ſhould content himſelf with relying upon a liberal and juſt deciſion of the Houſe, after they have fairly and fully conſidered every circumſtance that can enable them to decide upon his conduct, and thoſe who acted with him.

Mr. FOX. I do aſſure the Houſe that I mean to confine myſelf ſtrictly to explanation, having heard nothing from the right honourable gentleman to make me retract the cenſure, which, in my opinion, his conduct demands. But I wiſh the Houſe to recollect, that when, at the beginning of the laſt ſeſſion, I aſked for what purpoſe a part of the armament provided againſt Spain was kept up? I was told, that it aroſe from the ſituation of Europe, and was neceſſary for the protection of our homeward-bound Weſt-India merchantmen: but neither did I then underſtand, nor by any thing that fell from me, give gentlemen reaſon to think I underſtood, that force to be deſtined to act againſt Ruſſia. The right honourable gentleman's inſinuation, therefore, that I knew of, and approved the keeping up an armament to awe the Empreſs, is totally void of foundation.

With regard to what the right honourable gentleman has choſen to introduce into his ſpeech, reſpecting compliments and honours conferred on me by the Empreſs of Ruſſia, I am ready now, and at all times, to declare, that if any foreign Sovereign, in friendſhip with my country, ſhall pay me the compliment to think well of me, and teſtify it by thoſe marks of diſtinction to which he has alluded, I ſhall feel myſelf highly gratified by ſuch diſtinction. With regard to Ruſſia, it has ever been my opinion, that hers was the power in Europe, I will ſcarcely except even Holland, with whom the cultivation of reciprocal ties of friendſhip, both commercial and political, was moſt natural, and of the greateſt conſequence to this country. For the uniformity of this opinion, Sir, I appeal to my whole conduct, whether in office or out of it. At the cloſe of the American war, I thought Ruſſia the Power whoſe naval force, joined with ours, might effectually counterbalance the united navies of the Houſe of Bourbon. The gentlemen on the other ſide have opportunities of knowing to what degree I endeavoured to give effect to this opinion. When I was again in office, I refuſed to concur in remonſtrances to the Court of Peterſburgh againſt the ſeizure of the Crimea.—

I appeal farther to the sentiments delivered by me in this House, when I added my voice to those of the right honourable gentleman's supporters, in applauding the success of the measures taken to assist the Stadtholder in 1787; when in avowing my approbation of what was done, I gave, as my principal reason for that approbation, the option it placed in our power at that moment of forming alliances on the Continent, which might render the advantages we got by our interference permanent; and when I distinctly named Russia as one of those whom it was of the highest importance to cultivate. These have ever been my sentiments, and I have seen nothing in what has recently happened to make me change them. I thought it necessary to say thus much in answer to the hints and insinuations thrown out from the right honourable gentleman opposite to me: as to any farther reply, I should deem it wholly superfluous, even were I permitted, to make any, as the right honourable gentleman has chosen to avoid noticing almost every material argument I addressed to the House.

The strangers were desired to withdraw.

The question was then put on the first resolution,

"That no arrangement, respecting Oczakow and its district, appears to have been capable of affecting the political or commercial interests of this country, so as to justify any hostile interference on the part of Great Britain between Russia and the Porte." Which was negatived.

On the second,

"That the interference of Great Britain for the purpose of preventing the cession of the said fortress, and its district, to the Empress of Russia, has been wholly unsuccessful."

The previous question was put and carried.

On the third,

"That His Majesty's Ministers in endeavouring, by means of an armed force, to compel the Empress of Russia, to abandon her claim to Oczakow and its district, and in continuing an armament, after the object for which it was proposed had been relinquished, have been guilty of gross misconduct, tending to incur unnecessary expences, and to diminish the influence of the British nation in Europe."

The House divided,

Ayes, 116; Noes, 244.

CORRECT LIST of the MINORITY on Mr. WHITBREAD's Motions.

Honourable Cropley Ashley
Thomas Anson.
John Anstruther.
William Adam.

Lord Edward Bentinck.
The Earl of Burford.
Rt. Hon. John Burgoyne.
Sir Henry Bridgeman, Bart.
Hon. Edward Bouverie.
James Buller.
George Byng.
Richard Beckford.
Joseph Randyll Burch.
Richard Benyon.
Hugh Barlow.

Lord George Cavendish.
Lord Geo. A. H. Cavendish.
Lt.Gen. Sir H. Clinton, K.B.
Hon. John Summers Cocks.
Hon. Wm. Seymour Conway
Sir James Erskine St. Clare,
John Barker Church.
John Crewe.
Thomas William Coke.
Daniel Parker Coke.
Thos. Champion Crespigny.
William Currie.
John Cotes.

Viscount Downe.
Hon. Lionel Damer.
Sir Thomas Dundas, Bart.
Lawrence Dundas.
James Dawkins.

Rt. Hon. W. Ellis.
Hon. Thomas Erskine.
Gerard Noel Edwards.

Rt. Hon. Charles James Fox
Right hon. Col. Fitzpatrick
Sir Henry Fletcher, Bart.
Philip Francis.

Hon. Thomas Grenville.
Charles Grey.
Francis Gregg.

John Cox Hippisley.
David Howell.
John Harrison.
Filmer Honeywood.
James Hare.
Henry Howard.
William Hussey.
John Harcourt.
Winchcombe Henry Hartley

Earl of Inchiquin, K. B.
Sir John Jervis, K. B.
Hon. St. Andrew St. John.

R. Payne Knight.

Earl Ludlow.
Sir William Lemon, Bart.
Sir J. Fleming Leicester, Bart.
Edward Loveden Loveden.
James Martin Lloyd.
Samuel Long.
Gerrard Lake.
Wm. Henry Lambton.
William Laurence.

Sir W. M. Milner, Bart.
Sir Roger Mostyn, Bart.
Hon. Thomas Maitland.
Hon. Ed. Monckton.
James Martin.
Ralph Milbanke.
James Macpherson.

Lord North.
Dudley North.
John Nesbit.

William Mostyn Owen.

Rt. hon. Thomas Pelham.
Viscount Palmerston.
Thomas Powys.
Lawrence Palk.
John Willet Payne.
J. G. Philips.

Lord William Russel
Sir Matthew W. Ridley, Bt.
Hon. John Rawdon.

Lord Sheffield.
Lord Robert Spencer.
Sir Geo. Aug. Wm. Shuckburgh. Bt.
Sir John Sinclair, Bart.
Honourable James Stuart
General Richard Smith.
Thomas Stanley.
John Sawbridge.
Richard Brinsley Sheridan.
John Shaw Stuart.
Timothy Shelley.
Major John Scott.
Hans Sloane.
Charles Sturt.

Marquis of Titchfield.
Sir John Thorold, Bart.
Rt. hon. Ch. Townshend.
Banastre Tarleton.
John Trevannion.
Thomas Thompson.

Earl of Upper Offory.

Sir Joshua Vanneck, Bt.
Robert Vyner.

Sir George Warren, K. B.
Sir Ed. Winnington, Bt.
Rt. Hon. Wil. Windham.
Hon. Horatio Walpole.
James Walwyn.
Charles Callis Western.
William Weddell.
Roger Wilbraham.

Samuel Whitbread, } Tellers 116
M. A. Taylor, } 2

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END OF THE THIRTY-FIRST VOLUME.